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This study examines the techniques that can be used to assess the 
significance of risk in quantitative terms and compares how they are used 
in practice in nuclear industry with the way they are used in those parts 
of the process industry that can be classified as having a major hazard 
potential. The examination of the way the techniques are used in 
practice concentrates on the practices in Germany, Britain and France 
but, for the process industries, some additional comments are given on 
the practices adopted in Holland and Denmark. 
The examination of the techniques used for risk assessment showed there 
are three main problems and they are: the data used may not be entirely 
relevant to the case being studied, the assessment of complex plant may 
be simplifed to keep assessment costs within reasonable limits, and the 
techniques do not include economic and socio-political factors. 
The assessment of current practices also showed that the regulators tend 
to keep the basis on which they decide the acceptability of a plant 
flexible. Thus a proposer has an uncertain target to aim for as the 
conditions that have to be satisfied are to some extent only identified 
by iterative discussions between the proposer and regulator. 
To overcome some of the assessment problems identified, a proposal is 
made to develop the concept of ranking acceptability of a project in a 
comprehensive non-dimensional way which takes into account all the 
factors related to acceptability. The factors which the proposed 
technique takes into account include: the technical, economic and socio- 
political factors. To illustrate the efficacy of the technique proposed 
it is tested against three major decisions. 
Finally, a number of developments are identified that are required for 
the optimum exploitation of quantitative techniques. 
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PART 
CHAPTER 1 
The aim of this study is to determine how and to what extent it is 
possible to make a comprehensive quantified assessment of all the factors 
that have to be considered in making a decision about the acceptability 
of the risks associated with industrial activity. Interest in risk 
assessment has grown considerably in recent years but to suggest that it 
is an entirely new activity would be misleading, as for at least two 
centuries the insurance industry has as part of its business been 
estimating the insurance premiums required to cover particular risks. 
Such estimates are based on experience and contain an e10 ent 
In intuition, they also make due allowance for market forces. 
recent years in the nuclear and chemical industries considerable effort 
has been devoted to refining the techniques for quantifying the technical 
aspects of risk, but there has not been any significant effort devoted to 
developing a comprehensive way of assessing all the factors related to 
the acceptability of a risk. 
In this study a comparison is made of the way the acceptability of risks 
is determined in the nuclear power industry with the way it is determined 
in those parts of the process industry that can be classified as having a 
major hazard potential. To put the comparison on an international basis, 
the practices adopted for determining the acceptability of risk of a 
sample of EEC Member States are evaluated. The sample includes Germany, 
Britain, France, Holland and Denmark, the first three of which have 
significant nuclear power programmes and extensive process industries and 
so provide evidence for both types of risk assessment. Holland and 
Denmark have only small nuclear programmes and therefore the evidence 
they provide is related only to determining the acceptability of the 
risks associated with the potentially hazardous process industries. 
Until quite recently the acceptability of industrial risks was judged 
mainly on the basis of the technical evidence available. In 1980 the importance of public perception of the acceptability of risk as a factor 
in decisions concerning the acceptability of risk was exposed by the 
Royal ociety discussion, in London, on the assessment and perception of 
risk. (3ý Any assessment of the acceptability of risk that claims to be 
comprehensive must include the technical and economic as well as the 
perception factors. It is shown later that the significance of the 
various factors is influenced by a matrix of circumstances. Quite 
important among these circumstances is the influence of time. 
To structure the arguments that follow about the comprehensive assessment 
of the acceptability of risks the relevant factors are divided into three 
main groups which are: technical, economic and socio-political. The 
socio-political group is intended to embrace factors such as perception 
of risk, public opinion and political acceptability. Quantifying in a 
comparable way such diverse of factors, which are measured in different 
units, is one of the problems inherent in any attempt to assess the 
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acceptability of risk in a comprehensive way. A solution to the problem 
which is assessed and tested in the penultimate chapter is a non- 
dimensional method of ranking risks, based on a comprehensive assessment 
of all the relevant factors. 
The foundation on which this study is built is formed by two earlier 
studies by Chicken. The studies are 'Hazard Control Policy in 
Britain'( ) published in 1975 and 'Nuclear Power Hazard Control 
Policy', () published in 1982. In the earlier studies the term 'hazard' 
was used to embrace the same meaning as the term 'risk' used in this 
study, so these earlier studies provide a consistent foundation for this 
study. 
The aim of the first study was to examine the general nature of the 
British hazard control policy making process as it appeared at the 
beginning of the nineteen-seventies, that is before the recommendations 
of the Robens' Committee on Safety and Health at Work were implemented. 
Attention was directed mainly at identifying the apparent roles and goals 
of organizations associated with policy making. The analysis covered 
road transport, air transport, factories, nuclear power and air 
pollution. 
Some of the data on which the first study was based was derived from the 
response that twenty-seven organizations made to a questionnaire. The 
answers to the questionnaire were in some cases supplemented by direct 
discussion with the organization concerned. The organizations contacted 
could be regarded as a stratified sample of interest groups and included 
economic, integrative and cultural types of group. Care was taken with 
the design of the questionnaire to bring out information about the 
structure, resources, aims and interaction with government of each 
organization. The questionnaire also asked specifically if the group 
considered the acceptability of a particular hazard could be determined in probability terms. 
The results of the first study were presented under four main headings 
which are: the nature of hazards; hazard control policy; the role of 
interest groups; and conclusions. From the assessment of the nature of 
hazards it was postulated that unacceptable hazards are those which have 
a probability of causing death within a year greater than 10-3 and 
acceptable haz5aý are those with a probability of death within a year of 
less than 10 - If the probability of death within a year is between 
10-3 and 10-6, it was suggested that some steps should be taken to reduce 
the hazard to a more acceptable level. The 10- level was set by the fact 
that it intersected the ngtural probability of death of teenagers and the 
acceptable limit of 10- was set by the fact that it was close to the 
risk of death due to being struck by lightning. The probability of death 
associated 3with the five types of activity considered in the study fell in the 10- - 10 band, so action would be expected to reduce the risk. 
To give some feel for the remoter risks, attention was drawn to the fact 
that the probability of radiation from an exploding super novae arriving 
on earth in sufficient strength to kill more than 50% of the people 
exposed was 10- 0 per year. Some acknowledgement that these probability 
limits of risk acceptability were reasonable was given three years later 
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by Lord Ashby in his book 'Reconciling Man with the Environment'. (7 In 
his book, with an acknowledgement to Chicken's proposal, he developed the 
theme further. 
The examination in the first study of hazard control policy showed how 
policy development reflected the general concern about the adequacy of 
safety arrangements. Starting in 1970 it shows how this concern led Mrs 
Castle, then Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, to 
appoint the Robens' Committee to advise her on the action that should be 
taken. (8) Lord Robens' interest in safety was shown in his book 'Human 
Engineering' which was published in 1970. In his book he drew attention 
to the economic advantage of reducing accidents because their cost simply 
in te14) s of claims for social and security payments was £96 million a 
year. 
When the Robens' Committee reported, they ave specific attention to 
large-scale hazards and neighbourhood risks. 
() 
The following quotation 
shows something of their concern and the attention that they gavr1j? a 
fire that occurred in a built-up area of London during the inquiry. 
"A combination of locally and centrally exercised powers of control 
exists, but too many disquieting incidents have happened to permit 
of any complacency about the degree to which the existing pattern of 
controls operates effectively to prevent the creation of 
neighbourhood risks. One vivid example was provided by a much 
publicised incident which happened during the period of this 
Inquiry. In September 1970 there was a fire in a built up area of 
London at premises which were being used as a storage and 
distribution depot for liquefied gas containers. In the words of 
the Inspectors of Explosives the result was that 'many containers 
were projected through the air for long distances with their 
contents burning, bombarding houses in the vicinity'. One newspaper 
report referred to 'a night which for many residents recalled the 
terror of the blitz'. " 
Although the general theme of the Robens' report was how to achieve 
higher levels of safety through consultation and by voluntary effort, it 
was quite emphatic about the need for a technically strong group in the 
Safety Authority to control operations that could be classified as being 
potentially a major hazard to the pb ic. The following quotation 
illustrates the way the point was made: ( 2ý 
"We have said that arrangements should be made to strengthen the 
exercise of development controls by local authorities so that they 
make a more effective contribution to the protection of the public 
from industrial hazards. We have also said that these arrangements 
cannot be regarded as the main line of defence. For this we must 
look to specific controls exercised in the interests of public 
safety. 
Industrial operations or materials with a significant potential for 
causing danger to the public should be controlled directly by 
specific provisions under the main body of legislation for safety 
and health at work. There is a particular need for a comprehensive 
regime of control from the centre over the manufacture, storage and 
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use of intrinsically dangerous substances, and we discuss this 
separately and in more detail in Chapter 11. 
Direct and specific controlling provisions of the kind we describe 
in Chapter 11 - some of which would no doubt take the form of 
licensing - should be enforced by a special unit within the 
inspectorate of our proposed Authority for Safety and Health at 
Work. We envisage that this unit would be particularly concerned 
with large-scale risks involving explosives, flammable and toxic 
substances and, more generally, with all industrial situations with 
a potential for causing danger to the public on a large scale. 
The nucleus of such a unit might be formed from personnel of the 
present Explosives Inspectorate of the Home Office and of the 
Chemical Branch of the Factory Inspectorate. The unit would be 
concerned with the technical aspects of licensing controls in this 
area and could also take initiatives in investigating problems such 
as areas of hazard accretion (see paragraph 297) where a number of 
authorities might be involved and where a strong co-ordinating 
element is badly needed. This central corps of highly specialised 
experts would provide a focus of official knowledge and expertise, 
and we believe that it would develop considerable authority. It 
would be a body to which government departments, local authorities 
and industrialists could turn for reliable advice and assistance on 
major hazard problems. " 
The Robens' Committee avoided giving any indication that a particular 
level of risk expressed in quantitative terms would be acceptable. 
However, they did express the view that an important area for Ether 
research was the quantitative assessment of accident probability. In this context they recognised that the work of the Safeguards Division of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority could be usefully applied 
outside the nuclear industry. (14) The fact that the Committee recognized 
the potential usefulness of the quantitative techniques developed by the 
UKAEA perhaps reflects the fact that this was a topic which was 
specifically mentioned in the wr r idence which the UKAEA and Mr A. 
Cook submitted to the Committee. ( 1gy 
The development of the quantitative approach to assessing the 
acceptability of clear power reactors is described in Hazard Control 
Policy in Britain. The criterion of acceptability identified takes 
the form of a limit line approach which relates the size of release of 
radioactive iodine to the acceptable probability of such a release. If 
for a particular design the probability of a release of a certain size is 
found to be above the limit line, the proposal would be unacceptable and 
if it is below the limit line it would be acceptable. To justify for a 
particular proposal that there is a probability of a release of a certain 
magnitude requires a detailed quantitative assessment of all possible 
fault conditions and their consequences. The methods and acceptability 
of quantitative risk assessment were examined in a paper prese6o at an 
International Atomic Energy Agency symposium in Vienna in 1967 by Mr 
F. R. Farmer, then Director of the UKAEA Safety and Reliability 
Directorate. 
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It was recognized in the conclusions drawn in the 'Hazard Control Policy 
in Britain' study that in the future it was likely that quantitative 
techniques for assessing the significance of risk would play an 
increa(jýjg part in judgements about the acceptability of particular 
risks. 
In 'Nuclear Power Hazard Control Policy'(5) the ways are described in 
which quantitative criteria were being used up to 1980 for judging 
acceptability of nuclear plants. It shows increasing acceptance of the 
method by both the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and the Central 
Electricity Generating Board. (20) The study also drew attention to the 
nature of the opposition to nuclear power which had developed and the 
influence it had on nuclear safety arguments. The opposition to nuclear 
energy may simply be just one manifestation of the 'Environmental 
Movement' that expressed concern about all forms of pollution. Sandbach 
has shown that the environmental movement grew rapidly in the latý 1960's 
and early 1970's, but declined somewhat in the latter 1970's. (21) The 
decline did not, however, reduce the strength of the movement below its 
pre-late 1960's membership. 
One very influential event that took place in the 1970's was the 
preparation and publication in 1975 of the Rasmussen Report (WASH-1400) 
on reactor safety. " In 1972 the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
asked Professor Nor C. Rasmussen of MIT to make an independent study 
of reactor safety. ) The study was organized so that*it was quite independent of Atomic Energy Commission's operating and regulatory 
organizations. The AEC provided funds and staff for the study and 
the nl3ýonstraint they placed was to set out the objectives for the 
study. ( The staff provided included project leader, and one part- time and seven full-time specialists. One of the specialists 
provided was a specialist in operational matters and the others were technical nuclear safety specialists. (I addition, 
twelve specialist 
organizations collaborated in the study. 
The objectives set for the study were specified in the following way: (24) 
"The principal objective of the study is to try to reach some 
meaningful conclusions about the risks of nuclear accidents, using 
current technology. It is recognized, however, that the present 
state of knowledge probably will not permit a complete analysis of 
low probability accidents in nuclear plants with the precision that 
would be desirable. Where this is the case, the study will consider 
the uncertainty in present knowledge and the consequent range in the 
predictions, as well as delineating outstanding problems. In this 
way, any uncertainties in the results of this study can be placed in 
perspective. Thus, although the results of this study of necessity 
will be imprecise in some aspects, the study nevertheless will 
provide an important first step in the development of quantitative 
risk analysis methods. " 
The study examined the risks associated with pressurized water and 
boiling water reactors. A considerable part of the study was devoted to identifying the methodology to be used. Some of the techniques required 
had only been developed in the decade before 
y"ý(ý 
study was started. 
There were three main steps in the stud Step 1 was the 
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identification of potential accidents and the quantification of both the 
probability and magnitude of the associated radioactive releases to the 
environment. Step 2 was to determine the distribution of the 
radioactivity in the environment and the effects it would have on public 
health and property. Step 3 was concerned with combining the 
consequences calculated with the probabilities of releases in a way that 
allowed comparison with non-nuclear risks. 
The study identified about 130,000 potential accident sequences but for 
detailed 
2examination reduced 
this to 78 sequences of significant 
concern. Elimination of physically meaningless accident sequences 
reduced the number of sequences from 130,000 to 650 and the elimination 
of probability events reduced the number of sequences from 650 to 
78ý 
The results of the study were presented in three main ways which are 
comparing the annual frequency of the number of fatalities associated 
with 100 nuclear power reactor ith man-made events, with natural events 
and with property damage. The man-made events which reactor 
accidents are compared with are aeroplane crashes, fires, dam failures, 
explosions and chlorine releases. The study concludes that nuclear 
reactors represent a risk frequency at least a hundred times less than 
air crashes killing people. on the ground, which was the lowest of the 
man-made risks considered. Tornados, hurricanes and earthquakes are the 
natural events considered and nuclear power reactors were shown to 
represent a risk at least a thousand times smaller than natural events. 
In terms of property damage, it was concluded that nuclear reactors are 
likely to cause between ten and a thousand times less damage than man- 
caused events. Man-caused events generally involve less damage cost than 
natural events. In some respects the way the results were presented 
could be interpreted as an elementary attempt to justify the overall 
acceptability of nuclear power risks by comparing them with other risks 
which by definition have been accepted. 
The publicon of WASH-1400 aroused a considerable amount of 
controversy. This concern was perhaps one reason why the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission appointed a group chaired by Pr 758 ssor Harold Lewis 
of the University of California to review the report. The objectives 
set for the Lewis were described in the review group's report in 
the following way: 
"Our charter has three elements, and it is clear from the above that 
they are interwoven and do not lend themselves to neat separation. 
We are charged to clarify the achievements and limitations of WASH- 
1400 - not only as an end in itself, but also as a means of 
assessing what can now be said quantitatively about reactor safety. 
In addition, we were charged to assess the 'peer' comments on the 
Rasmussen report. Finally, we were charged to assess the current 
state of such risk assessment methodology, and to make a 
recommendation to the Commission on whether and how such methodology 
can be introduced into the regulatory and licensing process". 
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The review group concluded that WASH-1400 represented a substantial 
advance over previous attempts to estimate the risks associated with 
nuclear power reactors. (31) It accepted that further development of the 
methods used was still required but encouraged the Nuclelf Regulatory 
Commission to adopt the methodology in the following way: 
"Proper application of the methodology can therefore provide a tool 
for the NRC to make the licensing and regulatory process more 
rational, in properly matching its resources (research, quality 
assurance, inspection, licensing regulations) to the risks provided 
by the proper application of the methodology. NRC has moved 
somewhat in this direction, and we recommend a faster pace. " 
Perhaps the last five words of that quotation give a real indication of 
the support that the Lewis Group gave to the adoption of the Rasmussen 
methodology. 
Some indication of the international acceptance of WASH-1400 is given by 
the fact that it was subsequentused as the model for the German Risk 
Study of Nuclear Power Stations`%) and that it WAý)taken into account in 
the Norwegian Study of Nuclear Power and Safety. 
Any introductory discussion of nuclear power reactor risks must menti c 
the accident to the Three Mile Island Reactor (TMI) on March 28 1979. 
Due to a combination of operational errors and poor detailed design some 
of the fuel in the reactor melted aný3 there was a small release of 
radioactive material to the atmosphere. Cleaning up the mess inside 
the containment has been proceeding as quickly as conditions inside 
containment will allow, the clean up will cost millions of dollars. 
( 
This accident generated a lffi)of concern about the adequacy of the safety 
of nuclear power reactors. One result of this concern was that the 
President appointed a Commission to evaluate the significance of the 
accident. 
The Commission reported in October 1979 and made a series of 
recommendations related to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Utility 
Company and their suppliers, operator training, technical assessment, 
worker and public health (and) safety, emergency planning and the public's right to information. 6 The Commission exposed a number of inadequacies in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and proposed a 
restructuring of the agency and recommended that the reformed agency 
should prescribe stricter safety standards. This was seen by the 
Commission to require the nuclear industry to make a dramatic change in 
its attitude towards safety. Part of the changes required involved 
improving the training of operators. With regard to technical 
assessment, the Commission specifically recommended that continuing in- 
depth studies should be initiated on the probabilities of on-site and 
off-site consequences of nuclear power plant accidents. This was a clear 
endorsement of the quantitative methods of assessing risks. The 
Commission stressed that arrangements must be made to keep the public 
fully informed about the significance of any radiation-related emergency 
that develops and the action that has to be taken under such 
circumstances. 
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The TMI accident badly damaged confidence in nuclear power, particularly 
in America. Five years after the accident, in 1984, Nanzio J. Palladino, 
Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission since the middle of 
1981, wrote an ar iS]e for Nuclear News on the challenges facing a 
nuclear regulator. In this article Palladino gave particular 
attention to restoring confidence in the nuclear industry which had been 
lost by the Three Mile Island accident, and laid down the following 
conditions which he considered should be satisfied if confidence was to 
be restored: 
"For the near term, i. e. between now and the tenth anniversary of 
the ZI'II accident, three necessary conditions must be met: 
Avoiding accidents or occurrences that might be perceived as 
serious at operating nuclear plants. 
Overcoming the serious quality assurance problems that exist at 
some nuclear plants under construction. 
Demonstrating that the industry has the will and the capability 
to clean up its own messes, e. g. 'IMt-2. 
Over the longer haul, i. e. between the 10th and 20th anniversaries 
of TMI, I believe the industry must also satisfy three additional 
conditions: 
To design and develop the complete standard plant (or plants) 
of the future, and get NRC approval. 
To select suitable sites for future nuclear plants, and obtain 
NRC approval. 
To demonstrate, via consortia or some other resource pooling 
method, that at least one new standard plant can be built on a 
preapproved site in a significantly reduced time and at a 
significantly reduced cost compared with today's nuclear 
plants. 
On the regulatory side, for both the near term and over the long 
haul, the NRC must: 
Maintain clear guidelines for safe operation without imposing 
unnecessary backfits or other requirements that do not 
materially advance safety. 
Provide stability in its licensing process so that those plants 
of the current generation that are properly built and 
adequately staffed can begin operation without unwarranted 
delays or costs. 
Be prepared to review expeditiously future complete standard 
plant designs, proposed sites, and applications to build and 
operate standard plants on preapproved sites (it is hoped under 
new legislative authority passed by Congress). 
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Work with the Department of Energy to assure that a first-rate 
technical job is done on time, to demonstrate to the public 
that high-level nuclear wastes will be managed safely. " 
This approach shows that the acceptability of nuclear power does not 
depend simply on the assessment of technical factors but is very 
sensitive to public confidence and that resources that can be devoted to 
proving acceptability are not unlimited. 
To complete this introductory presentation of the factors that have to be 
considered in determining the acceptability of a nuclear installation, 
attention is drawn to the British practice of holding a public inquiry on 
proposals that could be considered as controversial. This is one method 
used to determine public acceptability of a proposal. In 1977 the 
Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing plant was subject to a public inquiry 
and currently there is an inquiry in progress into the acceptability of 
building a pressurized water reactor at Sizewell. As the Sizewell 
process is not complete it cannot be completely examined, but the process 
will have taken more than a year to complete. 
The Windscale Inquiry report was published in 1978. It showed(tt3t the 
inquiry lasted from 14th June 1977 to the 4thýlýý ember 1977.3 The 
inquiry closed on the 100th day of the hearing. During the inquiry, 
evidence s taken from 146 witnesses and about 1500 documents were 
received. ý3' Justice Parker, who held the inquiry, recommended, subject 
to several conditions, that outline planning pern Wion to build the 
proposed plant should be granted without delay. Following the 
publication of the report, the Guardian newspaper gave the rep? )front page coverage and made it the subject of a feature article. The 
theme of the article was that the controversy about the acceptability of 
the proposal was likely to continue. The findings of the report were 
also mentioned in The Times, The Financial Times, The Daily Telegraph, 
The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Daily Express and The Sun in their issues on the 7th March 1978. This suggests that the subject was 
considered to be of wide public interest. 
Having outlined the nature of concern about the nuclear industry, the 
concern of the study with the process industry can be introduced. Of all 
the accidents that has had a bearing on international opinion on safety 
in the process industry, the Seveso accident has perhaps been the most 
influential, so a few words about the accident are necessary to put it 
into perspective. On Saturday 10th July 1976 a cloud of 
tetrachlorodibenzodioxine, popularly called dioxin,, s released from the 
Icmesa factory close to Seveso, north of Milan. Dioxin is a very 
toxic substance and is 500 times more toxic than strychnineand 10,000 
times mo 1 toxic than cyanide, also it is very difficult to 
eliminate. ' After the accident, the Italian government established a 
Parlir4ytary Commission of Inquiry which reported its findings in July 
1978. The Commission found that Icmesa had made many infringements 
of the law in relation to the production involving dioxin, for example 
they had not informed the mayor or the National Institute of Work 
Accident ? 4flJNAIL), or the Works Inspectorate at Milan that production had 
started. 
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On the Sunday after the release had taken place, the first effects were 
noticed and these included vegetation burned, animals taken by disease, 
some twenty children had sores on their arms, red spots on their faces, 
some sort of burns on their bodies, high fever and intestinal 
troubles. 4 By the following Thursday 15th July, serious cases of 
poisoning were beginning to be reported. On the 18th July the local 
mayor ordered closure of the factory, on the 23rd Jtly it was announced 
that earth to a depth of 20 cm had to be removed. 
(4 r On the 25th July 
the army enclosed 12 hectares of the contaminated area with barbed wire 
and evacuated 225 eople. Later, more were evacuated bringing the total 
evacuated to 7304 i) Many farms and businesses had to close as a result 
of the release. (41) The Commission of Inquiry put the initial sum 
claimed for compensation at about £10 million. 
(41) The conclusion cannot 
be escaped that the Seveso incident was badly handled by the company and 
the officials involved. 
One important result of the European-wide concern generated by the 
incident. was that it eventually led to the EEC Directive on Major 
Hazards. In Britain the main requirements of the Directive were seen 
as being that where an installation is concerned that could be considered 
to have t%potential for causing a major hazard, the following action is 
required: 
1) The preparation of a written report on the hazards and their 
control. 
2) The preparation of an emergency plan for dealing with accidents 
and emergencies. This plan to include the arrangements for 
dealing with the off-site implications of major hazards. 
3) Provide people who might be affected by a major accident with 
information about the correct action they should take in such 
an event. 
Before leaving comment on the situation abroad, attention is drawn to a 
paper on pollution and risk control prep ed for the Council of the 
Province of Groningen in Holland in 1979. This paper is interesting 
for three reasons which are: 
1) It shows that people of Groningen want to keep their Province 
as clean as possible. 
2) It shows that the Council recognizes that increased industrial 
development is inevitable but they want it to be accommodated 
with as little disturbance as possible to the community and the 
environment. 
3) It shows that even at provincial level there is acceptance of 
quantitative assessment of risk and of the specification of 
quantitative criteria for acceptability. 
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In Britain the accident that had a major influence on thinking about 
Major Hazards was the Flixborough accident in June 1974, two years before 
Seveso, The accident injured 53 people, damaged 1,821 houses and 167 
shops. A Court of Inquiry into the causes of the accident was 
convened under the chairmanship of Justice Parker 
(46) The Inquiry 
lasted 70 days and took evidence from 173 witnesses, 
(47) and so was 
similar in time taken and views collected to the Windscale Inquiry 
mentioned earlier. Among the conclusions o4hýe Court of Inquiry that 
are of general application are the following: 
1) Care should be taken to locate plants with similar hazard 
potential away from populated areas. 
2) Planning and safety authorities should collaborate to ensure 
that safety considerations are taken into account in planning 
decisions. 
3) A disaster plan should be devised to co-ordinate the emergency 
services required to deal with a major disaster like 
Flixborough. 
4) The licensing procedures for storage of hazardous materials 
should be improved. 
The Court of Inquiry also drew attention to the problem of determining 
the social lev%e of tolerance of risks, but made no attempt to assess 
this problem. No attempt was made to produce a comprehensive 
assessment of all the factors that have to be considered in determining 
the acceptability of a proposal. 
The Flixborough Disaster was an important event that led the Health and 
Safety Commission to establish the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards in 
1974. The Committee stayed in operation until December 1983 and in the 
course of its existence it issued three major reports. (50) These reports 
provided the basis for the official response to the EEC Directive already 
mentioned. The reports also endorsed the use of quantitative techniques 
for assessing risk and the concept of 'reasonably practicable' as M7 
basis for judging the action that was justified in reducing a risk. 
This really means that elements of both the qualitative and quantitative 
approach were endorsed. The Committee also stressed the need to inform 
the public in the area of a major hazard of the significance of the 
hazarN Ind any emergency action that they might be called upon to 
make. It is interesting to note that the reports do not give any 
real discussion of the problem of assessing the socio-political aspect of 
the acceptability of a particular risk. 
During the period in which the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards was in 
existence, the Health and Safety Commission was asked by the Secretary of 
State for the Environment and Employment to make an assessment of the 
risskk, risks health and safety of the industrial complex in the Canvey Island 
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Two reports on theý5ssessments made were published, one in 1978(54) and 
the other in 1981. The reports are interesting for two main reasons. 
First, they represent the first major attempt in Britain and perhaps in 
the world to make a comprehensive quantified assessment of the technical 
aspects of the risks associated with a complex range of chemical and 
petrochemical installations. Second, the 1981 report shows in 
quantitative terms the benefits that accrued from making the 
modifications to improve safety that were proposed in the first report. 
These reports demonstrate that quantified techniques of assessing risk 
give a way of determining the benefits that can result from introducing 
changes to improve safety. 
The second report on Canvey Island is also interesting for the fact that 
it identified the limit upper of the risk of an individual being killed 
was of the order of 1 in 10,000. (56) There is no overt statement that 
this is the official limit, but it is shown that this is similar to the 
risk levels associated with other types of fatal accidents such as motor 
vehicle accidents, accidents at home, accidents 6ýork and accidents that are put under the generic heading of 'other'. It is also shown 
that t% ; isk would be lower than the risk of death from natural 
causes. In practice the justification rather similar to hat 
proposed in Hazard Control Policy in Britain, and by Lord Ashby. 
( 
Three papers by Chicken give some additional background material on the 
technical factors that have to be considered in assessing what is an 
acceptable risý The papers are 'Factors Influencing Nuclear, B ctor 
Safety Policy', (57) 'The Dilemma of the Risk Decision Maker 
'5ýý and 
'Summary 
ýýfýthe risk assessment made of the transport of plutonium nitrate'. 9 
The papers, 'Factors Influencing Nuclear Re r Safety Policy' 
(57) 
and 
'The Dilemma of the Risk Deciion Maker', 
' 4 
expand a ltle the 
argument given in 'Nuclear Power Hazard Control Policy' that the decision 
maker has to evaluate a complex range of factors and that the factors and 
the environment in which the decision has to be made change with time. 
The relevance to this study of the paper entitled 'Summary5pf the risk 
assessment made of the transport of plutonium nitrate' and of a 
fourth Pape ntitled "Environmental Impact of Transporting Radioactive 
Materials" 6 
ý) 
which Chicken presented with W. G. Milne of British 
Nuclear Fuels Ltd and E. Goldfinch of the Central Electricity Generating 
Board is that they illustrate both the practical problems involved in 
making a quantitative assessment of the technical aspects of potentially 
hazardous operations, and how the technical acceptability of a particular 
operation can be evaluated using such assessments. 
This introduction has shown, so far, that the regulatory bodies 
responsible for determining the acceptability of risks in general only 
call for quantification of the technical aspects of risk and that the 
socio-political and economic aspects tend to be judged separately in 
qualitative terms. Some of the problems involved in assessing the social 
and philosophical aspects of the acceptability of risk were captured in 
the following quotation from a paper by Covello, Menkes and Nehnevajsa of 
the Technology Assessment c Risk Analysis Group of the National Science 
Foundation Washington DC: ( 
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"How do we determine how safe is safe enough in situations in which 
people, acting individually, are not able to reach a satisfactory 
solution? Who should decide what is acceptable and on what basis? 
What rights do individuals have in decisions that affect their 
safety? What is the role of social consensus in determining a 
morally justifiable and equitable balance among risks, costs and 
benefits? What demands does social justice make on the distribution 
of risks, costs and benefits? When is it acceptable to impose a 
risk on others? All these questions deal, in one way or another, 
with a problem that is difficult to pose meaningfully and even more 
difficult to resolve - the philosophical problems of risk and 
consent. " 
Doubts have been expressed about the feasibility of determining people's 
percepti of the acceptability of risk, with a useful degree of 
accuracy. 
'") 
These doubts really represent a warning that research to 
measure people's perception of the acceptability of risk must be 
conducted carefully and that the findings will be specific to the 
particular risk situation considered. Against this, some work at Surrey 
University has shown it is possi, c to determine the depth of people's 
concern about particular hazards. 
Spangler recognizes the potential value of a comprehensive risk 
assessment and that benefits would result from the fc )that such 
an assessment requires an interdisciplinary analysis. ' He sees 
such an assessment requiring improved assessments of benefits to be 
coupled with assessment of ethical and equity considerations that have to 
be balanced in reconciling the conflict between individual and societal 
interests. 
In determining the extent to which economic factors should be 
incorporated into the risk acceptability decision making process, one of 
the central questions that has to be considered is the money value put on 
human life. This question of how ethical it is to assess the value of 
human life in money terms has been examined by William May of the 
University of Soi, iern California, School of Religion Programme in 
Business Ethics. He concluded that it is ethical to use such 
valuations in sensitive analysis of the acceptability of risks provided 
there is some kind of independent check on the reasonableness and 
fairness of the way the analysis is constructed. 
From this review of current practices and thinking on the assessment of 
the acceptability of risk, it is clear that no universally accepted 
procedure that attempts to evaluate all the relevant factors in a 
rational quantified way has been devised. The result of the analysis 
that follows is to suggest a method of making a comprehensive assessment 
of risk in a way that facilitates a comprehensive statement about the 
acceptability of risk being made publically in a form that is easily 
comprehensible and provides an easily understood yet precise way of 
comparing the risks associated with various proposals. 
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In this thesis the evaluation of the problems associated with assessing 
in quantitative terms all the factors that have to be considered in 
making a comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of industrial 
risks is constructed in nine main steps, each step being dealt with in a 
separate chapter. Following this Introduction, in Chapter 2 the 
philosophy of risk assessment is examined. This examination 
concentrates on the technical aspects and provides the basis for the 
examination that follows of the other aspects of risk that have to be 
considered in arriving at a decision about the acceptability of a risk. 
In Chapter 3, a critical evaluation is presented of the techniques for 
assessing in a quantified way the reliability of plant and the 
significance of the associated risks. The evaluation is built up in a 
way that relates the suitability of the techniques' to the stage in the 
development of a project for which they are appropriate, it being 
recognized that the assessments which are required at the conceptual 
stage of a project, when parameters of the project are still fluid, are 
quite different to the requirements when the plant is about to be put 
into operation. 
In Chapter 4, the limitations of the various assessment techniques are 
evaluated, particular attention being given to the comprehensiveness of 
the evaluation of risk that each technique gives, the suitability for the 
analysis of complex systems and how accurately they predict risk allowing 
for the fact that there are errors in the data they have to use. 
In Chapter 5, the ways risks are quantified in the nuclear industry are 
examined, both from the point of view of the regulatory requirements for 
quantification of risk and the quantification practices that are adopted 
in reality. Chapter 6 is similar in scope to Chapter 5, but it deals 
with the quantification of risk as applied to potentially hazardous 
process industries. 
In Chapter 7, the other aspects of assessing risk acceptability are 
examined. The aspects considered are the cost of saving lives, 
perception of risks and non-monetary factors. This chapter completes the 
review of present practices and serves as the introduction to the 
alternative philosophy of risk assessment which is developed in 
Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 8, an examination is made of the implications of using 
quantified risk analysis. The examination starts with some observations 
on the philosophical basis for risk analysis and from this an attempt is 
made to identify realistic quantified targets for risk acceptability. 
The problems involved in making a comprehensive quantified assessment of 
risk are then examined. 
In Chapter 9, a method of making a comprehensive assessment of all the 
factors associated with evaluating risk acceptability is proposed. The 
method is a non-dimensional risk ranking technique, which ranks the 
acceptability of a proposal on the basis of an assessment of the 
significance of all the technical, economic and socio-political factors 
involved. The efficacy of the technique is assessed by applying it to 
the Canvey Island, Moss Morran and Eemshaven cases. The advantages which 
the method appears to justify are that: it provides a logical and 
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consistent way of assessing all the factors related to the acceptability 
of risk, it is equally acceptable to the nuclear and the process 
industries, and it can easily be refined as better data becomes 
available. 
The final part of the chapter sets out the developments that are still 
required to produce a comprehensive, consistent and universally 
acceptable procedure for determining the acceptability of risks 
associated with any potentially hazardous installations. These 
developments include establishing universally accepted risk criteria, 
risk assessment techniques and risk evaluation data. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, a number of general conclusions are drawn from 
the study about the validity of risk assessments, the techniques that can 
be used for such assessments and the comparison of risk assessment 
practices in the nuclear and process industries. 
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CHUM M2 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
To provide the foundation for examination of how and to what extent it is 
possible to make a comprehensive assessment of all the factors related to 
risk acceptability decisions the philosophical basis for such assessments 
must be identified. The first step in the process of determining the 
philosophical basis is to define the term 'risk'. Definition of the 
term 'risk' leads naturally to examination of the principles underlying 
risk assessments. 
'Risk' is popularly used in many ways and because of this can be 
misunderstood. To develop an unambiguous definition for use in this 
study, a definition is built up which starts from the etymology of the 
word 'risk'. Generally, dictionaries define 'risk' in terms of hazard, 
chance of bad consequences, or exposure to mischance. This gives a sound 
basis for developing a definition as it clearly associates the word with 
the idea that it represents the possibility of an undesirable outcome. 
The basic etymological definition differentiates risk from benefits, so 
clearly risk is generally understood as being the detrimental outcome of 
an activity. This definition does not overtly require the chance of 
detriment to be quantified. 
The difficulty of defining precisely was recognized by the Royal 
Society Study Group on risk. To overcome the difficulty, the Royal 
Society Study Group proposed the following definition of risk: 'Risk is 
the probability that a particular adverse event occurs d(t ng a stated 
period of time, or results from a particular challenge. ' The Study 
Group argued, with considerable justification, that this definition 
required risk to be described in terms of exposure to a hazard for a 
specific time. Also as probability is an integral part of the 
definition, risk defined in this way obeys the laws of combining 
probabilities and of statistical theory. For the purpose of this work 
the Royal Society Study Group's definition of the technical 
characteristics of risk appears to be quite satisfactory and is therefore 
adopted as the definition of risk used throughout this study. 
As the Royal Society definition introduces the term 'probability', the 
meaning attributed to this word must also be defined. Three meanings of 
the word have extensive currency and they must be understood in order to 
appreciate the full significance of the term. Lord Ashby described these 
meanings very succinctly in the following way: 
'Those of us who are familiar with the concepts of probability find 
its conclusions so persuasive that we are surprised how unconvincing 
they are to many people. It's useful at the outset to distinguish 
three common meanings of the word 'probability'. It can refer to 
empirical results of observation, such as the statistics of road 
accidents; or to logical deductions from reasoning (a point made by 
Venn over a century ago in his book 'The Logic of Chance') such as 
the fault-tree analyses in the Rasmussen Report on nuclear power; or 
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it can express a degree of belief, as you hear in American weather 
reports, when it is said that there is a 30% chance of rain. 
Degrees of belief are sulj gtive and will differ even though based 
on the same set of data. " 
One characteristic common to all three meanings of probability is that 
however the term is used it implies that there is variability in the data 
to which it applies. Statisticians agree that in any body of data there 
is bound to be some error or uncertainty, and consequently there is 
generally no single unique and absolute value. To avoid statements about 
risk which give a misleading impression about their veracity, they should 
be presented in a way that indicates the uncertainty associated with the 
data on which the statements are based. This question of how to deal 
with uncertainty is returned to in several places in the arguments that 
follow. 
In assessing the significance of a particular risk, the variability and 
uncertainty of the data used haveto be allowed for in many ways. Two 
particularly important ways are in assessing the probability of the initiating events and in assessing the consequences of an event. Dunster 
and Vinck assessed the level of uncertainty in the following way: 
"Uncertainties in estimates of probability of events by factors of 
less than two or three can hardly be expected, and uncertainties by 
a factor of ten or more may occur. The estimation of the magnitude 
of the consequences in human terms almost always involves 
environmental modeng, and similar factors of uncertainty are to be expected here. " 
In their paper, Dunster and Vinck summarize their view on uncertainty in 
risk estimation by suggesting that careful analysis, coupled with sound 
professional judgement of a multi-disciplinary team, will tend to keep the uncertainty in predictions of risk assessment at the lower end of the 
range but will not eliminate the uncertainty. 
To provide a little more justification for the grounds for these views 
about the magnitude of uncertainty which has to be allowed for in 
estimating risk, two independent studies give a clear demonstration of the nature of the problem. From a study of the failure data related to 
various types of electronic equipment and small mechanical components, Aitken showed that typically failure rates fell in a band in which there 
was a factor of ten between the upper and lower limits of the band. Comparing these observed failure rates with theoretically predicted failure rates showed that the predicted failure rates could be a factor 5 
either above or below the observed.. te, the variations being different for different types of equipment. In a World Health Organization 
study of the health implications of Nuclear Power Production, it was 
shown that for 1 rad per generation of low level radiation, the 
equilibrium irr Bence of related diseases could also show variation by a factor of ten. ) These two elementary examples show that variation of data on one specific topic by a factor of ten is not unusual and that 
uncertainty of that magnitude must be allowed for in any assessment of 
risk. 
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The assessment of even a relatively simple component involves the 
assessment of several factors. In Reference (72) Chicken postulated that 
the probability of a component failure, PF, was made up of the following 
five factors combined in the following way: 
PF = PD x PI + PM x PI + PC x PI + PO x PI 
where PF = probability of component failing 
Pp = probability of failure due to a design fault 
PM = probability of failure due to a material fault 
PC = probability of failure due to fault in construction 
PO = probability of failure due to an operational fault 
PI = probability of failure of inspection techniques 
to reveal fault 
If in this simple example there is a ten to one range in the value of 
each factor, there can be a hundred to one range between the highest and 
lowest value of the probability of the component failing. That is an 
extreme case and in reality it is unlikely that all the low or all the 
high probability values will occur at the same time. The most likely 
value will be somewhere between. Even though the real errors may be 
lower than the extreme values just described, real systems are much more 
complex. A real nuclear reactor or a real process plant is likely to 
consist of thousands of components, some of which will be arranged so 
that they attenuate the consequences of failure of critical components. 
In making an assessment of any system, no matter how simple or how 
complex, there are four main stages, and an essential precursor of such 
an evaluation is that a detailed understanding of the design and 
construction of the plant involved is established and that all the 
processes carried out in the plant are identified. The four stages are: 
1) To establish the probability of the conditions occurring that 
could lead to a fault developing in the unit of interest. 
2) To determine what is the probability of a fault developing, 
given the conditions arise that are required for the 
development of a fault. 
3) To determine what will be the hazard potential in terms of 
energy or hazardous material released if the fault occurs. 
4) To determine the consequences in terms of loss of life, injury 
and damage to property of the fault developing. 
In each stage of the analysis there will generally be some error. The 
errors are likely to be larger when the plant being assessed is of a 
design that has not been built before and for which there is no relevant 
experience to call on. Confidence in the reliability of a particular 
plant will only develop as operating experience is accumulated. If 
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several units are built to exactly the same design, experience will 
develop faster and consequently understanding of the confidence that can 
be attributed to the reliability of the design will improve faster. 
However, it is surprising how rarely completely identical plants are 
built. Even small differences such as changes in supplier, changes in 
manufacturing processes, changes in material, changes in the operating 
environment and changes in the operating procedures, can have a 
significant effect on the life and reliability of plant. 
In a similar way, the siting of a plant has a profound influence on the 
risk implications for the population. If exactly similar plants are 
located in two different sites, the risk to the population may be quite 
different - one site may be remote from population and the other in a 
heavily populated area. There may also be differences in terrain and 
climate that would influence the way any hazardous material released is 
dispersed around the area. 
Identification of the problems associated with the quantification of risk 
gives rise to three questions. They are: what are the alternatives to 
quantification, what are the benefits of quantification of risk, and what 
role can quantification of risk play? These questions lead logically to 
the assessment in the chapters that follow of the way various countries 
and authorities use quantification of risk, and to examination of the way 
evaluation of risk can be improved as an aid to decision making. 
The simple answer to the first question is that there is no alternative 
to quantification. A qualitative statement about the nature of a risk does not give such an accurate picture of the significance of a risk as a 
quantitative statement that is based on relevant and accurate data. But 
such a statement is a gross over simplification of reality. There may be 
many occasions when a decision has to be made before all the data 
required for quantification is available. The options the decision maker has in such situations include allowing the activity to start under 
careful supervision and keeping the approval under regular review, 
assessing acceptability by comparison to the nearest similar activity, 
and refusing approval. In such circumstances sometimes a checklist 
approach helps the decision maker identify the significance of the 
uncertainty. 
Checklists are not a universal solution as they can make the assessment inflexible in a way that r(y 3glts 
in the significance of some intrinsic hazard being overlooked.. Even so, provided a flexible critical 
approach to the questions in the checklist is adopted, they can also be 
useful in the early stages of a project to give some structure to the 
process of identifying the areas that need careful analysis. A good 
example of a checklist approach that can be applied to a wide range of 
Labour. 
21 is that devised by the Dutch Directorate General of 
Regarding the second question of what are the benefits of quantification 
of risk, the rather trite answer that is often given is that the process 
of quantifying risk does, by its very nature, give a deep understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the system being examined. This hides 
several important features of the quantitative approach that justify the 
effort involved. 
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Among the benefits that accrue from making an integrated and 
comprehensive quantified assessment of risk are: 
1) A comprehensive assessment requires that every aspect of the 
construction and operation of the system is examined in a systematic 
way that identifies: the capability of each part of the system to 
withstand the environment it is exposed to, the interactions between 
the various components and between components and operators. In 
this context the term 'operator' is defined in very broad terms to 
include all people who interact with the system, from constructors 
to testers and from those that maintain the plant to those that 
drive it. The integrated approach requires that the system is 
examined vertically and horizontally. Examination in the vertical 
sense requires that every component and sub-system is assessed in a 
way that evaluates their construction from material proving to 
approval testing and throughout life testing. The horizontal 
assessment requires that all operators and other systems that interact with the system being examined are evaluated. The 
evaluation of operators includes evaluation of their selection, 
training and monitoring their suitability during their tour of duty. 
Such a systematic approach is useful in the way it exposes doubtful 
assumptions and areas of uncertainty both about the design and 
management of the project. 
2) Quantifying the risk requires that the reliability of equipment is 
quantified and this highlights weak points in the system and indicates how reliable the whole system is likely to be. This is 
useful information for the owner of the plant as it gives an indication of how reliable the system will be in service, how 
efficient the plant will be and it also indicates which parts are likely to require priority for servicing and replacement. 
3) Quantifying the risks associated with a plant gives the owner an indication of the extent of his potential financial liability 
regarding compensation for damage resulting from a fault with the 
plant. This can be useful in calculating the amount of insurance 
cover that is required. 
4) The process of quantifying risks shows where the system can be 
modified to improve reliability and efficiency. 
5) Quantification of risk gives the regulator a useful basis for 
assessing acceptability. 
With regard to the third question, namely what is the role for 
quantification of risk, to some extent the list of benefits hints at the 
role of quantification. The three main roles seen are: as aids to the designer, the owner and the regulator. For the designer these techniques 
can show him whether or not the design he is proposing is likely to 
satisfy the client's requirements for reliability and acceptable risk level. For the owner the techniques will give him an indication of 
whether or not the plant is likely to be sufficiently reliable for his 
purposes and if it is likely to satisfy the requirements of the 
regulators. It will also give him an indication of the financial burden 
that risks represent for him, and show him where improvements in the 
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plant would be most, effective. This indication of the financial burden 
is an important link between the technical and economic factors that have 
to be considered. For the regulator the usefulness of quantification of 
risk will depend on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the 
quantification and also on the extent to which the concept of 
quantification of risk is considered appropriate. If the assessment is 
accurate or at least the magnitude of inherent errors is established, and 
the assessment is comprehensive, in that it examines the whole system and 
all possible fault sequences, then it is likely to be acceptable to the 
regulator. This does not mean that the regulator will approve the plant, 
it merely means that the quantification of the risk will be regarded as 
acceptable evidence. For all parties involved, the methodology of 
quantitative risk assessment will show where the system being examined is 
weak and where additional data is required. There are many statements by 
proximate regulators which indicate their views about quantitative 
assessment of risk. The following quotations indicate the support there 
is for quantification of risk. In the British Health and Safety 
Commission's Draft Regulations and Guidance on the Control of Industrial 
Major Accident Hazards they say that one objective of the safety case is 
'to identify the type, relative li (Vood, and broad consequences of 
major accidents that might occur'. The only interpretation that 
seems possible of the phrase 'relative likelihood', in the way it is used 
in this quotation, is that the consequences of any major hazard should be 
expressed in probability terms. 
Another rather different, but important, role that the techniques for 
quantification of risk play is to provide professional engineers with 
methods they can use generally to quantify the hazards in the plant they 
are or will be associated with. The need for professional engineers to 
have such skills was endorsed by the fact that the Institution of 
Chemical Engineers, the British professional body for engineers 
specializing in chemical engineering, to include in their model syllabus 
for chemical engineering education a requirement fcý5 studying the 
systematic identification and quantification of hazards. 
In an earlier study by Chicken a survey was made the views on hazard 
control of twenty-seven organizations in Britain. ) The organizations 
surveyed represented a sample of the whole spectrum of social 
organizations in Britain and included representatives of British 
professional organizations, trade unions, clubs, regulatory bodies and 
trade organizations. Among the questions on which views were sought was 
the acceptability of probabilistic techniques for assessing the 
acceptability of risk. Many, but not all, of the organizations contacted 
accepted that probability techniques were appropriate in a variety of 
situations, but most of the organizations put a reservation in their 
reply to indicate that they did not consider the techniques would be 
appropriate in every case. The trade unions' views ranged from no risk 
being acceptable to the, cceptable probability of an accident being 
stated as to 10- per year by the British Airline Pilots 
Association. Trade associations and professional bodies expressed 
views that were in the range spanned by the trade unions' views. 
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To balance these British views about the role of quantitative techniques, 
two German views on the objectives of applying quantitative techniques 
are taken from papers by Professor Lindackers of TÜV and Dr Pilz of 
Bayer. The following quotation from a paper by Professor Lindackers 
appears to summarize his views: 'Within the scope of assessing new 
technologies, risk analyses - no matter how defi ient they may be - 
should be a vital constituent of decision aids'. (7' The views of Dr 
Pilz on the role of risk are interesting for two reasons: he speaks from 
the viewpoint of the chemical industry, and he has a very critical view 
of risk analysis applied to the chemical industry. The following two 
extracts from the con8 usions he drew in a recent paper appear to 
encapsulate his views: 
"Risk analysis methods (i. e. reliability analysis and hazard 
consequence analysis) have certain features which make them 
advantageous in some instances and inappropriate in others. When 
talking about their possible use, two points are important: 
(1) Possible benefits depend very much on the area of application 
and the objectives of the analysis. 
(2) It is important to note that, even when meaningfully applied, 
the methods of risk analysis can only cover part of the safety 
problem. They can therefore be applied only as a supplement to 
other methods. 
For what should the methods be applied in the chemical industry? 
Certainly not for estimating risks from chemical plant in order to 
discuss them in the open public. This would be too high a claim for 
methods depending so much on assumptions, simplifications and 
subjective judgements. " 
The final sentence of Dr Pilz's conclusions attempts to put a very firm 
limitation on the use of risk analysis, which is understandable as the 
chemical industry's view as they will naturally wish to keep their public 
presentations as simple as possible and will want to avoid discussions 
that may delay their projects being approved. The sentence is as 
follows: 
"Risk analysis should be used together with other methods as a 
design tool and should be kept away from politics. Then it will 
serve the promotion of safety and will not undermine the credibility 
of scientists. " 
Such a restrictive view of the use of risk analysis does not seem to 
recognize present trends towards more open decision making. These days 
there is significant public concern about industrial risks and if normal 
intelligent questions about the significance of the risks associated with 
a particular activity are not answered fully it is understandable that 
doubts will be raised in the public's mind that will generate opposition 
to the activity. An important implication of Dr Pilz's views is that 
there is a need for the development of a way of presenting to the general 
public, a comprehensive view of the significance of a risk in a simple, 
honest and easily understood way. Something of the importance of socio- 
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political factors is underlined by the fact that Dr Pilz wishes to keep 
risk analysis away from politics. 
To complete this examination of the philosophy of the quantification of 
risk, a few general comments must be made about the process that is 
involved in arriving at decisions about the acceptability of risk. The 
point has been made, by Kletz, that there will never be enough resources 
available to remove all risks and the pro . cm 
is to which risks should 
priority be allocated for their reduction. Kletz also mentions that 
the fatal accident frequency rate (FAFR), the number of fatal accidents 
in a group of 1000 men in a working lifetime (100 million hours), is a 
useful basis for comparing risks. Averaged over a ten year period, the 
British chemical industry's FAFR is about 4, excluding the Flixborough 
accident, or about 5 if Flixborough is included. Some typical FAFR 
values quoted by Kletz are given in Table 1. 
British Industry Generally 4 
Clothing and Footwear Industry 0.15 
Vehicle Manufacture 1.3 
Metal Manufacture and Shipbuilding 8 
Chemical Industry 4-5 
Agriculture 10 
Coal Mining 12 
Construction Erectors 67 
Travelling by Car 57 
TABLE 1 FATAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATES (FAFR) 
In the chemical industry if an activity contributes more than 0.4 to the 
FAFR, priority is given to the removal of the risk. It is stated that 
ICI had found he costs of adopting such a strategy were high but not 
unbearable. C$1 This is a clear demonstration of the use made of one 
type of risk quantification data and how the technical and economic 
factors interact. 
The question of how to decide what is an acceptable level of risk is a 
complex question. Quantitative criteria are used to guider and 
the role of such criteria has been discussed by Chicken %O Dr 
Pilz's view that risk analysis should be kept away from politics seems 
far too restrictive. Once the nature and significance of a risk has 
been determined in quantitative terms, the mature civilized approach 
would be to arrive at a conclusion by discussing the acceptability of the 
risk openly with the interested parties. Lord Ashby has endorsed the use 
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of the adversary procedure, used in British courts, as a satisfactory way 
of arriving at such complex decisions. (84) He lays down two important 
conditions which must be satisfied for the procedure to be effective. 
The conditions are: (1) that both sides in the adversary encounter must 
have access to similar information and technical expertise and (2) that 
the encounter must be conducted in a formal and rational way as in 
scientific discussion or in courts of law. 
The views of Lord Ashby were endorsed by John Dunster, then Deputy 
Director General of the Health and Safety Executive, when he agreed that 
reaching a compromise was an essential feature of a1rýr ýving at a 
decision 
about the acceptability of a particular risk. The following 
quotation from John Dunster's contribution to the New Scientist's 
publication, 'The Risk Equation', shows how far he considered the Health 
and Safety Executive had gone in developing a philosophy that was 
compatible with Lord Ashby's views: 
"Elements of the regulatory framework within which the Health and 
Safety Executive should operate are already being built up by a 
process of open discussion and debate repeated in parliament when 
legislation is needed. In such debates absolute views have little 
place. Absolute safety is not an available option. Society does 
not and should not value safety above all else. 'Safety First' is a 
good slogan but a poor policy. Perhaps the greatest contribution we 
can all make to the continuing debate is to agree that, oe 
details if not on principles, there is 'virtue in ccxrpromise'. " 
8tý 
Logically, before you can compromise, what you are compromising on must 
be defined quantitatively otherwise you are just playing with 'hunches' 
or making uninformed judgements. Recognition of the fact that in reality 
a decision about what is an acceptable risk will involve compromise. 
Ideally, the compromise should be based on an evaluation of all the 
relevant technical, economic and socio-political factors. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions that this examination of the philosophy of risk 
assessment suggests are: quantification of risk is required as the only 
rational basis for discussion of the acceptability of risk, the 
systematic processes involved in quantifying risks are useful in 
themselves as they give a deeper understanding of the system and 
highlight areas of uncertainty, and without quantification of risks there 
is no basis for rational discussion of the acceptability of a particular 
proposal in a specific set of circumstances. It is recognized that 
ultimately any decision about the acceptability of risk is a compromise 
that should be based on evaluation of all the relevant technical, 
economic and socio-political factors. Ideally, particularly for complex 
decisions, the compromise should be arrived at by the parties involved 
through open adversary procedures. 
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CHAPTER 3 
7 MQOFS FCR ME QUANTIFICATION OF RISK 
To determine to what extent existing techniques for risk quantification 
can be used in making a comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of 
a risk the various techniques available are evaluated. The techniques 
for quantification of the technical aspects of risk are well established 
and a great deal has been written about them. Unfortunately, sometimes 
the results of applying such techniques are presented in ways which give 
the misleading impression that the results are definitive absolute 
values. Such misleading impressions stem mainly from three sources, 
which are: a lack of appreciation of the errors inherent in the data 
used, the relevance of the data used and failure to take into account all 
the relevant fault sequences. Concern about these points has been voiced 
in studies made in both the nuclear industry and the process industry. 
In relation to the nuclear industry, one widely discussed commentary on 
this topic was given in the Lewis review of WASH-1400 and in relation 
to the process industry, the comments of Dr Blokker(%ý)the Rijnmond 
Central Environmental Protection Agency are apposite. 
The Lewis report concluded that: 
"The statistical analysis in WASH-1400 leaves much to be desired. 
It suffers from a spectrum of problems, ranging from lack of data on 
which to base input distributions to the invention and use of wrong 
statistical methods. Even when the analysis is done correctly it is 
often presented in so murky a way as to be very hard to decipher. " 
Despite this finding the Lewis Group recommended that the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission should use WASH-1400 probabilistic methodology more 
effectively to guide the reactor safety research programmes so that 
uncertainties in analysis are predicted and a greater understanding is 
obtained of the nature of the risk. Specifically on the question of how 
to deal with uncertainties, the Lewis report recommended that: 
"Where there is an inadequate data base, the methodology of WASH- 
1400 can still be used to uncover the topology of accident 
sequences. In such cases the limits of knowledge should be stated, 
without pressure to quantify (other than bounding) that which is 
unquantifiable". 
Blokker expressed the view that although the Dutch Authorities are making 
increasing use of risk analysis, they are becoming more aware of the 
restricted accuracy of such assessments. Even allowing for this 
reservation he expressed the view that risk assessments will maintain 
their rightful role as additional sources of information for the policy 
maker parallel to assessments of economic profit, employment and land 
use. These themes of accuracy and relevance of data and 
comprehensiveness of assessments made are in many ways the central themes 
of this chapter and will be referred to at several points. 
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The evaluation that follows of the techniques for reliability and risk 
assessment is built up in two stages which are the purpose for which the 
techniques are required and used and the techniques which are available. 
The limitations of the techniques are discussed in the next chapter. In 
examining the purpose for which the techniques are required, particular 
attention is given to identifying the different requirements for 
assessment. For example, the requirements at the conceptual stage of a 
project for determination of the magnitude of the associated risks are 
quite different to the requirements that have to be satisfied in order to 
justify to the regulatory authorities that in the plant in the 'as built' 
form the probability of certain hazards arising is acceptably low. The 
examination of the analytical techniques that are available gives 
attention to identifying techniques appropriate for each stage of a 
project. 
Purposes for which Techniques are Required 
The need for risk evaluation has much in common with the need for 
evaluation of reliability and the assessment techniques are similar. 
The terms risk and reliability have similar meanings in that they both 
include elements of probability of an event in a given time and its 
consequences. Attention is concentrated on the need for techniques for 
risk evaluation but at points in the analysis where reliability 
techniques are relevant they are also mentioned, and the significance of 
the differences between the roles of the techniques is made clear. 
The risk assessment of a project must consider three main factors, which 
are: the technical, economic and socio-political factors. This chapter 
is concerned particularly with the technical aspects, but as technical 
issues interact in many ways with economic and socio-political factors, 
in several places in the argument the relevance and significance of these 
other factors is also mentioned. 
To identify the role of the various techniques, the matrix of factors 
that have to be evaluated in a comprehensive assessment is first 
described. Risk has three main characteristics: source, time and aspect. 
These three characteristics are shown diagrammatically in Fig. 1. In the 
horizontal dimension are the sources of risk and they consist of the 
components that make up any industrial activity. Five main components 
have been identified: raw materials, plant, waste disposal, transport of 
related materials, and final disposal of plant. Any completely 
comprehensive whole life risk assessment must consider all of these 
components, but for particular assessment purposes it may be necessary to 
cover only one or two of them. 
Under the heading of 'Raw Materials' are included the extraction and 
processing of the materials up to the form in which they are delivered to 
the plant. Evaluation of this component is called for when a proposal 
has to be assessed in terms of 'its total impact on society and involves 
the assessment of the sort of risks that can be associated with mining 
and processing raw materials. Many of the characteristics of the risks 
associated with raw materials are similar in both the nuclear and process 
industries. The 'Plant' component is fairly straightforward and is the 
central factor in all risk assessments. For the purpose of this study, 
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the plant is defined as the complete installation associated with a 
particular project and is intended to include all auxiliary plant and 
equipment. 
Under the heading of 'Waste Disposal', it is intended that all discharges 
of waste to the environment and the ultimate disposal of any waste 
products are considered. There are many examples from the recent past 
where disposal of hazardous chemical waste and of slightly radioactive 
waste has aroused considerable public concern. 
Most process plant and most nuclear plants give rise to the need for 
materials to be transported and some of the most serious accidents 
associated with hazardous materials have taken place in the transport 
mode. Examples of these accidents are the Mississauga, Ludwigshafen, Los 
Alfagues, Lievin, and St Amand les Eaux accidents. These five accidents, 
none of which involved nuclear (terials, resulted 
in 279 people killed 
and several thousand injured. 
The 'Final Disposal of Plant' component is intended to cover the problems 
of returning a site to the 'green field' state at the end of its useful 
life. This means that all potentially hazardous materials associated with 
the installation have been safely removed from the site. Around Europe 
there are a number of industrial ruins that have been left from previous 
ages as they were too contaminated with hazardous materials to 
contemplate their demolition. 
The vertical dimension represents the aspects or intrinsic nature of 
risk. The aspects are divided into three sub-groups which are the 
technical, economic and socio-political. As mentioned earlier, this 
chapter concentrates on the evaluation of the technical factors. 
Only one term that is used requires special comment and that is the term 'Societal Risk'. In the extensive literature on risk, 'societal risk' is 
used in two main ways. In some literature the term is used, as it is used 
in this study, to identify the number of people who would be killed or 
injured by an accident to a particular installation. Sometimes the term 
is used in the global sense that embraces all facets of sociological 
risk, such as public opinion, economic factors and political significance 
and in this study this second meaning is ascribed to the term 'socio- 
political factors'. 
The 'Time' dimension is intended to identify changes in risk that are 
time dependent. Four basic variations with time are identified: stages 
in project development, changes resulting from operation, changes in 
requirements, and changes in knowledge. 'Stages in Project Development' 
is intended to identify the different types of analysis that are required 
such as simple identification of the magnitude of the hazard at the 
conceptual stage, to complete justification at the start of full output 
operation. 'Changes Resulting from Operation' is expected to take into 
account wear out of components such as due to fatigue, corrosion or 
radiation. Also under this heading are included such factors as the 
output of the plant being increased and the consequences of changes in 
the operating staff. The types of 'Changes in Requirements' with the 
passage of time that have to be allowed for are that statutory 
requirements may be introduced to: reduce the allowable emissions, the 
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way information is presented in the control room, or the frequency of 
inspection of critical equipment. 'Changes in Knowledge and Information' 
covers the whole spectrum of man's understanding about the world he lives 
in and new knowledge may take many forms including finding that levels of 
atmospheric contamination currently considered acceptable are really an 
unacceptable risk. An example of how new knowledge may be"of benefit is: 
when the operating environment a component is exposed to is found not to 
have the deleterious effect that was orginally predicted. 
Having identified the range and essential characteristics of the factors 
that have to be evaluated in order to arrive at a decision about 
acceptability, the next question is how to structure the consistent 
analysis of these factors. If a completely comprehensive whole life 
assessment is required then the whole matrix of factors will have to be 
evaluated, but for purposes subordinate to the comprehensive assessment it may only be necessary to consider parts of the matrix. 
Even with the range of assessment restricted to the technical aspects of 
risk, there is a wide variety of combinations of factors that may have to 
be considered. For each combination of factors there are different 
requirements in terms of accuracy and comprehensiveness. To keep the 
discussion to manageable proportions, five basic assessment phases have 
been identified, they are: the conceptual, design, regulatory, 
operational and review phases. At this stage no attempt is made to 
differentiate between nuclear hazards and potential major hazards in the 
process industries. In Table 2 the assessment requirements for each 
phase are summarized. 
With each phase of a project, a decision about the acceptability of the 
associated risks has to be made. The nature of the decision is different in each phase and is to a certain extent different between the nuclear 
and the process industries. At the conceptual stage the main concern will be to establish if the proposed project can be built for an acceptable 
price in a way that will be acceptable to the regulatory authorities. In 
the very commercial world of the process industry, a plant will only be built if the entrepreneur is convinced he will make an adequate return on his investment. An entrepreneur will only be willing to accept additions 
and changes to make his plant acceptable up to the point where there will 
still be an adequate return on his investment. For example, Shell were 
willing to extensively contain refinery installation in Switzerland to 
satisfy local requirements. ( Large international companies will 
sometimes build a plant in a country where the safety and environmental 
requirements are more relaxed, in preference to a country where the 
requirements are restrictive. This option is only really open to the 
process industry as nuclear installations have to be built fairly close 
to the load centres they have to serve. An extreme example of an industry moving its operations to countries with less restrictive 
requirements is the shipping industry where many ships now operate under flags of convenience. 
At the design stage the requirements are rather different. The designer 
will be concerned to analyse the design in detail to determine whether or 
not it is likely to be acceptably reliable and whether or not it is likely to satisfy regulatory and customer requirements. There may be 
significant differences and even some conflict between these 
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PHASE REQUIREMENT DETAIL 
To identify the magnitude To establish if the worst 
CONCEPTUAL of the main risk risk is likely to be 
acceptable 
To assess in detail the Careful and detailed 
reliability of the . assessment of all possible 
proposed installation and fault sequences and their 
DESIGN the acceptability of all consequences - this will 
the associated risks identify the events and 
sequences that have 
significant risk implications 
To prove that regulatory Ideally this should require 
requirements have been less detail than required to 
satisfied and that the substantiate the design. To 
risks associated with the a very large extent, the 
REGULATORY project are acceptable to precise specification of the 
the public evidence required is 
uncertain as some requirement 
will only be generated as a 
result of public discussion 
of the proposal 
To demonstrate that the The detail must be sufficient 
plant will operate reliably to specify exactly the action 
without unacceptable risks that must be taken under all to operators or people living circumstances. The design OPERATIONAL in the neighbourhood of the and regulatory requirements 
plant. Also to identify will have identified the 
maintenance and inspection critical points with risk 
required during the implications 
operational life of the 
plant 
Throughout the life of the Comprehensive monitoring of 
plant the content of the the whole field of knowledge 
acceptability arguments on associated with the 
which initial clearance acceptability justification 
REVIEW was based must be kept under is required. The changes 
review to determine if any that have to be made will 
new evidence, circumstance depend on the nature of the 
or experience requires the evidence found 
arguments to be changed 
TABLE 2 RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH PHASE OF A PROJECT 
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requirements, but the designer has a number of options open to him and 
will normally reach an acceptable compromise through an iterative 
process. It would be misleading to assume that every system and 
component in an installation will be studied. The designer will make a 
subjective or an informed professional judgement about the systems or 
components that are of sufficient significance as to warrant detailed 
assessment. The study of every system and component would be 
unrewarding, a wasteful use of resources, and would not significantly 
improve the quality of the argument. 
The evidence required by the Regulatory Authority will be slightly 
different to that required by the designer, but in many cases can be 
derived directly from the evidence the designer has to prepare. In some 
cases the type and form of the evidence required will be codified, but 
there are significant differences between the requirements of the various 
countries. The general conclusion that seems justified is that to some 
extent the evidence that will be required and the form it should be 
presented in is unpredictable, particularly when a proposal is subject to 
some form of public discussion, such as a public inquiry which by its 
very nature gives rise to unexpected questions. 
Consideration of operational requirements involves examination of two 
main conditions: firstly, the action and time for reaction under fault 
conditions and secondly the nature of the maintenance and inspection 
required. Determination of the action required to deal with fault 
conditions will include the whole spectrum of fault conditions from minor 
deviations in output to initiating all the actions required to deal with 
a major emergency such as loss of all electrical power or breach of a 
primary pressure circuit. For minor faults it may take half an hour or 
more before a serious situation develops, so there should be time to take 
corrective action. For more serious faults the time for corrective 
action will certainly be shorter and may be non-existent. The 
reliability with which actions can be taken, even allowing for human 
error, will have to be taken into account in both the design and the 
regulatory risk assessments. Estimating the probability that a system or 
component will be in a working state has to take account of the 
maintenance and inspection required. There is also the possibility that 
maintenance and inspection operations themselves can be the cause of some 
common mode failure and the probability of such consequences requires 
assessment. It is not unknown for components to be wrongly fitted after 
maintenance or for tools and loose parts to be left inside components. 
The final phase of a project which gives rise to a risk assessment 
requirement is the throughout-life review of the continuing acceptability 
of the project. Throughout the life of the project, new information will 
be coming forward that will improve the understanding of the risks 
associated with the project and the reliability of its constituent 
components. Typical examples of the types of new knowledge that may come 
forward are that the materials used may be found to either corrode or 
erode under the conditions they are subjected to in service, vibration 
may shorten the life of vital components, layout of control rooms may 
require improvement to make it easier to control fault conditions, and 
the life of vital pressure components may prove to be longer than 
envisaged at the design stage. The significance of this new knowledge 
must be realistically assessed to determine if it will modify the 
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quantified assessment of the acceptability of the project. It is also 
vitally important to keep the adequacy and capability of the operating 
team under review; the passage of time can introduce many problems in 
this area. 
Having identified the components of risk and reliability assessment and 
the needs for various levels of assessment, the various techniques 
available can be evaluated. 
Techniques Available 
In the previous section, the need for a quantitative technique for 
assessing the acceptability of a project at the conceptual stage and for 
techniques capable of assessing in detail the risk characteristics of a 
complete project were identified. These are two very different 
requirements: one is a ranging exercise and the other is a very detailed 
analysis. Before describing the techniques a word of warning must be 
given: merely selecting a technique does not carry with it a guarantee 
that the answers produced will give a complete and accurate picture of 
the risks involved. This particular point has been examined by the Oil 
Companies International Study Group for Conservation of Clean Air and 
Water - Europe (COINCAWE) in their report on the methodologies for hazard 
analysis and risk assessment in the petroleum refining and storage 
industry. They have exprejgaý the necessary cautionary notes in the 
following very succinct way: 
"The choice of procedure and depth of analysis will vary with the 
nature and potential scale of the hazard, and the stage in the plant 
life cycle at which the analysis is applied, e. g. in the early 
phases detailed design information is not available. 
The procedures facilitate the systematic identification of safety 
aspects of a process or installation, particularly where experience 
is lacking. The most sophisticated methods provide tools for 
solving particular problems, e. g. those involving high complexity or 
severity of consequences. Furthermore by enabling the available 
data to be formalized in a logical manner, omissions in the data 
base are highlighted and errors in the analysis minimized. 
However, there are certain limitations common to all the methods 
which must be born in mind: 
i) The analysis represents to a varying extent the analyst's 
interpretation of the installation, and particularly when the 
system being analyzed is complex the analyst may inadvertently 
introduce bias. 
ii) It is absolutely essential that all the data used are truly 
relevant to the case being analysed. In practice data'are 
often scarce, incomplete or not directly applicable. 
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iii) Sometimes, assumptions about major hazard events have to be 
based on extremely limited statistical data for events which 
happen infrequently. This will introduce an additional degree 
of uncertainty. 
iv) The prediction of human behaviour is extremely difficult and 
where it plays an essential part in the analysis this will 
result in further uncertainty. 
v) Some of the techniques are very complicated and detailed and 
demand appreciable specialist manpower and time resources. 
vi) The nature of the methodologies can easily lead to 
misinterpretation and misuse of the results. " 
Having given a caution about the limitations of risk assessment in 
general, the techniques available can now be examined. The techniques 
used at the conceptual stage tend to be more qualitative in their 
approach although, in some cases, quantitative data may be used to build 
up a non-dimensional index of the significance of the risks. There is 
also a considerable difference between the nuclear industry and the 
process industry in their requirements for studies at the conceptual 
stage. This difference stems from the fact that the nuclear industry 
consists of a few very large installations for which it is appreciated 
from the outset that a very detailed quantified assessment of risk will 
have to be made, whereas the process industry mainly consists of 
moderately sized installations for which the first requirement is to 
determine the nature of the hazard and if a detailed assessment of risk 
will be required. There are four main types of technique, each with a 
slightly different capability, they are: 
1) Checklisting 
2) Indexing 
3) Potential loss assessment 
4) HAZOP 
The main characteristics of these techniques are summarized in Table 3. 
Checklists are to a large extent self explanatory; they really amount to 
codifying the questions that a responsible engineer would ask about the 
adequacy of any design. Well designed checklists structure the form of 
questions about the design in such a way that the answer has to explain 
how a particular problem is dealt with. The central problems with 
checklists are their comprehensiveness and the relevance of the questions 
they ask when they are applied 9c an installation 
different from the one 
for which they were designed. 
Indexing, of the advanced type described in Appendix 1, is sometimes used 
to determine the extent of the safety studies required to justify the 
acceptability of a proposed . 
installation. * Although the basic index 
derived expresses the hazard non-dimensionally, the derivation of the 
index ffics require quantification of certain parameters of the 
hazard. For example, derivation of a fire and explosion index takes 
* This method is also discussed on p 92. 
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TECHNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS APPLICATION 
Simple method of identifying Mainly used in the 
aspects that require special process industry, but 
attention. The check list suitable for giving a 
CHECK-LIST approach generally aims to preliminary assessment 
identify the way a new proposal of the risks associ- 
is different to previous designs ated with any 
and the codes and standards that activity 
have to be satisfied 
Mainly developed from the Dow and Generally used in the 
Mond indices. The Dutch Regula- process industry to 
tory Authority version is determine the extent 
described in Appendix 1. For of the risk analysis 
particular units of an instal- that should be 
lation these indices give an performed 
INDEXING indication of the magnitude of 
the fire, explosion and toxicity 
hazard. These indices take into 
account the properties, quantity 
and way the material involved is 
being used. On the basis of the 
index, the risks are ranked in a 
way that indicates the action to 
be taken 
The potential loss of an instal- Used in the chemical INSTAN- lation is determined in a way industry mainly in the 
TANEOUS that indicates the loss in context of determining 
FINANCIAL financial terms. One version the insurance cover 
ANNUAL of this derives an index of loss for risks 
MSS that takes into account factors 
(IFAL) covering the inherent hazards, 
the design and the management 
This technique gives a systematic Used extensively in 
method of assessing the ways in the petroleum and 
which a ccmplex system can chemical industry 
HAZARD deviate from its planned method 
AND of operation and identifies the 
OPERABILITY consequences of such deviation 
(HAZOP) and the action that should be 
taken to prevent deviation 
becoming a hazard. Method is 
qualitative but can be developed 
to incorporate quantification 
TABLE 3 TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATING RISKS AT THE CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
OF A PROTECT 
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into account the total potential energy of the substance being 
considered, the pressure and temperature of the substance, and the 
conditions under which it is kept. The toxicity index takes into account 
the concentration and intensity of toxicity of the substance being 
considered. On the basis of the Fire and Explosion and Toxicity indices 
of the hazard level associated with a particular proposal, the Dutch 
Regulatory Authorities classify the risks into one of three categories. 
Category I represents the plant with the lowest hazard potential and 
Category III represents the plant with the highest hazard potential. 
The Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss (IFAL) technique requires the 
assessment of three factors: a process factor, an engineering factor and 
a management factor, and the technique specifies how these factors shall 
be calculated. These three factors multiplied together give the 
Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss Factor. The process factor is 
designed to give an indication of the magnitude of the hazard inherent in 
the proposed installation. The engineering factor is designed to indicate 
the quality and comprehensiveness of the design, and the management 
factor is envisaged as indicating the quality of the mana ement team and 
the procedures they have designed to control the project. 
"3) 
Evaluation 
of the factors does require a basic knowledge of the proposed plant, but 
determination of the factors is largely the result of subjective 
judgement. The process of determining the Potential Hazard Loss Factor 
has the merit that it can by its very nature identify aspects of the 
project that need to be modified to make them more acceptable. 
Of the four techniques considered for evaluating risks at the conceptual 
stage of a project, the hazard and operability technique (HAZOP) provides 
the most direct indication of the factors that should be evaluated 
quantitatively to develop a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the 
risks associated with a proposed project. The merit of the technique is 
that itt9j)s based on a systematic analysis of each part of the 
project. The assessment is built up by determining in a prescribed 
qualitative way the consequences of deviations from normal operation. The 
prescribed way consists of asking a set series of questions about the 
system; these questions aim to uncover the consequences of the system not 
functioning, functioning at above normal conditions, functioning below 
normal conditions, and operating at any condition outside the spectrum of 
normal conditions. 
Having determined the consequences of deviation from normal operation, 
the final part of the HAZOP technique is to determine what action is 
required to deal with the consequences of any deviation from normal 
operation. The HAZOP approach can in many ways be regarded as the 
ultimate development of the check-list approach as it overcomes the 
criticism of the check-list approach by structuring the questions in an 
'open ended' way. The conclusions from a HAZOP study, such as 
identification of the consequences of deviation from normal operation, 
can be the starting point for a quantitative assessment of the 
acceptability of a system. (' complementary 
technique HAZAN can be used 
for quantification of risk. It is possible to envisage that a future 
development of a comprehensive risk assessment scheme would integrate the 
HAZOP and HAZAN analysis into it as the preliminary stage for 
identification of the features that should be studied in detail. The 
HAZOP and the associated HAZAN technique seem to be widely accepted, as 
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in the CONCAWE repo6rt it is stated they are frequently used in the 
petroleum industry, and they are incorporated int? 9VI nstitution of Chemical Engineers Hazard Workshop Training Modules. 
A critical evaluation of the four techniques is given in Table 4. To 
illustrate the role of the techniques in practice, Figure 2 has been 
prepared. 
The techniques available for detailed and quantitative assessment of the 
risks associated such as will be required at later stages of a project 
are generally intended to be more rigorous, but are only as accurate as 
the data on which they are based. Even if the data base is poor, the 
quantitative methods can give some indication of the topology of g dent 
sequences, a point recognized in the Lewis report on WASH-1400. At 
this point it is relevant to reiterate the argument that was used to 
justify the early attempts to quantify risk in the nuclear industry. The 
argument was postulated by Farmer in 1967, when he stated that 
quantifying risks in probability terms is more logical than describing 
risks in arbitrary qualitative terms such as 'credible', or 'incredible', 
for such qualitative terms are meaningless as w' hout quantification 
there is no logical way of differentiating them. 1Many 
techniques have been devised for quantifying risk and mosh5f them 
can be described as developments of the decision tree approach. The 
main difference between the techniques is in the extent to which they 
describe the whole sequence from cause to consequence - some techniques 
simply consider the cause and predict the frequency with which 
unacceptable events can occur and other techniques take the frequency of 
the event as given and predict the consequences. In Table 5 the 
characteristics and use of the main types of analytical techniques for 
quantifying risks are summarized. Examples of the use of these 
techniques are given in WASH-1400, Appendix 2 of the German Risk Study of 
Nuclear Power Stations, the Norwegian Nuclear Power and Safety Study NOU 
1978 : 35c, the CONCAWE Report No 10/82: 'Methodologies for hazard 
analysis and risk assessment in the petroleum refining and storage 
industry', and Dr Jager's paper 'The Question of Quality of Risk Analysis 
for Chemical Plants' presented at the 4th International Symposium on 
Loss Prevention and Safety Pj8To tion in the Process Industries held at 
Harrogate in September 1983. 
Before considering the application of these techniques, it is vital to 
remember the cautionary words at the beginning of this section, namely 
that the analyst must understand the plant he is analysing and have 
relevant reliable data on which to base his assessment. If these 
cautionary words are not heeded, the methodologies can easily lead to 
very doubtful and misleading results. 
From these cautionary words, it follows that a prerequisite of any 
worthwhile attempt to quantify the risks is that the analyst must have a 
detailed knowledge of the plant to be assessed. This knowledge must 
include details of the form of the plant, exactly how it is constructed, 
the temperature and pressure conditions it will operate under, the 
materials it contains, an understanding of any reactions that will be 
taking place within the plant, how the plant will be operated, the 
capability of the people who will operate the plant, the life of the 
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TECHNIQUE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Useful for checking if codes only as good as the 
of practice and standards questions in the list. CHECK-LIST have been complied with. Does not quantify 
A method of identifying problems risks 
that need further study 
Gives a comparative assessment Does not quantify 
INDEXING of the associated risks. risks. 
Indicates where more detailed Does not assess the 
assessment may be required design 
Gives a comparative indication Does not quantify the 
INSTAN- of the potential losses a risks in the normal TAUS project could incur. safety or hazard FINANCIAL assessment way. ANNUAL The technique is 
LOSS relatively new and (IFAL) orientated towards the 
needs of insurance 
Systematic approach to Does not quantify identifying risks that have to risks (but HAZAN HAZARD be assessed. technique can be AND Collects the evidence in a way used for quantifi- OPERABILITY which identifies points that cation if relevant (HAZOP) need further study and gives data is available) 
an indication of the design 
features required to reduce 
risk 
TABLE 4 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUPTIi 3 RISK AT 
THE CONCEPTUAL STAGE OF A PROTECT 
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PRQ BI REWJRK 
PROPOSAL PRQIDCT 
ACTABILITY CAN IT BE 
OF FINANCIAL NO WIDE 
RISKS ASSESS ACCEPTABLE 
USING IFAL 
SCRAP 
PROJECT 
N 
ASSESS IF 
OFFICIAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
ARE COMPLIED 
WITH USING3 
CHEXK LIST 
YES 
REQUIREMENTS 
SATISFIED 
ASSESS 
ACCEPTABILITY NO 
OF RISK INDEX 
YES 
INDEX 
ACCEPTABLE 
SYSTEMATICALLY 
ASSESS RISK 
AND OPERABILITY NO 
PROBLEMS USING 
HAZOP AND HAZAN 
PROJDCT 
SUITABLE FUR 
SUPPORT 
FIG 2 THE ROLE OF CONCEPTt. L STAGE RISK EVALUATION TECHNIQUES 
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TECHNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS APPLICATION 
FAULT TREE Requires the construction of a Used in the nuclear 
ANALYSIS (102) logic diagram (fault tree) industry and less (FTA) which traces from an frequently in the 
(THIS IS undesirable event all the process industry 
ALSO THE causes that can lead to the 
ýIHAZAN'95) 
METHOD) 
event 
EVETr An event tree is similar to a Used in the nuclear TREE 
ANALYSIS(102) 
fault tree but explores the 
consequences of an undesirable 
industry and 
occasionally in the 
event process industry 
FFMA gives a comrehensive Used in the nuclear 
assessment of the- whole sequence industry but less FAILURE of events from initial cause, frequently in the MODE which may be a component process industry AND failure, through to the ultimate EFFECT consequence of the event. There 
( A) (102) is also a simplified form of this 
analysis that limits the number 
of failure scenarios considered 
and is known as the Simplifed 
Classical Method (SO'l) 
In many ways, cause consequence Used in the nuclear CAUSE analysis is a form of failure industry but less CONSE- mode and effect analysis but frequently. in the QýE (103) ANALYSIS presents the results diagrammatically. The diagrams 
process industry 
can became very complex 
This method is also called the only used to a very Monte Carlo Method. This is a limited extent in 
more refined version of fault either the nuclear or RAND 
NUMBER 
SIMULATION 
tree or cause consequence 
analysis. Instead of using a i i i 
the process industries 
(102) s n 
le value for the probab ty l f (RNSA) o failure, it uses a range of 
robabilit it C tl p ies. onsequen y 
presents outcomes as a range of 
possibility. 
This is really a sub-routine of only used to a limited TECHNIQUES 
FR 
the other techhniques as it is extent in either the 
a way of determining the nuclear or the process PREDICTING allowance that should be made industries 
HUMAN ERROR for human error in the other 
(Rp)(102) techniques 
PARANý"I 
Characterizes the installation Used by the petro- d i RIC by a set of parameters. ustry in cal in chem CORRELATION Parameters are derived either Holland(104) METHOD from full classical risk 
( (104) assessment or by judgement by 0 , experts, There is also a 
simplified form of this method known as the Simplified 
Parametric Method (SPM) 
EPIDEMIOL- These provide a way of relating Where relevant used in 
OGICAL (102) ES (102) 
gast experience to future both the nuclear and i d t STUDI us r es the process in 
TABLE 5 TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATING RISKS IN QUANTIFIED TERMS 
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plant, and the inspection and maintenance patterns. Knowledge of the 
design of the plant is not enough on its own, assessment of risk also 
requires very comprehensive data concerning the reliability of the 
equipment involved and a comprehensive understanding of the associated 
hazards. 
With new designs of equipment there may be no relevant past experience 
from which reliable data can be drawn and the reliability of equipment 
might have to be derived by synthesis. Besides the data being relevant, 
the analytical techniques used should be appropriate. The importance of 
data and techniques being relevant was brought out in the Lewis review of 
the prestigious WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study; the following two 
quotations from the Lewis report demonstrate the strength of feeling on 
this point. On the Reactor Safety Study as a whole the Lewis group said: 
"We feel that the uncertainty in the final probability produced by 
the Reactor Safety Study is understated. Reactor Safety Study 
assigns a multiplicative uncertainty factor of five to its results; 
we cannot here, in the short time available, produce a(165fýferent 
number, but we can, and do, feel that five is too small. 
The Lewis Study Group specifically commented on the use of a Log-Normal 
distribution for fitting data in the following way: 
'But none of the fits we have seen is so far from the available data 
that use of the log-normal form is likely to misestimate truth by 
more than a factor of two or at most three. So within the errors 
listed in Reactor Safety Study, j8 accept the log-normal as an 
acceptable summary of most data. 
This confirms that even in a prestigious report like WASH-1400 the 
statistical analysis of data can introduce an error up to a factor of 
three. 
It is important when starting to quantify risk to be clear about just 
what the calculations will produce. Care should be taken to determine 
from the beginning whether the data will produce a mean value for risk or 
an upper bound. An indication of the type of variation that might be 
involved is given by the following quotation from the WASH-1400 report 
about the probability of core melt: 
"Based on these arguments it is reasonable to believe that the core 
melt probability of about 5x 10- per reactor year predicted by 
this study should not be significantly larger and would almost 
certainly not exceed the value of 3x 104 whiC as been estimated 
as the upper bound for core melt probability. c 
The Norwegian study of the safety of nuclear reactors expressed their 
view of the uncertainties in calculated release probability in the 
following way: 
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"Due to the fact that the largest release generally results in the 
greatest consequences, it appears that the part of the risk curve 
which indicates the greatest consequences will have an uncertainty 
factor of 10 each way on the probability axis, while the part of the 
curve which shows accidents with small consequences wi. ]j have an 
uncertainty factor on the probability axis of 3 each way. 
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A little later in the Norwegian Report comment on the uncertainty in the 
calculation of consequences in WASH-1400 was given in the following way: 
"It is not possible to calculate to what extent without a major 
effort, but a moderate and careful estimate is that the calculated 
consequences are 5 to 10 times too high. 
Uncertainties in consequence calculations are reported in WASH-1400 
to be: 
Fatalities from 1/4 to 4 times the reported value. 
Early illness from 1/4 to 4 times the reported value. 
Cancer deaths from 1/6 to 3 times the reported value. 
Genetic effects from 1/3 to 6 times the reported value. 
Economical losses from 1/2* to 2 times the reported value. 
The figures will not apply directly to the Norwegian calculations. 
The American calculations are performed for an average site, while 
the Norwegian meteorological, topographical and population data etc. 
apply to a specific site. More cautious assumptions are further 
used in the dose effect calculations. This should indicate the 
uncertainty(fpXzards larger consequences is somewhat lower than in 
WASH-1400.11 
The consequences were calculated on the basis of the probabi}} Mof a 
core melt occurring once a year in a family of 100 reactors. The 
uncertainties were due to the data used and the method of calculation. 
After these warning remarks identifying the factors that have contributed 
to the margin of uncertainty in risk analysis that has been performed for 
the nuclear industry, it is salutary to consider the problems of the 
process industry. Dr Ectyl Blair, Director of Health and Environmental 
Sciences for the Dow Chemical Company, in a paper to the International 
Symposium on Risk and Safety Analysis in Bonn in 1982, drew attention to 
some ofth roblems of risk assessment associated with the chemical industry. ýlýlý He specifically mentioned that toxicological data are now 
available on more than 25,000 chemicals, but that the data was quite 
fragmentary on all but a few hundred. In his paper Dr Blair stresses the importance of using professional experts to interpret the data that is 
available and to advise how it should be used to minimize risks. Later 
in the paper he defines the importance of risk assessment in the 
following way which identifies sound business reasons for aiming at the 
best assessment of risk obtainable: 
* This figure in the Norwegian report seems to be misprinted, as in the 
original WASH -1400 it was 1/5. 
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"Both corporate and government decisions on risk ultimately focus on 
levels of risk that are acceptable to society. Because of the 
widespread inconsistencies in risk levels achieved by political 
factors in the regulatory process, and differences in laws, 
regulatory decisions show a pattern of inconsistency in the level of 
risk control actually achieved. These inconsistencies have 
increased the focus on methodology for estimating risks from various 
societal and industrial activities. It is important to emphasize 
that objective risk assessment should be viewed as one of the tools 
for the decision maker and that no methodology leads to a formula 
for a decision. Within the corporate setting, management needs the 
best assessment of risk which can then be integrated with the other 
business and public policy considerations. "(1) 
Conclusions 
The general conclusions that seem to be justified are that there are a 
range of the techniques for risk quantification that can be used to give 
the decision maker a quantified indication of the technical aspects of 
risks associated with a particular project. The quality and 
comprehensiveness of the indication depends on the data available and the 
understanding that the analyst has of the system. The very process of 
performing a risk assessment does lead to a better understanding of the 
nature of the risks inherent in the project and the steps that can be 
taken to reduce these risks. The techniques generally used for 
quantification of risk give no indication of the significance of economic 
or socio-political factors so on their own they do not give a 
comprehensive assessment of acceptability. How the techniques can be 
incorporated into a comprehensive assessment and coupled with assessment 
of the other factors is examined in Chapters 8 and 9. The assessment 
also justified the following conclusions about the optimum procedure for 
assessing the technical aspects of risk. The significance of the risks 
involved can be assessed by a combination of checklist, indexing, IFAL, 
HAZOP and HAZAN methods. If the significance of the risk has to be 
determined in detail, the ideal method adopted should examine the whole 
process of risk generation from cause to consequence. It is only by 
making the assessment in that way the significance of each factor becomes 
clear. The method used should also allow properly for the statistical 
distribution of the data used and for human error. 
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(U3'1 4 
LDIITATIQJS OF RISK TEMBUCAL FACPO[t ASSESSMENr 
Having examined, in the previous chapter, the techniques that can be used 
for the quantitative assessment of risk the limitations of the 
techniques, particularly as part of a comprehensive assessment, can now 
be made. 
The following quotation by Dr Blokker of the Rijnmond Central 
Environmental Control Agency in Holland puts the role of quantitative 
techniques for assessment of the technical aspects of risk into 
perspective and shows something of the concern about the limitations of 
the techniques. 
"Risk analysis is here to stay. In more and more occasions a risk 
analysis or a more simplified risk review is required before Dutch 
authorities will make decisions on matters where hazardous materials 
are involved. However, these same authorities are becoming more 
aware of the restricted accuracy of risk assessments. Nevertheless 
risk assessments will maintain their rightful place as an additional 
source of information for the policy maker, (t 
to assessments on 
economic profit, employment, land use, etc. " 
There are two features of the Blokker statement that underline the 
limitations of risk analysis techniques. The features are: the accuracy 
of the methods and that they only deal with one of the groups of factors 
which the policy maker has to deal with. 
In the context of the accuracy of the techniques, it is illuminating to 
look back on three often forgotten attachments to the main report of 
WASH-1400. These attachments are the Jters from: the National 
Aeronautics and Sc )Administration (NASA,, 
g 3) the Systems Reliability 
Servic 
, RS), 
( and the Comptroller General of the United 
States. 
The NASA letter made three important points: they accepted the use of 
fault tree and event tree methodology, they accepted that the methods 
were capable or producing numerical assessments but cautioned that the 
value of such assessments is dependent on the accuracy and content of the 
data available, and they recommended that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission should use the results of the study as an aid in making trade- 
off studies of design and operational improvements. In their letter NASA 
explained in the following way why they had not been using numerical 
assessment: 'NASA has not been using the numerical assessment portion of 
the methodology because our data base is of small size. This is due to 
the lack of repetitive missions in the changing hardware configurations. 
It has always been the NASA policy to pursue hardware failures until the 
precise failure mechanism is fully understood and to take immediate 
corrective action to prevent failure recurrence. This corrective action 
has created significant configuration differences from shot to shot even 
within the small family of vehicles which might be considered repetitive 
- hence the small data base from which to draw failure probability 
information. ' Clearly NASA with their mammoth space programme considered 
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that their data base was too small to generate useful quantitative 
assessments and they developed confidence in their system by qualitative 
means. The success of the operations was described in the letter from 
the Controller General which is discussed below. 
In the SRS letter, Eric Green who was then the General Manager of SRS 
explained the difference he found between predicted and observed failure 
rates and stated that the ratio of observed to predicted failure was 
between 0.26 and 2.6. A few years later Aitken, then a member of the SRS 
team, published a more detailed analysis of this data and the conclusions 
he drew abqyh)the ratio of observed failure rate to predicted failure 
rate were: 
"1) The ratio of observed to predicted failure rate appears to 
follow a log/normal distribution. 
2) The median value for R (i. e. p= 50%) is 0.76 which indicates, 
on average, the predicitions are pessimistic by about 30%. 
3) The chance of the ratio being within a factor of 2 of 0.76 is 
70%. 
4) The chance of the ratio being within a factor of 4 of 0.76 is 
96%. " 
An important feature of the data referred to is that it is all related to 
instrument type equipment and is not relevant outside that field. It 
would be quite wrong to interpret this data as suggesting that all 
predictions of failure rates can be predicted to a 96% accuracy of being 
within a factor of 4 of the median value. The author admits that the 
equipment considered was of an early design, so design changes may also 
invalidate the conclusions he drew. 
The following comments of the Comptroller General of the United States 
present a careful judgement on the usefulness of quantitative risk 
evaluation techniques and put the role of quantitative techniques neatly 
into perspective as far as the decision making process is concerned: 
"The confidence that can be placed on reliability predictions is 
directly related to the extent of the previous testing or use of 
the same or similar systems. 
Most early Department of 
set for the contractors i 
and production. Most s 
operations; but equipment 
and experience usually r 
period of time. 
Defence reliability predictions are goals 
ir laboratories to achieve in development 
ich goals are not initially achieved in 
and component modifications, training, 
asult in upward reliability trends over a 
Reliability of major new systems cannot be accurately predicted 
because of the many variables - materials, training, maintenance, 
and so forth that are involved. 
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NASA experts believe that 'absolute' reliability numbers are 
misleading and that the time required to develop them is better 
spent on critical component reliability analyses. It does make 
prediction during development to compare design alternatives and 
to evaluate components. NASA's reliability experience to 1974 can 
best be illustrated by its history of launch successes, which 
average about 85%. Only in small samplings, it will be noted, is 
100% reliability achieved. 
NASA Launch Vehicle Performance 
Vehicle Total Successes Success 
Percentage 
Mercury Blue Scout 1 0 0 
Juno II 10 4 40 
Jupiter C 1 0 0 
Thor-Able 5 3 60 
Vanguard 4 1 25 
Atlas-Able 3 0 0 
Atlas 11 9 82 
Thor 2 2 100 
Little Joe 7 7 100 
Little Joe II 5 4 80 
Scout X 1 0 0 
Scout 57 51 89 
Redstone 5 5 100 
Thor-Delta 99 90 91 
Thor-Agena 13 12 92 
Atlas-Agena 26 20 77 
Atlas-Centauer 32 26 81 
Saturn I 10 10 100 
Titan II 12 12 100 
Atlas X-259 2 2 100 
Gemini (Atlas-Agena 6 4 67 
Target) 
Saturn IB 8 8 100 
Saturn V 13 12 92 
Total 333 Total 282 Average 85 
As far as we could learn during this brief review, DOD and NASA 
officials can offer little guidance as to how very rare failures or 
catastrophic accidents to systems can be anticipated, avoided or 
predicted. Failure rates for most engineered systems cover a very 
wide range. According to several reliability experts, simple 
mechanisms (ordinance fuses) or systems liable to incur human 
losses, have failure rates of 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 100,000 
occurrences. 
45 
NASA goes to extraordinary lengths - reliability cost is hardly an 
object - to prevent disasters in manned space vehicles and has the 
singular advantage of vehicle occupants prepared to make onboard 
repairs. Still, three astronauts were lost in one vehicle. The 
Soviets suffered similar losses in other attempts. No or}l%ln tell 
if and when such catastrophic failures will be repeated. "", 
The conclusion that seems justified about the capability of quantitative 
techniques is that provided the techniques are based on accurate and 
relevant data, they can give a useful assessment of the significance of 
faults and weaknesses in design and operational procedures. Fault tree 
and event tree methods provide a logical structure for assessing the 
significance of the relationship between the various parts of complex 
systems and what happens if there is some deviation in performance of a 
part of the system or its operating conditions. 
Other views about the limitations of quantitative techniques which seem 
to be justified are related to the benefits that have resulted from their 
application. In the direct sense, for proposals that have had to satisfy 
quantitative regulatory requirements, the analytical techniques can be 
considered satisfactory if the proposals are approved by the regulatory 
authorities. This rather obvious statement needs some amplification as 
it covers a number of serious points. First, even if the techniques are 
not perfect, they are generally an improvement on the qualitative 
approach. Quantitative techniques do present the regulator with some 
indication of the parts of the proposal that are of the most significance 
from the risk assessment point of view. An indication of the critical 
points in a risk assessment is in itself an important piece of 
information as it shows where improvements in design are likely to bring 
about the greatest reduction of risk. It is mainly in terms of reduction 
in risk or improvements in safety that the benefits of applying 
quantified techniques of risk assessment can be judged. 
In this context, the Canvey Island studies are interesting for several 
reasons. Among these reasons is the fact that the first report was the 
first quantitative risk study of a major process industry complex that 
was made public in Britain. Other reasons for the studies being of 
special interest are: that three years after the first study was 
completed a second study was made that showed the risk reduction that had been achieved by making the modifications proposed in the first report 
and that the reports indicate in quantitative terms the level of risk that is acceptable to the regulatory authorities. 
The first study was commissioned by the Health and Safety Commission in 1976 in response to a request from the Secretaries of State for the Environment and Employment who were reacting to one of the 
recommendations made in the report of an exploratory public inquiry into the desirability11 revoking planning permission to build an oil refinery 
on tha11 land. The first report on the study was published in 1978. Preparation of the first report involved 30 §pecýalist 
engineers, chemists and other experts and cost about £400,000. 
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The specification for the study was to investigate the risks to people 
living in and around Canvey Island from the existing and proposed 
industrial activities in the area. In more detail, the study aimed at: 
analysing the kind of accidents which would have the potential for 
injuring people living in the area, assessing the likelihood of such 
accidents happening and assessix 1 zpat chance there was that 
if they 
happened people would be injured. 
The quantitative assessment of risk was made for the Health and Safety 
Executive by the Safety and Reliability Directorate of-the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority, so clearly they brought to the study all the 
expertise of the quantification of risk they had built up in the nuclear 
industry. 
The investigating team that was formed to carry out the assessment built 
up their assessment in the following five steps: 
1) Identify and locate any potentially hazardous materials and 
their quantity. 
2) Review properties of hazardous materials, e. g. flammability and 
toxicity. 
3) Identify possible ways in which failure of plants might cause a 
hazard to the community. 
4) Identify chains of events leading to selected failures, e. g. 
operator errors, component failures, and fires. 
5) Quantify the probability of the selected failures occurring and 
their consequences. 
It was appreciated from the start of the study that it was more 
meaningful to describe the probability of fats accidents quantitatively 
rather than in purely qualitative terms. ` ) It was also understood 
from the beginning of the study that a quantitative assessment of risk 
relied heavily on historical data for assessing the risk and reliance on 
such data could be a source of error. 
The main potential risks identified by the investigating team concerned 
liquefied ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, liquefied natural gas, l uefied 
petroleum gas, flammable liquids and ammonium nitrate. ýlýý The investigating team concentrated their attention on those accidents where 
a gross failure of containment could result(irA2the generation of a large 
vapour cloud of flammable or toxic material. 
For ea%mlected failure the contributory factors examined 
included: 
a) Operator errors 
b) Metallurgical fatigue or ageing of materials 
c) Internal or external corrosion 
d) Loss of process control, e. g. pressure, temperature or flow 
e) Overfilling 
f) Introduction of impurities 
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g) Fire and/or explosion 
h) Missiles 
i) Flooding 
The Safety and Reliability Directorate made eleven main risk evaluations 
and these were: hazards from refineries, hazards from the British Gas 
Corporation terminal, hazards from handling ammonia, considerations 
relevant to flooding, hazards from the Calor filling depot, possibilities 
of major hazards from London and Coastal Wharves Ltd, hazards from 
ammonium nitrate storage at Fisons Ltd, hazards from the commissioning of 
methane tankers at British Gas jetty, interaction risks from a massive 
spill of hydrocarbon liqid at the Canvey Island complex, hazards from 
road transport of flammable and J oxic substances, and 
hazards from 
pipelines carrying hydrocarbons. 
In general, the steps in the analysis were to construct a fault tree of 
the events that could lead to a hazardous condition and then to determine 
the consequences of the hazard. The team also showed how the hazard 
could be reduced by improvements and additional measures. The 
conclusion, in the first report, about the verage ind}ýual risk on 
Canvey Island was that it was about 7.4 x 10 per year. 
Three years after the first Canvey report, the Health and Safety 
Executive published a review ojthe progress that had been made in 
reducing the hazards in the area. 
1z5ý The report showed that taking an 
average over all the risks and the areas affected by them, the estimated 
individual risks were over twenty times smaller than estimated ii the 
1978 aee4c3rt, that is, the risk had been reduced to 0.35 x 10- per 
year. Also the risks were over eight times smaller than it was 
estimated would hieved if all the improvements suggested in the 1978 
report were made. 1 he five reasons for this reduction in risk were 
identified as being: (126T) 
1) Some hazardous operations had ceased or been significantly 
changed. 
2) A number of the improvements suggested in the 1978 report had 
been made. 
3) The assessors had improved their understanding of the plants 
involved. 
4) Understanding of the potential consequences of some of the 
hazards had improved. 
5) More and better data on which to base the assessment of risk 
had been obtained. 
The comment of Professor Farmer on the(lst Canvey report assesses the 
role of the study in the following way: 
'The report is a good example of a technical assessment made on the 
best information available, and in the spirit of British practice, it has been published to advance knowledge, to ensure that all interested parties have access to technical data and to stimulate 
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criticisms of techniques. The report is a unique pioneering 
exercise. " 
Without a quantified risk assessment the magnitude of the risk reduction 
would not be known and there would be no logical way of judging the 
benefits of the action taken. The benefits resulting from the application 
of quantified techniques can be summarized as giving the evidence 
required by regulatory authorities and in addition giving an improved 
understanding of the risks associated with a particular installation in a 
way that indicates where improvements can be made to improve safety. The 
advantage of such studies can be justified in economic terms. 
An examination of the benefits ink i 2gIncial 
terms of applying risk 
analysis has been given by Taylor, who compared the results of 
several types of theoretical studies of the faults associated with the 
various units of a chemical plant with the faults found in practice. 
From the outset of the study, Taylor and his team appreciated that their 
studies were likely to be less than fully comprehensive and the two main 
reasons for incompleteness were lack of knowledge about the adjustments 
required during commissioning, and lack of knowledge of the real 
operating characteristics of the units. For the systems examined, it was 
found that on average about two design changes per unit examined were 
necessary. The cost in terms of analyst's time to identify the changes 
required was found to be of the order of two man-hours. simply taking 
the cost of analyst's time would be misleading as the full cost would 
have to allow for the cost of making the design change and the cost of 
downtime while the modification is made. The economic analysis presented 
by Taylor was limited by the restrictions placed on the length of 
conference paper and it would be misleading to repeat the costs that he 
did give as they are related specifically to Danish conditions. However, 
the general form of the argument can be expressed as follows: It is 
worthwhile to identify and take action to reduce a fault condition to an 
acceptable level if the costs involved are such that they can be borne by 
the operators of the plant and still leave the continued operation of the 
plant a viable economic proposition. Under free market conditions this 
means that any additional costs could be recovered over a period from the 
income derived from the sale of the product. This of course assumes that 
costs involved would still allow the product to be sold at a profit; if 
this were not the case the plant would have to be closed down. Under 
economic conditions, such as might apply to state owned industries or 
monopoly conditions, the operator might be able to allow a higher level 
of expenditure. * 
* Further discussion of the optimum level of expenditure on safety is 
given in JOC/L[IX/P2 'Report on the Study of Methods of Assessing the 
Optimum Safety Policy' prepared by J. C. Consultancy Ltd. for the 
Commission of European Communities and in Chapter 7. 
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Finally, the general limitations of quantification of risk techniques can 
be examined. Most of the weaknesses of the techniques stem from the fact 
that unless the meaning of the results obtained is clearly explained, 
they can be misunderstood. In this context, the techniques are only as 
accurate as the data they are based on. If the description of the system 
that is used as the basis for the analysis is not exactly the same as the 
system that is built, it is unrealistic to expect the analysis to predict 
exactly the behaviour of the 'as built' system. In his paper, Taylor 
drew attention to the difference he had found between theoretical 
predictions of faults and faults found in the 'as built' system. 
(128) 
Another form which the misunderstanding can take is that determining the 
probability of failure can be mistaken as a replacement for all the 
detailed technical calculations and quality checks that have to be 
prepared to support a design. A complex pressure vessel, such as the 
reactor pressure vessel for a pressurized water nuclear power reactor, 
involves considerable stress analysis and quality assurance programmes. 
Nichols has examined the problem of determining quantitati 1y the 
reliability of a pressure vessel in his John Player Lecture. 
( ýý' He 
suggested that the failure probability of a pressure vessel is determined 
by a combination of factors and accepted that there was only limited 
information on the probabilities associated with these factors; the 
values used have to be based on engineering judgement, as on any 
practical timescale it would be difficult to replace engineering 
judgement with experimental information. The final assessment of the 
reliability of a complex structure like a pressure vessel requires that 
the analyst knows exactly the final construction of the component, as 
during the construction of a complex component many deviations from the 
original specification may have occurred. These deviations may take the 
form of differences in material, defects in material, differences in heat 
treatment, and changes in structural form. The fact that the analyst 
does not appreciate all the implications of failing to take account of 
all the factors that may influence the failure of a system can produce 
some weirdly optimi tis figures. One American study produced a figure for 
an LNG(136}1 of 10 -"/year - this is believed to be the low probability 
recorVan de Putte suggests that probabilities smaller than 10 
- 10-'/year should be treated with extreme caution as often(IS6F sub- 
probabilities or common mode failure-has beep overlooked. One 
specific example he quotes is of a value of 10-ß0/year being quoted for 
the probability of chlorine escaping through rupture of an above-ground 
chlorine line, which seems to ignore the probability of the line being 
struck by a crashing aircraft which is of the order of 10 - 10-8/year. 
To put this argument about the risk of an aircraft crashing onto a 
hazardous target into perspective it should be remembered that in January 
1984 a Jaguar aircraft exploded above and then crashed a few hundred 
yards from the germ and chemical warfare 1q (ld gerous 
diseases testing 
establishment at Porton Down in England. 
Another quite strong argument for ing sanguine about probabilities of 
failure significantly lower than 10 /year is that natural disasters'like 
lightni r eor impacts are of about that order and they cannot be 
avoided. 
gýýl 
Dutch and Norwegian authorities have argued that man- 
made constructions with potential major hazard impacts, such as dams and 
off-shore constructions, should not 4 
be asses 3f jr3tter 
if the frequency 
of occurrence is smaller than 10- per year. 
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Not only must the failure analyst have an accurate model of the system he 
is assessing but he must understand the weaknesses in the models used by 
the people who built up the system. This may sometimes mean that he has 
to have some way of assessing complex computer programs. There have 
recently been structural failures in building due to an error in the 
computer program used to determine the form that structural members 
should take. Frequently proof of the validity of such programs is very 
hard to obtain. 
Apart from the weaknesses related to the comprehensiveness of 
quantitative assessments of risk, it has to be appreciated that these 
techniques generally do not directly assess economic or socio-political 
factors which are often of considerable importance in decision making 
related to the acceptability of risk, and the significance of these 
factors has to be assessed separately. However, the quantification of 
the technical aspects of risk does provide the essential basis for 
assessing the significance of economic or socio-political factors. 
Conclusions 
Unless the technical aspects of risk are quantified there is no rational 
basis for attempting to quantify the economic and scoio-political factors 
that have to be assessed in a comprehensive assessment of the 
acceptability of risk. There are practical limitations to the accuracy 
and comprehensiveness of quantitative assessments of risk. The quality 
of the assessment which the techniques provide is related to the quality 
of the data base and improves as the data base improves, but obtaining 
adequate data for assessing very small numbers of novel installations may 
be an insuperable problem. Even when data does exist there are doubts 
about the reality of considering probabilities of events estimated to be 
lower than 10-/year as such events can be overtaken by natural disasters 
which have approximately the same probability. The lower probabilities 
are only relevant if there is complete protection against natural 
disasters. 
The two Canvey Island reports illustrate how even if the quantification 
of risk is not perfect the techniques can identify the critY, ý 
points in a system which can be modified to reduce the risk. 
The Canvey Island case is also important for the way it illustrates the 
linkage between technical, economic and socio-political factors. The 
technical alterations made to make the risks associated with the various 
installations on the Island generally acceptable also had to be 
economically viable. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Q WfIFICATION PRACTICES IN THE DEAR INDUSTRY 
To show how comprehensively the acceptability of the risks associated 
with the nuclear industry is determined this chapter examines the 
quantification of risk practices adopted by the nuclear industries in 
Germany, Britain and France. The importance of nuclear power to the 
three countries can be judged from the fact than in 1983 in Germany 18% 
of electricity was produced by nuclear power, in Britain the figure was 
17% and in France, the country with the highest nucleaýl Eer output of 
the three countries mentioned, the figure was 48%. The three 
countries are examined separately, and from this examination a number of 
conclusions are drawn about the common features of the practices adopted 
by the three countries. In making this survey, the views expressed in 
the report of the Task Force on Safety Goals/Objectives appointt by the 
Commission of the European Communities, are taken into account. 
For each country considered, the legal requirements for presentation of 
quantified risk assessment as part of the licensing procedure are 
examined, and the way in which the requirements have been developed for 
practical application are then examined. In examining these 
requirements, it is accepted that the proposer may be asked to supply 
some information that is not used directly by the regulatory bodies in 
reaching their final decision about the acceptability of a particular 
proposal. It is also difficult if not impossible to determine how, if at 
all, the regulatory bodies weigh the importance of the various parts of 
the safety justification they are presented with, and if there are any 
factors not included in the safety justification that influenced their 
decision. German practices are described at rather greater length than 
the other countries, as more information was available about the thinking 
of the regulatory authorities on the role and requirements for 
quantitative assessment. 
German Practices 
The German AtomicE gy Law is mainly derived from the Atomic Energy Act 
1976 (AEA 1976), (1 which established a licensing and supervision 
procedure for nuclear plant. The procedure consists of a series of 
partial licences, each of which is unique and deals with a specific 
aspect of the nuclear installation. This allows approval at each stage 
of construction to be based on solid design information. An applicant 
for a licgpc for a nuclear power plant has to present about 1,700 
documents. 
AEA 1976 and the ordinances based on it, particularly the Radiation 
Protection Ordinance 1976 (RPO 1976) and the Nuclear Licensing Ordinance 
1982, contain general provisions about the installations covered and the 
licensing requirements. The particularly vague legal terms used have 
resulted in a judicial review of licensing decisions of competent 
authorities. Detailed interpretations of the Act are given in general 
administrative regulations, guidelines, recommendations, technical 
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standards etc. made by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (the 
supervising authority), State-established commissions and private 
organizations. These more detailed requirements are essential for 
licensing practice, but do not bind legally. 
The essential requirements for granting a licence are laid down in 
section 7 of AEA 1976, which reads as follows: 
"A licence may only be granted if: 
1. There are no known facts giving rise to any doubts as to the 
reliability of the applicant and of the persons responsible for the 
construction and management of the installation and the control of 
its operation and such latter persons possess the requisite 
competence. 
2. It is ensured that the persons who are otherwise engaged in the 
operation of the installation possess the necessary knowledge 
concerning the safe operation of the installation, the possible 
hazards and the safety measures to be applied. 
3. Every necessary precaution has been taken in accordance with the 
latest state of scientific knowledge and technology to prevent 
damage resulting from construction and operation of the 
installation. 
4. The necessary financial security has been provided to cover all 
legal liability to pay compensation for damage. 
5. All necessary protection is provided against disturbance or other 
interference by third persons. 
6. The choice of the site of the installation, in particular with 
respect to non-contamination of water, air and soil, is not contrary 
to overriding public interests. " 
On the level of legally binding ordinances, RPO 1976 describes the basic 
principles of radiological protection as follows: 
1. To prevent any unnecessary radiation exposure or contamination of 
persons or the environment. 
2. To keep as low as possible all types of radiation exposure or 
contamination of persons, property or the environment, taking due 
account of the latest state of scientific knowledge and technology 
and paying attention to the merits of each individual case, even 
where the values are below the limits specified in this ordinance. 
The RPO 1976 also specifies limits for allowable radiation exposures: The 
whole body dose for persons in the monitored off-plant area shall not 
exceed 150 millirem (mrem), and the radiation exposure of man resulting 
from the discharge of radioactive materials into air or water is kept as 
low as possible and shall not exceed 30 mrem in each case or 90 mrem in 
the case of the thyroid exposed via food chains. In the case of 
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incidents, whole body doses in the environment of the plant shall in the 
most unfavourable incident not exceed 5 rem. 'Incidents' are defined in 
RPO 1976 as 'occurrences requiring the shutdown of the plant or the 
interruption of the work for safety-related reasons'. The term 'incident' 
is distinguished from the term 'accident' which is defined as 'an event 
which can cause one or more persons to undergo a radiation exposure or 
incorporate radioactive substances in excess of the described limits'. 
For accidents there is no specification of allowable limits and the 
precautions required against incidents are descibed in vague legal terms 
like: 'The latest state of scientific knowledge and technology', but 
limits are being discussed. 
The list of documents which the applicant has to present to show that the 
licensing requirements have been met includes: a safety report, drawings 
of the plant, a list of all data relevant for the safety of the plant and 
its operation, and details of the measures for control of incidents and 
accidents. 
Particularly relevant to thistud)y are the Safety Criteria for Nuclear 
Power Plants (Safety Criteria) 39 which gives broader guidance on the 
interpretation of the precautions required for a plant to be in 
accordance with the latest state of scientific knowledge and technology. 
The Safety Criteria were written for nuclear power plants with light 
water reactors, but other types of reactor must meet their intent. The 
following is a list of the topics covered by the Safety Criteria: 
Quality Assurance 
Testability 
Radiation Exposure of the Environment 
Radiation Exposure in the Plant 
Arrangement of the Work Area, Work Cycle, Work Environment 
Effects from External Events 
Protection Against Fire and Explosion 
Access Control, Off-limit Areas 
Escape Routes and Means of Carinunication 
Decomnissioning of Nuclear Power Plants 
Reactor Design 
Inherent Safety 
Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals 
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 
Residual Heat Removal During Specified Normal Operation 
Residual Heat Removal After Loss-of-Coolant Accidents 
Monitoring and Alarm Systems 
Incident Instrumentation 
Equipment for Control and Shutdown of the Nuclear Reactor 
Control Room and Auxiliary Control Installations 
Reactor Protection System 
Emergency Power Supply 
Containment of the Nuclear Reactor 
Design Bases of the Containment 
Leakage Tests of the Containment Vessel 
Containment Vessel Penetrations 
Heat Removal from the Containment 
Ventilation and Air Filtration Sytems 
Radiation Protection Monitoring 
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Monitoring and Activity of Exhaust Air and Waste Water 
Environment Monitoring 
Handling and Storage of Nuclear Fuel and Other Radioactive 
Substances. 
The second basic principle of the Safety Criteria concerns the measures 
to be taken to control incidents. It says that: 'sufficiently reliable 
engineered safeguards shall be provided. These engineered safeguards 
shall be designed such that the personnel and population are guarded 
against the effects of incidents. The following design principles shall, 
therefore, be employed: 
- redundancy, diversity, general avoidance of interlaced partial 
systems, spatial separation of redundant partial systems; 
- fail-safe operation of systems during malfunction of partial 
systems and plant components; 
- giving preference to passive over active engineered safeguards. 
Beyond these principles, organizational and technical measures shall be 
provided for on a precautionary basis inside and outside of the plant to 
determine and limit the effects of accidents'. 
With regard to the methodology, a note to the vague term 'sufficiently 
reliable' reads as follows: 'To ascertain that the safety concept is 
well-balanced, the reliability of safety related systems and plant 
components - supplementing the overall assessment of the nuclear power 
plant's safety on the basis of deterministic methods - shall be 
determined with the aid of probabilistic methods as far as the required 
accuracy can be achieved according to the latest state of scientific 
knowledge and technology'. 
The precise safety requirements to be met are specified mostly during the 
licensing process, which is determined essentially by the Federal 
Minister of the Interior as the competent supervisory authority. Before 
giving directions, the Federal Minister of the Interior normally involves 
his advisory committees, in particular the Reactor Safety Commission 
(RSK) and the Radiation Protection Commission (SSK). The technical 
reviews of licence applications by the RSK are pub] ked as RSK 
Recommendations, which are based on the RSK Guidelines. The RSK 
Guidelines are more detailed than the broader guidance of the Safety 
Criteria and they also identify the relevant technical standards of the 
Nuclear Technical Committee (KTA). 
The technical standards of the State-established Nuclear Technical 
Committee (KTA) are important examples of the detailed technical criteria 
used in the licensing process. Also important in this context are the 
technical standards of the German Standardization Organization (DIN), the 
resolutions of the TÜV-Headquarters Nuclear Technology Group, the 
leaflets of the Working Group Pressure Vessels (AD), and the Rules for 
Prevention of Accidents to Man (WV) of the various Working Associations 
for Protection of Industrial Workers (Berufsgenossenschaften). These 
criteria do not bind legally. 
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It can be seen from the description of the German legal requirements for 
licensing that there is a certain amount of flexibility about the 
evidence which must be presented to justify the acceptability of a 
nuclear reactor in Germany. Following the publication of the Farmer risk 
criteria in 1967, there was, in official circles, interest in quantified 
risk assessment which was further stimulated by the publication of WASH- 
1400 in 1975. (U4l) In 1976 the German Federal Ministry for Research and 
Technology initiated a study of the risks associated with German nuclear 
power reactors. The aim of the study was to determine the risks 
associated with accidents in nuclear power stations, using the methods of 
the WASH-1400 study but taking full account of conditions in Germany. The 
work was carried out under the guidance of Professor Dr A. Birkhofer, 
Director of the Gesellschaft für Reak'6rs h rheit (GRS), and the main 
report was published at the end of 1979. (1 2ý The complete study with 
eight appendices was published in 1980. 
The study took the Biblis B design as the reference design, as it is 
representative of the Kraftwerk Union Pressurized Water Reactors that are 
intended to form the basis of the Convoy programme of reactors. The 
Convoy programme was intended to consist of ten reactors and increase the 
nuclear power capacity in Germany to 37 o00 ýe by 1995, but there have 
since been cuts in the programme. (1ý3)(l44) The Biblis B station 
incorporates many special safety features such as a strong double 
containment, heavy shielding, capability to deal with a wide range of 
loss of coolant accidents and a high integrity pressure vessel. Each 
appendix to the study report deals with a specific aspect of the 
analysis. Appendix 1 describes the event tree analysis of internal 
accidents such as loss-of-coolant and transient accidents. Appendix 2 
describes in detail the methods of reliability analysis used. Appendix 3 
describes the data used, particularly frequencies of initiating events, 
the reliability of the reactor pressure vessel, failure rates and failure 
probabilities for components, and probabilities for human error. 
Appendix 4 deals with external events like earthquakes, severe weather 
conditions, aircraft impact explosions, and interaction with nearby 
plant. Appendix 5 deals with core melt accidents. Appendix 6 presents 
an analysis of fission product production and release. Appendix 7 
presents a summary of the more important results from the risk analysis 
of the plant systems. Appendix 8 presents an analysis of the risks and 
consequences of reactor accidents on the nineteen sites in West Germany. 
In relation to this study, Appendices 2 and 3 are the most important as 
they present a comprehensive review of the techniques and data used to 
quantify the risks. 
The fault tree analysis adopted was a conventional approach, but special in the range of the fault conditions covered and the way each step of 
the analysis is justified. Although the coverage is extensive, it is not 
completely comprehensive: to save computer time and computer storage 
space, fault trees for systems having more than 500 components were 
simplified. One form of simplification was to condense into one 
equivft g component all the components whose functions enter the same OR 
gate. 
The analys Aºakes allowance for human error using the same procedure as WASH-1400. 
'4 
There are however many significant differences between 
the German design of reactor and the American reactors on which WASH-1400 
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was based. One particularly important difference is that the German 
power stations are designed so that protective actions are carried out 
automatically and in the event of an accident action by th$prator is 
only required 30 minutes after the start of an accident. In the 
study it is assumed that no unplanned manual interventions are made. 
This could be a source of error in the analysis. 
For most of the fault conditions considered, an expected value, median 
value and uncertainty factor for the consequences are given, so 
uncertainty about the quality of the data used was indicated. For 
example, the expected value for the unavailability of the main coolant 
system due to a large leak was stated as 1.5 x 10-3 with a median value 
of 1.2 x 10-3 and an uncertainty factor of 3, (13) and the probability of 
failure of the system functions required to control a power failure was 
calculated to be 1.3 x 1144 with a median value of 9x 10-5 and an 
uncertainty factor of 4. ( 
The results of the analysis are presented diagrammatically in two main 
ways: as a fault tree showing simply the failures considered, and 
secondly as an event tree indicating something of the consequences. For 
the fault tree of the systems related to a large leak of the main coolant 
system, mentioned above, the following six fault conditions were 
identified and the mea 4unavailability of the system 
functions on demand 
were stated as being. 
Reactor Trip 5 x 10-6 
Data Signals fail to prime emergency cooling 3 x 10-5 
Failure of accumulator injections 7 x 10-4 
Failure of LP injections for flooding 2 x 10-4 
Failure of LP injections for sump re-circulation 6 x 10-4 
Failure of primary containment integrity for 5 x 10-5 
emergency cooling 
Failure of system functions on demand 1.5 x 10-3 
In the event tree similar information is presented but in addition the 
initiating event, the sequential develop%ý) of the accident, and the 
possibility of core meltdown is given. The significance of a 
release of fission products from a damaged core is examined in Appendix 8 
of the German Risk Study. The very broad general conclusion that was 
drawn in the report was that for a population of 29 nuclear power plants, 
the risk of a core meltdown was once in 2.5 x 10 3 years, the risk of 1 fatality was about once in 1.6 x 10 ý year 9,15W the risk of 2,000 fatalities was about once in one in 10 years. 
In a paper published in the Annals of Nuclear Energy, Professor 
Birkhofer, who had guided the preparation of the German Risk Study, 
attempted amongst other things to put into perspective the role in 
Germany of quantitative assessment of the risks associated with nuclear 
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power. (152) He drew attention to the difficulties that arise from 
attempts to bring into coincidence quantitative technical statements 
about what is acceptable with qualitative legal statements about criteria 
that should be satisfied. To illustrate that something. of this problem 
is officially recognized, he mentions that in 1977 the Federal Minister 
of the Interior in promulgating the Safety Criteria demanded that: 
139) 
"The reliability of safety related systems and main components should be 
evaluated using probabilistic methods as far as this is possible with the 
techniques in their present state of development. " This statement by the 
Minister recognizes that quantitative techniques are not absolute. 
Three other important comments that Professor Birkhofer makes amplify his 
views on the methods of analysis and the adequacy of quantitative risk 
assessment and are also germane to the arguments presented earlier in 
Chapter 3. He expresses the view that for the analysis of relatively 
large fault trees, either analytical methods that compute failure rates 
directly or simulation methods such as the Monte-Carlo techniques can be 
used. The simulation methods are in principle more flexible but require 
considerably more computing time, especially if inherently very reliable 
systems have to be evaluated. Some feel for the magnitude of the 
calculation problems involved is given by the fact that to evaluate the 
safety and reliability of a reactor, the performance and interaction of 
tens of thousands of individual components have to be considered. 
Developments of combined analytical/simulative methods may reduce the 
computer time required below that required for simulation methods alone. 
Professor Birkhofer's second point is that, in principle, the methods and 
data for quantitative risk assessment are available but present knowledge 
is insufficient for best estimate analysis. The assumptions that have to 
be made in such assessments lead to pessimistic results and this 
underlines the need for careful estimation of the uncertainty factors. 
The third very important point which Professor Birkhofer makes is his 
conclusion that with the current state of knowledge, reliability and risk 
analyses are supplementary to the usual deterministic methods of 
safety assessment. 
One table of incident probabilities and limit dose values that is 
currently being considered in Germany as the basis for assessing the 
acceptability of various event sequences is shown in Table 6. This set 
of values was reported(} 6t 
he Commission of the European Communities 
Report on Safety Goals. 
The general conclusion that seems to be justified from this examination 
of the German practices which have been adopted, is that the usefulness 
of a thorough quantified risk analysis as an aid to designers and 
assessors alike is well recognized. Equally, the limitations of 
such techniques are recognized and currently for licensing purposes they 
are regarded as supporting, not replacing, the conventional deterministic 
methods of safety assessment. 
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EVENT DEFINITION OF INCIDENCE BASE 
CLASS EVENT CLASS PROBABILITY 
PER YEAR 
1 Normal 1 <30 mrem whole body dose, 
Operation <90 mrem thyroid dose * 
including all dose paths 
2 Abnormal events >3.10-2 . 30 mrem whole 
body dose, 
that can occur 90 mrem thyroid dose * 
in the life of including all dose paths 
the plant 
3 Low frequency 3.10-2 - The fraction 1/n of 5 rem 
accidents whole body dose, 15 rem 
not expected 1.10-4 thyroid dose for a single 
in the life event not considering the 
of a single ingestion path. 
plant but 
could occur Note: the figure n has 
still to be 
determined 
4 Frequency so <1.10-4 5 rem whole body dose 
low not expec- 15 rem thyroid dose for the 
ted to occur event not considering the 
in plants ingestion paths 
during their 
lifetime 
5 Frequency so <1.10-6 Possible in excess of 5 rem 
low they need whole body dose, 15 rem 
not be thyroid dose 
considered 
* The higher dose limit quoted for the thyroid simply reflects the 
fact that the risk factor for the thyroid is lower than for the 
whole body 
TABLE 6 EVENF FREQUENCIES BEINS CONSIDERED BY GERMAN 
AUI'W RITIES (CONSTRUCTED FROM DATA IN REF 136) 
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British Practices 
In Britain, nuclear power reactors for the Generating Boards have to be 
licensed. The licensing and regulatory process is performed by H. M. 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, which was formed under powers 
conferred by the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 
1959. The 1959 Act was modified by the 1965 Nuclear Installations Act 
and in 1974 the Health and Safety at Work Act was passed and when this 
act was implemented, H. M. Nuclear Installation Inspectorate became part 
of the newly formed Health and Safety Executive. 
Planning consent to install a nuclear power station or any other typg555 
station has to be obtained under the Electric Lighting Act of 1909 
which has been modified to some extent by the Electricity Act 1957 and 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. These acts impower the Secretary 
of State to hold a public inquiry if he considers such an inquiry is 
justified, and a public inquiry is mandatory if either the local planning 
authority objects to the proposal or the generating board finds 
conditions hich the planning authority seeks to impose 
unacceptable. tl'4ý The current Sizewell B nuclear power station public inquiry was called under these acts. In Britain the process of obtaining 
planning permission for a new power station is tedious, regardless of the 
type of fuel to be used, and the process of obtaining permission starts 
10-15 years before commissioning of the power station is thought to be 
necessary. 
Before embarking on a description of the requirements which H. M. Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate currently specify a nuclear power station 
should satisfy, it is worth looking back at the comments regarding the 
working methods of the Inspectorate that the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution made in 1976 in their Si, c i) Report, as these 
comments put the present position into perspective. At the time the 
Royal Commission examined the Inspectorate's practices, the Inspectorate 
was using the concept that if the maximum credible accident occurred, any 
consequential release of radioactivity should not cause significant harm 
to the public. Such a concept of acceptability presents difficulties in 
application, particularly in how to decide whether theoretically possible failures are credible or incredible. The following extract from the 
Commission's report puts their views on the maximum credible accident 
approacjj, e d their preference for a probability approach, quite 
clearly: 
"The fact that a reactor has been designed so that the maximum 
credible accident would cause no harm, conveys the impression that 
absolute safety has been achieved, though such an impression would be illusory. There is a conflict between the kind of assurance 
about safety that the public would expect to receive and governments 
like to give, and the kind that engineers can supply; that is, 
between such statements as 'This reactor is completely safe and 
presents no danger to the public' and 'This reactor is so designed 
that the chance of an accident th$t would cause serious harm is 
considered to be less than (say) 10- per year'. The public are not 
generally so acquainted with probabilities as to understand the 
significance of a statement of the latter kind; it may increase 
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rather than allay anxiety. We can see, therefore, that the maximum 
credible accident may be useful as a means of assuring the public 
about reactor safety. 
We are more concerned about the use of the concept as a criterion 
for safety design within the industry. We described earlier the 
technique of fault-tree analysis which requires the disciplined 
investigation of the probabilities of all failure modes and, in 
principle, allows a design to be confirmed against specified risk 
objectives. It is clear that probability analysis must to some 
degree already be used in applying the maximum credible accident 
concept, for the determination of what is incredible or otherwise 
must rest on judgement of the likelihood of failures, but the 
systematic use of the technique is not a condition of licensing. It 
is possible, therefore, that because attention is focussed on 
certain specific failures that would lead to the maximum credible 
accident, there will not be disciplined analysis of other modes of 
failure which, though less likely to occur, could have much more 
serious consequences, and whose probabilities of occurrence it 
should be an object of design to reduce to known and acceptable 
levels. This may mean that resources are not used in the optimum 
way in relation to the spectrum of risks that actually exists. " 
The Commission drew attention in their report to the fact that there was 
strong support for the probabilistic approach to safety in nuclear 
reactor design from the Nuclear Power Company Ltd., the British Nuclear 
Design and Construction Company, the Central Electricity Generating Board 
and the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority. The Commission concluded that there was a need to 
review the criteria and methods of working of H. M. Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate. One final point about the Commission's report that is 
worth mentioning, as it relates to both the nuclear and major hazards in 
the process industries parts of this study, is that they foresaw that a 
system of licensing will be needed for some potentially hazardous non- 
nuclear installations and that the same disciplines and safety techniques 
were required for the nuclear industry and the potentially hazardous 
parts of non-nuclear industry. 
Three years after the Commission's report, H. M. Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate published the first edition of th%jj guide to safety 
assessment principles for nuclear power reactors. ' These guidelines 
described the fault sequence evaluation which the Inspectorate would 
expect to see for any new nuclear reactor proposals. In the following, 
the main quantitative conditions that the guidelines postulated should be 
satisfied are summarized under the headings of normal operation and fault 
conditions. If the risks are greater than specified in the guidelines, 
then very careful evaluation of their acceptability is called for. 
In normal operation 
1) The dose equivalent commitment from normal operations to 
occupationally exposed persons on site should not be more than one 
third of the appropriate annual dose limit. 
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2) The average dose received from normal operations by occupationally 
exposed persons should not exceed one tenth of the appropriate 
annual dose limit when averaged over a year. 
3) The dose received by any person outside the site boundary from all 
sources originating on the site should not exceed one thirtieth of 
the annual dose limit for the general public. 
Under fault conditions 
1) The dose received by any person outside the site boundary from all 
sources originating on the site should be no more than one thirtieth 
of the appropriate annual dose limit for the general public more 
frequently than once in a reactor lifetime. 
2) The dose received by the public from direct radiation and release of 
radioactive material should not exceed the annual dose more 
frequently than once in a reactor programme (of about 100 reactors). 
Additionally, any discrete fault sequence which could lead to a dose 
greater thin an E4mergency Reference Level Dose (ERL) more frequently than 
once in 10 - 10 years should be controlled by at least two effective 
barriers each capable of reducing the potential release. 
Another way in which quantitative criteria have emerged is in the 
assessment reference levels that the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
reported it uses (136ýhe 
Commission of the European Communities Task Force 
on Safety Goals. The levels are shown in Table 7. It was emphasized 
that the values were not set down as rigid targets, but as a guide to the 
Inspectorate's staff on the depth of assessment required. 
FREQUENCY PER YEAR WHOLE BODY RADIATION DOSE 
ASSESSMENT REFERENCE LE'VELS* 
>3.3 X 10-2 16.6 mrem 
3.3 x 10-2 - 3.3 x 10-4 500 mrem 
<3.3 x 10-4 10 rem 
'remote' >10 rem 
(In the report(136) a 
remotely low probability 
was describ%4 as between 
10-6 and 10_7) 
* IF A FAULT SEQUENCE COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER DOSE IT WOULD BE 
SUBJECT TO CAREFUL ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE IF IT IS ACCEPTABLE 
TABLE 7 NLELEAR INSTALLATIONS ASSESSMENT REFERENCE LEVELS 
(FROM REF 136) 
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The reports to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate published on the 
generic safety issues of pressurized water reactors(15ý and on the 
review of the Sizewell B pre-construction safety report(159) illustrate 
the role that quantification of risk in probability terms is expected to 
play in future assessments. In the review of the Sizewell B pre- 
construction safety report, the Inspectorate went as far as welcoming the 
effort that had been made to producing a probability analysis in support 
of the safety case which attempted to show that the design satisfied the 
probability targets in the Central Electricity Generating Board's 
(CEGB's) design safety guidelines and stated that the analysis had made a 
valuable contribution to the safety case. 60) The CEGB's safety design 
guide lines as reported to the Commission of the European Communities 
Task Force on Safety Goals are shown in Table 8. (138 The CBGB mentioned 
to the Task Force that in special circumstances they may consider 
variation of these targets. 
FREQUENCY PER YEAR WHOLE BODY DOSE 
LIMIT GUIDELINE 
Normal operations 25 mrem 
<10-2 0.1 rem 
<10-3 1 rem 
<10-4 10 rem 
<10-6 >10 rem 
TABLE 8 CEGB'S SAFETY DESIGN GUIDELINES 
The first reactor that was subjected to a complete detailed quantified 
risk and reliability assessment was the Hartlepool Advanced Gas Cooled 
625 MW(e) Reactor and this resulted in considerable redesign of the 
system, which delayed construction and the reactor being put into 
operation. * 
Clearly, in the British licensing procedure, quantification in 
probability terms of the risks associated with a particular proposal is a 
requirement that has to be satisfied. The following are the more 
important 
ýf 1irements which the Nuclear Inspectorate specify for a fault analysis: 
* From various discussions with members of the staff of the CEGB and 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 
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1) The aim of the fault analysis is to estimate in quantitative 
terms the behaviour of the reactor and associated plant in 
specified fault conditions, the outcome of such faults and the 
likelihood of their occurrences. 
2) The fault analysis in any safety submission should be based on 
systematic and detailed studies which span the range of 
specified discrete faults including common mode faults, 
combinations of faults, and situations beyond the design basis 
of the plant. All these factors should be considered in a way 
that takes account of any changes that may take place during 
the lifetime of the plant considered. 
3) Techniques using fault tree or event tree analysis should be 
regarded as aids to the logical evaluation of the fault 
potential of any plant. Evidence of such analysis should be 
presented in any safety case and should also be basic tools to 
be employed where appropriate by an assessor in examining such 
a case. 
4) The fault analysis should be reviewed from time to time to 
determine if it requires modification to take account of 
changes in the data available or analytical techniques of 
analysis used. 
5) Any statistical data used should be supported by a statement 
which shows its source, sample size, sample elements, working 
conditions and a statement about the accuracy of the data. 
6) Presentation of particular reliability analyses should be 
supported by a statement of the confidence associated with the 
data used, possible variations with time and testing and 
maintenance frequency. 
7) The reliability claimed for any human actions involved, e. g. 
maintenance, should be based on the complexity of the task, the 
stress involved and weighted for repetitive actions. 
8) One case where the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate place a 
limit on what they consider to be a credible level of 
reliability is for systems employing redundance through the use 
of identical components, measurements or actions. For 
protection equipment this limitation sho1ild be in the range 
corresponding to one failure per 10 to 10 demands, depending 
on the complexity and novelty of the system. 
In their review of the Sizewell B pre-construction safety report, the 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate show clearly how they use the 
probability data to assess the acceptability of the proposal. In several 
cases the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate say the reliability of a 
particular system is too low and steps should be taken to improve the 
reliability. 
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The general conclusions that seems to be justified from this examination 
of British practices is that quantified risk analysis is used by the 
regulatory authorities as a way of assessing the acceptability of a 
particular proposal. The indications are that the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate use the estimates of reliability in an iterative way to 
encourage the proposer to progressively improve reliability up to an 
acceptable but maintained standard. That is, if reliability of some 
system or component is indicated as being low in the pre-construction 
safety report, the proposer will be asked to improve the design of that 
item so that by the time the final safety report is presented it will 
have an acceptable level of reliability. 
French Practices 
The licensing procedure in France is in many ways similar to the British 
system, h differences being more of detail than in the overall 
concept. 
ý6ý In France there are three main stages in the licensing 
procedure: a construction permit, permission for fuel loading and start- 
up tests, and final authorization for normal operation. The Ministry of 
Industry and the Ministry of Health are the ministries mainly concerned 
with the licensing procedure, but other ministries such as the Ministries 
of Interior, Equipment, Agriculture, Environment and Transportation are 
also concerned. 
A construction permit is only granted when the technical evaluation of 
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report submitted by the owner has been 
evaluated, other ministries consulted and local inquiries completed. 
These public inquiries are much simpler than the public inquiry held for 
Sizewell B and amount to little more than the Prefect making the 
documents available for public comment. The Prefect also consults local 
authorities. Approval to load fuel and initiate start-up tests is only 
given after the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report has been evaluated. 
Before normal full power operation is authorized, a Final Safety Analysis 
Report and operating instructions must be submitted and approved. 
To guide owners and designers in the safety requirements that nuclear 
plants should satisfy, a set of Design and Construction Rules (RCC) is 
being devised. Responsibility for preparing these rules now rests with 
AFCEN (Association Fran? aise pour les regles de conception et de 
construction des materials des chaudieres electronucleaires), an 
organization formed by Electricite de France (EdF), Framatome and 
Novatome on October 19,1980. The involvement of industry in preparing 
these rules illustrates how industry can participate in regulating 
safety. AFCEN published the RCC-M (Design and Construction Rules for 
Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear Islands) in an initial edition dated 
January 1981 and a second modified version was published at the beginning 
of 1982. English translations of these texts are available from AFCEN 
while English and French versions are also available of AFCEN's RCC-E 
(Design and Construction Rules for Electrical Equipment of Nuclear 
Islands) and of RCC-C (Design and Construction Rules for Fuel Assemblies 
of PWR Nuclear Power Plants). A review of AECEN's programme is given in 
Appendix 3. The general scope and status of these rules is summarized in 
Table 9. 
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PART DESCRIPTION SCOPE STATUS 
General design Rules for 900 Mae 
principles, basic stations approved by 
structure and system French Safety 
1 SYSTEM DESIGN design, interface Authorities. Rules 
criteria, operating proposed for 1300 MWe 
condition analysis stations being reviewed 
and radiation by French Safety 
protection Authorities. 
Deals with component Approved by French 
2 MECHANICAL design, materials, Safety Authorities 
DESIGN inspection, manufac- 
(RCC-M) turing and welding 
processes 
Will cover electrical This section has not 
equipment design, yet been approved by 
testing and instal- the French Safety 
3 ELECTRICAL lation and will cover Authorities 
DESIGN topics such as cable 
(RSC-E) penetrations and 
seismic qualifi- 
cation of electrical 
equipment 
Deals with the Not yet approved by 
4 NUCLEAR FUEL design, manufacture the French Safety 
(RCC-C) and testing of Authorities 
nuclear fuel 
Design rules for The rules for 900 MWe 
reactor containment plant have been issued 
including liners and the rules for 1300 
and penetrations. MVe plant are to be 
The requirements issued during 1982 
5 CIVIL DESIGN for pre-stressing 
operations and 
testing for resis- 
tance and leak- 
tightness are also 
given 
The rules will deal These rules are not yet 
6 FIRE with material approved by the French 
PROTECTION selection, fire Safety Authorities 
detection and fire 
fighting 
TABLE 9 SCOPE AND STATUS OF DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION RULES 
PROPOSED BY AFCEN 
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To the Commission of the European Communities Task Force on Safety Goals 
it was reported that th Y6? nch regulatory authorities have laid down the 
following requirements: 
"In general, plant that goes to make up a nuclear reactor unit of 
the pressurized water type should be so designed that the overall 
probability of the ynit giving rise to unacceptable consequences 
does not exceed 10- /year. " 
"Therefore, when a probabilistic approach is to be used for 
assessing whether a family of events should be taken into 
consideration in the design of a unit of this kind, that family of 
events should effectively be taken into consideration if the 
probability of it giving rise to unacceptable consequences exceeds 
10- /year.... " 
"Nevertheless, this figure should be considered more as a guide than 
a strict mandatory limit : 'the probability figures... should of 
course be considered as giving orders of magnitude for the overall 
objective and the various families of events... " 
The French have defined three levels of safety which are: (163) 
First level - maximum inherent ability of the plant to 
function safely during normal operation through 
design and quality of fabrication. 
Second level - incorporation of protection systems capable of 
minimizing the effects of abnormal transient or 
incident events. 
Third level - incorporation of engineered safety features 
capable of mitigating the effects of postulated 
accidents. 
For design purposes four categories of conditions that have to be 
considered have been identified as follows: 
Category 1- normal operation 
Category 2- accidents of low frequency 
Category 3- improbable accidents 
Category 4- hypothetical accidents 
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The frequency and exposure limit associated with the four conditions are 
summarized in Table 10. Clearly these four categories are intended to 
span the whole spectrum of conditions that can arise on a reactor. 
CATEGORY ANNUAL EXPOSURE LIMIT 
(CONDITION) FREQUENCY 
1 Radiation release limits of each 
(normal NOT nuclear plant are specified by 
operation) RELEVANT decree within the maximum of the 
'Arretes du 10 aoüt 1976' 
2 
-2 -1 
Radiation release limits of each 
(accidents of 10 - 10 nuclear plant are specified by 
low frequency) decree within the maximum of the 
'Arretes du 10 aoüt 1976' 
3 
(improbable 10-4 - 10-2 
0.5 rad whole body 
1.5 rad thyroid 
accidents) 
4 15 rad whole body dose 
(hypothetical 10-6 - 10-4 30-40 rad thyroid dose 
accidents) 
TABLE 10 FREQUENCY/EXPOSURE LIMIT FOR EACH CATEGORY OF EVENT 
TO BE CONSIDERED IN DESIGN 
The French ministerial declaration reference CAB 900 MZ, dated September 
3,1979, specifies a number of spe i is conditions that have to be met by 
1300 MW series of nuclear plants. These requirements have now also 
been applied to recent plants in the 900 MW series. The conditions that 
have to be satisfied are the following: 
1) To ensure fuel assembly integrity and leak tightness is 
maintained in all normal and transient situations there must be 
surveillance of their condition by measurement of at least one 
parameter that will indicate the condition of the fuel cladding 
tubes. 
2) Reactor vessel internals must be able to withstand all credible 
accident conditions and must be capable of inservice 
inspection. 
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3) To minimize as far as possible the dose to the public and 
operators in all credible situations (this implies limiting 
reactor coolant circuit activity). 
4) To preclude any risk of abnormal leak tightness failure, 
cracking or sudden rupture of the main primary coolant system 
by taking into account in the design, fabrication and 
inspection adequate precautions to ensure that sufficient 
allowance is made for service conditions and uncertainties in 
material properties. 
5) To provide for inservice inspection of the primary coolant 
system (the exact amount of the inspection is not specified). 
The French have not so far published, in the open literature, a risk 
study of the WASH-1400 or the German Risk Study type, but for a South 
African customer Framatome did make such a study and the essential 
features of the study are summarised in Appendix 4. Two important 
conclusions that the study drew attention to are the significance of 
human errors in accident sequences and the importance of following the 
development of the consequences of fault sequences over a period of time, 
sometimes extending to months. Also effort is being devoted to 
collecting reliability data from the operating reactors. 
The role of quantification practices is now not very different in France 
from either Germany or Britain. M. Tanguy of the French Institut de 
Protection et de Sürete(11 gleaire defended the position very positively 
in the following terms: 
"In France, although there still exists a variety of viewpoints on 
how probabilistic methods must be used on some concrete cases, there 
is a general agreement on their interest and usefulness, and 
probabilistic criteria have already been in use for quite a few 
years. 
The implementation of probabilistic methods in the licensing 
procedure must be progressive, and one can identify four main steps: 
(a) Use probabilistic methodology as an assistance to safety with 
the present safety rules. 
(b) Introduce new probabilistic safety criteria and/or replace some 
deterministic criteria by probabilistic ones. 
(c) Derive a consistent set of probabilistic safety criteria from 
an overall risk acceptance criterion. 
(d) Compare probabilistic evaluations with the feedback from 
experience and the results of safety research. " 
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Many examples can be given of the actions taken in accordance with the 
first two steps. But it is the third step, (c), which raises the most 
serious difficulties. Without deterministic design criteria there can be 
no clear definition of what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, and 
this can result in a lack of precision, clarity and consistency in safety 
arguments. 
The conclusion that seems to be justified from this examination of French 
practices on the quantification of risk in the nuclear industry, is that 
the capability of techniques for quantification of risk are fully 
appreciated. Interest in the method has extended to collecting relevant 
reliability data from the reactors that are currently operating. Also 
when a comprehensive quantified safety study has been required, such as 
for the South African Koeberg Reactor, it has been produced. One way the 
French approach to quantification can be justified, is that the main line 
of French power reactors has been the pressurized water reactor and the 
first thirty of these reactors were all very similar in design and had a 
power output of about 900 MWe. The first of this line of reactors 
started operation in Ap 1 1977 and the last is scheduled to start 
operation late in 1984. (jý6ý This series of reactors had been given 
approval before the probabilistic approach to assessing acceptability had 
been given wide endorsement, so clearly it would have been inconsistent 
to change the method of assessment part way through the series. The 
second series of pressurized water reactors, the 4 loop 1300 MWe units, 
are being built in parallel with the last few units of the 900 MWe 
series. As the 1300 MWe units are a direct development of the already 
approved 900 MWe units, there was clearly little incentive to change the 
method of assessment. 
Conclusions 
In Germany, Britain and France the primary legislation establishing 
nuclear reactor licensing procedures does not specify that the 
acceptability of nuclear reactors must be determined on the basis of 
assessments which quantify risk in probability terms. However, the 
Regulatory Authorities have adopted practices which require an applicant 
for a licence to support his application with a quantified assessment of 
the associated risks. The practices vary slightly from country to 
country but generally leave the Regulatory Authorities free to decide in 
a deterministic way whether or not a proposal is acceptable. This seems 
to endorse the view that currently quantitative evidence presented should 
only be used to guide the regulators in their assessment of acceptability 
and that quantitative criteria should not be specified in a prescriptive 
way. In the three countries considered the regulatory authorities are in 
various stages of developing safety goals, which specify in probability 
terms limit levels for whole body dose that will be used in assessing the 
acceptability of nuclear reactor designs. It is important to notice that 
goals are being developed rather than a mandatory requirement. The 
current form of these goals is summarized in Fig 3, which is based on the 
evidence given in Reference 136. There is a remarkable similarity in the 
way the goals have been specified in the three countries. The limiting 
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FIG 3 QUAWIFIID TARGETS FOR NCULEAR INSTALLATIONS 
(BASED ON FIGURE 1 REF 136) 
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dose specified is of approximately the same order of magnitude in each 
country. They also show considerable agreement on the fact tha 
unacceptable conditions should not have a probability higher than 10- 
per year. 
The following quotation from the conclusions Professor Birkhofer draws in 
his paper seems to summarize well the role that is seen for risk 
analysis: 
"Risk analyses are quite a new, yet effective, way to assess the 
level of safety of large technological systems. Although the 
uncertainty margins of results are considerable, valuable 
information can be gained from the analysis, provided that for the 
interpretation the limitations of the method are taken into 
account. " 
The preferred method of risk assessment appears to be a combination of 
fault and event tree analysis with the event tree being taken as far as 
assessing the consequences of the fault. The results of the analysis 
should be expressed in terms of expected and median value accompanied by 
an evaluation of the associated uncertainty factor. The potential of the 
simulative techniques such as the Monte Carlo method are appreciated but 
are currently considered to be too expensive in computer time. It is 
also recognized that some simplification of the systems analysed is 
usually required to keep the demands for analytical resources within 
practical limits. 
The approval procedures examined do not directly require that the 
proposer should present a comprehensive assessment covering the 
technical, economic and socio-political aspects of the acceptability of 
the risks associated with his proposal. The information demanded is 
mainly of a technical nature, but data on the other factors may, 
particularly in Britain, be called for in any public debate of the 
acceptability of the proposal. 
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CHAPTER 6 
QUANTIFICATION PRACTICES IN MJR HAZARD INDUSTRIES 
To extend and provide a basis of comparison of current procedures for 
determining the acceptability of risk the practices used in the major 
hazard industries are now examined. The examination of the practices in 
Major Hazard Industries presented in this chapter follows a similar 
pattern to that adopted for the examination of the practices in nuclear 
industry presented in the previous chapter. As in Chapter 5, the 
practices in Germany, Britain and France are examined but, additionally, 
some comments are given on Danish and Dutch practices. 
Two major differences between the nuclear industry and the major hazard 
industries have to be recognized, as they have a bearing on the approach 
to assessing acceptability that has been adopted. First, the major 
hazard industries in the countries considered are made up of many units 
of various sizes, types and ownership so they do not present the same 
uniform pattern of organization as the nuclear industry. This leads to 
the second difference: as the major hazard industries are made up of 
large and small units, not all have the same capability to make extensive 
safety studies. For the major units the safety justifications they 
present are often similar to the safety justification presented for a 
nuclear installation, but in general they are not so voluminous. Some of 
the similarity with the nuclear industry approach stems from the fact 
that often the same risk assessment specialists are involved in both 
industries. For example the British study of the major hazards on Canvey 
Island was made by a team from the Safety and Reliability Directorate of 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 
German Practices 
The complex set of regulations relating to those parts of the German 
chemical industry which require a licence are examined in two stages. 
First, a general view of the most important law in the field is presented 
and then the specific licensing requirements are outlined. In official 
documents it is stated that the development of the special requirements 
for installations with major hazard potential was motivated by the 
disastrous incidents in Feyzin in France in 1966, in Fli xl1o6rough in 
England in 1974, in Seveso and Manfredonia in Italy in 1976. This 
demonstrates the international implications of such incidents. The only 
major German accident, the explosion at the BASF plant at Ludwigshafen in 
1948, was perhaps too far back in history to influence these 
developments. 
The basic law governing plant and equipment such as pressure vessels, 
installations for pressurized gas, highly pressurized gas pipe-lines, 
installations for flammable liquids and electric installations in spaces 
with a danger of explosion has developed from sections 24-25 Industrial 
Code 1869-1978 and special supplementary ordinances. The legal approach 
combines specific safeguard requirements with complementary reference to 
the 'generally approved technical rules' and additional requirements to 
be specified by the competent authority. The law concerning protection of 
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labour is laid down in sections 708-722 Reichsinsurance Code 1911, the 
rules for Prevention of Accidents to Man (Unfallverhütungsvorschriften) 
of the various trade associations for Protection of Industrial Workers 
(Berufsgenossenschaften) and the Technical Means of Work Act 1968. The 
Berufsgenossenschaften are public corporate bodies with the legal 
responsibility for accident insurance. They are financed by industry 
and, of course, have an interest in keeping their costs low by achieving 
a high standard of occupational safety. Safety standards are formed by 
measures and requirements laid down in the Unfallverhutungsvorschrif ten 
of the Berufsgenossenschaften, which must be fulfilled by both firms and 
people at work. 
The law governing dangerous substances includes the Substances at Work 
Act 1939, the Explosives Act 1976, the Chemicals Act 1980, the Atomic 
Energy Act 1976, and the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 1980. The most 
important law concerning environmental protection related to industrial 
installations is the Federal Emission Control Act 1974 (FICA 1974). A 
translation of the Act as amended up to 4th March 1982 is given in 
Appendix 2. The legal and technical basis of the chemical installations 
regulatory system is derived from the following documents: 
- Federal Emission Control Act 1974 as amended March 1982 
(see Appendix 2) 
- Ordinance on Installations Subject to Licensing 1975 
(see Appendix 5) 
- Ordinance on Principles of Licensing Procedure 1977 
- Ordinance on the Implementation of the German Federal Emission 
Control Law 12BImSchV June 1980 (see Appendix 6) 
- Hazardous Incident Ordinance 1980 
- First General Administrative Regulation on the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance 1981 (a translation of this regulation is 
given in Appendix 7) 
- Second General Administrative Regulation on the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance 1982 (a translation of this regulation is 
given in Appendix 8) 
- Technical Guidance Noise 1968 
- Technical Guidance Air 1974 
- EEC-Directive on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial 
Installations 1982 
- Technical standards and guidelines of private (standardization) 
organizations such as DIN the German Institute for Standardization 
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The Federal Emission Control Act 1974 (FICA 1974), (168) and the 
ordinances and administrative regulations based on the Act define the 
essential legal regulations in the field of environmental protection and 
specify the licensing and supervision procedure for major hazard 
industries. The tenor of the Acts, ordinances and administrative 
regulations can be judged from the following notes on the essential 
features of the legislation. 
According to Article 4 (1) FICA 1974 installations shall be subject to 
licensing if they are particularly liable to cause harmful effects to the 
environment or otherwise to endanger or cause considerable disadvantages 
or considerable nuisances to the general public or to the surrounding 
area. Installations which do not serve commercial purposes and are not 
used within the framework of commercial undertakings shall only be 
subject to licensing if they are particularly liable to cause harmful 
effects on the environment through air pollution or noise, the 
justification for the subtle differences in requirements is not clearly 
defined but seems to be based on the scale and nature of the operations 
concerned and to include reasons of National Defence. 
The problems caused by the use of vague legal terms, such as 'harmful 
effects', 'considerable disadvantage' are partly solved by the Fourth 
Ordinance on the Implementation of the Federal Emission Control Act 
(Ordinance on Installatioll6, ýjbject to Licensing - 4. BImSchV) of 14 
February 1975 (ISLO 1975). In ISLO 1975 two lists are given of 
types of installations which meet the requirements of Article 4 (1) FICA 
1974. Article 2 ISLO 1975 specifies 58 types of installations with a 
higher hazard potential (like installations for the manufacture of 
phosphoric or nitrogenous fertilizer) which are subject to the formal 
licensing procedure. Article 4 ISLO 1975 also specifies 40 types of 
installations with a lower hazard potential (like shooting places) which 
are subject to a simplified licensing procedure. Further precision to 
the definition of installations subject to licensing is given by the 
Twelfth Ordinance on the Implementation of the Federal Emission Control 
Act (Ha dons Incident Ordinance) - 12. BImSchV of 27 June 1980 (HIO 
1980), (ýý) which applies only to industrial installations with major 
hazard potential. A translation of the Twelfth Ordinance is given in 
Appendix 6. 
Article 1 HIO 1980 selects from the installations subject to licensing 
according to Article Mil FICA 1974, those in which hazardous incidents 
are likely to happen, the selection being made by reference to the 
nine types of plants listed in Annex 1 of the Twelfth Ordinance in which 
substances listed in Annex II of the Ordinance 'are present during 
regular operation or may be formed during a disturbance of regular 
operation'. The fact that a selection has been made suggests some 
attempt has been made to assess, perhaps even in quantified terms, the 
significance of the risk associated with each type of installation. 
Annex II identifies 142 trade names of chemical substances which may 
create a public hazard, and which are selected from the MAK* value list 
* MAK is a German expression for the maximum allowable concentration in 
a work place. 
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1979 of a commission of72 the German Research Association (Deutsche 
Fors chungsgemneinschaft). 1 
According to Article 1, of HIO 1980, it does not apply 'to installations 
in which the amounts of such substances that may be present or formed are 
so small that a public hazard resulting from a disturbance of regular 
operation can obviously be excluded'. The First General Administrative 
Incident Ordinance of 23 April 1981 specifies threshold quantities 
which, as a rule, do not create a public hazard like for example 10 
kilogram of phosgene. 
The essential legal requirements for granting a licence are laid down in 
Article 5 and 6 FICA 1974, and in ordinances and general administrative 
regulations based on this Act. 
Article 6 of FICA provides that a licence shall be granted if: 
"1. Measures have been taken to ensure that duties arising out of 
Article 5 and out of any ordinance based on Article 7 have been 
fulfilled; 
2. Other public law regulations and labour protection requirements do 
not prevent the establishment and operation of the installation. " 
Article 5 of FICA 1974 describes the duties imposed on operators in the 
following way: 
"Installations subject to licensing shall be established and operated in 
such a way that: 
1. Harmful effects on the environment and other hazards, considerable 
disadvantages and considerable nuisances to the general public in the 
vicinity cannot be caused by such establishment and operation; 
2. Precautionary measures, in particular measures to ensure the 
limitation of emissions in accordance with the latest state of 
technology are taken to prevent harmful effects on the environment; 
3. Residual substances from the operation of such installations are 
properly and harmlessly utilized or, in so far as this is not 
possible technically or is not justifiable on economic grounds, are 
properly disposed of as waste. " 
This list of duties identifies three basic principles which are 
protection, precaution and disposal. 
The vague legal terms used in Article 5 are defined elsewhere in the 
document as follows: 'harmful effects on the environment' are emissions 
which, according to their nature, extent or duration, are liable to cause 
hazard, major disadvantages or major nuisances to the general public or 
to the surrounding area. The 'latest state of technology' is the stage 
of development reached with processes, facilities or methods of operation 
which shows the practical suitability of measures for limiting emissions. 
These legal interpretations are not sufficiently precise with regard to 
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the terms 'hazard' and 'major' to answer the question of what is an 
acceptable risk. With respect to emissions associated with the normal 
operation of installations subject to licensing, precise definitions are 
given the Technical Guidance Concerning the Protection Against Noise of 
16 July 1969 and the Technical Guidance nce Concerning the Purity of the Air 
of 28 August 1974 (TG Air 1974). (173) TG Air 1974 contains regulations 
concerning the limitation of emissions and sets out basic principles for 
determination and assessment of emissions. The technical measures are 
also specified by reference to the 'latest state of technology' and by 
reference to the technical standards of the various standardization 
organizations. Particular mention is made of the guidelines given in the 
Purity of Air Handbook of the Federation of German Engineers (VDI) and 
the technical standards of the German Institute for Standardization (DIN) 
as published by the Federal Minister of the Interior. The provisions of 
the TC Air 1974 were based technically and scientifically on the 
guidelines prepared by a commission of VDI, and information from the 
competent authorities 7f7 the German Lander and from national and 
international industry. 14) The provisions of the TG Air 1974 are 
legally binding for the licensing authorities, but open for judicial 
review. In practice the administrative courts of justice accept the 
borderlines drawn by the ZG Air 1974 between accepted and non-accgpý 
emissions characterizing them as 'anticipated expert opinions'. 
This gives an important role to professional judgement and avoids the 
need for a quantitative statement about what is acceptable. 
HIO 1980 concentrates on accidents that could give rise to a 'public 
rýcý, jf hazard' and describes the requirements for prevention and limit' 
incidents and the need for preparing a detailed safety analysis. 
This means that the approach used in HIO 1980 can be described as system 
orientated. 
HIO 1980 specifies the duty to prevent hazardous incidents in the 
following: 'The operator of an installation shall take the measures 
required in view of the type and extent of possible hazards, in order to 
prevent hazardous incidents'. The vague wording of the terms 'hazardous 
incident', 'possible hazards' and 'required measures' requires further 
definition. 
According to the legal interpretation in Article 2 HIO 1980, 'hazardous 
incident' means a disturbance sturbance of normal opergtýq during which a 
substance covered by Annex II of the HIO 1980 is released, or 
formed, or takes fire, or explodes, giving rise to a public hazard. 
'Public hazard' means a hazard: (1) to the life of persons not belonging 
to the operating staff of the affected part of the installation, or the 
risk of serious injury to the health of such persons, (2) to the health 
of a large number of people, or (3) for goods of high value outside the 
installation in cases where due to any alteration of these goods the 
public welfare would be impaired (for example vitiation of water or 
land). Keeping in mind that hazardous incidents have to be prevented, it 
becomes clear that there is no description of a non-acceptable risk in a 
quantified manner. 
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The Kalkar decision of the Federal Constitution Court, 
(179) limits the 
sources of hazards that have to be taken into consideration in a real way 
by excluding hazards which may be reasonably expected not to cause any 
hazardous incident. But there is no quantification of what 'reasonably' 
may mean. Three types of hazards are distinguished: those inherent in 
the installation, locational sources of hazards like earthquakes, 
flooding etc., and the actions of unauthorized persons. 
The 'required measures' to prevent, hazardous incidents are identified in 
Article 4 HIO 1980 which provides that the operator shall: 
1. Ensure that the installation will also resist the stresses and 
strains to be expected during a disturbance of normal operation; 
2. Ensure that fire and explosions: 
a) are prevented inside the installation, and 
b) cannot act on it from outside the installation in 
a way that would affect the safety of the installation; 
3. Equip the installation with adequate warning, alarm and safety/ 
security systems; 
4. Equip the installation with sufficiently reliable measuring 
instruments and control units, employing as far as is required from 
the viewpoint of safety technology several units for each function, 
using different types and units that are independent of each other; 
5. Protect the parts of the plant that are important from the safety 
technology viewpoint from the acts of unauthorized persons. 
The required measures are specified in more detail in the check list of 
the Annex to the Second General Administrative Regulation on the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance of 27 April 198? 1 wich among other 
things 
refers to the relevant technical standards. (This regulation is 
reproduced in Appendix 8. ) Furthermore, Article 3 (4) HIO 1980 (this 
document is reproduced in Appendix 6) requires that the technical 
measures must meet the latest state of safety technology which, according 
to Article 3 HIO 1980, has to be interpreted as 'the latest state of 
technology', and this phrase has already been defined. * 
The duty of the operator is to take precautions to keep the effects of 
hazardous incidents as small as possible and the safeguard requirements 
necessary to fulfil this duty are identified in Article 5 (1) HIO 1980 as 
follows: 
"1. Ensure that the design of the foundations and loadbearing parts of 
the buildings cannot cause additional hazards in the event of an 
incident; 
* See p 76-77 
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2. Equip the installation with the necessary safety equipment and take 
the necessary technical and organizational precautions; 
3. Establish alarm and hazard control plans in line with local disaster 
control and hazard control planning. " 
With regard to both the first and second duties, Article 6 (1) HIO 1980 
amplifies the requirement by stating that the operator shall: 
1. Subject the installation to continuous surveillance from the point 
of view of safety technology and ensure that the relevant equipment 
is serviced at regular intervals; 
2. Carry out the maintenance and repair work according to the generally 
recognized rules of technology; 
3. Take the precautions required from a technical safety standpoint to 
avoid errors in operation which could have harmful effects on the 
public or the environment; 
4. Prevent mistakes by operating staff by providing suitable operating 
and safety instructions as well as adequate training of the staff; 
5. Instruct the staff concerned on the action required by them 
according to the installation alarm and hazard control plans, in the 
event of a hazardous incident. 
In HIO 1980, it is specified that the operator shall prepare a safety 
analysis. The content of the safety analysis is outlined in Article 7 of 
HIO 1980, and specified in more detail in the Second Gen ? r8} 
Administrative Regulation of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 1982. 
(A translation of this regulation is presented in Appendix 8. ) The 
general principles laid down in section 3.1 are as follows: 
"The safety analysis to be prepared by the operator according to 
Article 7 of the Ordinance is a document which must be intelligible 
as such and summarise and evaluate a systematic assessment of all 
conditions which are of significance for the safety and security of 
the installation and its operation. This document shall only be 
deemed complete if it contains the information required according to 
Article 7 para 1 No 3.2 of the Ordinance. The information shall be 
sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to allow the responsible 
authority to assess adequately the operator's compliance with the 
safety duties pursuant to Articles 3 and 6 of the Ordinance. If 
calculations are required for this purpose, it shall become manifest 
from this documentation that they have been carried out. 
The safety analysis shall also provide a clear picture of the steps 
in the assessment methods used for the systematic analysis of the 
installation, with regard to the parts of the installation which are 
of significance from a technical safety standpoint to critical 
situations, to determination of the effects of hazardous incidents, 
and to safety precautions. Deterministic methods for evaluating the 
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process may be used, e. g. Hazop (Hazard and operability 
study), tabular checklists, failure modes and effects analysis, 
preliminary risk analysis, fault trees, event analysis. " 
Most of the analytical techniques mentioned are of the type that give a 
quantified assessment of risk. 
The safety analys%Eg responds to the requirements of section 7 of the 
Ordinance only if: 
- "the descriptive parts of the safety analysis correspond to the 
processes, facilities or operating procedures existing in the 
installation and if the right conclusions are drawn from the 
described facts. This shall be deemed to apply if all interrelations 
between the various operations and conditions in the installation, 
which are of significance from a technical safety standpoint were 
correctly assessed - taking scientific and technological laws and 
casua]ities into account - if the calculations were arrived at 
correctly and the effectiveness of the measures taken to prevent 
hazardous incidents or to limit their effects were evaluated along 
the lines of plausibility from an engineering standpoint" 
Pursuant to Article 83 Federa}llic Act 1949, the German Länder (states) 
implement the federal law. Therefore the competent licensing 
authorities are determined in special ordinances of the German Lander. 
The licensing authorities are bound by the law mentioned earlier, which 
is mostly prepared by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and by the 
relevant law of the Länder. 
The general conclusion that seems to be justified is that the German 
practices concerned with licensing of installations that have the 
potential for causing a major hazard are very detailed about the 
technical requirements that an applicant has to satisfy. These 
requirements demand that a justification of the technical adequacy of the 
design, construction and operating procedures is presented in the form of 
a safety analysis. The specification for the safety analysis implies 
that the acceptability of many features of the proposal are justified in 
quantitative terms, but stops short of demanding an assessment of the 
inherent risks being expressed in probability terms. There is also no 
attempt to identify the level of risk that would be acceptable, even 
though the methods of analysis stated to be acceptable could in practice 
give an assessment of the level of risk in probability terms. This 
suggests that the German Authorities regard the quantitative assessment 
of risk as supplementing the regulatory authorities' professional 
judgement about acceptability of risk. The requirements avoid any 
mention of the economic or socio-political aspects of acceptability. 
British Practices 
Responsibility for control of major hazards in the United Kingdom is 
centred on the Health and Safety Commission. The Commission was 
established in 1974 under the authority of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 which, following the recommendation of the Robens' Committee in 
1972, was aimed at unifying all the safety services in the United 
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Kingdom. The report of the Robens' Committee shows that the Committee's 
concern about existing industrial safety arrangements was at least in 
part due to the fact that fatal accident statistics for the previous 
decade did not show any significant improvement. Because of this 
statistical evidence the Committee aimed to determine what action was 
required q8prevent an unfavourable trend in fatality rates 
developing. ( In their deliberations the Committee was clearly 
influenced by a number of incidents. Like the German authorities they 
were influenced by the Feyzin incident in 1966. They were also 
influenced by the 1964 Brent Cross incident when the jib of a crane 
collapsed and fell onto a passing bus killing seven passengers, the 1966 
Aberfan colliery tip slip, the explosion in South St i ford, Thurrock in 
1969 and the Dudgeons Wharf explosion in 1970. Seveso and 
Flixborough also influenced later policy developments related to major 
hazards. 
Before examining current control practices in the UK, it is worth 
examining the organization of the Health and Safety Commission. In very 
general terms the Commission is concerned with policy and the field or 
operational responsibilities of the Commission are undertaken by the 
Health and Safety Executive. The staff of the Executive is divided 
between the following functions: Field Force, Policy, Assessment, Medical 
Advisory Service, Research and Information Service. The Field Force is 
divided into eight Inspectorates: Factory, Explosives, Mines and 
Quarries, Industrial Air Pollution, Agriculture, offshore oil and Gas, 
Railways, and Nuclear Installations. 
In the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate is included the Major 
Hazards Assessment Unit, which was formed essentially in anticipation of 
the Seveso Directive. The following extract from the Health and Safety 
Commission's 'Plan of Work 1983-84 and Onwards' puts the role of the 
Major Hazards Assessment U it into perspective and gives an official view 
of likely developments: 
"The Major Hazards Assessment Unit (MHAU) (part of the Hazardous 
Installations Group which includes staff engaged inter alia on the 
development of regulations requiring the notification of hazardous 
installations, and grouped for management purposes with the 
Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate) was established in 1978 and is the product of our increasing concern over the trend in industry 
to construct larger and more complex installations which may 
represent a major hazard to the work force and the general public 
should an accident or failure occur. To date the main role of MHAU 
has been to provide expert advice to planning authorities about the 
safety implications of proposed developments at or in the vicinity 
of a 'major hazard' as currently defined. The amount of this work 
is likely to increase very substantially during 1983/84 with the 
Hazardous Substances Regulations and the likely consequential 
changes in consultation arrangements currently being discussed with 
the Department of the Environment and the Scottish Development 
Department concerning new installations and developments near 
existing installations. The Unit will have to be enlarged to cope 
with this work and other functions for which it has responsibility. 
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In the longer term there may be a need for a further build up of the 
Unit when the legislation to implement the requirements of the EEC 
"Seveso" Directive is made and comes into operation. " 
The impact of the "Seveso" incident and the subsequent Directive is 
clear. The intention to bring British practices closer to the 
requirements of the Directive during 1984 has been stated. This will 
involve some strengthening of the controls of instfflýtions which have 
the potential for causing a major hazard potential. 
So that the commitment to the control of Major Hazards as it was at the 
beginning of 1984 can be appreciated, it should be noted that the planned 
staff level for the Industrial Air Pollution section for 1983/84 was 44 
including the MHAU, compared with 102 for Nuclear Installations and 847 
for Factories and Explosives. However, these figures alone do not give a 
complete picture of the effort devoted to major hazards. In addition to 
the staff of the MHAU, some of the staff involved in the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate, the Explosives Inspectorate and part of the 
Research and Laboratory Services Division are involved in the problems 
associated with major hazards. 
Having outlined the organization that has been established under the 
aegis of the Health and Safety Commission to deal with the regulation of 
major hazards, the way acceptability is judged in practice can now be 
examined. The first point to note is that there has been no official 
requirement laid down stating in unequivocal terms the quantitative risk 
criteria that an installation has to satisfy to be acceptable. However, 
the first report of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards does give 
some indication of the views of pro xi atze policy makers on the acceptable 
probability of serious accidents. ( 4 To prevent any misunderstanding 
of the views-of the Committee, the following is the way their views were 
recorded in their report: 
"If, for instance, such tentative conclusions indicated with 
reasonable confidence that in a particular plant a serious accident 
was unlikely to occur more often than once in 10,000 years (or - to 
put it another way -a1 in 10,000 chance in any one year), this 
might perhaps be regarded as just on the borderline of 
acceptability, bearing in mind the known background of risks faced 
every day by the general public. Disciplined effort may achieve 
even lower risk of failure - in favourable cases very much lower 
than the figure just indicated - leading to a very much lower risk 
of causing death or injury. We hope to refine our thinking in this 
area". 
Additionally, some views on the terms in which officials of the Health 
and Safety Executive currently discuss the acceptability of risk were 
reported in an earlier study made for the EEC. The following quot tn 
from that earlier report identifies the comments on their approach: e 
"It was mentioned that for some purposes in relation to assessing 
the acceptability of risk and safety precautions, HSE use phrases 
such as: 'so far as is reasonably practicable', 'as low as 
reasonably achievable', and 'the best practical means'. The first 
and third of these phrases describe precise legal requirements, and 
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the first has been formally defined in the Courts. (186) Such 
phrases are, in the author's view, open to the criticism that they 
do not demand quantified statements about risk, but on the other 
hand they have the merit that they give the decision maker 
sufficient flexibility to be able to balance the complex set of 
factors that have to be considered in evaluating the acceptability 
of a particular risk. 
Underlying this approach, there seems to be some recognition of the 
fact that the acceptability of risk by any group depends on their 
perception of the significance of risk and that people's perception 
of risk can change with time and circumstances. 
To the author of this report, the views expressed by the HSE 
officials suggested that in the best traditions of English 
government they have a flexible approach to the determination of 
what are acceptable risks and recognized quantitative methods of 
assessing risks as an important aid to decision making in this 
field. " 
To provide a basis for judging the acceptability of a potentially 
hazardous installation, the Health and Safety Executive requirel85) 
proposer of a potentialy hazardous plant to submit a hazard survey. 
This hazard survey is intended to cover the same ground as the safety 
analysis required by German regulations. The Health and Safety Executive 
do not consider the hazard survey as the only information they will 
require, and retain the right to call for additional assessments if they 
judge these to be required. 
The Health and Safety Executive's specification for the hazard survey 
requires it to cover three main topics which are: data on the nature and 
control of hazardous substances that may be present or generated, 
judgement about the events that could lead to a release of hazardous 
material and an evaluation of the consequences of such release and the 
measures that can be taken to minimise its consequences. 
One important major hazard control, using the term in the widest sense, 
which is quite separate from the Health and Safety Commission but with 
which they collaborate, is the planning control procedure. It is the 
role of local planning authorities to decide whether or not a proposal to 
site a potentially hazardous plant in the area under their jurisdiction 
is acceptable. Planning approval has a fairly long history. The Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1947 introduced the need for planning permission 
to be obtained for any major development. All planning legislation was 
consolidated by another Act in 1962. Under the Planning Acts some 
applications are approved by local government but major questions are 
generally referred to the Minister for approval. In cases where there is 
sensed to be public concern about the proposal, a public inquiry is held. 
These public inquiries can take a considerable time. It is not unusual 
for two years to elapse from the time the decision to hold a public 
inquiry is announced to the time the Minister announces his decision. 
Among the major inquiries of this nature are those associated with 
London's third airport, motorway development, the nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plant at Windscale, the proposed PWR at Sizewell, the Canvey 
Island chemical complex, and the coal mine at Selby. The Sizewell 
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Inquiry is to a certain extent a special case and is intended to cover 
the generic issue of the acceptability of pressurized water reactors; so 
the Inquiry process will not have to be repeated if several pressurized 
water reactors are built. These inquiries are conducted by an Inspector 
appointed by the government and are open to the general public. Any 
member of the public may make submissions or ask questions. When the 
Inspector has heard all the evidence, he submits his findings and 
recommendations to the Minister, and after considering the Inspector's 
report the Minister announces his decision. There is no fixed time 
between the conclusion of the inquiry and when a report must be made. 
Also there are no criteria for acceptability expressed in quantitative 
terms that have to be satisfied. 
The fact that there are no stated quantitative criteria for acceptability 
that have to be satisfied makes the quantitative risk studies that were 
made to determine the acceptability. f expansion of the chemical complex 
on Canvey Island more interesting. 
°9) 
The Health and Safety Executive 
asked the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority to evaluate the risks associated with this proposal. The 
report on the first study w s9 gublished in 1978 and the second report was 
published in 1981. The first report demonstrated in 
quantitative terms the benefits, in terms of reduced risk, that could be 
obtained by modifications which could be made to various installations on 
the island. The second report showed that the modifications made to the 
various installations, in the intervening period, had in broad terms made 
the ind(i i ual risk twenty times smaller than mentioned in the first 
report. 
In many ways the third and final report of the Advisory Committee on 
Major Hazards epitomized the state of development that British official 
thinking had reached by the end of 1983, ien the committee was disbanded 
after nine years of deliberations. The final report gave a 
comprehensive view of all the related problems associated with major 
hazards and stressed the need for appropriate emergency arrangements, 
improved planning controls, the need to keep the public informed about 
the significance of installations that are potentially major hazards, 
better operational controls to overcome the Three Mile Island type of 
problem, better safety education and more research to develop a deeper 
understanding of the underlying problems. 
On the question of quantitative criteria, the Committee did not support 
the need for such criteria and endorsed the view that the 'reasonably 
practicable' approach to assessing the balance of risks and be f is to 
decide acceptability should continue to be followed. The 
committee's views on quantitative criteria represent an important 
judgement, and they expressed their views in the following way: 
"We believe that there is less scope in setting a risk criterion 
than is sometimes acknowledged in discussions of the subject. Most 
major hazard risks fall in the band between clearly unacceptable and 
the clearly negligible. Within this band there is a region of 
uncertainty and the acceptance of a particular situation will depend 
upon a whole range of factors. These might include such aspects as 
whether the plant is a new or an existing installation, whether it 
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is a single or multiple installation, the siting, the level of 
confidence obtained from the safety assessments, the benefits, and 
the availability of alternative processes. 
In the context of the control of major hazards we believe that there 
is widespread support for the following propositions. 
(a) The risk from a hazardous installation to an individual 
employee or member of the public should not be significant when 
compared with other risks to which he is exposed in everyday 
life. 
(b) The risk from any hazardous installation should, whenever 
reasonably practicable be reduced. 
(c) When there is a risk from a hazardous installation, additional 
hazardous development should not add significantly to the 
existing risk. 
(d) If the possible harm from an incident is high, the risk that 
the incident might actually happen should be made very low 
indeed. This takes account of society's particular abt)Qrcnce 
of accidents which cause many simultaneous casualties. "8 
These findings of the Committee do not mean that a proposer will be 
excused from substantiating quantitatively his claim that a proposed risk 
is acceptable. It merely means that the proposer will not have a fixed 
quantitative criterion to aim at and that the final decision about 
acceptability will be a matter of professional judgement on the part of 
the regulatory body. The propositions do give rise to some problems of 
definition. For example, what exactly does the phrase 'very low indeed' 
really mean? 
The conclusions about the United Kingdom's organization in this field 
that seem to be justified are that there are some similarities between 
the British and German practices but British requirements are not 
specified in such detail as the German. In both cases there is an 
involvement of the local authorities with the assessment process and some 
form of safety document has to be presented. Also there are no specific 
quantitative criteria in terms of probability that have to be satisfied. 
The major difference between the procedures in the two countries is that 
the British procedure can involve a public inquiry and it is the public 
inquiry procedure that attempts to determine acceptability of the socio- 
political factors involved. 
85 
French Practices 
Over the last twenty years 
involving chemicals and oil 
associated risks and must, 
policy. Among these accident 
Feyzin, January 1966: 
France has experienced several accidents 
which give warning of the seriousness of the 
as in Germany and Britin, have influenced 
* s are the following: (19 
Fire and explosion of an unconfined vapour cloud in a refinery 
(South of Lyon); 16 dead (many firemen) and 63 injured. 
Lievin, 1968: 
Explosion of a road tanker filled with ammonia. 19 tonnes of 
ammonia escaped forming a toxic cloud; result 6 dead, 20 people 
living in the neighbourhood hospitalized. 
Saint-Amand-les-Eaux, 1973: 
Explosion of a road tanker filled with propane; result 6 dead, 37 
injured. 
Pierre-Benite, 1976: 
Discharge of a wagon (21 tonnes) filled with acrolein into the River 
Rhone (South of Lyon); fauna destroyed from Pierre-Benite to Vienne 
(320 tonnes). A similar accident also occurred on the same site in 
1978 when 100 kg of acrolein escaped into the atmosphere; result 
inconvenience for several thousands of people in the neighbourhood. 
The Feyzin incident was certainly instrumental in initiating a general 
revision of the French safety system: the new law of 1976 was one result 
of this revision. An innovative policy was developed similar to that 
required by the EEC Seveso Directive and with much in common with the 
British Health and Safety Executive system. 
The general framework of legislation in the field of industrial accident 
prevention dates back to an Imperial Act of October 15,1810 and was 
modified in 1917,1932 and 1961. This legislation was extensively 
modernized and the basic text is now the Law of July 19,1976, 
'Registered Works for Environment Protection' and the decree of September 
10,1977. At the national level, the relevant administrative action is 
the responsibility of the Direction de la Prevention des Pollutions 
(Service de 1'Environnement Industriel, Ministere de l'Environnement) and 
at the local level, it is the responsibility of the Inspectorate of 
Registered Works whose functions are carried out under the authority of 
the Prefects by the 'Directions Interdepartementales de l'Industrie'. 
* Attention is drawn to the fact that the list of accidents given in Ref 
195, which was published in 1982, is considerably longer than that 
given in the Third Report of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards 
Ref 192 which was published two years later. 
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The 1976 law and the 1977 decree introduced new concepts to the 
industrial risks policy and management by clarifying responsibilities of 
intervening parties, re-enforcing the technical requirements, and 
enlarging the decision process. 
For several years, continuous effort has been devoted to the question of 
reducing major risks. At present, the manufacturers concerned are asked 
to prepare precise and detailed studies on the risks associated with 
their activities. This reflects the tendency of the responsible 
authorities to adopt the methods of risk analysis employed in the nuclear 
field. The approach adopted is, as a result of pressures from industry, 
somewhat simpler than used in the nuclear industry. 
The main procedural and technical requirements of this legislation are as 
follows: 
a) Procedures 
The types of works which must be regulated are specified in an 
official list (periodically revised). According to quantitative 
thresholds, it is determined whether an installation requires to be 
'authorized' (or just 'declared'). Each year, about 2500 permits are 
issued for construction or substantial modifications of industrial 
activities; about 50,000 installations are covered by the 
authorization requirement. 
Activities referred to in the official list must comply with 
technical regulations which lay down the measures that must be 
adopted to prevent fires, explosions or accidental discharges. 
These regulations are made specific to each installation and are the 
'end product' of a technical analysis of the project. 
Decision-making is decentralized and based on a detailed examination 
of the facts. The purpose of the legislation covering industrial 
hazards is to establish open procedures which allow true expression 
of different points of view and, as such, ensure that the final 
decision will be a real arbitration - enlightened by deep technical 
and economic analysis. The process is decentralized to avoid 
creating heavy procedures and to ensure that the arbitration will be 
at a level where all the various factors can be clearly assessed. 
The final decision is made by the Prefect but at the end of an open 
investigative procedure including a public inquiry (conducted on the 
basis of a precise report on the project), and after consultation 
between the different departmental organizations involved (i. e. 
Conseil Departemental d'Hygiene). 
b) Technical studies 
According to the 1977 decree, the manufacturer must: 
- submit with his application a study of the impact of his 
project on the environment; 
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- attach to his application a study of the risks presented by his 
project. 
The requirements for these studies are described in Article 3,5 of 
the decree as follows: 
'A study setting out the dangers which the 
installation may present in case of an accident and 
justifying the measures to reduce the probability of 
its occurrence and its effects as determined under 
the responsibility of the applicant. This study 
shall spell out in particular, taking into 
consideration the public means of rescue known to 
him, the essential features, consistency and 
organization of the private means of rescue at the 
disposal of the applicant or such as he has 
ascertained to be available for combating the effects 
of an accident. ' 
The main features of the technical justification required are: 
- to describe the installations; 
- to identify the dangers; 
- to detail: 
the products used; 
all possible reactions; 
the processes in use; 
- to record the safety measures adopted 
- to describe the most serious menaces connected with the project. 
The requirements for such a safety justification were first applied to 
extensions of the Rhöne-Poulenc factory at Grand Quevilly near Rouen (in 
1976) which involved the construction of a unit for the synthesis of 
ammonia (1000t/day) and the setting up of a cryogenic storage of 24000t. 
ammonia. A dozen other safety studies have been made since then. On 
November 6 1981, the Minister for the Environment announced his decision 
to apply these in-depth safety studies to most dangerous installations 
and some 20 installations are to be studied each year. The problem of 
major hazard control has become a key function of the Ministry of the 
Environment. 
The conclusion that seems to be justified is that in France the existence 
of major technological risk is recognized and procedures adopted for 
assessing their acceptability are similar in technical scope to those 
adopted in Germany and Britain. The French procedure, like the British, 
attempts to evaluate the socio-political factors by a public inquiry 
procedure. Also the local Prefect is expected to consult interested 
parties before arriving at his decision about the acceptability of a 
proposal. 
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Danish Practices* 
There have only been three minor accidents in Denmark that could be 
described as having anything like major hazard potential. These 
accidents were: a spillage of mercury at a chemical works in Jutland, a 
chlorine release from a works in Copenhagen, and the escape of chemical 
waste from an establishment in Nyborg. These accidents did not result in 
any deaths, so were less serious than some of the accidents in Germany, 
Britain and France. 
The Danish legal requirements on acceptability of risks, such as are 
associated with hazardous industrial processes, are expressed in general 
terms and do not specifically require an assessment to be presented in a 
way that quantifies the probability of the risk. In the Danish practice, 
particular importance is attached to any new project being acceptable to 
the Safety Committee of the undertaking proposing the project - 
essentially that is by the employees who will be associated with the 
project when it is operating. The justification of the acceptability of a 
particular project is often presented in quantitative prý ility terms. 
Eighteen quantitative risk analys s1pre made up to 1983 by a team 
from the Riso National Laboratory. The fact that the RisorNational 
Laboratory is also Denmark's nuclear research centre illustrates how 
practices used in the nuclear industry can flow to the chemical industry. 
Among the quantitative risk assessments that have been made are the 
natural gas pipeline across the Little Belt passing near an ammonia 
storage, and the chemical waste installation at Nyborg. In the case of 
the pipeline, the risk of a rupture of the line, leading to dispersion of 
ammonia, was considered as low as the risk of an aeroplane crashing on 
the ammonia storage. Such a risk is low but not impossible. 
Even though there has been no general criterion established specifying an 
acceptable level of risk in probability terms, probability levels 
were endorsed for the chemical waste plant. These levels were qº10- per 
year for the individual fatality risk for the most exposed member of th 
public, a societal risk of 10-6 per year for 10 person incidents and 10-' 
per year for 100 person i1ci nts, and a risk of a worker being killed of 
less than 10-5 per year. In general terms an acceptable risk was 
defined as being one that is lower than the risk of natural catastrophes. 
Even when the risk is not expressed in probability terms, the safety 
justification has to show that any environmental contamination would not 
exceed threshold values and that pressure components were properly 
designed. 
Footnote 
* This section on Danish practices is based mainly on statements made by 
representatives of the Danish Labour Inspection Service during a 
meeting with John C. Chicken on 14 December 1983 to discuss Danish 
practice. 
89 
The formal regulatory decision about the acceptability of a particular 
project is made as a result of consultation between the various 
government agencies concerned and the Labour Inspection Service. The 
decision about the gas pipeline across Little Belt, mentioned above, 
involved discussion with the Department of Energy; other cases might 
involve the Department of the Environment. In the discussion about 
acceptability account is taken, as already mentioned, of the views of the 
relevant Safety Committee. 
In Denmark about 50 installations have been identified that fall within 
the Seveso Directive definition of being potentially hazardous 
installations and will require careful assessment. For small companies 
that do not have the appropriate staff for making risk assessments, the 
Labour Inspectorate advises on the information that must be presented for 
approval and how the information can be prepared. 
It is not the general practice of the Danish regulatory authorities to 
assess or comment on the suitability of the management of a project and 
they would only make such assessments if specifically asked to do so by 
the Safety Committee of the organization concerned. 
The conclusions that this brief survey of Danish practices suggests are 
that importance is attached to assessing the significance of the risk in 
quantified terms andtýcIthe Danish practice is unique in the attention 
that the regulatory. body gives to the views of the Safety Committee of 
the organization concerned. The consultation with the local Safety 
Committee is an attempt to assess the socio-political factors involved, 
but the procedures appear to avoid general public discussion of 
acceptability. 
Dutch Practices* 
Dutch safety legislation was considerably modified by the Statute dated 
23rd November 1977, and this Statute will be incorporated into the new 
compreheump safety legislation which is in the process of being 
prepared. 
Pressure for this new legislation, while being partly due to some of the 
concerns about major industrial hazards that had developed 
internationally, was also due to the concern of the Dutch public about 
major industrial accidents in Holland. These accidents include Pernis 
in 1968 which killed two people and injured seventy-five, Beek in 1976 
which killed fourteen people, Hengelo in 1976 and Tiel in 1976. A unique 
element, of the Dutch pressures for stricter control of potentially 
hazardous installations is the existence of the Rijnmond Public 
Authority. The Authority was established by Act of Parliament in 1964 
and entrusted with responsibility for controlling co-ordinating and 
Footnote 
* This section on Dutch practices is to a large extent based on the 
comments and information given by representatives of the Dutch 
Directorate General of labour during a meeting with John C. Chicken 
in Holland on the 18th January 1984. 
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advising upon matters to do with prevention and control of industrial 
calamities, environmental affairs, traffic and transport, town and 
country p)aý ing, public health services and waste disposal in 
Rijnmond. Rijnmond is the name given to that area of the Rhine 
delta stretching from Rotterdam to the North Sea. It is the location of 
the largest harbour in the world. Within an area 40 kilometers long and 
15 kilometers wide more than one million people live alongside a vast 
conglomeration of chemical and petrochemical industries. Another 
pressure which Dutch regulators have been subjected to is the proposal, 
put forward by the Country Aldermen of Groningen, for quantified limits 
to the riss00ffom pollution associated with industrial developments in 
the area. The Groningen proposal is interesting because it 
postulates acceptable levels of group risk in probability terms. 
The November 1977 Statute requires a Safety Report to be submitted for 
hazardous installations. In general, the proposer has to submit copies 
of the safety report to several authorities. Responsibility for giving 
permission for the project to be built rests with municipal, regional or 
provincial authorities. The average length of a Safety Report is about 
200 pages. The assessment of the acceptability of the proposal is made 
by a multi-disciplinary team that has at least four people in it: one 
Inspector from the district in which the plant will be built, one 
specialist from the boiler approving agency, one specialist from the 
central inspecting authority, and one from the district administration to 
act as Secretary. Typically, about 200 man-hours are devoted to the 
assessment of a Safety Report. 
If, after an organization has been requested to present a Safety Report 
for a potentially hazardous plant by the'Labour Inspection Service, it 
fails to comply with that request, it can be fined up to £50,000. The 
Dutch authorities have the impression that the system is about 90% 
effective, that is 90% of the organizations provide the required 
information. This is a very important point as it indicates the 
effectiveness of the regulatory system and shows that even a very well 
organized regulatory system cannot expect to be 100% perfect. 
Another important organizational matter that was mentioned during the 
discussion with representatives of the Dutch regulatory authorities was 
that due to budget cuts the number of staff in work for the Dutch 
Government was being reduced by 2% per year. Staff can only be increased 
on specific tasks if there are larger cuts elsewhere to bring the total 
staff level down by the required 2%. This shows clearly how the effort 
that can be devoted to regulating hazardous activities is not limitless 
and is subject to national economic forces. 
The Dutch view is that their requirements fý2b1 Safety Report are very 
similar to those of West Germany and Britain. There are however some 
features where the emphasis is different. For example, the justification 
for the Safety Report. Important justifications for the report are the 
view that the preparation of a Safety Report makes the entrepreneur more 
aware of the risks to which the workers in his industry are exposed, and 
that submission of a Safety Report to the Works Council can play a part 
in the employer-worker relationship in a way that may improve safety 
within the enterprise. The emphasis which the Dutch place on employee 
participation is very similar to the Danish approach. 
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There are four other features of the Dutch Safety Report procedure that 
are worth special consideration. These features concern the 
specification of the processes for which a Safety Report must be 
prepared, the analysis of hazards in probability terms, the assessment of 
the fire, explosion and toxicity indices, and the consideration given to 
personnel policy. The Dutch specify that a Safety Report is only 
required if the quantity of hazardous material involved in the process 
exceeds a 'threshold value'. The threshold value being defined as the 
quantity of material that would, in the event of an accident, seriously 
endanger human life beyond 100m from the point of the accident. 
(202) The 
method of calculating the threshold value and the way it is weighted to 
allow for the specific circumstances surrounding its use, are described 
in detail in Appendix 9. The essential features of the method are that 
four categories of substance are identified, which are: flammable 
substances, explosive substances, toxic substances and extremely toxic 
substances, and for substances in each category a basic threshold 
quantity is specified. For flammable substances the quantity is 10,000 
kg, for explosive substances the quantity is 1,000 kg, for toxic 
substances the quantity depends on the substances (for chlorine it is 300 
kg) and for extremely toxic substances the threshold quantity is 1 kg. 
These basic threshold quantities have to be corrected to allow for the 
form in which the substance is kept, and the conditions under which it 
exists. Also a priority index or phasing factor has to be applied which 
indicates the urgency that is attached to the preparation of a Safety 
Report. 
For the Safety Report it is a requirement that if no representative 
accident data is available for a specific installation, the probability 
of undesirable events that could adversely ct the health of workers 
must be indicated as accurately as possible. 
To assess the depth of study required and the precautions necessary, the 
Guidelines for the Safety Report state that an assessmeý hould be made 
of the fire and explosion index and the toxicity index. t2"4' The form of 
indexing proposed is a development of the Dow Index and is detailed in 
Appendix 1. Essentially the fire and explosion index is the product of a 
material factor, a general process hazard factor and a special process 
hazards factor. The material factor is designed to be a measure of the 
potential energy of the dangerous substances present. The general 
process hazard factor (GPHt t) is intended as a measure of the hazards inherent in the process and t%e special process hazard factor (SPGtot) is 
related to the hazards inherent in a specific installation. For a range 
of substances, tables of values for the material factor are given in 
Appendix 1 and also in the appendix are examples of how GPHtot and SPGtot 
may be calculated. 
The toxicity index T is being equal to T (1 + GPHtot + SPGtot) 100 
where Th = toxicity factor for which a table of values is given in 
Appendix 1 
Ts =a special weighting factor to be applied to the toxicity 
factor 
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GPHtot = the general process hazard factor, already described 
SPHtot = the special process hazard factor, already described. 
The indices give a comparative indication of the significance of the fire 
explosion and toxicity hazards associated with particular materials and 
installations. From the values determined for these indices, an 
installation is categorised into one of three categories , Category I 
being the lowest risk and Category III being installations that contain 
explosives or similar high risks. 
Such use of indices to rank or categorise the risk associated with a 
particular installation are not generally a feature of the Safety Reports 
in other countries, but their existence is recognized and they may be 
used in preliminary assessments. 
The fourth special feature of the Dutch Safety Report requirements is the 
attention th05 hs to be given to organizational and personnel aspects of 
a proposal. 
ý 
In addition to the organizational structure for 
operating the proposed plant being described, they require the criteria 
for staff selection to be described. It is also a requirement that the 
adequacy is demonstrated of the management arrangements for dealing with 
emergencies. This concern about staff suitability appears to be an 
attempt to overcome the staff problems that were qpy tributory factors in 
the Flixborough and Three Mile Island accidents. 
In a little more detail, the Labour Inspectorate Guideline for the 
compilation of an operational safety report recommends that the safety 
report should describe the duties and resW, ýbilities of all levels of 
staff with respect to safety and health. To demonstrate that the 
staff concerned are likely to be able to discharge their duties and 
responsibilities effectively in an emergency, the personnel policy the 
proposer adopts to achieve this goal has be explained. The 
description must include the following points: (20 
ý 
1) Criteria for selection of technical staff 
2) Educational background of such staff 
3) Internal and external training given 
4) Procedure for introducing new personnel 
5) Specific instruction given in safety matters 
6) The extent to which staff are capable of dealing with several 
disciplines 
7) What attention is given to safety responsibilities in job 
descriptions? 
8) Is the staffing level adequate to deal with normal and 
emergency conditions at all times? 
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9) What average training/experience level of the operating staff 
is aimed at? 
10) What is the policy with respect to staff working alone in 
isolated positions? 
The general conclusion that appears to be justified about the Dutch 
practices for determining the acceptability of potentially hazardous 
plants, is that the approach to the technical assessment of potential 
hazards is very similar to the British and German approach but has some 
special features that are worth considering for wider application. These 
special features are the way the hazard potential is ranked and used as a 
guide to the depth of safety analysis required and the complexity of 
safety precautions justified, and the detail that is required about 
operating staff and their suitability. The public discussion of 
acceptability is very similar to the British case, so the Dutch approach 
to evaluating socio-political factors can be considered as similar to the 
British approach. 
Conclusions 
There is considerable agreement in the five countries considered about 
the way the technical acceptability of proposals for industrial plants 
with major hazard potential should be assessed. It is clear that the 
Seveso Directive has had a harmonizing influence on the legislation of 
the countries concerned. All the practices that have been examined 
require a technical justification of the acceptability of the proposal. 
In general the criteria of acceptability that have to be satisfied are 
expressed in qualitative terms rather than in quantitative terms. This 
leads to a flexible approach about what is acceptable, which gives the 
proposer a rather amorphous requirement to attempt to satisfy. However, 
the requirements for the way the case should be presented for accepting a 
potentially hazardous plant generally requires that the risk is 
quantified. This quantification appears only to be regarded as an aid to 
decision making and not the basis for decision making. The nearest 
approach to a general quantitative criterion was found in the British 
practice which suggested that the bottom limit of acceptability was the 
risk of a fatality once in 10,000 years. There are indications that the 
Danish Authorities are moving towards a similar criterion. The German 
requirements and procedures that have to be followed are described in 
very detailed terms Both the Danish and Dutch practices stress the 
importance of frank discussion between employer and employee about the 
acceptability of risks. The Dutch approach is also interesting for the 
way potential hazards are ranked and the ranking used as a guide to the 
depth of safety analysis required, and the importance that is attached to 
establishing the suitability of staff and the adequacy of the operating 
practices proposed. Acceptance of ranking also implies acceptance of risk 
quantification. The attempt to evaluate the socio-political factors 
involved generally seems to take the form of a public inquiry. 
Evaluation of economic factors appears to be generally regarded as the 
responsibility of the proposer and not to be a matter requiring public 
discussion. 
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MU? = 7 
Oru ASPHCIS OF RISK AC CEPTABTTT1'g 
In this chapter, the monetary and non-monetary factors that need to be 
considered in evaluating the expenditure which should be allocated to 
reducing the risk associated with hazardous plant are examined. The data 
used are drawn from several fields, but the results are generalized and 
can be applied to the assessment of any potentially hazardous project. 
The starting point for this examination of the role which economic and 
societal factors play in decisions about the acceptability of risk was 
established in an earl' study by the author entitled 'Nuclear Power 
Hazard Control Policy'. (186) In that study a qualitative balance sheet is 
presented of the various factors that should be considered in making 
decisions about the acceptability of risk. To turn qualitative 
statements about the value of the factors to be considered into 
quantitative statements requires a considerable range of data. At the 
heart of such a process is the value put on human life and the amount of 
money people are willing to spend to avert loss of life. This need to 
understand public responses to risk was end r e, by Hayns and Winter in 
their paper to the American Nuclear Society. 
In the first part of this chapter, the value of life factor is evaluated 
as it provides a useful base against which to judge the problems involved 
in evaluating non-monetary factors. The second part of the chapter 
examines the question of risk perception which then leads to an attempt 
in the third part to determine what evidence there is that people's 
perception of risks correlates with the order of priority given to the 
arrangements for action to reduce the risks. Finally, consideration is 
given to the inherent nature of non-monetary factors and how they are 
currently allowed for in the decision making process. 
To overcome the criticism made in this chapter of current procedures for 
allowing for non-monetary factors a ranking technique is proposed in 
Chapter e, which provides a logical and consistent method of assessing 
the complex spectrum of quantitative and qualitative factors associated 
with risk acceptability decisions. 
The Cost of Lives 
Evaluating the value of a life is complicated by the fact that there are 
several ways of valuing life, and even considerable debate about whgig 
or not it is ethical to evaluate the value of life in money terms. 
It is important to understand the ethical argument right from the 
beginning as it puts into proper perspective discussion about the 
importance of valuing human life carefully. 
The central feature of this argument is how to decide what is an 
equitable distribution of risks and benefits in society. The two extremes 
of the argument are: it is unreasonable to expose anyone to a risk if he 
will not be compensated for any harm he suffers as a result of such 
exposure, and at the other extreme of the argument is the view that 
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provided the arrangements for compensation are adequate the risk will be 
acceptable. Both of these extremes are unreasonable. Certainly nobody 
would be able to accept unlimited financial responsibility for a risk and 
not many people would accept exposure to unlimited risk. This obvious 
limit to financial responsibility is one important justification for 
careful determination of the value ascribed to human life. Most 
organizations try to limit their liab' 1ity in some way and even limit the 
amount of insurance cover they buy. (22) A word of warning must also be 
sounded about the use of the phrase 'careful determination of the value 
ascribed to human life'. It is not intended to give the impression that 
it will make cost benefit analysis or any of the related techniques into 
precision tools, at best it will enable risk benefit analysis or cost 
benefit analysis to be used to make broad comparisons of risks. 
However, a broad rather coarse comparison is better than none. 
Another important facet of the argument is the question, 'Who bears the 
costs and who bears the benefits associated with the activity? ' The 
argument is fairly simple when the costs and benefits are borne by the 
same party, but when the costs are borne by one party and the benefits by 
another, there is a deep moral question about how the benefits and 
burdens should be distributed. The following quotation from Daniel 
Callahan's presentation of the Congressional Hearing's Risk Benefit 
Analysis in the Legislative Process goes some way towards identifying a 
solution to the problem in a way that helps to keep th72cfcussion in 
this thesis about the value of human life in perspective. 
"The first moral question to be asked is this: 'How ought benefits 
and risks be distributed? ' It is a good rule of thumb to assume 
that no policy based directly on risk-benefit analysis will 
automatically distribute benefits and burdens fairly. That will 
happen only as the result of a deliberate additional effort. A very 
heavy burden of risk on one group, while another group gains most of 
the benefits, is clearly inequitable... " 
The deduction that seems obvious from the above quotation is that the 
risks and benefits must be expressed in quantified terms that enable the 
equity of their distribution to be checked. It is only when the 
discussion can be held in numerical terms that the adequacy and fairness 
of the arrangements for compensation can be judged. Considering 
specifically the question of the value of human life, the extreme limits 
on the value are easily identified. Some people would argue that the 
value is infinite and others would argue that it is negligible. These 
extreme limits are often stated simply for bargaining purposes. 
Those that argue that life is priceless would effectively stop all 
development as it would be impossible to arrange compensation for a 
single victim of the development but, equally, if no value is ascribed to 
human life it could encourage risky or life threatening developments to 
be accepted. Obviously between these limits is a value of human life 
that the decision maker could realistically use in his calculations of 
what is acceptable. Given that a precise value of human life is an 
unrealistic goal, the next step is to identify a value that gives the 
decision maker a practical guide to what is likely to be acceptable in 
the real world. 
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Valuation of lives for various economic purposes has a1n history - in 
1699 Sir William Petty valued an adult life at £160. 
(2i4ý In 1894 the 
valuation of human capital was expressed in the following terms: 
"The wages of men express the value of their labour in gold and, 
from the mean value of these earnings at different ages of life, the 
economic value of a man is calculated by taking the interest on 
money and the contingencies of his life into account. At the age of 
25, the present value of the future earnings of an English 
agricultural labourecl15ýfter deducting the cost of necessary 
maintenance, is £246. 
More recently Professor Pearce expressed his views on the economics of 
safety in the following way, which seems to encapsulate the essential 
features: 
"If, as economists have repeatedly pointed out for the last two 
centuries, our wants exceed our capacities to meet them, we must, 
when choosing one thing, give something else up. This, very simply, 
is the notion of opportunity cost and an inescapable fact of life. 
Since no society devotes its entire resources to the elimination of 
the risk of death (if it did, we would spend our entire gross 
national product, bar something to enable us to survive, on the 
national and private health services), it follows that society 
itself places a finite value on human life. What the cost-benefit 
analyst seW6)is a methodology for 'revealing' that underlying 
valuation. " 
There are also several legal reasons that require life to be valued; it 
has to be valued when cases involving claims for compensation for loss of 
life have to be settled, and there are requirements for compulsory 
insurance. In Britain, insurance is compulsory for employer's liability, 
motoring third party risks and nuclear accident liability. The cost of 
obtaining insurance cover is not a fixed factor and it depends, to some 
extent, on the state of the market. For example, as recently as 1982 the 
view was being expressed that with high interest rates existing at the 
time, the insurance markets were 'premium hungry' and were cutting their 
premiums, perhaps hoping that any shortfall between lo s incurred and 
premium income could be covered by investment income. ý2ý For example, 
some employers' liability risks were accepted at a premium of 60% of the 
annual claims experienced over the previous five years. 
Before leaving the question of insurance and the value of human life, it 
is important to recognize that the value fixed for insurance purposes 
not be the same as the total cost burden resulting from an accident. 
(Rm 
Typically, factors such as production losses, retraining new staff, 
cleaning up the accident and investigating the accident are not covered. 
To give some indication of the value put on human life by various 
authorities, Table 11 has been drawn up and the simple exercise of 
preparing the table drew attention to the problems of making comparisons 
of life values. For example, the data used was not all prepared at the 
same time or in the same currency and the values were calculated in 
different ways but, even allowing for these differences, the wide range 
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ESTIMATE 
VALUE OF LIFE DATE OF REFERENCE TO CORRECTED 
£ ESTIMATE ESTIMATE ZO 1983 
PRICES £ 
Risk Analysis Vol 2 No 1 191,000 - 
130,000 - 230,000 1978 March 1982, Plenum Press 338,000 
New York p 37 
Date of 
death to Product Liability 
187,000 which this International 393,000 
award May 1980 p 119 
applies 
1975 
100,000 - Risk Assessment 100,000 - 
1,000,000 1983 Royal Society London 1,000,000 
1983 p 182 
10,000 Agriculture Innovation and Human Risk 25,000 
230,000 Steel C. Sinclair, P. Morstrand, 575,000 
handling 1972 P. Newick. Centre for 
10,500,000 Pharma- the Study of Industrial 26,200,000 
ceuticals Innovation 1972, p7 
1,000,000 Nuclear 2,500,000 
Application of Cost- 
Benefit Analysis -A 
42,000 1976 Consultative Document, 75,000 
National Radiological 
Protection Board, 
Harwell 1980, p 28 
1968 for Application of Cost- 
50 - 20,000,000* the £50 Benefit Analysis -A 210 - 
(THESE WERE IMPLIED figure Consultative Document, 36 , 000,000 
VALUES OF LIFE) and 1972 National Radiological 
for the Protection Board, 
£20,000,000 Harwell 1980, p 29 
Risk Analysis, Vol 1, 48,000 - 
33,000 - 5,300,000 1978 No 1, March 1981, Plenum 7,800,000 
Press, New York, p 89 
RANGE £ 210 - 
36,000,000 
* These implied values were derived from past policy decisions. The 
figure of £50 was derived from the cost of screening pregnant women to 
prevent still births and the £20,000,000 figure was for the changes in 
Building Regulations following the Ronan Point high-rise flat collapse. 
TABLE 11 VALUE OF LIFE ESTIMATES 
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of the values found is surprising. The two main ways of calculating the 
value of life are to value the loss of earnings and to build up the value 
from all the costs that result from the loss of life, such as the need 
for compensation to be paid, the need to train and recruit new personnel 
and the loss of production. If compensation alone is taken as the 
criteria, it is worth noting that last year a man who had suffered 
devastating brain injuries when his head was crus V in the mechanism of 
a combine harvester was awarded £220,000 damages. 
Another way of judging the value of human life is to assess how much 
insurance cover is taken out to provide funding for any claims that might 
result from accidents. Insurance companies paid claims amounting to £168 
million for Employer's Liability claims in 1979 when there were 292 
fatal acc aents in industry and about 9000 other non-fatal 
accidents. (2ý0) Industry represents about 40% of all civilian employment 
so, of the £168 million which insurance companies paid out in claims, 
perhaps £68 million could be attributed to industry. If the non-fatal 
claims average £2,00p hich adjusts for inflation the figure as 
suggested by Bamber, tý21 then the cost of fatal accidents to the 
insurance market is about £170,000 which does not seem very far away from 
the figure of £220,000 compensation mentioned earlier and would be higher 
if state benefits were taken into account. 
Valuing life in the ways described so far is a useful way of assessing 
the potential liability for compensation associated with a particular 
activity. However, an alternative approach which is currently quite 
widely used is to assess the cost of saving an extra statistical life. 
This term is often referred to as the CSX value. One advantage of this 
method is that it avoids the criticism that is sometimes levelled at 
methods which are based on integrating lifetime earnings or production, 
namely that they give misleading results for the value of older people. 
Many of the estimates of CSX values published have been made in America 
and relate specifically to American conditions. In one major study of 57 
policy options, the CSX val'ýe ere found to range from zero to about 
£135 million at 1983 prices. The rather surprising result of zero 
cost of saving a life is due to the fact that if the particular policy 
proposed was adopted, other benefits accrue which are either equal to or 
greater than the expenditure involved, so the life saving result of . 
the 
policy is obtained as a free bonus. All the 57 policy options examined 
were associated with the activities of five American agencies: the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OHSA). In Table 12 the median and 
range of the CSX values for each agency are shown, the original values 
quoted being converted to pounds sterling and 1983 values. The table 
shows a considerable difference between the CSX values of the policy 
options of the five agencies and it has been suggested that a more 
careful study is required before reliance is place3 the differences in 
the level of CSX values which each agency( 1g? ts. `22v)n Another catalogue 
of CSX values has been given by Siddall. From References 222 and 
223 the values in Table 13 have been derived, the selection being made on 
the basis of the values that will be most relevant to the argument that 
follows. 
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ESTIMATING 
AGENCY 
MEDIAN VALUE OF 
COST OF SAVING 
AN EXTRA LIFE 
RANGE OF ESTIMATES 
OF COST OF SAVING AN 
EXTRA LIFE (CSX VALUES) 
IN £ FROM REF. 222 
NHTSA 47 x 103 0-1.04 x 106 
HHS 76 x 103 0-0.11 x 106 
CPSC 37 x 103 0-0.74 x 106 
EPA 1.9 x 106 0- 38 x 106 
OHSA 8.9 x 106 2.6 x 106 - 135 x 106 
TABLE 12 MEDIAN AND RANGE OF AMERICAN COST OF SAVING 
AN EXTRA LIFE (CSX) ESTIMATES 
RISK 
COST OF SAVING AN EXTRA 
LIFE IN £ AT 1982 PRICES 
FROM REFS 222-223 
Skyscrapers 20 x 106 
Nuclear Safety of 
Operatives 
7x 106 
Car and Road Safety 
Improvements 
0-2x 109 
Sulphur Scrubbers on 
Fossil Power Plants 
0.11 x 106 -5x 106 
Civil Aircraft 1.5 x 106 
Reduced Infant Mortality 0.15 x 106 
Diagnostic X-Ray Equipment 4x 103 
TABLE 13 COST OF SAVING LIFE (CSX VALUE) 
FOR PARTICULAR RISKS 
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Before attempting to determine if there is any relationship between cost 
or value of lives and perception of risk, the concept of perception of 
risk must be examined. 
Perception of Risk 
A considerable amount of effort has been devoted to trying to understand 
and explain how various people perceive risk. Perceived risk is taken as 
the combined evaluation which an individual makes of the likelihood of an 
adverse event occurring in the future and the seriousness of its 
consequences. The prestigious Royal Society Study Group on risk 
assessment comments that: 'It follows that the public not infrequently 
have a different perception of events from those suggested by the 
objective t4'tistical assessments made by scientists and other 
experts. '(2 Public perception of risk and their reaction to it has 
had a considerable influence on policy. It was also stated by the Study 
Group that: 'At the policy level, it is possible to argue that public 
misperceptions are responsible for an expenditure on safety in the 
pharmaceutical industry that is thousands of times greater than in 
agriculture, for an expenditure on fire precautions of many times more 
per life saved than would be achieved by the same amount spent on 
hospital services and an expenditure due to changes in the Building 
Regulations of an estimated £20 million (£50 mn at 1983 prices) per 
life saved following the Ronan Point disaster,. 
The Study Group appreciated that there was a plethora of papers on risk 
perception but stressed that there was very little dependable research 
evidence and they gave their endorsement to the programmes of research 
being undertaken by Professor Lee of the University of Surrey and 
Professor Eiser of the University of Exeter. Of the research that has 
been completed, the work by vic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein is the 
most apposite to this study. 
( 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Licht ns ein argue that perceived risk is 
quantifiable and predictable. 
('26' They analysed how a sample of the 
population perceived the risk associated with 90 subjects, and assessed 
their characteristics under 18 headings. The characteristics they 
considered covered three main aspects of risk, namely: knowledge of risk, 
dread of risk and exposure to risk. In general the results of their work 
showed that the more dread there was of a particular risk, the more 
desire there was of people to have the risk regulated in such a way that 
the hazard was reduced. Typically it was perceived that activities 
involving nuclear power, pesticides, crime and terrorism, which are 
considered most dangerous, should be subject to regulation that would 
reduce the hazard. 
The work by Slovic et al does not quantify acceptability directly, but in 
Table 14 an attempt is made to codify their findings on 21 of the 90 
subjects which they considered, in a way that ranks them so as to 
facilitate correlation with expenditure on safety. The four headings 
under which the subjects are classified are: 1) Dreaded and unknown; 2) 
Not dreaded and unknown; 3) Dreaded and known; 4) Not dreaded and known. 
The term 'dreaded' is taken to imply an uncontrollable catastrophic risk 
and involuntary risks. 'Not dreaded' is used to characterize risks 
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considered to be controllable, and voluntary risks. The term 'unknown' 
is intended to identify risks that are unknown to those exposed, new 
risks, and risks whose characteristics are unknown. 'Known' risks are 
taken to be those that are known to those exposed, and whose 
characteristics are known. 
FURTHER 
CLASS RISK RANK RDGULATION 
REQUIRED 
Nuclear Per 1 Strong support 
DDT 2 Strong support 
DREADED Herbicides 3 Strong support 
UNKNOWN Fossil Electric Power 4 Support for 
Skyscrapers 5 Support for 
Radiation Therapy 6 Support for 
Nerve Gas 7 Strong support 
Terrorism 8 Strong support 
DREADED Crime 9 Strong support 
KNOWN Commercial Aviation 10 Support for 
Bridges 11 Support for 
Firefighting 12 Some support for 
Food Irradiation 13 Support for 
NOT Food Preservatives 14 Some support for 
DREADED Diagnostic X-Rays 15 Support for 
UNKNOWN Prescription Drugs 16 Some support for 
Motor Vehicles 17 Support for 
NOT Scuba Diving 18 Some support for 
DREADED Mountain Climbing 19 Little support for 
KNOWN Boxing 20 Some support for 
Pregnancy (Childbirth) 21 Little support for 
TABLE 14 RANKING OF A SELECTION OF RISKS 
INVESTIGATED BY SLöVIC (REF 226) 
Slovic and his co-workers have examined some of the criticism that has 
be evelled against risk perception and have attempted to answer 
itý'2ýý The criticism and the answers they have given are summarized in 
Table 15. 
The role of risk perception is clearly important, but it is only part of 
the set of factors that the final decision maker has to consider. To 
help keep the argument balanced it is worth remembering the following 
extract from John Saxe's poem, 'The Blind Men and the Elephant': 
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CRITICISM SUMMARY OF ANSWERS 
1 Virtually anything can be The work showed that sane 
a determiner of risk factors did not correlate with 
perception. risk perception. 
2 When the experts rate The experts try to take account of 
'risks', are they not really factors not adequately described in lust performing a test of 
t ll bil i existing statistics. ity ý o reca ra 
the 
statistical tabulations that 
risk experts are expected to know. 
3 The results of psychometric There is no predetermined correct 
scaling methods lend support i answer. 
Factors may be weighted by 
s t diff i ng that to notions indicat way eren n different people 
there are 'Correct answers' for perfectly valid reasons. (i. e. statistics or theor- 
etical projections) against 
which perceptions can be 
calibrated. 
4 In view of the infinite If the problem and the policy making 
number of attitude objects, environment remain the same, the 
and the perishable nature results will remain relevant. If 
of the results (especially d i l i attitudes change, 
the policy making l ll i i for new an at vo ssues) le so a cy wi env ronment ana pol 
such studies can provide change. information to the regula- 
tors that might be useful but not sufficient as a basis for firm policies. 
5 It is difficult t. Q k 
It is because it is aýo mplex issue id bl i - generalize fron ris 
rception research, except 
era e that t requires cons 
research, but results so far obtained 
say that the deter- f i 
show considerable stability between i d d on vary percept minans o various var ous respon ents an from object to object. hazards. 
6 Use of psychometric methods There is nothing in the methods used 
tacitly accepts the notion that assumes a fixed level of 
that there is a level of acceptable risk. The researchers 
acceptable risk. accept that acce tability may be t td d N t b th 
t. 
con ex epen e y e en ( o 
author: It may in some circumstances be useful to have a clear fixed and 
positive statement of what is 
acceptable risk. ) 
7 Although risk-perception The researchers could not have 
studies have produced some discovered their results through important insights, there 'common sense' and 'ju gement'. There 
is some question as to to seem less is a tendency for rip 
whether empirical research hindsight surprising in hindsight than in 
should have been necessary foresight. It is a human failing that i to get them; perhaps good ment are once the results of an exper 
common sense and profes- known, people believe they knew all ld b l - l sional judgement could have ts wou ong what e. a the resu 
told us that to begin with. 
TABLE 15 CRITICISM OF RISK PERCEPTION AND THE REPLY 
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'And so those men of Indostan 
Disputed loud and long, 
Each in his own opinion 
Exceeding stiff and strong, 
Though each was partly in the right, 
And all were in the wrong! ' 
The question that arises is, 'How can risk perception be related to other 
techniques? ' One important concept in the decision making process was 
enunciated by Lord Ashby in the following way. (227) He identified a 
scale of risk of death per annum of an individual on which there are four 
points: Risks of one in a million are of no concern to the average 
person; risks of one in one hundred thousand elicit warnings; when risks 
rise to one in ten thousand people are willing to pay to have the risks 
reduced; risks of one in a thousand are unacceptable to the public and 
there would be strong pressures to have them reduced. 
It seemed possible that the four points on Lord Ashby's scale could be 
related to the four main groups of Slovic's risk perception approach in 
the following way: Taking Table 14 as the starting point, Table 16 was 
constructed which combines the two approaches by setting the points 
described in Ashby's scale of risks against risks described in Slovic's 
classification. To take the comparison a little further and assess how 
strong the relationship is between perception of risk and the probability 
of risk, the types of risks identified in Table 16 must be examined more 
closely. Unfortunately, probability of a fatality for all the 
SLAVIC RISK TYPICAL RISK ASHBY CRITERIA 
CHARACTERISTIC ALLOCATED ON BASIS OF EQUIVALENT RANKING 
SLAVIC RESULTS 
Motor Vehicles 
NOT DREADED Mountain Climbing Acceptable 
KNOWN Boxing 
Pregnancy (Childbirth) 
NOT Food Preservatives Warnings 
DREADED Diagnostic X-Rays given 
UNKNOWN Prescription Drugs 
DREADED Nerve Gas Willing 
KNOWN Terrorise to spend 
Cotmwrcial Aviation irony 
Nuclear Power 
DREADED Fossil Electric Power Unacceptable 
UNKNOWN Herbicides 
Skyscrapers 
TABLE 16 RISK-PERCEPTION AND PROBABILITY APPROACH COMPARED 
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risks mentioned has not been established. However, taking the risks for 
which data does exist allowed Table 17 to be constructed, and from the 
Table it will be seen that the two methods give very different results. 
None of the risks considered fit in either the directly unacceptable or 
the directly acceptable categories identified by Lord Ashby, and only 
diagnostic X-rays seem to be given similar ranking in both systems. 
However, this conclusion must be treated with caution as only a small 
sample of risks was considered. 
Relationship Between Risk and the Cost of Saving Lives 
Having established a general view of the value of life and the public's 
perception of risk, consideration can now be given to how expenditure on 
reducing risk correlates with risk. 
First, taking the data from Table 17, an attempt was made to determine 
how ranking in perception and probability order agrees with ranking on a 
CSX basis. The results are shown in Tables 18 and 19. 
Inspection of Tables 18 and 19 shows that on the basis of the data 
selected there is no simple strong correlation between risk ranking and 
CSX value. There is an indication from the tables of CSX values which 
suggests that in contemplating expenditure, policy makers are more 
responsive to public opinion about what is an acceptable risk than they 
are to purely rational analysis. A rather more cynical view is that 
policy makers are not fully aware of the results of quantification of 
risk as an aid to deciding priorities for expenditure. 
Looking a little more closely at the CSX vales in Tables 18 and 19, one 
figure that looks out of place is the 2x 107 value in the first rank or 
low risk line. This figure was specifically for CO standards introduced 
for cars in the USA in 1980, and if this upper limit value is deleted, 
most of the CSX values for cars reported in Reference 223 are measured 
more in the tens of thousands of pounds. The general impression given by 
these figures is that policy makers are willing to contemplate 
expenditure in the range of a few thousand pounds to a few million pounds 
to save a life, and the more unacceptable the risk is perceived to be, 
the higher is the level of expenditure that is likely to be contemplated. 
There seems to be no similar correlation between the probability of risk 
and the level of expenditure that policy makers are willing to 
contemplate to save a life, which suggests that other factors, such as 
perceived risk, are more influential in expenditure decisions. 
To determine if there is any correlation between type of risk and the 
level of life saving expenditure which policy makers are willing to 
contemplate, the evidence shown in Table 12 provides an interesting basis 
for speculation. The NHTSA, HHS and CDSC, who cover traffic, health and 
consumer products, are willing to contemplate expenditure when the CSX 
value is measured in tens of thousands of pounds. In contrast the EPA 
and OHSA, who have responsibility for environmental protection and 
occupational safety, are willing to contemplate expenditure when the CSX 
value is measured in millions. This suggests that there is a greater 
willingness to contemplate higher levels of expenditure to'save lives 
when the risk is involuntarily accepted than when it is voluntarily, 
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RANKED IN PERCEPTION OF RANKED IN ASHBY QT ? I'ITATIVE 
RISK ORDER RISK ORDER 
Slovic Probability 
Risk Risk of Death in Ashby Risk 
Charac- Examples One Year Ranking Examples 
teristic 
Motor 1x 10-4 
Vehicles 
NOT Mountain 4x 10-5 
Climbing Acceptable 
DREADED Terrorism 
Boxing 7x 10-5 (in 1x 
KNOWN 1,000,000) 
Pregnancy 8x 10-5 
(Child- 
bearing) 
Diagnostic X-Rays 
NOT Diagnostic 1x 10-5 Warnings given Skyscrapers 
DREADED X-Rays (1 in 100,000) Cannercial 
UNKNOWN Aviation 
Nuclear Power 
Motor Vehicles 
Mountain Climbing 
DREADED Commercial 5x 10-6 Willing to Boxing 
KNOWN Aviation spend money Childbearing 
(1 in 10,000) Fossil Fuelled 
Power Station 
Nuclear 
Power 3x 10-6 
DREADED Fossil Unacceptable 
Fuelled 5x 10-5 
UNKNOWN Per (1 in 1,000) 
Station 
Skyscrapers 7x 10-6 
TABLE 17 PERCEPTION AND QUANTIFICATION OF RISC 
CLASSIFICATION COMPARED 
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RISK RISK RISK COST OF SAVING 
RANK CHARACTERISTIC A LIFE (CSX VALUE) 
Not Motor Vehicles 70 x 103 - 
109 1 Dreaded 2x 
106 5 Known Infant Mortality x 0.1 
Not Diagnostic 
103 2 Dreaded X-Rays 4x 
Unknown (Equipment) 
3 Dreaded Commercial 1.5 x 106 
Known Aviation 
Nuclear Power 7.4 x 106 
106 - 4 Dreaded Fossil Fuelled 0.11 x 
106 Unknown Power Stations 0.44 x 
106 Skyscrapers 20 x 
TABLE 18 RANKING BY PERCEPTION OF RISK COMPARED WITH 
COST OF SAVII3 A LIFE 
RISK RISK RISK COST OF SAVING A 
RANK CHARACTERISTIC LIFE (CSX VALUE) 
1 Acceptable Infant Mortality 0.15 x 106 
(1 in 1,000,000) 
Skyscrapers 20 x 106 
Warnings Commercial Aviation 1.5 x 106 
2 Given Nuclear Power 7.4 x 106 
(1 in 100,000) X-Ray Equipment 4x 103 
3 Willing to Motor Vehicles 70 x 103 - 
109 2 spend money x 
106 11 (1 in 10,000) Fossil Fuelled Power x - 0. 
106 0 44 Stations x . 
4 Unacceptable 
Unknown 
(1 in 1,000) 
TABLE 19 RANKING BY PROBABILITY OF RISK COMPARED WITH 
COST OF SAVIWG A LIFE 
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the point being that individuals have very little control over the 
environment they live and work in. 
One final point that should be made is that the cost of action to save a 
life is sometimes higher than the compensation paid for a loss of life. 
Non-Monetarv Factors 
In the process of taking decisions about risk, two quite different 
approaches to the problem have to be allowed for. They are the 
technological and the societal approaches. Very broadly, the 
technological approach, which earlier parts of this study have 
dealt with, evaluates the problem on the basis of the quantifiable data 
that is available. The societal approach, as the phrase is used in this 
study, is concerned with identifying public opinion, the political 
implications, and psychological considerations. The technological 
approach has already been shown to produce an evaluation of risk in a way 
that quantified the options for the decision maker. By definition this 
approach is not sensitive to societal concerns. The societal approach 
generally identifies the societal concerns in qualitative terms and so 
does not produce results that give clear quantified guidance to the 
decision maker. This leaves the decision maker in the position of having 
to make an intuitive judgement on the basis of a mixture of quantified 
and qualitative data. Such a situation is not really strange to decision 
makers, as in most decisions there is an element of uncertainty; if there 
was not, decision taking would be a relatively simple process. 
The societal factors are basically non-monetary factors as they have 
their origins in people's emotions, but they can result in very 
significant costs. one interesting case which illustrates the gap that 
can exist between the technological approach and the societal approach is 
that quo d8) by Lathrop about the Oxnard liquefied natural gas 
terminal. " Oxnard had been selected as the site for a liquefied 
natural gas import terminal and a technical risk analysis had shown that 
the installation was very safe and there was a very low risk to the 
community. However, the analysis did show that if a series of extremely 
rare events took place, the maximum credible accident could occur which 
could result in up to 70,000 fatalities. During the political process 
associated with obtaining site approval, the maximum credible accident 
was considered, with the result that the applicant was required to site 
the terminal more remotely. This is an example of how costs can rise as 
a result of a political process. 
In Britain, one of the many ways the significance of societal factors may 
be taken into account and influence decisions is through the public 
inquiry system. For example, the public inquiry into British Nuclear 
Fuels Limited's application for planning permission to build a 
reprocessing pla (t AA Windscale lasted 100 days and is reported to have 
cost £2 million. The public inquiry into the proposal to build a 
pressurized water reactor at Sizewell lasted for most of 1983 and has 
continued into 1984. Such inquiries are by their very nature societal; 
they are in many ways unpredictable in their outcome and cost. Prior to 
the inquiry there is no way of assessing by how much it will delay a 
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project or what resources will have to be devoted to providing the 
information required by the inquiry and answering the questions raised. 
A public inquiry is in some ways an exercise in communications. Not only 
does information flow to the inspector who has to assess the 
acceptability of the proposal, but, as presentation of the evidence is 
open to the public, anyone who cares to attend the inquiry can hear all 
the evidence presented. Generally an inquiry operates at two levels: at 
one level it deals with evidence which is within the limits of present 
knowledge and at the other level, it seeks to identify where the proposal 
goes beyond the limits of present knowledge and what is the significance 
of any excursion beyond those limits. It is when a proposal is found to 
go beyond the limits of present knowledge that non-monetary factors and 
emotional arguments become most significant. By their very nature these 
factors are hard to quantify, although suggestions such as those by 
Nagel, do help and the approach thUI t is suggested in the following has 
been derived from Nagel's ideas. ý23 
The central feature of the method is that projects with different non- 
monetary features can be compared by ranking each project in a way that 
takes account of both costs and non-monetary features. To illustrate the 
method, consider the hypothetical problem of choosing between two sites 
for a power station. At Site A there is local opposition to the siting 
but less has to be spent on developing access roads and piping cooling 
water. Around Site B there is high unemployment which wduld be partly 
relieved by the construction of the power station but the cost of 
developing access roads and a cooling water supply would be more than for 
Site A. The benefits from power generation are assumed to be the same on 
both sites, so that factor is neglected in this example. For the purpose 
of this example, the cost of Project A is assumed to be 120 units, 
allowing for the lower cost of roads and cooling water supply, and the 
political significance of the opposition is 3, ranked on a scale of 0 to 
10. Factors ranked from 0 up to 1 on the scale are considered an 
advantage, and those ranked over 1 up to 10 are considered a 
disadvantage. If a factor is ranked as 1, its effect is considered to be 
neutral. For Project B, the cost is 140 units and the political 
significance of the relief of unemployment is ranked as 0.5. 
This gives a ranking of Project A as: 120 x3= 360 
and a ranking of Project B as: 140 x 0.5 = 70 
In this example, on the basis of the assumptions made Project B appears 
to have the advantage as it has the lower ranking number. The lower the 
ranking number, the more acceptable the project is. There is no limit to 
the number of factors that can be allowed for in the ranking process and 
in a real case it is likely that more factors would have to be considered 
than were considered in the example. The only caveat to increasing the 
number of factors considered is that when projects have to be compared 
the ranking of each project must be built up in the same way. 
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Conclusions 
The following tentative conclusions seem to be justified: 
1) There is some indication that the level of expenditure on risk 
reduction which people are willing to contemplate, is more related 
to the perception of risk than to estimates of the probability of 
the risk. 
2) There is also an indication that policy makers are willing to 
contemplate higher levels of expenditure to reduce involuntarily 
accepted risks than for voluntarily accepted risks. 
3) To reach more positive conclusions about the correlation of risk 
reducing expenditure with other factors, considerably more evidence 
is required. 
4) The cost of saving life is only one factor taken into account in 
deciding the level of expenditure on risk reduction. The other 
factors need careful evaluation. 
5) The value of life for compensation purposes often seems to be put at 
about £200,000 but there is a considerable range in valuations. 
6) CSX values range from £0 to 2x 109. For many of the decision 
situations considered, the range of values was from £10 to E10. 
7) The cost of action to save life is sometimes higher than the 
compensation paid for loss of life. 
8) With many activities there is some residual risk to life and as a 
result of these risks, claims for compensation may arise. The 
provision of funds to pay such compensation is clearly the role of 
insurance. The insurance market has built up its view of the cost 
of providing cover for such compensation from its past experience. 
9) There seems to be some merit in developing a way of combining 
evaluation of risk in perception terms and economic terms with 
assessment of the technical aspects of risk expressed in probability 
terms. The first steps towards comprehensive assessment are shown 
in Tables 14,16 and 17 and they provide the starting point for the 
comprehensive assessment technique developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMERr 
In this chapter a more philosophical examination is given of the wider 
implications of risk assessment. The examination assesses the ethical 
implications associated with making decisions about the acceptability of 
risks based on the mainly technical features of risk analysis identified 
in the earlier chapters. The assessment leads to the identification of 
the range of factors that should be evaluated if an assessment of risk is 
to be considered as comprehensive. From the beginning of this study it 
was recognized that the world of technology and science is constantly 
changing and developing and that people's aspirations and demands for a 
higher quality of life tend to increase with time. One manifestation of 
this changing pattern is the increase in the number of publications 
dealing w th risk: between 1966 and 1982 there was a twelve fold 
increase, % 31' the greatest increase took place from 1974 to 1981, and 
then in 1981 and 1982 the rate of increase seems to have slowed down. 
The arguments presented recognize the fact that, as with most things in 
life, there is no absolute value of risk and man's knowledge is limited. 
Lack of perfect understanding does not generally stop progress; in a 
prudent and caring society a way forward is generally found which limits 
the risks taken to some level that is considered acceptable, taking into 
account the circumstances existing at the time the decision is made. It 
is the way this final decision about the acceptability of risk can be 
made logically that is given particular consideration i{}tl this chapter. 
In the eccý1ýa'. a+. d tlýird svc tonS 1(e tmp1Ie0. tlons cf -, e va, riccý 
types o regrýe, +2+""ef EarajctS arn1 the pyohfe S of GSSýSSth1 a'1+d' 
ýaaýiifyrº, y cal tk e. "'eteuz'1f fa cf or. < c'Cell' and, 
to complete the study, the final section describes the developments that 
are still required in the field of risk assessment. 
The arguments in this chapter are built up in the following five steps: 
philosophical observations, realistic targets, problems with the 
quantitative approach and e 1tct aSýOnýý, "_ 
Philosophic Observations 
In Lord Ashby's introductory remarks at the Royal Society of London's 
discussion on "The Assessment and Perception of Risk" he said, in 
relation to the disparity between assessments of risk and the perception 
of risk by those exposed to them: 
"And it will not do to suppose that the disparity can be resolved by 
education. The challenge to the decision-maker is to create an 
acceptable policy in the light of this disparity. One class of 
experts has successfully met this challenge, namely underwriters who 
deal with insurance. For them to remain solvent, their calculations 
have to be based on assessed risk; otherwise they would go out of 
ill 
business. But to attract customers their advertisements must make 
some appe2t to perceived risk; otherwise they would get no 
business-. 
The message from Lord Ashby's remarks which is carried forward to the 
discussion that follows is that even if a risk is accurately assessed 
by appropriately skilled specialists to be acceptably safe, it will not 
necessarily be accepted by the general population who may have a quite 
different view of acceptability. Tools for risk assessment exist, as has 
been shown in the previous chapter, and tools for determining the 
perception of risk are available but their appropriateness is still being 
tested, so as yet their application appears not to be fully exploited. 
This point will be returned to a little later in this chapter. 
The question of how to reduce risk to an acceptable level is not new; it 
seems toi 4n integral part of man's struggle to improve the quality of 
his life. There are many everyday examples of how risks have been 
recognized in the past and action has been taken to reduce them. Most 
towns and cities in Europe and America have fire brigades, fairly clean 
piped water, hospitals, signalling on railways, air traffic control 
systems and regulations for siting industry. To some extent this action 
to reduce risks partly accounts for the increase in life expectancy for a 
male(2c4ld at birth from about 40 years in 1841 to about 70 years 
now. The action taken in the past was taken mainly to reduce 
unacceptable trends. With the statistical evidence that is now available 
it would be possible, retrospectively, to make a very good quantitatively 
based case to support many of the actions taken. The situation is 
similar today for nuclear power and process industry installations which 
are perceived to represent a risk. Decisions have to be made on 
imperfect information about how the associated risks may be made more 
acceptable. 
One evaluation of the completeness of risk assessments has shown thffi% 
best only 80% of the potential faults are found by assessment. 
Prediction of potential operational faults may be lower and commissioning 
checks may only reveal 14% of the potential faults. The installations 
considered in the study on which these estimates of comprehensiveness of 
fault detection were made, were relatively simple chemical plants, so for 
more complex plant like a nuclear reactor the perfect completeness of 
fault identification is likely to be lower. 
If the assessment of risk involves the assessment of toxic implications 
of a range of chemicals, the possibility of incomplete assessment due to 
lack of adequate knowledge of the toxicity characteristics of all 
substances involved must be considered. About four million chemicals 
have been identified and of those about ttý % thousand are made in 
quantities of more than one tonne per year. ` Interaction between 
chemicals can produce more serious effects than if the chemicals act 
alone, and some chemicals are transformed into more toxic entities, for 
example carcinogens may be produced by enzymes in the human body. To 
keep costs of assessing the carcinogenic characteristics of a chemical 
low, use is often increasingly being made of what are called 'short term' 
tests which use damage to DNA material as an indicator of carcinogenity, 
and these are about 90% effective. This means that 10% of the materials 
tested do not have carcinogenity identified. The problem is compounded 
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by the fact that the presence of some of these potentially dangerous 
chemicals are difficult to identify in the environment at low but still 
potentially dangerous concentrations. 
Some risk analyses simply consider the faults in the design as presented, 
but a comprehensive risk analysis should consider faults arising from 
deficiencies in plant operation and from inadequacies in maintenance and 
inspection. There is some evidence from the petroleum refining and 
storage industry which 31ggests that the causes of 
faults have the 
following distribution: 
Design faults, equipment failures, construction 30% 
and modification errors 
Deficiencies in plant operation 45% 
Inadequate maintenance and inspection 20% 
Other unidentified causes 5% 
Recognition of the fact that the decision maker generally has to make a 
decision on the basis of imperfect technical risk data is only part of 
the story, he may also not fully appreciate the influence that some 
factors will have in terms of long term benefits to the community. This 
problem was identified in the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4: if the 
decision maker attempts to evaluate the significance of the whole 
spectrum of factors that are related to the acceptability of risk, not 
only should he consider the technical factor t he must take into 
account economic and socio-political factors. 
'2 g) 
The question that 
arises from recognizing that a wide spectrum of disparate factors has to 
be considered is what criteria shall be used to judge acceptability? For 
technical risk it has been shown in Chapter 5 that in the nuclear 
industry there are attempts to identify a risk/probability line below 
which the risks are acceptable and above which they are unacceptable. 
For the process industry there appears to be more interest in determining 
the acceptability of risk as a single limit value that should not be 
exceeded. The views expressed by Lans and Bjordal, in a paper presented 
at the 4th International Symposium on Loss Prevention, appear to be 
representative of the views of the process industry. The following 
quota(týiS Wi) from their paper seems to summarize these views quite 
well: 
"In order to spend our limited resources on improving of safety in 
the most cost-effective way, quantitative risk analysis techniques 
should, in the views of the authors, not be applied beyond the point 
where the credibility is affected and the results become imaginary 
for example at very low probabilities. 
We have found that many analysts and decision makers tend to regard 
a frequency of major failures of man-made constructions of once per 
ten thousand years as a reasonable parameter for the present status 
of technology. 
The authors question the usefulness of extending risk analysis to 
beyond such limits. 
113 
Although these conclusions are based on logical reasoning, we must 
not remain blind to the perception of our society, to their concern 
about large although infrequent incidents, and to the inherent 
desire to continue to inprove industries' safety performance". 
The ultimate aim of any decision by a government body should be to 
maintain and if possible improve the quality of life of the people within 
the area controlled by the government. This philosophic observation 
implies that major decisions should be justified, to those likely to be 
affected by the decisions, in a clear and readily understood way which 
shows how all the relevant factors have been evaluated and their 
significance weighed. Ideally the evaluation should be built up in 
quantitative terms but if the relevant data for evaluation of a 
particular factor is of poor quality, the importance of individual 
factors could be ranked subjectively. The assessment of the significance 
of all the factors related to a particular decision might have to be 
based on evaluation of a set of factors, some of which will have been 
evaluated qualitatively and others quantitatively. Obviously the ranking 
can be improved as better data becomes available. The scheme for 
assessing the acceptability of a proposal using a technique that determines overall acceptability by integrating the ranking of all the individual factors is discussed in some detail later intktnc chapter. 
Realistic Targets 
There are a variety of limiting characteristics that can be used to 
specify the targets which a project should satisfy. Identification of 
the limiting characteristics depends on the perspective of the people 
setting the target. A commercial company may set targets for the 
acceptability of a project in money terms, that is they may say that a 
project has to be completed in a way that satisfies the relevant 
commercial and regulatory requirements within a particular sum of money. 
Regulators may specify the targets which have to be satisfied in a 
variety of ways: for some cases they may require that the risks are 
reduced to as low a level as is reasonable achievable, for other cases, 
such as releases of potentially toxic material, they may specify that 
only a specific maximum quantity or a particular maximum concentration of the material may be released. Some requirements, such as the 
acceptability of the occurrence of a potentially hazardous accident, may be specified in terms of the probability of the occurrence of an 
accident. The public tend to express their views about the acceptability 
of a project in simple, direct and unequivocal terms, such as 'acceptable' or 'not acceptable'. 
In this part of the study, attention is concentrated on the realistic 
targets that the regulators should aim to ensure that projects satisfy. 
But before embarking on identification and assessment of targets for the 
regulators, a brief commentary is given on the relevant views of the 
public and of commercial organizations. 
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There is no indication that the general public has a clear understanding 
of the significance of a risk expressed in probability terms. However, 
the daily press sometimes describe risks in probability terms and clearly 
they would not print such descriptions if they were likely to be 
unintelligible to a large proportion of their readers. For example, an 
article in the International Herald Tribune discussing the significance 
of importing into the United States of America fruit pulp contaminated 
with ethylene dibromide, stated that the US Food and Drug Administration 
usually considers a2n7 tthing 
less than a one-in-a-million chance of cancer 
to be acceptable. The Article went on to say that the measures 
taken to restrict the use of ethylene dibromide will reduce the risk to 
adults to about one in ten million. The author of the article clearly 
assumes that some general readers have an appreciation of the 
significance of risks expressed in probability terms, and that they share 
the view that one-in-a-million is only a small risk. 
Another example of the assumption that the general public have some 
understanding of risk described in quantitative terms, is given by the 
following extract from the article in The Times describing the explosion 
of a Jaguar i4rlrýraft above the Porton Down Chemical Defence Establishment 
in England. 
"Dr Jeremy Bray, the Opposition spokesman on science and technology immediately called for restrictions on flying over Porton Down. 
'The one-in-a-million chance of an aircraft crash on the highly 
toxic and dangerous research establishment at Porton Down very 
nearly happened this afternoon. Flying restrictions must be imposed 
to make any such possibility less likely to happen', he said. " 
This comment suggests that if the risk of an accident with very serious 
consequences is as high as one-in-a-million, the public would expect 
action to be taken to reduce either the frequency or consequences of such 
accidents. The reaction to the accident appears rather extreme, as 
generally it is only if the risk of an individual becoming a casualty is 
greater than one-in-a-million that there is likely to be pressure to 
reduce the risk. The level of one-in-a- r for the acceptable level 
of risk was identified by Chicken(24 
2 
and by Lord Ashby. (243) The 
special feature of the Porton Down case is that the public did not 
understand the true nature of the substances involved but understood they 
were very dangerous and if they were released they would have unpleasant 
consequences and this gave rise to a feeling of dread. The reaction to 
the Porton Down incident implies that if there is a risk of multiple 
fatalities, it must be less than one-in-a-million to be acceptable. 
Simply questioning the level of probability of a hazard that is 
considered as being acceptable does draw attention to the question of 
whether there is somewhere a 'right', 'correct' or 'objective' criterion 
in existence. The question of how predictable are people's views about 
what is ý. ccptable has been examined by Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and 
Phillips. They show that it is possible to calibrate the way people intuitively assess probabilities. Such calibrations may also give some indication of how predictable assessors of the acceptability of risk are 
when assessing the acceptability of risk in qualitative terms that depend 
on judgements about the risks being as low as reasonably achievable. The 
usefulness of such procedures depends on there being a body of 
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performance data for situations similar to those to be assessed. Without 
such data the technique would not for example give any significant 
insight into the reliability of an intuitive assessment of acceptability 
of a novel plant of which only one was built. 
Having hinted at the difficulties associated with establishing realistic 
targets, the problem is approached by first considering what has been 
done and then postulating what would be the ideal form for targets to 
take. In examining targets, attention is first concentrated on the 
targets related to technical issues. The targets that could be used for 
judging the acceptability of the economic and socio-political aspects of 
risk are rather different and are not directly compatible with the 
targets used for technical issues. 
So far the study has recognized that there are considerable differences 
between the way risk is assessed in the process industry and in the 
nuclear industry, and that there are a number of differences between the 
different countries studied. In very broad terms, the common 
characteristics are that: there is generally some requirement to limit 
discharges of potentially hazardous materials to some specified level, 
there is some requirement to limit the exposure of workers and people 
living in the area exposed to potentially hazardous conditions, and also 
there is generally either a direct or implied requirement to quantify the 
risk. Except in a few cases, quantified targets for acceptable risk 
levels are not stated. In many ways it is reasonable to describe the 
present status of the regulation of risk in quantified terms as being at 
the development stage in the process industry, and for the nuclear 
industry quantified targets are being actively considered. Quantified 
descriptions of risks are frequently used as part of the evidence 
presented to substantiate the case for a project under consideration for 
acceptability. In both industries there is a tendency for the regulatory 
bodies to keep a degree of flexibility about the precise conditions that 
must be satisfied in order for a particular plant to be acceptable. This 
means that there is an element of professional judgement in any final 
decision about acceptability. 
The views of the Dutch Rijnmond Public Authority appear to be 
representative of the views of all the regulatory authorities concerned 
with process industries in the countries considered. The Rijnmond area 
is an example of a highly industrialized and heavily populated area. It 
includes the largest harbour in the world and a vast conglomeration of 
chemical and petrochemical industries. The Rijnmond Central Control 
Agency registers approximately 350 incidents per year from industry in 
the area; the individual cases vary from potential danger, to incidents 
that actually cause additional air pollution, stench or spillages. 
During 1981 there were: seven cases in which one hundred or more 
complaints were received about stench and seventy-eight industrial fires. 
Four of the fires were so spectacular that they received extensive media 
coverage. Up to 1982, none of the accidents had caused casualties among 
the population. 
The lines along which the Rijnmond Public Authority are developing their 
es their safety safety policy, which in the terms of this study iMW 
targets, have been described in the following terms: 
116 
"1) For the judgement of the acceptability of risks, both the 
probability and the consequences of possible accidents will be 
considered, but the consequences will play a more important 
role. 
2) After the prescription of risk-reducing measures, there will 
remain a residual risk. For the judgement of the acceptability 
of this residual risk, other aspects such as social and 
economic factors should be taken into consideration. 
3) For practical purposes, a distinction will be made between new 
activities (yet to be started up) and existing activities to 
which historic regulations apply. Still, the authorities may 
decide that in some cases improved safety precautions for 
existing activities are necessary. However, because of the 
possible adverse economic consequences of such policy to the 
operator, the authorities will proceed very carefully. 
4) The elaboration of this policy into concrete measures will be 
done after an assessment of the current situation. 
Consultation and co-operation with industry is considered 
essential. " 
Simply establishing a target does not make a plant safe. It is only if 
it is feasible to prove that a plant satisfies the target that the target 
takes on real meaning. The justification that a particular target is 
satisfied requires not only simple direct demonstration that some 
numerical target has been satisfied, but also that the method by which 
the justification has been established is sufficiently rigorous to ensure 
that all significant potential faults and their consequences are properly 
identified. Blair of th ow Chemical Company suggested one risk 
assessment methodology, `4ýý and the analytical scheme given below in 
Table 20 is a development of that methodology. The methodology represents 
an iterative approach to determining that the target has been satisfied 
in a particular case. 
It is important to recognize that any risk assessment is open to 
considerable criticism it if omits consideration of some sequence of 
events that could lead to a major hazard, and also if the analysis 
devotes time to the analysis of events that are of no safety 
significance. This particular p*) blem is discussed at length by 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein. ( It is also important that the 
events considered must include allowance for human errors as well as for 
all types of technical faults and for natural phenomena. 
Another vital aspect of setting numerical targets is that they should be 
acceptable to industry, and for a numerical risk target to be acceptable 
to industry, it would have to be applied uniformly across the whole 
trading area. Industry would regard a requirement to satisfy a 
particular level of risk unfair if the requirement was more restrictive 
than their competitors in other countries were subjected to. This is 
really a very strong argument for having uniform requirements across the 
whole trading area. 
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STEP ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
1 Identify plant design 
2 Identify all the required risk data 
3 Identify the magnitude of the worst risk 
4 Identify the probability of the events that 
would cause the worst risk 
5 Identify the spectrum of risks 
6 Determine if risk level can be reduced 
7 Determine the spectrum of risks if action 
identified in (6) is taken 
8 Make recommendations about the acceptability 
of risk 
TABLE 20 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Similarly, the risk targets should be the same for all industries; there 
is no logical and no moral justification for having different targets for 
different industries. This means that in some industries there is room 
for considerable improvement. As an illustration of this point, in 
Britain the risk to workers in the chemical industry is the&aj e as the 
average value for all industry covered by the Factories Act. In the 
clothing and footwear industry the risks are about one twenty-seventh of 
the average for all industry, and in the vehicle industry the risks are 
one third of all industry. The industries that are higher than average 
are metal manufacture and shipbuilding, they have about double the 
average risk. In agriculture the risk is about two-and-a-half times the 
average for industry, and for construction erectors the risk is about 
seventeen times the average value. 
The next question that has to be considered about targets is whether 
people outside an industry should be subjected to the same or a lower 
level of risk than people inside the industry are exposed to. In the 
nuclear industry the approach has been that the general public outside a 
reactor site should only be exposed to a fraction of the risk that 
workers voluntarily accept, the fraction being between one tenth and one 
thirtieth, depending on the particular circumstances, wit te one 
thirtieth factor applying if the exposure is continuous. The 
radiation dose for workers may not exceed 50mSv in a year, and if all 
radiation workers received doses up to the limit it has been estimated 
that the mortality would be about five times the average for all 
industry. However, the average annual dose received by radiation 
workers is only 4mSv and therefore the risk from radiation is on average 
below that of industry. On the basis of the dose received in practice, 
the average annual mortality risk for radiation workers is about 
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4x 10-5. (250) This sug 
' 
ests that a target for workers of an annual 
mortality limit of 10- and for the general public 10-6 would be 
consistent with current practice. This view is based on current 
assessments but there are indications from re-assessments of the doses 
that people received from the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan that the 
maximum permissible neutron dose rates should be reduced by a factor of 
between 2 and 6. (251) If such a change was found to be necessary it 
would not imply a major change of mortality risk for workers in the 
nuclear power industry as usually the neutron dose is only a small part 
of the total dose. 
The question that remains is should the target be expressed as a band or 
should the target be expressed as a limit line which relates the 
acceptable probability to the severity of the accident? This question 
has been examined by several writers and Kletz has cut through the 
somewhat amorphous argument with some astringent practi reasoning, the 
sense of which has influenced the remarks that follow. 
For the ultimate decision about acceptability, a target expressed as a 
band of values can be unsatisfactory as there will be a tendency for the 
bottom of the band to become the target. However, the identification of a 
band of acceptable values can be helpful in the preliminary stages of 
design and assessment of acceptability if the band is used in the sense 
that it identifies the area in which it should be possible to reduce the 
risks inherent in the design to an acceptable level. If the risks are 
greater than allowed for by the band, very careful assessment would have 
to be made to determine if the project can be made acceptable. 
The alternative of a single line target that takes into account the 
severity of the accident, is slightly more complex. If there is some 
probability that accidents which could kill hundreds or even thousands of 
people might occur, such a possibility has to be allowed for in deciding 
the level of probability that is acceptable, as was shown above in the 
Porton Down case. * For plants with such hazard potential to be 
considered, the possibility of major accidents must be kept remote, 
perhaps of the order of 10-N to 10- per year. For a plant with a life 
of thirty years, such an accident probability means the risk of the 
accident occurring during that life is between 1 in 3,000 and 1 in 
300,000. In this example of what may be considered an acceptable level 
of risk, the level is fixed quite arbitrarily, but is an attempt to 
identify a target that is as nearly as possible a consensus view of the 
various quantitative targets that have been published in the open 
literature. 
From the arguments presented above, it is suggested that a realistic 
target for potentially hazardous plant to satisfy to be technically 
acceptable, regardless of the cause of the hazard, can be expressed as 
follows: 
* See p 115 
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1) The annual risk of an accident that would cause multiple fatalities 
should not exceed 10-7 
2) The annual mortality risk for members of the public outside the 
plant should not exceed 10-6 
3) The annual morality risk for workers involved with the plant should 
not exceed 10- 
4) For annual mortality risks greater than 10-6 for members of the 
public outside the plant and greater than 10-5 for workers involved 
in the plant, a special justification of their acceptability would 
be required. 
It is appreciated that initially all the data required to make such 
assessments may not be available, particularly where novel equipment is 
involved. In such cases, if it seems likely that the information 
required to prove acceptability will become available, the plant can be 
accepted on a time or operationally limited basis. Such a procedure is 
widely used in the aircraft industry. Prototype aircraft have tight 
operational limits placed on them, and as experience increases the limits 
are generally widened, but if experience shows it to be necessary, the 
restrictions will be tightened. For comparison with other industries it 
is interesting to note that the failure probabilities which civil 
aircraft have to satisfy for certification purposes are stated very 
positively in quantified terms. For example the accept4Dle probability 
for hazardous modes of failures of f1 ps is less than l0 - per flight, or ý253ý one event in one billion flights. 
Problems with the Quantification Approach 
The quantification of the technical aspects of risk is an important part 
of the process of assessing the acceptability of risk but, as already 
mentioned, it does not give a comprehensive assessment of the 
acceptability of risk. 
The following quotation from a paper by Dunster and Vinck puts the role 
of quantitative risk at ment neatly into perspective from the 
regulatory point of view. 'ýýs Although they are specifically addressing 
the acceptability of nuclear plant, their argument is relevant to any 
potentially hazardous plant. 
"In the long run, quantitative risk assessments will encourage the 
process of public understanding and are likely to be beneficial, 
provided that they are put into the right perspective and expressed 
in comprehensible terms. In the short term they may well make the 
problem of persuading a reluctant public of the need for major 
industrial installations more difficult in individual cases. Our 
view is that the benefits of risk assessment outweigh the 
disadvantages, and that risk assessments should be carried out and 
the results published. Both the regulatory authorities and industry 
must recognize, however, that this process will not be without 
tribulations. " 
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Similar arguments can be applied to the quantification of economic 
factors. However, it is not so easy to put the socio-political arguments 
into perspective, as the procedures for assessment of the relevant 
factors are not so well established. Further, the results of assessing 
socio-political factors cannot be considered as everlasting. The results 
obtained in six month's time may, due to changing circumstances, be quite 
different fran the results obtained now. 
If it were possible to make a perfect and comprehensive assessment of the 
acceptability of a particular risk, there would be no problem. As with 
many things, a perfect assessment is not possible and an assessment 
generally represents a compromise that has to be set round with 
qualifications. Some of the limitations of techniques for assessment of 
the technical features of risk are identified in Table 21. 
Some of the qualifications that must be made about the process of 
assessment of the technical factors are: 
1) Assuming the techniques are applied rigorously, the accuracy of the 
results will depend on the accuracy of the data used. From this it 
follows that a prerequisite of applying the techniques is to 
establish the relevance and accuracy of the data to be used. 
2) For the total assessment of risk it is not sufficient simply to 
consider the physical structure and components of the installation 
that is being evaluated. The operators associated with the plant 
must be considered, as must the public around the plant. This 
implies that for any technique to be considered as satisfactory it 
must adequately describe the whole cycle of any feasible fault 
condition, from initiation to dispersion of any toxic substances or 
radiation released, through to the ultimate clean-up. The ideal 
technique would cover all these requirements. Failure mode and 
effect analysis combined in some cases with random number simulation 
can generally be adapted to satisfy most of this requirement. 
3) The techniques described do not make any allowance for the changes 
that can take place with time such as wear out, changes in 
operations, changes in requirements or changes in knowledge. 
Allowance for wear out and also some changes in operation like 
higher output can be made in the data used for assessment. The 
other changes with time that can take place may necessitate the 
calculations to justify acceptability being reworked. 
4) The techniques described so far make no allowance for economics, 
public acceptability, or political implications. These factors are 
important to a comprehensive evaluation of acceptability and 
cannot be evaluated by the techniques described so far; even 
epidemiological studies do not give a reliable guide to what will be 
accepted in the future. 
The economic factors can be analyzed in several ways, but before 
examining the various forms of analysis that can be used it is worth 
remembering the point that Professor Pearce made, in the quotation given 
earlier, that no society devotes its entire resources to the elimination 
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MEfl1OD SIREMTH LIMITATION COMA 
Allows May overlook same A sound first 
FAULT TREE quantification sequences, stage refinement. 
ANALYSIS of fault ignores socio- Starts from end 
(ETA) frequency political and event (top down) 
economic factors 
FAILURE Gives a Time consuming if Starts from 
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AND understanding scale. Excludes event and 
EFFECT of the socio-political determines the 
(FMEA) problem and economic consequences 
factors 
Easier to Diagrams may This is really 
identify became conpli- a variation 
EVENT TREE sequences cated. Ignores of Failure Mode 
ANALYSIS socio-political and Effect 
and economic Analysis 
factors 
Diagrams may be Really a 
CAUSE Easier to conTlicated. variation of 
CONSEQUENCE identify Ignores socio- FMEA 
ANALYSIS sequences political and 
economic factors 
Very flexible Generally requires This is 
RANDOM analytical tool extensive computer capable of 
NUMBER which partly program. further 
SIMULATION solves the Currently ignores development 
(RNSA) problem of the socio-political 
variability of and economic 
input data factors 
This allows for Tends to separate Allowance for 
TECHNIQUES the operator human error from human error 
FLOR taking no the rest of the should be built 
PREDICTING action argument. Does into the other 
HUMAN ERROR not allow for techniques 
('I ERP) socio-political 
and economic 
factors 
Based on Past experience Past experience 
EPIDEIIOL- past may not be may indicate 
OGICAL experience relevant to new critical factors 
STUDIES proposal 
TABLE 21 TECHNIQUES FOR ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL FACTORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH POTEIJ= RISK 
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of the risk. * The techniques that can be used to evaluate economic 
implications of risk are summarized in Table 22. Economic factors cannot 
be evaluated with precision but this does not remove the validity of the 
argument that requires all expenditure, including expenditure on risk 
reduction, be optimized. The following method derived from the work 
of Cannon(E5) shows how the optimization of expenditure on risk 
reduction can be approached. 
The cost of the risk associated with a particular activity is equal to 
the sum of the various types of risk events R1 multiplied by F1 the times 
the risks will occur in the time interval considered, and Ehe cost of 
each type of risk event Cl. If there are 'n' types of risk events, then: 
CR = L.. 1 C1F1R1 
If the cost of eliminating the risk is CE, then C is, like CR, the sum 
of the various types of risk events R1 multiplieg by F the times they 
will occur in the time interval considered and the cost of the steps 
taken to reduce the risk C2. If there are in, types of risk events, 
then: 
CE =G1 C2F1R1 
C2 may be a complex value as for each risk event several steps may be 
taken to reduce the risk of the event or its impact. 
If CR > CE the solution is financially acceptable. 
If CR < CE some other solution to the problem must be found and 
will require careful evaluation against the benefits. 
It may be that under certain circumstances a reduction of the risk by a 
factor 'K' may be acceptable. If this is the case: 
KCR > KCE may be financially acceptable 
or KCR < KCE may still require some other solution and careful 
evaluation against the benefits. 
More detailed evaluation of C. < C. and KCR < KCE cases may involve the 
use of analytical techniques such as net present value, discounted cash 
flow, rate of return, cost/benefit, and ratio range. A refinement of 
this approach would determine the distribution of the initiating events 
and then determine the probability of C being either higher or lower. 
It would be wrong to assume that the benefits from a project are constant 
and immutable. There are many instances where the benefits from an 
investment turn out to be lower than initially predicted. One classic 
example is the Concorde supersonic airliner and other cases where the 
return on investment may be lower than expected are the Three Mile Island 
reactors and the Flixborough Nypro plant. 
* See page 97 
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decision maker to in quantifying science but 
COST-BENEFIT structure his risk, with the gives a measure 
ANALYSIS analysis of the result that of economic 
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TABLE 22 TDCHNIQUES FOR ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC FACTORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL RISK 
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Ewen if evaluation of economic factors is not an exact science, it does 
give the decision maker an additional way of assessing the significance 
of various types of risk and at least an indication of their importance. 
For a project that is part of the private sector and will operate under 
free market conditions, the assessment of the economic viability of the 
project is the most important test as, if the project cannot be built to 
an acceptable safety standard for a price that will enable a profit to be 
earned, the project will not go ahead. The argument is rather different 
if the project is going to operate under monopolistic or state ownership 
conditions. 
Evaluation of the acceptability of risk in socio-political terms centres 
on establishing the nature of the public's perception of risk and the 
political implications. The techniques for evaluating these 
characteristics are summarized in Table 23. There are four main ways of 
establishing the view of a community, each of which has some limitation, 
and all suffer from the weakness that they are trying to evaluate - 
public opinion - which is notoriously fickle. What is a frequently held 
view one day may be changed the next day. Politicians are well aware of 
this fact and it is well recognized in the old adage: 'A week is a long 
time in politics'. In each of the four methods there is an element of 
sampling, but it is mainly in the formal sampling and in epidemiological 
studies that the evidence can be gathered in a way that will help the 
decision maker understand the nature of the public perception of risk. 
The methods that the analyst may use to evaluate such data have been 
examii bin 
the Royal Society's studies on assessment and perception of 
risk, bý, dies made in the Psychology Department of Surrey 
University 
ýt 
The Surrey University studies demonstrated the 
importance of performing a survey in a way that allows the depth of 
people's concern about a particular hazard to be identified in an 
impartial way that does not stimulate either pro or anti views about the 
particular hazard. Table 24, which is taken from Reference 258, gives an 
analysis of the views on six hazards of a national sample of 1189 people, 
collected during March and April 1981. The people were aged eighteen 
years or over. The fact that the survey was based on a national sample 
means that the conclusions are more likely to be representative of the 
whole population than if only people closely involved with a particular 
hazard were considered as there is some evidence that people sely 
associated with a hazard tend to underestimate its significance. 
Level of 
Concern 
Expressed 
Smoking 
Nuclear 
Plant Chemical Work 
Air 
Pollution Home 
Concern 80% 76% 64% 53% 32% 24% 
Worry 14% 1% 13% 3% 4% 16% 
Anxiety 3% 0.4% 3% 0.7% 1% 4% 
TABLE 24 LEVEL OF CONCERN ABOUT SIX HAZARDS 
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TABLE 23 TECHNIQUES FOR ASSESSMENT OF SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL RISK 
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The level of concern identified is assessed on a scale of three, with 
'Concern' being the lowest level and 'Anxiety' the highest. An 
interesting feature of these results is that while people express a 
similar level of concern about the hazards from nuclear plant and 
chemicals, their anxiety about nuclear plant is less than a seventh of 
their anxiety about chemical hazards, and only a tenth of their anxiety 
is about hazards in the home. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions that appear to be justified about the implications of 
risk assessment are that the problems that exist are similar to those 
existing in any field of human endeavour. In other words they arise from 
the current limitations of knowledge. The assessments that can be made, 
and this applies to technical, economic and socio-political factors, are 
only as good as the data they are based on. As better data becomes 
available, the assessments can be improved. This is very similar to the 
procedure followed in testing a new aeroplane, car or ship. The 
performance of the vehicle is proved step by step until maximum 
performance is achieved, progress from one step to another only being 
made when the first step is found to be satisfactory, and the necessary 
proving data has been obtained. The problem of how to bring the 
assessment of the various factors involved in risk assessment into a 
single comprehensive assessment is examined in the next chapter. 
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CHUY1 9 
EVAI TICN OF ME RAWIN '1 NI4UE 
In this chapter a method of ranking the acceptability of risks is 
proposed and critically assessed. The aim of the ranking technique is to 
provide a way of making a comprehensive assessment of all the factors 
that have been identified in earlier chapters as influencing the 
acceptability of risks. First, the technique is described then the data 
required for ranking is discussed. Next, the efficacy of the technique 
is assessed by testing the technique against three major decisions and 
then a critical assessment of the technique is given. Finally, a survey 
of the developments still considered to be required to make the technique 
universally acceptable are given. 
Proposed Technique for Overall Assessment of Risk 
In Chapter 3, Fig. 1, seventeen factors were identified as having some 
bearing on the risk acceptability of a particular project. The way in 
which these factors can be evaluated individually, in some cases in a 
quantified way, was examined in Chapters 3,4,7 and 8. This examination 
showed that there were considerable problems to be overcome to in order 
to arrive at a balanced view of the overall significance of the whole 
matrix of factors, in a way that would give the final decision maker a 
survey of the significance of all the related factors. A possible 
solution to this problem can now be described, and evaluation of this 
proposed solution leads to the suggestion that it should be adopted as 
the preferred technique for risk assessment. 
A major difficulty in assessing the whole range of factors is that they 
cannot all be measured in the same dimensional units, there are at least 
four quite different types of unit involved. Some of the techniques 
proposed for evaluation of projects at the conceptual stage produce a 
non-dimensional index number based simply on the technical nature of the 
activity. The detailed technical assessment techniques yield results 
which puts the risks in terms of probability. The consequences of these 
risks may be expressed as the probability of casualties in a specific 
period, or they may be expressed as the damage to property that may 
result in a specific period. The techniques for evaluating economic 
factors generally produce results in monetary terms. Perhaps the most 
difficult factors to quantify with precision are the socio-political 
factors. It is tempting to suggest that the assessment of socio- 
political factors would produce a simple yes or no answer, but such a 
suggestion would be misleading. Public opinions and perceptions are full 
of shades of meaning. Even the outcome of voting may leave doubts and 
uncertainty, particularly if there is only a small margin between the 
number of votes for and the number of votes against the proposal. 
To overcome these differences in units, it is suggested that the end 
product of a comprehensive assessment technique should be a non- 
dimensional ranking of the factors involved. Decisions about the ranking 
of factors could be based on an assessment of the results of evaluating 
the significance of each factor by the appropriate technique, in its 
relevant units, and to the highest accuracy possible with the data 
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available. One merit of 
stage, is that it avoids 
common monetary unit which 
monetary value to life. 
this technique that is clear, even at this 
the problem of expressing the results in a 
may be emotive because it involves ascribing a 
The form of ranking that is proposed as being appropriate is a two stage 
form of ranking. In the first stage the individual factors are ranked. 
Table 25 shows the three main groups of factors that it is considered 
should be ranked. The groups are intended to include all the factors 
identified in Fig 1 in Chapter 3, and this means that changes with time 
are allowed for and all components of the project are included. It is 
appreciated that for some purposes ranking of only part of a project may 
be required, but such an assessment is simply a sub-section of the 
comprehensive assessment. The ranking is built up by scoring the 
acceptability of each of the factors in Table 25 on a scale of 1 to 4, 
where the lower the mark given the more acceptable the results of the 
underlying assessment. The scoring should only be made on the basis of 
whole numbers, so a total score of 3 would be the most acceptable 
proposal possible and a score of 12 would be a completely unacceptable 
propositon. 
FACTOR GROUPS UNITS COMPREHENSIVENESS 
Socio-political Non-dimensional 
Economic Money terms Must include allowance 
for changes with time 
and the whole process 
Risk to society fron raw materials to 
and individual disposal of plant 
(This is the Probability 
technical terms 
characteristic 
of risk) 
TABLE 25 FACTORS M BE CONSIDERED FOR RANKING 
The second stage of the process is to evaluate the total acceptability of 
the project. It is proposed that there should be four classes of 
acceptability. Table 26 shows how the scoring can be related to the 
classes of acceptability. 
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ALLOW ABLE ALLO WABLE SUB-SCORE 
RANK ACCEPTABILITY TOTAL 
OF OF PROPOSAL SCORE SOCIO- ECONOMIC RISK TO 
RISK RANGE POLITICAL INDIVIDUAL 
AND SOCIETY 
1 YES without 1- 3 1 1 1 
restriction 
2 YES subject to 4- 6 1- 2 1- 2 1- 2 
certain action 
ONLY acceptable 
3 if risk can be 7-9 1-3 1-3 1-3 
reduced 
4 UNLIKELY to be 10 - 12 1-4 1-4 1-4 
acceptable 
TABLE 26 RANK SCORES 
The scoring and resulting ranking reflects the assessor's professional 
judgement of the significance of the relevant factors. The technique has 
the merit that it gives a logical structure to an assessment, and it 
provides a consistent way of comparing the acceptability of risks and 
which can be refined as the quantity of the information available 
improves. It is accepted that there can be discussion about the 
assumption of equal weighting of the factors and the linear scoring 
adopted. 
The characteristics expected of each rank are shown in Table 27. To show 
how they can be compared with other criteria, the appropcighc risk level 
from the Ashby criteria are shown alongside each rank. The Ashby 
criteria was included as it is an independent view. Also it is a view 
which is defensible logically and appears to identify the criteria that 
various bodies concerned with this problem seem to be moving towards. 
A paper on the ranking technique devised as part of this study was 
presented by the author to the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Society for 
Risk Analysis in Knoxville. The text of the paper is reproduced in 
Appendix 10. 
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CONTROL 
RANK ACTION RISK LEVEL TARGETS 
OF CONSIDERED (ASHBY CRITERIA) DEFINED 
RISK APPROPRIATE RISK OF DEATH PER YEAR ABOVE 
1 None required One in a million Acceptable to 
general public 
2 Engineering One in 100,000 Acceptable for 
workers 
Would require 
3 Administrative One in 10,000 special 
evaluation 
4 Unlikely to be One in 1,000 Unacceptable 
controllable 
TABLE 27 CHARACTERISTICS OF RISK RANKS 
Data for Ranking 
The technical, economic and socio-political groups of data which have to 
be assessed to determine acceptability are each quite different in 
nature. One general comment that applies to all the data is that it must 
be relevant not only to the particular factor but also to the particular 
circumstances in which the factor is used. This, as will be shown later, 
gives rise to evaluation of some deep moral issues, particularly when 
questions about the monetary value of human life are involved. As 
already mentioned, it is vital that the technical data used are relevant 
to the proposal being considered, for example, the failure rate of steel 
pipe operating under static conditions is not the same as under dynamic 
conditions. Similarly, with socio-political data the views of people in a 
nature reserve about the acceptability of a chemical plant being located 
in their area bear little relationship to the views of people in a major 
industrial conurbation on the same subject. 
The technical group of data is essential to developing an understanding 
in quantitative terms of the significance of a risk. Ranking the 
technical aspects of risks can have many uses beyond answering questions 
about acceptability and satisfaction of criteria. It can for example be 
particularly useful for identifying priorities for resource allocation in 
relation to various activities such as design, modification and 
maintenance. 
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In the nuclear industry the techniques of quantified assessments of risks 
have been widely used. In one definitive study of probabilistic risk 
assessment (NURDG 1050) a clear indication of the uncertainty associated 
with such studies is given by the conclusions that estimates of the 
frequency of nuclear reactor core-melt may differ by two orders of 
magnitude and that estimates of the }ik"ihood of operator error may 
deviate by an order of magnitude. `26 The magnitude of these 
uncertainties appears to have led to some interesting conclusions being 
expressed in NUREG 1050 about the usefulness of probabilistic risk 
assessment. Some of these conclusions are worth repeating as they put 
the role of prob 2621istic risk assessment neatly into perspective, the 
conclusions are: 
"Probabilistic Risk Assessment results are useful, provided that 
more weight is given to the qualitative and relative insights 
regarding design and operations, rather than the precise absolute 
magnitude of the numbers generated. 
It must be remembered that most of the uncertainties associated with 
an issue are inherent to the issue itself rather than artifacts of 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Analysis. The Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment does tend to identify and highlight these uncertainties, 
however. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment results have useful application in the 
prioritization of regulatory activities, development of generic 
regulatory positions on potential safety issues and the assessment 
of plant-specific issues. The degree of usefulness depends on the 
regulatory application as well as the nature of the specific issue. " 
"The basic attributes of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment are not 
highly compatible with a safety-goal structure that would require 
strict numerical compliance on the basis of the quantitative best 
estimates of Probabilistic Risk Assessment. However, there could be 
useful application if the structure were less strict or the goals 
were set so conservatively that there would be little regulatory 
concern if the actual value substantially exceeded those goals. 
The results of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment should only be one 
consideration in regulatory decisions, i. e., they should not replace 
other conventional considerations. " 
These conclusions draw attention to two very important issues. First, 
they accept that the significance of a risk will not be known accurately. 
The study specifically recognizes that allowance for uncertainty is not 
generally adequate and they a need to develop a comprehensive way of 
allowing for uncertainty. 
( ý Second, they indicate that decisions 
about risk acceptability are in part made in qualitative and relative 
terms. This second point has many significant implications. The last 
sentence in the quotation above from NUREG 1050 clearly underlines the 
view that quantitative risk assessment is only one consideration in 
regulatory decisions. In this context it is important to remember that 
NURDG 1050 is an official report of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and represents a serious attempt on the part of the Commission to 
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identify the role which quantitative risk assessment should play in 
determining the acceptability of risks. 
It is easy to imagine that in some circumstances the fact that the 
significance of a risk is not known accurately would make public defence 
of the acceptability of a risk very difficult. Recognition of the fact 
that there can be considerable uncertainty about technical data-and that 
there is a qualitative aspect to decisions about acceptability suggests 
that the proposed ranking technique may be a useful way of presenting 
technical arguments about which there is some uncertainty. The ranking 
that the technical factor is given for any proposal will reflect the 
probability and significance of the risk involved and the uncertainties 
associated with the particular calculation. 
To show a little more clearly the range of uncertainty that can be 
associated with estimates of risk it is worth looking at the results of 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) study of 
decision making and risk alysis in relation to the siting of liquefied 
energy gas facilities. ) This study argued th. t 
for most risk 
estimates the range of uncertainty is at least 1021ý5) To emphasise 
that 10 may be the minimum range of uncertainty expected in risk 
estimates attention is drawn to two figures in the IIASA report that are 
considerably different. The two figures are estimates for the 
probability of ait nal system failure, one is 3.2 x 10-3 and the 
other is 1.0 x 10 
41. ý16G 
Such a wide difference in the estimate of the 
probability of a particular event illustrates dramatically how great the 
uncertainty in risk estimates can be. 
The conclusion about the technical data that seems to be justified is 
that the technical data likely to be available about a particular 
proposal is bound to contain an element of uncertainty. An understanding 
of the magnitude and significance of the uncertainty is vital to determination of the acceptability of a proposal. It is in dealing with 
uncertainty in risk assessment that the ranking technique can be 
particularly helpful. The technique used in this study has been designed 
so that there are only a relatively small number of boxes into which the 
results of assessment have to be quantified. In this way the technique 
recognizes that there will be uncertainties associated with the results 
and that they should be considered as broad banded. Also this approach 
ensures that the impact of the uncertainties is kept in proportion and 
not misinterpreted. 
In our everyday lives we are all conscious of the wide variations that 
there can be between predicted and real expenditure. When major 
projects, for instance chemical plants or power stations, are considered the variation in cost can be many millions of pounds. In NUREG 1050 it 
is shown that the total financial risk for a pressirized watet, reactor 
with certain safety ý31fications is between 5x 10 and 8x 10 dollars 
per plant lifetime 267) To put the magnitude of such a risk into 
perspective it should be noticed that the upper limit represents about 2% 
of the Gross National Product of a country like Luxembourg with a 
population of about 360,000. 
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The impact of safety factors on the economics of a nuclear power station 
were called the exogenous variables at the Sizewell B public ip u y, in 
other words they are the external and unpredictable factors. The 
level of fuel prices, exchange rates and the pattern of demand for 
electricity all have a profound influence on the economic viability of a 
nuclear power station over its 35 year lifetime. To some extent such 
factors are an inherent part of commercial decisions and an integral part 
of most decision making. There is no way of predicting accurately long- 
term changes in requirements, patterns of demands and economic criteria. 
This again emphasises the uncertainty associated with determining 
acceptability. 
Partly as a result of the Three Mile Island accident the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission had a study made of the socio-economic consequences 
of nuclear reactor accidents. Many of the general findings of the study 
are also applicable to any major industrial accident situation. The 
study particularly stressed the uncertainties in predicting the economic 
impact of an accident and suggested that economic losses will mainly be 
in the form of loss of property, (1p of 
life, loss of business and 
production and increased taxes. Overall losses in business 
sustained in the directly damaged areas will be partly offset by gains 
outside the damaged area. 
Some of the economic arguments are very closely related to socio- 
political questions. One aspect of this relationship is given by the 
statement: "We c duce the risk in any sector provided we are prepared 
to pay the cost. "ý7 This statement brings out the economic concept of 
opportunity cost which underlies many economic decisions and reflects the 
fact that resources are limited and are allocated on the basis of the 
perception of priority for funding of those responsible for deciding 
about allocation. Such perception of priority may change with time but 
determination of priority for action is, as already mentioned, helped by 
the ranking technique. 
There are clear indications from the study of the siting of liquefied 
energy gas facilities in four countries that the authorities responsible for deciding about the acceptability of the siting of such installations 
take into account the need (I ff) development in the area surrounding the proposed site. ý2"-a But there are no universally agreed 
ways in which such factors are taken into account. The judgement is made in qualitative terms in what could almost be described as on a political basis. This fuzziness in the economic argument shows the need to 
evaluate the uncertainty in the figures when determining the ranking that 
should be allocated. 
In an earlier study of the correlation between expenditure on life saving 
and the public's perception of risk the following conclusions w drawn 
about the factors that influence expenditure on risk reduction: 
1) There is some indication that the level of expenditure on risk 
reduction is more related to people's perception of risk than to 
estimates of the probability of the risk. 
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2) There are indications that policy makers are willing to contemplate 
higher levels of expenditure to reduce involuntary accepted risks 
than for voluntarily accepted risks. 
3) The value of life for compensation purposes often seems to be put at 
about £200,000, but there is a considerable range in the valuations. 
4) The range of cost of saving an extra statistical ife (often 
referred to as the CSX value) used is from £0 to 2x 10 For many 
decision situations the values used are in the range £104 to 105. 
5) The cost of action to save a life is sometimes higher than the 
compensation paid for loss of life. 
In a more recent study of the way human life is valued for various 
purposes attention is drawn to the view that life insurance does not 
really value 2ffe but just amounts to saving to provide for dependants or 
the future. The values for human life and the basis of valuation 
reported in reference 274 are summarized in Table 28. 
The figures in the table reinforce the view that there is a wide spread 
in the values put on human life. It is interesting to notice that the 
highest value put on human life was associated with the introduction of 
changes to the building regulations in Britain and that for road 
improvements the value of human life is put 20 times higher in the USA 
than in Britain. 
A practical illustration of the way the cost of accidents is taken into 
account is given by the the optimum expenditure for road lighting 
schemes is determined. () There is a correlation between lighting 
level, as measured by the Visibility Index, and accident rate. Moonlight 
is often taken as the minimum acceptable level of lighting against which 
improvements are judged, the criteria for selecting a proposal being that 
it should have the highest benefit-cost ratio. The benefit being 
determined from the reduction in accident rate from improved lighting. 
In ref 274, which was published in 1979, the average cost of accidents is 
quoted as being $2130. This example shows how in practice spending 
authorities aim to optimise the benefits from their expenditure and that 
they recognize the goal of eliminating accidents entirely as being 
unrealistic. 
The use of cost-benefit analysis has also been proposed as a means of 
assessing the acceptability of radiological protection schemes. (275) In 
the National Radiological Protection Board's proposal they suggest tb 
figures for calculating the costs associated with health detriment. 
The three figures are related to dose level and are as follows: 
1) When the dose level is below 1% of the dose limit, the figure used 
should be £2000 per man Sv (£20 per man rem). 
2) When the dose level is between 1% and 10% of the dose limit, the 
figure used should be £10,000 per man Sv (£100 per man rem). 
3) When the dose level is between 10% and 100% of the dose limit, the 
figure used should be £50,000 per man Sv (£500 per man rem). 
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The above values were calculated at 1980 UK prices. 
HUMAN LIFE 
VALUE 
TYPE OF VALUE BASIS OF VALOATICN 
£94 x 103 Human Capital Assessing road schemes in the UK 
£1 x 103 Implied Value Introduction of child-proof drug 
containers 
£20 x 106 Implied Value Changes in building regulations in 
the UK 
£0.5 x 106 Implied Value Tractor cab legislation 
£0.35 x 106 Compensation Highest court award 
£0.12 x 106 Compensation Compensation to a BNFL employee 
£30 x 103 - 
103 
Risk Approach Prevention of some forms of cancer 
£80 x 
£2 x 106 Risk Approach US highway safety improvements 
£3.3 x 106 Risk Approach US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(some consider this figure is too 
high and it is currently being 
debated in the USA) 
£1.5 x 106 - 
106 
Risk Approach Italian Caorso plant 
£6.2 x 
£0.85 x lg6 - Risk Approach Kraft Werke Union plants 
£5.3 x 10 
£1.3 x 106 - 
106 
Risk Approach French PWRs 
£3.3 x 
TABLE 28 HU1AN LIFE VALUATIONS 
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The conclusion that seems to be justified about the economic data is very 
similar to the conclusion about the technical data, namely that there is 
a wide distribution in the data it is proposed should be used. This 
means that there is a considerable degree of uncertainty about the values 
ascribed to economic factors and this uncertainty must be taken into 
account in determining the ranking score appropriate to the economic 
factors associated with a particular proposal. 
At the heart of assessing socio-political factors is the determination of 
the nature of public opinion. Any successful politician, before he 
decides whether or not to support an issue, will sense the views of his 
electorate and take these views into account in the views he expresses. 
Any proposer of a major project would want to know whether or not there 
is likely to be opposition to the proposal. Before any attempt can be 
made to assess public opinion the technical nature of the risks involved 
in the proposal must be identified and described in a way that is 
understandable by the public at large. This underlines the importance of 
the assessment of the technical factors mentioned earlier. 
public opinion can be polled and such polls give a guide to the nature of 
opinion at the time the poll is taken. The results of such polls are not 
permanent, public opinion is fickle and opinions do change. Dr Keyes, a 
Director of the Westinghouse Electric Corp 9f, ion, has summarized the 
roll of polls in the following incisive way: 
"Certainly, the techniques are not perfect. Sometimes the pollster 
errs; sometimes, his client. Nevertheless, polling is one of the 
most important tools available for measuring public attitude on 
certain issues in order to ascertain the public will which, in the 
long run, will find expression in the actions of government in a 
democratic society. 
1. Polling provides significant input to the decision process 
concerning communication with the public. 
2. Polling can save time and money in maximizing the 
effectiveness of communication programmes. 
3. The usefulness of polling depends on the expertise of the 
pollster and the frequency of polling. 
4. The proper analysis of polling results is of critical 
importance. 
5. Polling has value only if the information it provides is 
utilized. " 
Provided public opinion is determined early in a project, before 
opposition causes delays, it is possible from a carefully designed poll 
to assess the nature of any possible opposition and to determine if any 
action is possible to modify public opinion. If opposition is based on a 
lack of information or on a misunderstanding of information given, it is 
possible by judicious publicity and education processet2A? reduce 
opposition, but such processes can take a considerable time. 
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If the public's view about a project is determined, for example by taking 
a poll, it is very unlikely that it would show unanimous support for a 
project and this leads to the question of what is the desired level of 
support. In the 12th century the Italian philosopher Vilfredo Pareto was 
concerned with the analogous problem of dete ning the optimum 
distribution of actions to achieve social justice. ) His solution to 
the problem became known as the Pareto criterion. The criterion requires 
that a project is only accepted if it makes nobody worse off. The Pareto 
criterion is almost impossible to satisfy as(2n%%st projects of any size 
will generally adversely affect some people. The influence that a 
small group of people can have on decision making related to the 
acceptability of a project depends to a larg utent on the ability of 
the people and the role they play in society. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that the people's views 
about the acceptability of a project will not simply divide it yes or 
no, there will be many shades of meaning to take into account. 
'2°2r 
This 
question of assessing the significance of shades of meaning has been 
recognized for many 05 s and various scaling methods have been devised 
for describing them. 
The merit of these scaling methods is that they allow opinions about the 
acceptability of a particular project to be ranked in a way that can be 
directly correlated to the ranking technique described above. This fact 
means that although there are many uncertainties in assessing public 
opinion, there are analytical techniques available that allow opinions to 
be tested in a way that produces results which can be directly 
incorporated into the overall ranking of acceptability. In testing 
public opinion the survey technique must be designed so that it does not 
give too much emphasis to the views of people who are not concerned with 
the issues involved. 
The conclusion about socio-political data that seems to be warranted is 
that although socio-political data covers a great diversity of views 
there are survey techniques available that allow opinions about the 
acceptability of a proposal to be ranked in a way that correlates 
directly with the overall ranking technique proposed. If the opposition 
is based on a lack of information or on a misunderstanding of information 
given it is possible by judicious publicity and education proces to 
reduce opposition but such processes can take a considerable time. ý'° 
Efficacy of the Ranking Technique 
To demonstrate how the ranking technique may be applied, three well known 
projects, Canvey Island, Moss Morran and Rijnmond, that have caused a 
certain amount of controversy and on which the decision process is now 
complete have been selected. An additional reason for choosing these 
projects is that sufficient-relevant assessment data has been made 
publicly available to enable the efficacy of the ranking technique to be 
demonstrated realistically. The first case is the proposal to extend the 
oil refining capacity on Canvey Island, the second case is the Moss 
Morran terminal facilities and pipeline in Scotland and the third case is 
the well known Rijnmond decision about the siting of a liquefied natural 
gas terminal in Holland. Using these ý. lýýe examples means that three 
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slightly different decision processes are involved. In the following 
first the three projects are described and the ranking that they would be 
given on the evidence now available determined. 
The Canvey Island Study was commissioned in 1976 as a result of the 
report of a public inquiry that had been held into the desirability of 
revoking the planning permission given in 1973 to United Refineries Ltd 
to build an oil refinery with a capacity of four million tonnes/year on 
Canvey Island. To appreciate the concern it is important to understand 
the nature of the industrial and residential development on Canvey 
Island. Canvey Island is on the north bank of the Thames, about twenty- 
seven miles east of London and the area measures approximately nine miles 
by two-and-a-half miles. About 33,000 people live in the area. In the 
area there are tank storage installations for Texaco Ltd and London and 
Coastal Oil Wharves Ltd, and British Gas Corporation have a methane 
terminal there. Close to Canvey Island and in the area covered by the 
study, Shell UK Oil and Mobil Oil Company have large oil refineries, also 
Calor Gas Ltd have a plant for filling cylinders with liquefied petroleum 
gases. 
It was concluded from the study that the risks associated with the 
various industrial installations would be reduced if certain 
modifications were made. It was also concluded that provided certain 
design and operational conditions were satisfied, there was no health and 
safety objection to the construction of the proposed new refineries. 
Some of the concerns about existing plants must have been very serious as 
in the second report which was published three years after the first 
report, it was stated that "Provided that these improvements were carried 
out, we did not consider that the residual risks would be such as to 
justify us28r4 quiring any of the existing installations to cease 
operation". The main objectives of the second report were to show 
the results of making the modifications identified in the first report as 
being necessary to the various installations and assessing the 
significance of improvements in the data and methodology of the risk 
assessment. The first report showed that the average annual risk o 
death to ndividual in the area covered by the study was 740 x 10- 
per year. 
5ý In the second rept it was shown that thp average f pre 
had been reduced from 740 x 10-1 per year to 35 x 10 per year. 
The information from the Canvey Island studies has been interpreted for 
the ranking technique in the following way: 
At the time of the first report the acceptability of the level of risks 
associated with the area was doubtful. The technical risks were 
unacceptable as the regulatory body required modifications to be 
introduced. The economic aspects of the risks were acceptable, as the 
owners of the various installations involved were willing to continue to 
operate them. The extent of the socio-political concern was high, as it 
was considered necessary to hold a public inquiry and to commission a 
detailed study of the risks. 
By the time the second report was issued, the significance of the various 
factors related to acceptability of risk had changed considerably. The 
work done in the three years since the first report allowed estimates of 
the technical aspects of the risks concerned to be reduced and made the 
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risks more acceptable, and the economics of the plant must have been 
slightly more favourable as the threat of closure was removed. 
How the acceptability of Canvey Isand could be judged by the proposed 
ranking method at the times of the two reports is summarised in Tables 29 
and 30. 
ALLOWABLE SCORES OF SUB-FAKTORS 
RANK TOTAL 
OF ACCEPTABILITY SCORE SOCIO- ECONOMIC TECHNICAL 
RISK RANGE POLITICAL RISK 
1 YES 1-3 
2 YES subject to 4-6 2 
certain action 
3 YES if action 7- 9 3 3 
taken to reduce 
risk 
4 UNLIKELY to be 10 - 12 
acceptable 
WTAL SCORE; 
OF SUB-FACTORS 8 
TABLE 29 RANKING OF CANVEY ISLAND ON THE BASIS OF THE FIRST REPORT 
A score of 8 gives Canvey Island a rank of 3 at the time of the first 
report. The implication of a rank of 3 is that the site is only 
acceptable if assessment establishes the required confidence. 
ALLOWABLE SCORES OF SUB-FACTORS 
RANK TOTAL 
OF ACCEPTABILITY SCORE SOCIO- ECONOMIC TECHNICAL 
RISK RANGE POLITICAL RISK 
YES 1-3 
2 YES subject to 4-6 2 2 2 
certain action 
YES if action 
3 taken to reduce 7-9 
risk 
4 UNLIKELY to be 10 - 12 
acceptable 
TOTAL SCORE 
OF SUB-FAC mRS 6 
TABLE 30 RANKING OF CANVEY ISLAND ON THE BASIS OF THE SECOND REPORT 
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A score of 6 gives Canvey Island a rank of 2 at the time of the second 
report The implication of a rank of 2 is that the site is acceptable 
which reflects that the fact that the modifications introduced had 
reduced the technical risk and improved the public acceptability of the 
various installations on the site. 
This example shows that the ranking method does give an overall view of 
the acceptability of a proposal and the ranking can be refined in an 
iterative way as better data becomes available. 
The Moss Morran liquefied energy gas terminal facilities and pipeline 
were planned as part of the range of facilities required to exploit the 
Brent oil and gas field in the North Sea. The proposal was that the oil 
and gas should be brought ashore by pipeline at St Fergus and then after 
some processing transmitted down to the Firth of Forth area for 
processing into fuel and feedstocks such as propane, butane and ethylene. 
From the processing plant they would be transported mainly by sea to 
their ultimate destination. 
There were thr in steps in the process leading to outline permission 
being granted. (196J Step 1 culminated in Shell and Esso formally lodging 
planning applications to develop a processing facility at Moss Morran and 
a storage and shipping terminal at Braefoot Bay about 3 miles south on 
the Firth of Forth. Step 2 included four main actions. Action 1 was for 
the national government in the form of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland to call in the application for decision, i. e. for the decision 
to be made at central rather than local government level. This was 
because the decision was considered to be important to the national 
energy policy, the national economy and the environment of the Firth of 
Forth. Action 2 was for a public inquiry into the acceptability of the 
proposal to be held. Action 3 was for the local government authorities 
to publicise the fact that the planning applications had been lodged and 
to describe the general nature of the proposals. Action 4 was for the 
local authorities to ask a firm of consultants to advise them on the 
hazards involved and the environmental impact of the proposal. This 
action was taken to supplement the general advice on potential hazards 
issued by the statutory advisors and guardians of safety, the Health and 
Safety Executive. In addition, the directors of planning of the three 
local authorities concerned jointly prepared a report on the socio- 
economic impact of the proposal. The conclusion of Step 2 was marked by 
the Secretary of State receiving the report of the public inquiry. The 
final step, Step 3, started when it was found that the public inquiry had 
exposed concern about the possibility of a vapour cloud being ignited by 
radio frequency transmissions. Rather than re-open the public inquiry, 
the Secretary of State invited written comments on the subject. 
Deliberations on this subject took nearly two years. The report on the 
inquiry was presented in November 1977 but it was August 1979 before the 
Secretary of State announced he would grant outline planning permission. 
The public inquiry exposed several differences in the views of the 
consultants retained by the local authorities, the risk experts of Shell 
and EsPY97 the Health and Safety Executive, and the opposition Action 
Group. Only the Action Group considered these differences were 
significant and a reason why the public should be suspicious about the 
safety of the proposals. The Action Group was a well organised pressure 
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group representing some of the people living in the Aberdour and Dalgety 
Bay areas close to the proposed development. The Action Group was 
particularly concerned about the procedures used to determine the 
acceptability of proposals like the Moss Morran project. 
The consultants expressed the view that the installations proposed for 
Moss Morran - Braefoot Bay could be designed, built and operated in such 
a manner as to be acceptable in terms of environmental impact and 
community safety pQ ed that reasonable and adequate safeguards are 
agreed and enforced. 
On the question of the possibility that radio frequency transmissions 
could ignite a vapour cloud, the report of the Steering Committee for 
further investigation of the effects of RF transmissions from RN Crimond 
at the St Fergus Gas Terminals was particularly important. 
(288) The 
report showed that on the basis of tests at the Shell Research Centre, 
Bradford University, and on site, radio frequency transmissions were 
unlikely to produce sufficient power to reach the minimum required for 
ignition. These results would also be applicable to the Moss Morran 
site. 
The risks associated with the pipeline from St Fergus to Moss Morran were 
assessed by the Health and Safety Executive in 1978 and again in 1980 
when it was pr? Fgged to increase the pipeline size from 16-inch to 24- 
inch diameter. The assessment showed that the total ipteraction 
frequencies for the pipeline fell in the range 1 to 4x 10-11 per year, 
these interactions being the chance of leakage from the pipeline putting 
people in the area of the pipeline at risk. The report advised: "... the 
level of risk would not be such as to lead to a recommendation that a 
Construction Authorisation should be withheld on health and safety 
grounds". 
Although the consultants made consequence analysis calculations they 
expressed the probability of various types of failure in qualitative 
terms like low, very low or e t5? 8$$ y low and gave no estimate of the 
possible number of fatalities. The Action Gr4oup estima6( )that the probability of an individual fatality was 7x 10- per year. 
The one hazard figure that seems to be very high is the shipping hazard 
figure which stated that the probability of a shipping accident at 
Braefoot Bay which could cause death or severe injury among the 
commes of Aberdour and Dalg3ety was of the order of 10-3 per 
year. This same figure of l0- per year appears to have been used 
in the assessment of the acceptability of Eemshaven, Braefoot Bay and 
Wilhelmshaven despite these three ports having very different traffic 
patterns. This apparent statistical anomaly has been adversely commented 
on in reference 293. 
Something of the official concern about the safety and risk justification 
of the Moss Morran site appears to be reflected in conditions that were 
attaci d4)to the outline planning permissions granted to Shell and 
Esso. To both permissions 50 nearly similar conditions were 
attached. The most important condition from the safety point of view 
being the requirement that a full hazard and operability audit should be 
conducted before the facilities would be allowed to be commissioned. The 
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importance attached to the audit is indicated by the fact that the 
Secretary of State decided the audit must be to his satisfagýýgi and not 
just to the satisfaction of the Health and Safety Executive. 
On the basis of the information above it is considered that a rank 2 can 
be justified for the Moss Morran proposal. The justification of the 
ranking is summarized in Table 31. 
With the benefit of hindsight the ranking of the Moss Morran proposals 
adequately reflects that they are acceptable subject to certain actions. 
The actions required included the presentation of a hazard and safety 
audit that satisfies the Secretary of State. 
FACTOR SCORE JUSTIFICATION 
All the advice, which was a mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative 
TECHNICAL 2 assessments suggested the proposals 
were acceptable subject to detailed 
justification. The installations 
are similar to those accepted in 
other parts of the world. 
National Energy Policy required the 
Brent Oil and gas field to be 
exploited. The financial risks of 
ECONOMIC 1 the operation were undertaken by 
private companies and were 
consistent with the scale of risk 
they undertook in other parts of 
their work. 
The proposals were accepted at 
Government level but the Secretary 
SOCIo- 1 of State made it a condition that 
POLITICAL he was satisfied with the safety 
audit. The opposition to the 
proposals was essentially of a 
limited local nature. 
TOTAL SCORE 4 So a risk rank 2 was justified. 
TABLE 31 RANKING FACTOR SCORE FOR MOSS MORRAN 
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The history of the Rijnmond Decision is complicated and has its origins 
in the early 1970's when plans were made to import large quantities of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from A ria. (295) Eight possible sites for 
the LNG terminal were considered. (2ýý) The two main contenders for the 
site were Rotterdam and Eemshaven. 
Discussion abo which was the most acceptable site was also divided into 
three steps. (2 ) Step 1 was the period up to the final signing of the 
contract for the supply of LNG and included the preliminary search for a 
terminal site. Step 2 involved the cabinet and several government 
departments and at this stage it was recognized that siting of an LNG 
involved several issues such as energy policy, the environment, safety, 
land use and regional planning. At the beginning of this round Rotterdam 
was the preferred site and discussions were held with the local 
authorities in the region. ' These included the Province of Zuid-Holland, 
Rijnmond Public Authority and the City of Rotterdam. These discussions 
showed that these authorities, particularly the Rijnmond Public Authority 
were likely to apply stringent safety requirements to any LNG terminal. 
The involvement of Rijnmond Public Authority is the reason the decision 
became known as the 'Rijnmond Decision'. In simple terms it was 
considered that discussion of these requirements was likely to delay the 
start of delivery of LNG and this led to Eemshaven being reconsidered as 
the site for the terminal. Step 3 was the final step which ended with 
the cabinet deciding in favour of Eemshaven. In April 1978 the Rotterdam 
and Groningen local authorities were each given three months in which to 
formulate their views on the acceptability of an LNG terminal in their 
area. During this period there were formal council debates and public 
meetings at which the public and interest groups could air their views. 
The views of the local authorities were presented to the cabinet in June 
1978. In August 1978 the cabinet announced its preference for Eemshaven 
primarily on socio-economic and regional industrial grounds. The 
decision was debated at considerable length in Parliament and finally 
approved in October 1978. 
The view has been expressed that in part the reason that the decision 
went in favour of Eemshaven was that the Governor of Groningen was a 
skillf litician and a longstanding member of one of the parties in 
power. 
9°' In this context the final decision appears to have been 
guided more by political opportunity than by consistent government 
policies, strategies or decision procedures. Attention has been drawn to 
the fact that the decision was in conflict with the official advice of 
the Inter epartmental Co-ordinating Committee for North Sea Affairs 
(ICONA). tý) The official ICONA report can be criticised because it 
intentionally did not consider either local risk perception in relation 
to public and official acceptance of LNG or the political import W 
attached by some interested parties to the siting of the terminal. 
These twp2gjýctors seem to have had a dominant influence on the 
decision. 
ICONA was the only co-ordinating body that included representatives of 
all the relevant ministries and it2 $6gparing its advice took account of 
all aspects of national policy. ICONA advised that from their 
evaluation of economics, energy policy and environmental impact they 
preferred the Maasvlakte site near the Hook von Holland for the LNG 
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termina1. (299) 
eequal. `i0$) 
en 
The ICONA views on the risks associated with Maasvlakte 
sites was that the risks with both sites were approximately 
In addition to the local authorities, the trade unions were in favour of 
Eemshaven. (300) The environmentalist groups, Sý%wners Association and 
Electricity Corporation were against Eemshaven. `i The Shipowners saw 
some navigation and operational problems and some risks could be 
associated with Eemshaven. The Electricity Corporation saw some risk to 
their existing coal-fired power station. 
A quantitative comparison of the risk assoc with the Maasvlakte and 
Eemshaven sites was presented officially and Table 32 shows the 
essential figures. 
The probability of a major accident was shown to be marginally higher for 
Eemshaven than for Maasvlakte, but this is more than offset by the number 
of deaths and casualties predicted, being ten times lower for Eemshaven 
than for Maasvlakte. Such differences in estimates of the consequences 
of accidents are not really very important. There can be signi nt 
differences between the consequences estimated by various experts. 
RISK MAMSVLAKTE EEMSHAVEN 
Probability of major accident 3x 10-7 10-7 
(after additional safety measures) (3 x 10-8) (5 x 10-8 
Maximum consequences 
Number of deaths 0.5 -2x 104 0.5 -2x 103 
Number of casualties 1-4x 104 1-4x 103 
Material third party damage 18 x 109 not given 
(Dutch Guilders) 
Increase in risk of individual 3x 10-6 <3 x 10-7 
death 
Weighted risk after safety 0.028 0.023 
measures (approx) 
TABLE 32 COMPARISON OF THE MAASVLAKTE AND EE4SHVAEN RISKS 
On the basis of this evidence it is possible to rank the acceptability of 
the risks associated with the Rijnmond decision. The scores of the 
ranking factors and their justification for the Maasvlakte site are shown 
in Table 33 and for the Eemshaven site in Table 34. 
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FACTOR SCORE JUSTIFICATION 
Probability of a major accident 
put at (3 x 10-0) and the 
increase in risk of individual 
TECHNICAL 2 death 3x 10-6. 
The slightly high score given 
because some engineering work 
required. 
The economic need for a LNG 
terminal was agreed. 
ECONOMIC 1 Maasvlakte is slightly nearer 
to the point of use for LNG. 
The third party risk is 
acceptable. 
Although the site was rejected 
SOCIO- 1 by cabinet and the parliament, 
POLITICAL the socio-political arguments 
were marginal. 
TOTAL SCORE 4 So a risk rank 2 is justified. 
TABLE 33 RANKING FACTOR SCORE FOR THE MAASVLAKTE SITE 
FACTOR SCORE JUSTIFICATION 
Probability of a maýor accident 
- put at 5x 10 and the 
TECHNICAL 1 increase of rick of individual 
death <3 x 10- , this is why a lower score than Maasvlakte is 
justified. 
Benefit to the development of 
ECONOMIC 1 the area. 
Risk the same as the other 
site. 
The site was accepted. 
SOCIO- 1 Political support for the site. 
POLITICAL Trade union support for the 
site. 
TOTAL SCORE 3 So a rank 1 is justified. 
TABLE 34 RANKIl 3 FACTOR SCORE FOR THE EFINSHAVEN SITE 
146 
With the benefit of hindsight the Eemshaven proposal is seen to justify a 
more acceptable ranking than the Maasvlakte site. A critical assessment 
of this and the Moss Morran ranking is given in the next section. 
Although the information that had to be used for this assessment of the 
ranking technique was not ideal it was quite adequate to show that the 
ranking technique gives a clear and honest evaluation of the 
acceptability of a proposal. The process of constructing and justifying 
the ranking scores exposes very clearly the strengths and weaknesses of 
the evidence on which acceptability has to be based. 
The starting point for this assessment is to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the evidence used. The technical factor evidence showed 
considerable differences between the three cases considered. The Canvey 
Island case showed how the technical assessment can show where 
improvements are required to reduce risk and also indicate the 
significance of changes made to improve safety. One very important 
difference was between the qualitative evidence about risks presented by 
the consultant used for Moss Morran and the quantitative evidence used to 
compare the Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites. If there had only been 
qualitative evidence about the risks associated with Moss Morran any 
assessment of acceptability would have been questionable and there would 
not have been a really defensible basis for making a ranking. There was, 
however, some quantitative data which included the risk of a pipeline 
failure, the risk of a shipping accident and the estimates of the Action 
Group. Also, it was possible to estimate the order of the risk by 
comparison with the estimates of the risks made for other similar 
installations. Obviously these other installations are not exactly the 
same as the Moss Morran installation, in some cases the volume of 
material handled is different, in other cases the population density 
around the installation is different. This illustrates the magnitude of 
the uncertainties that can be associated with assessment of 
acceptability. 
The assessment of the acceptability of the economic factors associated 
with the cases considered is perhaps the weakest part of the ranking 
exercise as there was not a great deal of direct evidence available. The 
assessment of acceptability was based, mainly, on the fact that the 
installations in some way or other formed part of the national policy of 
the countries they were built in and that the risks were of a type 
normally accepted by the companies involved. If the companies had been 
small or unused to building and operating such facilities, doubts about 
the acceptability of the economic factors would have existed. 
Ideally more detailed economic information, such as the arrangements for 
funding possible claims, would have given more confidence to the scoring 
of the economic factors. 
Scoring of the acceptability of the socio-political factors was in this 
study somewhat simplified as the ultimate assessment of the acceptability 
of the socio-political factors was known. However, the justification of 
the scoring of the socio-political factors did indicate how the ranking 
of such factors could be built up at various stages in the development of 
a proposal. Keeping the ranking of a proposal under review as the 
proposal progresses through the various stages of development is a useful 
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way of identifying the acceptability issues that are of concern and the 
action that is required to make them acceptable. 
If the ranking technique is applied to a new proposal it would be 
possible to design a sampling survey to determine the attitudes of the 
relevant populations. Studies have been made which have identified 3 
hý 
basic underlying value structures in different cultural groups. 
B 
Such basic value structures play decisive role in determining public 
reaction to controversial issues. (303) Other relevant studies have}ý 
performed to determine public beliefs about five energy systems. s4 
The research reported in reference 304 showed the beliefs that a sample 
of the Austrian public had about nuclear power, solar power, hydro-power, 
coal power and oil power. The sample was questioned about their beliefs 
concerning the associated indirect risk, economic benefit, environmental 
risk, psychological and physical risk, and development. The study showed 
more people were in favour of solar and hydro-power than coal and oil 
power and more people were in favour of coal and oil than nuclear power. 
Differences in the beliefs of people in favour of nuclear power and those 
against nuclear power were also identified. Such detailed surveys are 
perfectly practical ways of assessing public opinion on the acceptability 
of any proposal including refining plants like those considered in this 
study. 
The conclusions that seem to be justifed about the technique are that it 
gives an overall assessment of all the factors that have tobe considered 
in determining the acceptability of a potentially hazardous installation, 
no other method gives such a comprehensive assessment of all the factors 
involved, the technique identifies those issues that generate the most 
concern about a proposal and the technique has to be supported by sound 
assessment of the various factors. 
Critical Assessment of the Technique 
The information available was adequate to show that the ranking technique 
gives an overall view of the acceptability of a proposal. The process of 
constructing and justifying the ranking scores exposes very clearly the 
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence on which the assessment of 
acceptability has to be based. 
The technical factor evidence showed considerable differences between the 
three cases considered. The Canvey Island study showed how ranking could be improved. There was also a big difference between the qualitative 
evidence about risks presented by the consultant used for Moss Morran and 
the quantitative evidence used to compare the Maasvlakte and Eemshaven 
sites. If there had only been qualitative evidence about the risks 
associated with Moss Morran any ranking of acceptability would have been 
questionable. There was, however, some quantitative data, which included 
estimates of pipeline failures, the risk of a shipping accident and 
estimates of fatalities. Confidence that an adequate technical study had been made of the proposal was reinforced by the fact that detailed 
conditions, which had to be satisfied, were attached to the outline 
planning permission. Also, it was possible to estimate the order of the 
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risk by comparison with the estimates of the risks made for other similar 
installations and this gives some confidence in the acceptability of the 
risk. 
Nevertheless from the study Kunreuther et al made of four similar plants 
in four different countries some criticism f the differences in the 
analyses used in such case appears justified. ýý90) In five of the eight 
risk assessment reports involved there was n ntion of the 
uncertainties associated with the final findings 29i, so it was not 
clear whether the results were mean, maximum or minimum values. 
The assessment of the acceptability of the economic factors associated 
with the cases considered is perhaps the weakest part of this ranking 
exercise as there was not a great deal of direct evidence available. The 
evidence that was available was somewhat doubtful as it included shadow 
pricing and was also politically influenced. The assessment of 
acceptability was based, mainly, on the fact that the installations in 
some way or othr formed part of the national fuel policy of the countries 
they were built in and that the risks were of a type accepted by the 
companies involved. If the companies had been unused to dealing with 
such risks, doubts about the acceptability of the economic factors would 
have existed. 
Scoring of the acceptability of the socio-political factors was somewhat 
simplified in this study as the ultimate decision was known. However, 
sampling techniques exist for determining the attitudes of the relevant 
populations in such cases. Studies have also been made which have 
identi%&j t &4 asic underlying value structures in different cultural 
groups. Knowledge of such basic value structures can be 
particularly help f1 In determining likely public reaction to 
controversial issues. ýD3} 
The problems with the technique are mainly associated with the adequacy, 
relevance and accuracy of the data that has to be used. Ideally for the 
ranking of proposals to be comparable the quality and comprehensiveness 
of the data used to rank each proposal should be the same. In practical 
terms perfect data is rarely available and some compromise has to be 
made. 
When a proposal is being ranked or assessed doubts about the accuracy of 
the data used must exist and the only way to overcome this problem is to 
revise the ranking as better data becomes available. For major projects 
the ranking would, in general, be reviewed several times as the projects 
progress from conception to completion. This iterative development and 
review of ranking enables allowance to be made for: changes in the 
accuracy of the data, changes that take place in the relative 
significance of the hazards considered, changes in design and operational 
changes. 
Four points in favour of the ranking technique are: 
1) The method does introduce some logical structure into the 
comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of risk. Without 
such structure and discipline, the assessment of the acceptability 
of risks is somewhat arbitrary. 
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2) The method is equally applicable to the nuclear and process 
industries. 
3) By putting the risk in non-dimensional terms, the ranking technique 
will help the public presentation of risks by removing the emotive 
element without reducing the fairness of the description. 
4) The more quantified data there is about the risks associated with a 
particular activity, the more precise the ranking becomes. 
There are three main arguments against the technique which are: 
1) The ranking technique merely complicates the assessment of 
acceptability of risk argument by introducing another step in the 
process. 
2) It may be considered by the public to be a way of hiding unpalatable 
facts. 
3) It would remove an element of freedom from the regulatory bodies by 
codifying the way they assess risk. 
The conclusions that seem to be justified about the ranking technique are 
that it gives a comprehensive assessment of all the factors that have to 
be considered in determining the acceptability of a potentially hazardous 
installation, no other method gives such a comprehensive assessment of 
the factors involved, and the technique identifies those issues that are 
likely to generate the most concern about a proposal. 
Future Develorir nts Seen to be Required 
This chapter has concentrated on examining how the a comprehensive 
assessment of the acceptability of the risk can be demonstrated taking 
into account economic and socio-political factors as well as technical 
factors. Although the ranking is now being studied for the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, British Nuclear Fuels and the Commission 
of the European Communities, further developments are seen to be needed 
and these are discussed below. 
An important feature of the assessment of the acceptability of risk that 
requires development is a universal criterion for judging acceptability. 
There is no justification for having different criteria in different 
industries. If the criteria are carefully thought out they should be 
applicable across all industries and in all countries. This is a rather 
ambitious goal as many sociological and political factors may impede 
achievment of such a uniform practice. Although such a goal is 
difficult to achieve, the success of the European Community Directive on 
Major Hazards shows what can be achieved. 
From the above, it is clear that there is a need for a number of 
developments to produce a comprehensive, consistent and universally 
accepted procedure for determining the acceptability of the risks 
associated with various potentially hazardous installations. These 
developments include criteria, techniques and data. 
150 
The criteria that are required should identify the acceptable level of 
risk in terms that are related to the impact of risk on all sections of 
the community. These criteria should be stated in clear and simple 
terms, and should be such that they can be applied to all types of 
potentially hazardous industry. One form that the technical criterion 
could take is suggested in the earlier section dealing with realistic 
targets. The acceptability of these targets would need to be agreed with 
the various industries concerned and with the relevant regulatory 
authorities. 
Criteria also need to be established for determining how the 
acceptability of the economic and socio-political aspects of risk can be 
judged. Acceptability of economic factors will be based mainly on 
determining whether or not the costs of risk reduction and the costs that 
would result from a major accident can be met by industry. The criteria 
for acceptability of socio-political factors should be expressed in terms 
that require evaluation of the public's views on the acceptability of the 
risks associated with the proposed project. It is important that the 
criteria adopted are suitable for being applied consistently to all 
industries. 
The techniques that are available are adequate to assess the probability 
of the events that can cause risk, but there are indications that there 
is confusion about the way the techniques should be applied. This 
confusion seems to stem from the fact that often there is no separation 
between studies that are made by the proposer for internal use to assess 
the adequacy of the design, and those studies made to justify the 
acceptability of the design to external organizations such as regulatory 
bodies. The internal studies are essentially an aid to the designer and 
are most useful at the design stage to show where, if at all, changes in 
the design are necessary to make the design acceptable. The risk 
assessments required for external presentation to justify the 
acceptability of the design are different in character to the internal 
studies, although they draw quite heavily on the results of such studies. 
The aim of external presentation studies should be to show as precisely 
as possible the probability of various types of accident and their 
consequences for the public. In building up the picture of the possible 
consequences the study should give attention to establishing the limits 
to the spectrum of consequences and particular attention to determining 
upper limits to the severity of the consequences. 
To solve the problem of defining the optimum form for the external 
presentation of the risk assessment of a project, it is proposed that a 
universal specification should be developed for the information that 
should be presented to the regulatory authorities to justify the 
acceptability of a potentially hazardous project. This specification 
should state the types of accidents that have to be considered, and the 
probability levels that have to be determined. The limits to the 
information likely to be required will be identification of the maximum 
accident, its consequences and probability, and identification of the 
minimum, median, mode and maximum accidents in the same detail. This 
requirement should be developed in terms that will allow it to be applied 
universally to hazard assessment, not simply to nuclear or chemical hazards. 
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Development of techniques for comprehensive assessment of the 
acceptability of risks should continue and the starting point for such 
development should be the non-dimensional ranking technique for risk 
assessment described in the previous section. The assessment of the 
technique that was made using the Canvey Island, Moss Morran and 
Eemshaven data showed that it had the potential for development into a 
comprehensive assessment technique. The development should include 
detailed testing of the efficacy of the method against several current 
cases and determining how acceptable the method is to both proposers and 
regulators. 
The quality of any assessment of risk depends on the quality of the data 
used. The three important characteristics of data are: its relevance, 
its reliability, and its availability. A great deal is being done 
throughout the world to collect and assess data that may be required for 
risk assessment. The two main types of data are the reliability of 
systems and data related to the consequences of accident conditions. 
Superficially the amount of technical data available gives the impression 
that the reliability of every conceivable type of component is known - 
this is far from reality. Engineering components are under constant 
development and even small changes in design invalidate assessments of 
reliability derived from experience with earlier designs. Also, more 
data is required on the way components fail. For example, do they fail 
catastrophically or do they simply start to perform below specification. 
Such information is vital if a precise assessment of risk potential has 
to be made. 
The reliability of systems cannot be divorced from the implications of 
human errors, and for this the prediction of human errors under a range 
of environments needs to be improved as does the procedure for relating 
psychological characteristics of operators to their error patterns when 
working under certain operating conditions. Even highly trained and fit 
men like airline pilots make mistakes. It is their training and skill 
that helps them to correct their errors and keep the accident rate very 
low. In two studies of pilot error quoted in an article by Professor 
Senders, one showed an average of 15.6 errors per hour on a short 
distance flight with a high workload and the other study which simu}ý 
a transatlantic flight showed an average of 11.4 errors an hour. 
Although these error rates are high the continued growth of air traffic 
suggests that careful design of the complete operating system has in this 
case kept the consequences of human error to a generally acceptable 
level. 
The data required to assess the consequences of an accident is not 
adequate in every case. More information is needed about the dispersion 
and retention in the environment of potentially hazardous materials. 
Such information is required both to determine the immediate and long- 
term consequences of accidential releases of materials that are 
potentially hazardous. For this a co-ordinated research programme is 
required to determine dispersion and retention characteristics, and the 
In the reference cited, the total number of operations the pilot had to 
perform in an hour is not stated. 
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nature of the health risks, of the whole range of potentially hazardous 
materials. New materials will always pose a special kind of problem 
until they are manufactured in quantity and their characteristics are 
fully established. Therefore, when they are first introduced, assessment 
of their behaviour needs special care and attention to identify the 
parameters that may have risk significance. Extrapolation of data is a 
doubtful practice and any extrapolation needs to be soundly based on 
relevant data. 
One development that is required is of a procedural nature. Currently 
projects are often delayed by regulatory procedures, such as public 
inquiries. These delays can be of several years duration, as in the case 
of the Sizewell Inquiry. Clearly allowance has to be made for free and 
democratic discussion of the acceptability of a project, but there is no 
reason why such discussion should not be time-limited so that a proposer 
knows exactly when a decision will be made. In the countries examined in 
this study, there is a considerable range in the way the public 
discussion of the acceptability of controversial projects is allowed for. 
It is therefore suggested that a uniform public inquiry practice should 
be developed and priority should be given to establishing consistent 
national criteria and procedures. Once these are established there is a 
sound basis for discussing development of uniform practices 
internationally. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CIONCLUSIMS 
This study of the concept of acceptable risk has concentrated on 
identifying the matrix of factors that have to be considered in assessing 
the acceptability of risks and comparing the way the acceptability of 
risks associated with potentially hazardous installations in Germany, 
Britain, France, Holland and Denmark is determined. - From this evaluation 
of the practices in five countries, a number of conclusions are drawn 
about the optimum approach that could be adopted to give a consistent and 
comprehensive assessment of risk. 
Uncertainty about failure rates and consequences of accidents can, even 
for conventional plant for which some data exists, introduce wide 
variation in quantitative assessments of risk. Even for quite simple 
cases, the uncertainty can be a factor of ten or more from the mean 
predicted value of risk. For more complex systems, the range of 
uncertainty can be many times greater. For systems that are novel in 
design or that could release substances whose toxicity is unknown, the 
essential parameters have to be determined before the inherent risks can 
be quantified. 
The examination of the practices used for the quantification of the 
technical aspects of risk in the nuclear industry showed that there is a 
considerable amount of common ground in the practices adopted and being 
considered in Germany, Britain and France. In Germany, quantified 
analysis is regarded as a useful technique which supplements the 
conventional deterministic methods of safety assessment, but probability 
targets for various classes of accident are not yet finally agreed. The 
British regulatory authorities have stated the quantified targets they 
consider a proposal should satisfy. Also the British Central Electricity 
Generating Board have specified their safety design guidelines in 
quantified terms. In France, the regulatory authorities have identified 
quantitative targets which nuclear reactors should satisfy. The targets 
currently adopted and being considered by the regulatory authorities in 
the three countries identify acceptable risk in very similar terms of 
radiation dose and probability. 
Of the three countries, Germany is the only one to have published a 
detailed analysis of the risks associated with nuclear reactors. The 
study followed very closely the pattern of the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission WASH-1400 study and it recognized the uncertainty associated 
with the data used and presented the results as 'expected value', 'median 
value' and 'uncertainty factor'. For the complex systems considered, 
often involving thousands of components, some simplification of the fault 
trees was found necessary to keep the volume of work required within 
manageable proportions. 
In assessing the practices adopted by the potentially hazardous process industries, the practices followed by Germany, France, Britain, Holland 
and Denmark were evaluated. There is considerable agreement in the five 
countries considered about the way the acceptability of proposals for 
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industrial plants with major hazard potential should be assessed. It is 
clear that the EEC Seveso Directive has had a harmonizing influence on 
the national legislation of Member States. One manifestation of this 
harmonization is that the authorities in the five countries examined 
require the proposer to present a technical justification of the 
acceptability of the proposal. The harmonization has not yet resulted in 
universal quantitative acceptability criteria being adopted; in general, 
the criteria of acceptability that have to be satisfied are expressed in 
qualitative terms rather than in quantitative terms. This leads to a 
flexible approach about what is acceptable which gives the proposer a 
rather amorphous requirement to attempt to satisfy. However, the 
specifications for the way the case should be presented for acceptance of 
a potentially hazardous plant generally require that the risk is 
quantified. Such quantification appears only to be regarded as an aid to 
decision making and not the basis for decision making. The nearest 
approach to a quantitative criterion was found in the first report of the 
British Advisory Committee on Major Hazards in which it was suggested 
that the bottom limit of acceptability was the risk of a fatality once in 
10,000 years. The German requirements and procedures that have to be 
followed set out in considerable detail the information that has to be 
provided. This includes preparation of a comprehensive safety analysis 
that requires quantification of fault sequences and consequences. But 
the requirements do not give any indication of the acceptable level of 
risk. The French authorities also require a detailed systematic safety 
analysis for installations that would be regarded as major hazards. Both 
the Danish and Dutch practices stress the importance of frank discussion 
between employer and employee about the acceptability of risks. There 
are several other features of the Dutch approach that deserve wider 
consideration. They are: the way potential hazards are ranked and the 
ranking used as a guide to the depth of safety analysis required, the 
extent of the safety precautions that are considered to be justified, the 
importance that is attached to establishing the suitability of staff and 
the adequacy of the operating practices proposed. 
The conclusion that seems to be justified from the examination of the 
various techniques for reliability and risk assessment is that there is 
an adequate range of such techniques capable of giving the decision maker 
a quantified indication of the technical aspects of risks associated with 
a particular project. However, sufficient relevant data may not exist to 
fully exploit the potential of the technique. But the very process of 
building up a risk assessment leads to a better understanding of the 
nature of the risks inherent in the project and the steps that can be 
taken to reduce these risks. 
The techniques for quantification of the technical aspects of risk, as 
currently generally used, give no indication of the significance of 
economic or socio-political factors. These factors are of importance in 
determining public acceptability, and an assessment of their significance 
should be coupled with a quantified assessment of the technical 
characteristics of risks. The ranking method proposed in Chapter 9 
appears to be capable of making assessments in a consistent and logical 
way of the whole range of factors which have to be considered in 
assessing the acceptability of a risk. The simple tests of the technique that were made on the Canvey Island, Moss Morran and Eemshaven cases 
showed that the method has the capability for making an overall 
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assessment of acceptability which would be useful both for industrial and 
regulatory decision making. 
The general conclusions about the differences and similarities in the way 
the nuclear industry and those parts of the process industry that can be 
defined as a potential major risk assess the acceptability of risk can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) The quantification of the technical aspects of risk is more 
extensively used in the nuclear industry than in the process 
industry. 
2) Quantified targets for acceptable risk levels in technical terms are 
more developed in the nuclear industry than in the process industry. 
3) The regulators do not regard quantification of risk in technical 
terms as the only evidence they have to consider in assessing 
acceptability of a proposal. 
4) The usefulness of quantitative techniques in both industries depends 
to a large extent on the quality and relevance of the data 
available, and there is a need for the quality of the data base to 
be improved particularly in relation to the influence that 
environmental conditions have on human errors and also in relation 
to the toxic characteristics of chemicals that might be released 
following an accident. 
5) Quantitative techniques are not, in general, capable of identifying 
the magnitude of the risk likely to be associated with novel plant 
or with substances for which there is no relevant data. In such 
cases the techniques of risk assessment like fault trees and 
consequence analysis can simply give a very useful guide to the 
parts of a proposal where the data base is inadequate. 
Looking at alternatives to present procedures interest was found both 
from industry and official organizations in the development of a 
technique, similar to the ranking technique proposed in Chapter 9, that 
gives a comprehensive assessment of all the factors which have to be 
considered in determining the acceptability of a potentially hazardous 
installation. The particular merit of such a technique is that it brings 
together an assessment of all the factors concerned with determination of 
acceptability. 
Finally, a number of developments that are required for the optimum 
exploitation of risk acceptability assessment were identified, these 
include: the development of a universal criterion for judging 
acceptability of all types of industrial risk which takes account not 
only of the technical but also the economic and socio-political factors, 
developing further and proving the non-dimensional ranking technique for 
risks proposed in this study, - development of a universal specification for the information that must be presented to the regulatory authorities 
to justify acceptability, improving the data base available with respect 
to human errors and how they are influenced by the working environment, improving the data base with respect to dispersion and retention of 
hazardous materials following an accident, improving the data base with 
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respect to the precise identification of the toxic effects of chemicals 
likely to be released, and, finally, developing improved ways of 
assessing public opinion and incorporating the results of such assessment 
into the acceptability decision making process. 
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PART II 
APPENDIX 1 
THE DtICH REGULATORY AITTHORITIES' FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INDEX AND TOXICITY INDEX() 
DE90RIPTION OF FX SE F WARDS OF INSTALLATION-UNITS 
In order to determine the extent of the safety studies to be carried out 
one may proceed as follows: 
a) Divide the designated installation into logical and independent 
units 
b) Determine a fire and explosion index F and/or a toxicity index T for 
each unit where dangerous substances occur 
c) Classify each unit in one of 3 hazard categories on the basis of F 
and T 
d) Determine the extent of the safety studies to be carried out, 
considering the hazard category, the kind of installation concerned, 
and the technology applied. 
Subdivision of the designated installation 
Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in question 
should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In 
general, a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the 
process that takes place in it. In some cases the unit may consist of a 
plant element separated from the other elements by space, or by 
protective walls. 
A plant element may also be an apparatus, instrument, section or system 
that can cause a specific hazard. 
Examples of logical, independent units are given below: 
- feed section; 
- heating section/cooling section; 
- reaction section; 
- compression section; 
- distillation section; 
_ wash section; 
- collection system; 
- filtration section; 
- buffer tanks; 
REFERENCE 
(1) The Labour Inspectorate, Draft Manual 'Guideline for the Compilation 
of Operational Safety Report', First Edition 1982, The Labour 
Inspectorate Voorburg, pp 13-28 and pp 55-62. 
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- prill tower; 
- destruction section; 
- flare system; 
- blow-down system; 
- recovery section; 
- quench section; 
- etc. 
In the case of storage installations, each tank, bunker and silo is 
regarded as a separate unit. 
In the case of storage of dangerous substances in packaging units (bags, 
bottles, drums etc. ) the total of packaging units stored in one location 
is regarded as one plant element. 
Determination of fire and explosion index F and toxicity index T 
For each separate plant element which contains flammable or toxic 
substances a fire and explosion index F and/or toxicity index T may be 
determined in a manner derived from the method for determjýýng a fire and 
explosion index developed by Dow Chemical Company, U. S. A. 
The fire and explosion index F is calculated from: 
F= MF X (1 + GPHtot) x (1 + SPHtot) 
in which: 
MF = material factor =a measure for the potential energy of the 
dangerous substances present (see Table 1 and 2) 
GPHtot = general process hazards =a measure for the hazards inherent 
in the process 
SpHtot = special process hazards =a measure for the hazards 
originating from the specific installation 
The toxicity index T is calculated from: 
T= Th +00 Ts (1 + GPHtot + BPGtot) 
in which: 
Th = toxicity factor (see Table 3) 
Ts = supplement for MAC-value (see Table 1) 
REFS 
(2) Fire and explosion index hazard classification guide, May 1976, 
fourth edition. The Dow Chemical Company, Midland, Michigan 48640, 
USA. 
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TABLE 1 
HAZARD FIGURES AND MWERIAL F iU S AS DERIVED FiiCM NATIONAL FIRE 
PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 1Y5 
NFPA Material 
Narm Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Acetaldehyde 2 4 2 24 
Acetic Acid 2 2 1 14 
Acetic Anhydride 2 2 1 14 
Acetone 1 3 0 16 
Acetonitrile 2 3 1 16 
Acetyl Chloride 3 3 2 24 
Acetyl Peroxide 1 2 4 40 
Acetyl Salcyl Acid 1 1 0 4 
Acetylene 1 4 3 29 
Acrolein 3 3 2 24 
Acrylic Acid 3 2 2 24 
Acrylamide 2 1 1 14 
Acrylonitrile 4 3 2 24 
Allyl Alcohol 3 3 1 16 
Allylamine 3 3 1 16 
Allyl Chloride 3 3 1 16 
Allyl Ether 3 3 2 24 
Ammonia 3 1 0 4 
tert Acnylacetate 1 3 0 16 
Aniline 3 2 0 10 
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Name 
health 
'A 
Classification 
Fire Reactivity 
Material 
factor 
Bariran Stearate 0 10 4 
Benzaldehyde 2 20 10 
Benzene 2 30 16 
Benzoic Acid 2 10 4 
Benzoyl Chloride 3 21 14 
Benzoyl Peroxide 
Bisphenol A 
Bromobenzene 
Butane 
1,3-Butadiene 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
4 
1 
2 
4 
4 
4 
0 
0 
0 
2 
40 
4 
10 
21 
24 
Butanol 2 3 0 16 
1-Butene 1 4 0 21 
n-Butyl Acetate 1 3 0 16 
Butyl Alcohol 1 3 0 16 
n-Butylamine 2 3 0 16 
Butyl Bromide 2 3 0 16 
n-Butyl Ether 2 3 0 16 
tert-Butyl Hydroperoxide 1 4 4 40 
Butyl Nitrate 1 3 3 29 
tert-Butyl Peroxide 1 3 3 29 
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Name 
Health 
NF? A 
Classification 
Fire Reactivity 
Material 
factor 
Butylene 1 40 21 
Butylene Oxide 3 32 24 
Calcium Carbide 1 42 24 
Calcium Stearate 0 10 4 
Carbon Disulfide 2 30 16 
Carbon Monoxide 
Chlorine Dioxide 
1-Chlorobutane 
Chloroform 
Chloromethylethyl Ether 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
3 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
21 
29 
16 
0 
4 
O-Chloro Phenol 3 2 0 10 
Chloropicrin 4 0 3 29 
1-Chloropropane 2 3 0 16 
Chlorostyrene 2 2 2 24 
Counarin 2 1 0 4 
O-Cresol 2 2 0 10 
Cunene 2 3 0 16 
Cumene Hydroperoxide 1 2 4 40 
Cyanuric Acid 2 0 1 14 
Cyclobutane 1 4 0 21 
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NFPA Material 
Name Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Cyclohexane 1 3 0 16 
Cyclohexanol 1 2 0 10 
Cyclopropane 1 4 0 21 
Diesel Fuel 0 2 0 10 
Dibutyl Ether 2 3 0 16 
O-Dichlorobenzene 2 2 0 10 
P-Dichlorobenzene 2 2 0 10 
1,2-Dichloroethylene 2 3 2 24 
1,2-Dichloropropene 2 3 0 16 
2,3-Dichloropropene- 
Crude 2 3 0 16 
3,5-Dichlorosalicylic 
Acid 0 1 0 4 
Dicumyl Peroxide 0 2 3 29 
Dicyclopentadiene 1 3 1 16 
Diethyl Amine 2 3 0 16 
Diethyl Benzene 2 2 0 10 
Diethyl Carbonate 2 3 1 16 
Diethyl Peroxide 0 4 4 40 
Diethanolamine 1 1 0 4 
Diethylene Glycol 1 1 0 4 
Diethylamine Triamine 3 1 0 4 
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NFPA Material 
Name Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Diethyl Ether 2 4 1 21 
Diisobutylene 1 3 0 26 
Diisopropylbenzene 0 2 0 10 
Dimethyl Amine (Anhy. ) 3 4 0 21 
2,2-Dimethyl Propanol 2 3 0 16 
n-Dinitrobenzene 3 1 4 40 
2,4-Dinitro Phenol 3 1 4 40 
m-Dioxane 2 3 0 16 
Dioxolane 2 3 2 24 
Diphenyl oxide 1 1 0 4 
Dipropylene Glycol 0 1 0 4 
Di-tert-Butyl Peroxide 1 3 4 40 
Divinyl Benzene 1 2 2 24 
Divinyl Ether 2 3 2 24 
Dowtherm A heat tr. agt. 2 1 0 4 
Epichlorohydrin 3 3 2 24 
Ethane 1 4 0 21 
2-Ethanolamine 2 2 0 10 
Ethyl Acetate 1 3 0 16 
Ethyl Acrylate 2 3 2 24 
Ethyl Alcohol 0 3 0 16 
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NFPA Material 
Name Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Ethyl Benzene 2 3 0 16 
Ethyl Bromide 2 3 0 16 
Ethyl Chloride 2 4 0 21 
Ethylene 1 4 2 24 
Ethylene Carbonate 2 1 1 14 
Ethylene Diamine 3 2 0 10 
Ethylene Dichloride 2 3 0 16 
Ethylene Glycol 1 1 0 4 
Ethylene Oxide 2 4 3 29 
Ethylenimine 3 3 2 24 
Ethyl Nitrate 2 4 4 40 
Ethylamine 3 4 0 21 
Formaldehyde 2 4 0 21 
Glycerine 1 1 0 4 
Heptane 1 3 0 16 
Hexane 1 3 0 16 
n-Hexanol 2 2 0 10 
Hydrazine 3 3 2 24 
Hydrogen 0 4 0 21 
Hydrogen Sulfide 3 4 0 21 
I 
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Narre 
Health 
NFPA 
Classification 
Fire Reactivity 
Material 
factor 
Isobutane 1 40 21 
Isobutyl Alcohol 1 30 16 
Isopentane 1 40 21 
Isopropanol 1 30 16 
Isopropyl Acetate 1 30 16 
Isopropyl Chloride 2 40 21 
Isopropyl Ether 2 3 1 16 
Jet Fuel 1 3 0 16 
Lauroyl Peroxide 0 2 3 29 
Maleic Anhydride 3 1 1 14 
Magnesia m 0 1 2 24 
Methane 1 4 0 21 
Methanol 1 3 0 16 
Methyl Acetate 1 3 0 16 
Methyl Acetylene 2 4 2 24 
Methyl Amine 3 4 0 21 
Methyl Chloride 2 4 0 21 
Methyl Chloracetate 2 2 1 14 
Methyl Cyclohexane 2 3 0 16 
Methylene Chloride 2 0 0 0 
Methyl Ether 2 4 0 21 
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 1 3 0 16 
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NFPA Material 
Name Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Methyl Hydrazine 3 3 1 16 
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 2 3 0 16 
Methyl Mercaptan 2 4 0 21 
Methyl Styrene 2 2 0 10 
Mineral Oil 0 1 0 4 
Monochlorobenzene 2 3 0 16 
Monoethanolamine 2 2 0 10 
Naphtha 1 3 0 16 
Naphthalene 2 2 0 10 
Nitroethane 1 3 3 29 
Nitroglycerine 2 2 4 40 
Nitromethan 1 3 4 40 
Nitropropane 1 2 3 29 
2-Nitrotoluene 2 1 4 40 
Octane 0 3 0 16 
pentane 1 4 0 21 
Peracetic Acid 3 2 4 40 
phenol 3 2 0 10 
p-Phenylphenol 3 1 0 4 
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NFPA Material 
Name Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Potassium Perchlorate 1 0 2 24 
Propane 1 4 0 21 
Propargyl Alcohol 3 3 3 29 
Propargyl Bromide 4 3 4 40 
Proprionitrile 4 3 1 16 
Propylene 1 4 1 21 
Propylene Dichloride 2 3 0 16 
Propylene Glycol 0 1 0 4 
Propylene Oxide 2 4 2 24 
Sodium Dichromate 1 0 1 14 
Stearic Acid 1 1 0 4 
Styrene 2 3 2 24 
Sulfur 2 1 0 4 
Sulfur Dioxide 2 0 0 0 
Toluene 2 3 0 16 
1,2,3-Trichlorobenzene 2 1 0 4 
jr 1,1-Trichloroethane 3 1 0 4 
Trichloethylene 2 1 0 4 
Triethanolamine 2 1 1 14 
Triethylene Glycol 1 1 0 4 
Triethyl Aluminium 3 3 3 29 
Triisobutyl Aluminium 3 3 3 29 
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NFPA Material 
Nam Classification factor 
Health Fire Reactivity 
Triisopropanol Amine 2 1 0 4 
Triisopropyl Benzene 2 3 0 16 
Trimethyl Aluminium 3 3 3 29 
Trimethyl Amine 2 4 0 21 
Tripopylamine 2 2 0 10 
Vinyl Acetate 2 3 3 24 
Vinyl Acetylene 4' 3 29 
Vinyl Allyl Ether 2 3 3 24 
Vinyl Benzyl Chloride 2 1 0 4 
Vinyl Chloride 2 4 1 21 
Vinyl Cyclohexene 2 3 2 24 
Vinyl Ethyl Ether 2 4 2 24 
Vinyl Toluene 2 2 1 14 
Vinylidene Chloride 2 4 2 24 
Xylene 2 3 0 16 
Zinc Stearate 0 1 0 4 
For GPHtot and SPHtot the same values apply as for the determination of 
the Fire- and explosion index. 
For the determination of F and Ta form, a copy of which is shown on the 
next page, may be used. 
Where more than one dangerous substance occurs in one plant-element, a 
fire and explosion index F and/or a toxicity index T must be determined - 
when desired with the help of the form - for each substance. 
When determining the hazard category of the plant-element the highest 
values found for F, respectively T, are applied. 
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DETERMINATION OF TIE FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX F 
AND OF THE ZOXICITY INDEX T 
NAME DATE 
LOCATION Job number 
PLANT Unit Charge 
MATERIALS AND PROCESS* 
MATERIALS Solvents 
MATERIAL FACIUR Mg' (See Table 1 or Table 2) 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS (G. P. H. ) 
Penalty Penalty 
used 
Exothermic reactions 
Endothermic reactions 0.20 
Material handling and transfer 
Process units within a building 
Add: G. P. H. tot º 
(1 + G. P. H. tot) x material factor l- subfactor ---ý 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (S. P. H. ) 
Process temperature (use highest penalty only) 
- Above flashpoint 0.25 
- Above boiling point 0.60 
- Above auto ignition 0.75 
Iaw pressure (atmospheric/sub atmospheric) 
- Hazard of peroxide formation 0.50 
- Hydrogen collection systems 0.50 
- Vacuum distillation at less than 0.67 bar abs. 0.75 
Operation in or near f1a®ble range 
- Storage of flammable liquids and LPG's 
outdoors 
- Reliance on instrumentation and/or N2 or air 
purging to stay out of flammable range 
0.50 
0.75 
- Always in flammable range 1.00 
Operating pcess: ire 
low ae 
- Between 0 and -30c1C 0.30 
- Below -30k 0.50 
Quantity of fl-ble Material 
- In process 
- In storage 
Corrosion and erosion 
leakage joints and packing 
Add: S. P. H. 
(1 + S. P. H. tot) x subfactor - Fire- and explosion index r 
TOXICITY INDEX T 
Th + Ts x (1 + G. P. Htot + S. P. H. tot) - Toxicity index T 100 ---. 0. 
* The term 'process' includes handling as well as storage. 
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Substances which occur in a concentration of less than 5% (weight 
percentage for liquids and solids, volume perecentage for gases) need not 
be considered here. 
Determination of the material factor MF 
The starting point for the calculation of the fire and explosion index is 
the material factor. This factor is a measure of the energy potential of 
the most hazardous material, or mixture of materials present. The 
material factor is denoted by a number from 0 to 40, with the higher 
numbers indicating greater energy available. 
The materifactor is determined using only two properties, 
flammability"' and reactivity, characterized by instability and water 
reactivity of a chemical. The material factors for many materials are 
listed in Table 1. The material factor should be determined for every in 
the plant-element occurring dangerous substance. 
The material factor may be derived from Table 2, using the numerical 
value for (14th 
flammability and reactivity as contained in NFPA 
literature. 
For example, ethylene oxide with a flammability of 4 and a reactivity of 
3 leads to a material factor of 29 from Table 2. Butyl acrylate, with a 
flammability of 2 and a reactivity of 2, leads to a material factor of 24 
from Table 2. 
For materials not listed or rated for hazard by the NFPA, estimates have 
been developed that can be made fro'basic properties of the materials 
shown within heavy lines in Table 2. 
) 
Flashpoint or He can be used for flammability Nf. The value of Hcv is 
calculated by muftiplying the heat of combustion, kJ/mol, by the vapour 
pressure at 300K (27°C) in bar. For materials boiling below 300K use 
1.00 for vapour pressure. For Nr use the adiabatic decomposition 
temperature Td* (6) 
REFERENCES 
(3) In this connection a substance is considered flammable if the 
process temperature is higher than or equal to the flashpoint. 
(4) National Fire Protection Association, Identification of the Fire 
Hazards of Materials, NFPA No 704M, 325M and 49. 
(5) CRI Report No. GE 76-4, Self Reactivity Scales for Hazard Evaluation 
Systems by G. de Haven. 
(6) Strictly speaking Td is not a temperature but a temperature-rise. 
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For example, propylene oxide has the basic properties: 
flashpoint below - 200C 
heat of combustion 30.703 kJ/g 
vol. weight 58 
heat of combustion is thus 30.703 x 58 = 1780/78 k. /hol 
vapor pressure 0.745 bar (27c) 
decomposition temperature 67500 
For a flashpoint below - 2000 the hazard value for flammability is 4. 
This nay be checked by calculating Ham: 
HCV = 1780.78 x 0.745 = ca. 1326 kv. bar/mol 
An HCV of 1326 gives a hazard value of 4 for flammability. 
The adiabatic decomposition temperature is: 
Td - 675 + 273 = 948 K. This gives a hazard value of 2 for reactivity. 
On the basis of Table 2a material factor of 24 will be applicable to 
propylene oxide. 
MULE 2 
1 OF MATERIAL FACTOR 
Flash 
t i kJ 
b 
/ n pooC r 1 . 
None <4.10-5 
100 4.10-5-2.5 
40-100 1 2.5-40 
20 - +401 40-600 
< -20 1 >600 
Aal 1c ä3U- 935- 1010- 
decaciposition <830 935 1010 1080 >1080 
Tens IM K 
reactivity 
Nr 012 
Nf 
0 
44 3 
4 
3I4 
0 14 24 29 40 
4 14 24 29 40 
10 14 24 29 40 
16 16 24 29 40 
21 21 24 29 40 
Material Factor I4F 
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Determination of general process hazards 
Exothermic reactions 
A 0.20 penalty is required for: 
Combustion = the combustion of solid, liquid or gaseous fuel with air as 
in a furnace. 
The following reactions require a 0.30 penalty: 
a) Hydrogenation = the addition of hydrogen atoms to both sides of a 
double or triple bond. Hazards are the use of hydrogen under pressure 
and at a relatively high temperature. 
b) Hydrolysis = the reaction of a compound with water, such as the 
manufacture of sulphuric or phosphoric acids from oxides. 
c) Alkylation = addition of an alkyl group to a compound to form various 
organic compounds. 
d) Isomerization = rearrangement of the atoms in an organic molecule, 
such as a change from a straight chain to a branched molecule, or 
displacement of a double bond. Hazards are dependent on the stability 
and the reactivity of the chemicals involved and may in some cases 
require a penalty of 0.50. 
e) Sulfonation = introduction of an S03H radical into an organic molecule 
through reaction with H2SO4. 
f) Neutralization = reaction between an acid and a base, to produce a 
salt and water. 
The following require a 0.50 penalty: 
a) Esterification = reaction between an acid and an alcohol or 
unsaturated hydrocarbon. Moderate hazard, except in cases where acid 
is highly reactive or where the reacting substances are unstable, 
which may lead to a penalty of 0.75 or 1.25. 
b) Oxidation = combination of oxygen with some substances, in which 
reaction is controlled and does not go to CO2 and H2O as in the case 
of combustion. Where vigorous oxidising agents such as chlorates, 
nitric acid, hypochloric acids and salts are used, increase the 
penalty to 1.00. 
c) Polymerization = joining together of molecules to form chains or other 
linkages. Heat must be dissipated to keep the reaction under control. 
d) Condensation = joining together of two or more organic molecules with 
the splitting off of H20, HCL or other compounds. 
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The following requires a 1.00 penalty: 
a) Halogenation = introduction of halogen atoms (fluorine, chlorine, 
bromine or iodine) into an organic molecule. This is both a strongly 
exothermal and corrosive process. 
The following requires a 1.25 penalty: 
a) Nitration = involves the replacement of a hydrogen atom in a compound 
with a nitro group. Very strong exothermal reaction, possibly with 
explosive by-products. 
Temperature controls must be good, impurities can act as catalysts for 
further oxidation, or nitration, and rapid decomposition can occur. 
Endothermic reactions 
Endothermic reactions receive a 0.20 penalty. 
Examples of endothermic reactions are: 
a) Calcination = heating of a material to remove moisture or other 
volatile material. 
b) Electrolysis = separation of ions by means of electric current. There 
are hazards because of the presence of flammable or highly reactive 
products. 
c) Pyrolysis or cracking = thermal decomposition of large molecules by 
high temperatures, pressures and a catalyst. Regeneration of the 
catalyst by a separate combustion process can be dangerous. 
If a combustion process is used as source of energy for calcination, 
pyrolysis or cracking, the penalty is doubled to 0.40. 
Material handling and transfer 
a) The loading and unloading of dangerous materials, especially with 
respect to the hazards involved in coupling and uncoupling of transfer 
lines of roadtankers, tank cars and ships. Penalty is 0.50. 
b) Warehousing and yard storage (excluding tank storage) of hazardous 
materials in drums, cylinders, transport tanks etc: 
- materials with process (storage) temperature below the 
atmospheric boiling point. Penalty 0.30; 
- materials with process (storage) temperature above the 
atmospheric boiling point. Penalty 0.60. 
The above penalties are applied because of possible exposure in 
handling and of potential fire-hazard. They are applied regardless of 
quantity (for which a penalty is given elsewhere). 
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Process units within a building 
Process units which are located within a building and in which dangerous 
materials are processed and/or stored represent an increased hazard 
because of obstruction of natural ventilation. 
- flammable liquids above flash point but below atmospheric boiling 
point. Penalty 0.30; 
- flammable liquids or LPG above atmospheric boiling point. 
Penalty 0.60. 
Miscellaneous 
Packaging, filling of drums, sacks or boxes with dangerous materials, use 
of centrifuges, mixing of batches in open apparatus, more than one 
reaction in the same apparatus: Penalty 0.50. 
Determination of special process hazards 
Process temperature 
a) Apply penalty of 0.25 when process or handling conditions are above 
flashpoint of material. 
b) Apply penalty of 0.60 when process or handling conditions are above 
atmospheric boiling point. 
c) Materials such as hexane and carbon disulphide have low auto-ignition- 
temperatures and can be ignited on hot steam lines: penalty 0.75. 
Low pressure 
No penalty is required for processes that operate at atmospheric or sub- 
atmospheric pressure, provided air leakage into the system will not 
create a hazard. 
Example: Vacuum distillation of glycols. 
a) When air leakage into the system could create a hazard, apply a 0.50 
penalty. 
Example: Handling pyrophoric materials, diolef ins with hazard of 
peroxide formation and catalyzed polymerization. 
b) Hydrogen collection systems require a 0.50 penalty. 
c) Any vacuum distillation at less than 0.67 bar absolute should be 
penalized 0.75 if air or contaminants leaking into the system could 
create a hazard. 
operation in or near flammable range 
a) Storage of flammable materials requires a penalty of 0.50 for outdoor 
tanks, if the gas-air mixture in the vapour space is generally in or 
near the flammable range. 
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b) For processes that operate close to the flammable limits or where it 
is necessary to use instrumentation and/or nitrogen-or air purging to 
stay outside the explosion limits, use a 0.75 penalty. 
Examples: oxidation of toluene to benzoic acid, dissolving of rubber, 
direct oxidation in ethylene oxide process. 
c) For processes that normally operate in the flammable range, use a 1.00 
penalty. 
Examples: ethylene oxide distillation and storage. 
Operating pressure 
Operating pressures above atmospheric pressure require a penalty which 
will increase as the operating pressure increases. 
The penalty to be applied is given in Diagram 1. 
Diagram 1 Penalty for operating pressure 
1 
0 
12 3456789 2 3456789 2 3456789 2 34 
10 100 1000 
Operating pressure : bar (abrolute) ýº 
The penalty Y may also be calculated with the formula: Y-0.435 log P, 
in which P is the absolute pressure at which the relief valve is set, 
expressed in bars. 
The penalty curve in Diagram 1 is for flammable and combustible liquids 
and must be corrected for other materials as follows: 
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a) For highly viscous materials such as tars, bitumen, heavy lubricating 
oil and asphalts, multiply penalty by 0.7. 
b) For compressed gases multiply the penalty by 1.2. 
c) For pressurized liquefied flammable gases multiply the penalty by 1.3. 
d) penalties are not applicable to extrusion or moulding operations. 
Low temperature 
a) For processes that operate between Oct and -3O k add 0.30. 
b) For processes that operate below -30°r add 0.50. 
The purpose is to make allowance for presumed brittleness. Moreover 
in case of leakage cold liquid will come into contact with the 
relatively hot environment, which can cause considerable evaporation. 
Quantity of flammable material (Diagrams 2 and 3) 
In process 
To obtain penalty, multiply kilograms of material in process by heat of 
combustion expressed in kJ/kg. Diagram 2 gives the appropriate penalty. 
Diagram 2 
i 
Z4 
1i4681.0 2468 10 20 40 60 80 100 
Energy in kJ x 109 ON 
The penalty Y may also be calculated with the formula: log Y=0.305 log 
eQ--2,965 in which e= heat of combustion of the material in kJ/kg, and Q 
quantity of flammable material in kg. 
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Penalty for quantity of energy present in the 
flammable material in process 
Use quantity of material in largest process vessel or train of process 
vessels connected together. In so far as that quantity can be released 
in its entirety because of an undesired event. 
In storage 
For flammable substances in storage the penalty to be used with respect 
to the quantity present in a tank is determined in accordance with 
Diagram 3. A distinction is made here between pressurized liquefied gas 
(curve A) and flanmable liquids (curve B). 
The penalty Y may also be calculated with: 
Y= 185 - log (eQ. 10-9ý 
2- 11.45 for pressurized liquefied gas 700.000 
(curve A), and: 
Y= 155 - flog (eQ 27 70 0_9)) 
2-6.4 for flanmable liquids (curve B) 
l 
Diagram 3 Penalty for the quantity of energy present in the flammable 
material in storage 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
0.8 
ä 0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 0.2 Q3 0.5 Q7 12357 10 20 30 50 70 100 
Energy in kJ x 109 
B 
A 
Curve A: pressurized liquefied gas 
Curve B: flammable liquids 
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Loss of material through corrosion and erosion 
This hazard should be assessed for both internal- and external corrosion. 
Some areas to consider are: 
- the influence of minor impurities in the process fluid on corrosion; 
- external corrosion from breakdown in paint and coatings; 
- resistant linings (plastics, brick etc. ) liable to damage at seams, 
joints or pinholes. 
Apply the following penalties: 
a) Corrosion rate less than 0.5 mm/year with risk of pitting or local 
erosion: 0.10. 
b) Corrosion rate over 0.5 inn/year,, and less than 1 IruV'year: 0.20. 
c) Corrosion rate over 1 nuVyear: 0.50. 
Leakage of joints and packing 
Gaskets(7), sealing of joints or shafts and packing can be sources of 
leaks, particularly where thermal- or pressure cycling occurs. A penalty 
factor should be selected according to the design and materials chosen 
for these its as follows: 
a) Pump and gland seals likely to give some leakages of a minor nature: 
0.10. 
b) Processes known to give regular leakage problems on pumps and flange 
joints: 0.20. 
c) Process fluids penetrating in nature, abrasive slurries which cause 
continuous sealing problems: 0.40. 
d) Sight glasses, bellows assemblies and expansion joints: 1.50. 
Determination of the toxicity index T 
The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health 
hazards established by the NFPA. For a number of materials, these 
figures, ranging from 0 to 4, are given in Table 1. 
REFERENCES 
(7) In principle this concerns only gaskets for the sealing of moving 
parts or connections that must be opened regularly. 
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For materials not included in this table, reference is made to the NFPA 
publications NFPA No 704M, 325M and 49. 
The NFPA figures are translated into a toxicity factor Th according to 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
RELATION EE'1WEEN NFPA HAZARD FIGS 
AND ioxicr Y FACT R Th 
NFPA index figure Toxicity factor (Th) 
0 0 
1 50 
2 125 
3 250 
4 325 
In addition, the toxicity factor has to be corrected for the MAC-value of 
the toxic substance by adding to it a penalty Ts, which is given in Table 
4. 
! IKE 4 
PENALTY T Fit MC-VALUE 
(maximum aiic aiRe concentration value) 
MC-ppm Penalty Ts 
<5 125 
5-50 75 
>50 50 
The toxicity index (T) is now calculated as follows: 
T= Th + Ts x (1 + GPHtot + SPHtot) 
100 
In this the material which gives the highest value of Th + Ts is 
determining. 
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GPHtht = the total of General Process Hazard penalties 
SPHtot = the total of Special Process Hazard penalties 
Classification in hazard-categories 
By comparing the indices F and/or T to the criteria stated in Table 5, 
the unit in question is classified in one of the three categories 
established for this purpose. Category I is the category of plant 
elements with the lowest hazard potential, category III the one with the 
highest hazard potential. 
TABLE 5 
CATGOKIES OF PLANT EE»I 11S 
Fire and Explosion 
index (F) 
Toxicity 
index (T) 
Category I F <65 T<6 
Category II 654 F <95 64 T <10 
Category III F ), 95 T >, 10 
In cases where both for the fire and explosion index and for the toxicity 
index a category has been found, the highest one is adopted. 
Plant elements containing explosive substances are in all cases 
classified in category III. 
The method of indexing explained leads to an indicative classification of 
plant elements in categories. 
This classification will not in all cases properly reflect the potential 
hazard of a plant element under consideration. In a particular case too 
much or too little weight may be attached to a hazard aspect. In that 
case the classification may be adjusted after consultation of the Labour 
Inspectorate. 
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APPENDIX 2 
GERMAN LAW FOR THE PREVENTION OF HARMFUL EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
CAUSED BY AIR POLLUTION, NOISE, VIBRATION AND SIMILAR PHENOMENA 
(Bundes-Imnissionsschutzgesetz - Federal Immission Control Law) 
of 15 March 1974 (Bundesgesetzblatt Part I, pp. 721,11973) 
last amended on 4 March 1982 
(Federal law Gazette*, I, p. 281) 
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e 
The Bundestag, with the approval of the Bundesrat, has passed the 
following Law: 
FIRST PART 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 
Purpose of the Law 
The purpose of this Law is to protect human beings as well as animals, 
plants and other objects from harmful effects on the environment and, in 
so far as installations subject to licensing are concerned, from dangers, 
considerable disadvantages and considerable nuisances caused in other 
ways, and to prevent such harmful effects on the environment. 
Article 2 
Sphere of Application 
(1) The provisions of this Law shall apply to the following: 
1. establishrent and operation of installations, 
2. production, marketing and importation of installations, fuels 
(Brennstoffe, Treibstoffe), substances and products from substances, 
within the terms of Articles 32 to 37, 
3. nature, equipment, operation and inspection of motor vehicles and 
their trailers, and of rolling stock, aircraft and watercraft, 
within the terms of Articles 38 to 40, 
4. construction of public roads as well as railways and tramways within 
the terms of Articles 41 to 43. 
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(2) The provisions of this Law shall not apply to aerodromes; nor shall 
they apply to installations, equipment, devices or nuclear fuels and 
other radioactive substances which are subject to the provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 23 December 1959 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 814) as 
most recently amended by the Cost Authorization Amendment Law of 23 June 
1970 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 805), or are subject to an ordinance issued 
under that Law in so far as it concerns protection from the dangers of 
nuclear energy or from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. 
Article 3 
Definitions 
(1) Harmful effects on the environment within the meaning of this Law 
are immissions which, according to their nature, extent or duration, are 
liable to cause danger, considerable disadvantages or considerable 
nuisances to the general public or the vicinity. 
(2) Immissions within the meaning of this Law are air pollution, noise, 
vibration, light, heat, radiation and similar effects on the environment 
which have an effect on human beings as well as animals, plants or other 
objects. 
(3) Emissions within the meaning of this Law are air pollution, noise, 
vibration, light, heat, radiation and similar phenomena emitted by an 
installation. 
(4) Air pollution within the meaning of this Law are changes in the 
natural composition of the air, especially through smoke, soot, dust, 
gas, aerosols, steam, or odorous substances. 
(5) Installations within the meaning of this Law are: 
1. industrial premises and other stationary facilities, 
2. machines, equipment, and other moveable technical facilities, as 
well as vehicles, in so far as they are not subject to the 
provisions of Article 38, 
3. land, with the exception of thoroughfares, on which materials are 
stored or seasoned, or where work is carried out which could cause 
emissions. 
(6) The latest state of technology within the meaning of this Law is the 
stage of development of progressive processes, of facilities or of 
methods of operation which indicates the practical suitability of a 
particular measure for limiting emissions. In determining the latest 
state of technology special consideration shall be given to comparable 
processes, facilities or methods of operation which have been 
successfully tried out. 
(7) Manufacture, processing or any other treatment shall be deemed 
production within the meaning of this Law; the introduction in any other 
way of an item into the area of application of this Law shall be deemed 
importation within the meaning of this Law. 
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SECOND-PART 
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF INSTALLATIONS 
First Section 
Installations subject to Licensing 
Article 4 
Licensing 
(1) The establishment and operation of installations which by reason of 
their nature or their operation are particularly liable to cause harmful 
effects on the envirommnent or otherwise to endanger, or cause 
considerable disadvantages or considerable nuisances to the general 
public or the vicinity, shall be subject to licensing. Installations 
which do not serve commercial purposes and are not used within the 
framework of commercial undertakings shall only be subject to licensing 
if they are particularly liable to cause harmful effects on the 
environment through air pollution or noise. The Federal Government shall 
determine, after hearing the parties concerned (Article 51), by means of 
an ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, which installations 
shall be subject to licensing. 
(2) Mining installations or parts of such installations shall only be 
subject to licensing pursuant to paragraph 1 if they are constructed and 
operated at the surface. 
Licensing pursuant to paragraph 1 is not required for open mines and the 
installations needed for surface mining and for the installations which 
are indispensable for ventilation. 
Article 5 
Obligations of Operators of Installations subject to Licensing 
Installations subject to licensing shall be established and operated in 
such a way that 
1. harmful effects on the environment and other dangers, considerable 
disadvantages and considerable nuisances to the general public and 
the vicinity cannot be caused by such establishment and operation, 
2. precautionary measures, in particular measures to ensure the 
limitation of emissions in accordance with the latest state of 
technology, are taken to prevent harmful effects on the environment, 
3. residual 
properly 
possible 
properly 
substances from the operation of such installations are 
and harmlessly utilized or, in so far as this is not 
technically or is not justifiable on economic grounds, are 
disposed of as waste. 
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Article 6 
Conditions for the Grant of a Licence 
A licence shall be granted if 
1. measures have been taken to ensure that the obligations arising out 
of Article 5 and out of any ordinance issued under Article 7 have 
been fulfilled, 
2. other public-law regulations and labour protection requirements do 
not prevent the establishment and operation of the installation. 
Article 7 
Requirements with regard to the Establishment, Nature and Operation 
of Installations subject to Licensing 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized to prescribe by means of an 
ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, and after hearing the 
parties concerned (Article 51), that the establishment, nature and 
operation of installations subject to licensing must satisfy certain 
requirements in order to fulfil the obligations arising out of Article 5, 
and in particular that 
1. the installations must meet specific technical requirements, 
2. emissions from installations may not exceed specific limits, and 
3. the operators of installations must take measurements or have 
measurements taken of emissions and immissions in accordance with 
procedures to be more specifically defined in the ordinance. 
(2) With regard to the requirements pursuant to paragraph 1, first 
sentence, sub-paragraphs 1 to 3, reference may be made to generally 
accessible notices by expert agencies; in this respect 
1. the ordinance shall contain the date of such notice and the exact 
source reference, 
2. the notice must be deposited in the archives of the German Patent 
Office and appropriate reference made thereto in the ordinance. 
Article 8 
Partial Licence 
Upon application, a licence may be granted for 
1. the establishment of an installation or part of an installation or 
2. the establishment and operation of part of an installation if a 
provisional examination shows that the conditions specified in 
Article 6 with regard to the establishment and operation of the 
whole installation have been met, and that there is a justified 
interest in the granting of a partial licence. 
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Article 9 
Provisional Decisions 
(1) Upon application a provisional decision may be issued regarding 
particular conditions for the grant of a licence, and the location of an 
installation, provided that the effects of the proposed installation can 
be adequately estimated and there exists a justified interest in the 
issue of a provisional decision. 
(2) The provisional decision shall become invalid if the applicant does 
not apply for a licence within two years after the decision has become 
incontestable: this period may, on application, be extended to four 
years. 
(3) The provisions of Article 6 and 21 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
Article 10 
Procedure for the Granting of a Licence 
(1) The procedure for the granting of a licence shall be initiated by a 
written application. The application must be accompanied by the 
necessary drawings, explanations and other documents required for 
examination in accordance with Article 6. If the documents submitted are 
insufficient the applicant shall, at the request of the competent 
authority, furnish supplementary documents within a reasonable period of 
time. 
(2) If the documents contain business or industrial secrets they must be 
marked accordingly and presented separately. Their contents must, to the 
extent possible without divulging the secret, be described in such detail 
that third parties can judge whether and to what extent the effects of 
the installation apply to them. 
(3) If the documents are complete, the competent authority shall give 
public notice of the project in its official gazette as well as in local 
daily papers in the area where the installation is to be established. 
The application and the pertinent documents, with the exception of the 
documents referred to in paragraph 2, first sentence, shall be open for 
inspection for two months after public notice; during this period 
objections to the project, either in writing or orally to be placed on 
record, may be lodged with the authority. At the end of this period all 
objections not based on special titles under private law shall be 
precluded. 
(4) The notice pursuant to paragraph 3, first sentence, shall 
indicate the time and place where the application for the issue of a 
licence and the pertinent documents may be inspected; 
2. state that any objections must be lodged within the period specified 
for inspection with an agency to be designated in the notice; in 
this connection reference shall be made to the legal consequences 
under paragraph 3, third sentence; 
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3. state a date for discussion and point out that duly lodged 
objections will be discussed even if the applicant or persons having 
lodged the objections are absent; 
4. point out that service of the decision on any such objections may be 
replaced by a public notice if more than 300 persons have to be 
served with such decision. 
(5) The competent licensing authority shall obtain the opinion of any 
other authority whose area of con petence is affected by the project. 
(6) After the expiry of the period specified for objection the licensing 
authority must discuss the objections to the project lodged in good time 
with the applicant and with those who have lodged the objections. 
Objections based on special title under private law shall be dealt with 
by the ordinary courts according to regular procedure. 
(7) The decision on the application for a licence shall be issued and 
the grounds stated in writing; it shall be served upon the applicant and 
the persons having lodged the objections. 
(8) If such decision has to be served upon more than 300 persons in 
addition to the applicant, such service may be replaced by public notice. 
Public notice shall be effected by publication of the mandatory part of 
the decision and of the notice of legal remedy in application mutatis 
mutandis of paragraph 3, first sentence; attention shall be drawn to any 
conditions. In this case one copy of the full decision shall be laid out 
for inspection for two weeks as from the day after notice has been 
published. The notice shall indicate the time and place where the 
decision and the grounds upon which it is based may be inspected and, 
pursuant to the sixth sentence, requested. At the end of the inspection 
period the decision shall be deemed served; this shall be indicated in 
the notice. Following public notice the decision and the grounds upon 
which it is based may, until the expiry of the period for objection, be 
requested in writing by the persons who have lodged an objection. 
(9) Paragraphs 1 to 8 shall apply mutatis mutandis to provisional 
decisions. 
(10) The Federal Government is authorized to determine the principles for 
the licensing procedure by means of an ordinance with the approval of the 
Bundesrat; such ordinance may also determine the principles for the issue 
of a licence by the facilitated procedure (Article 19) and for the issue 
of a provisional decision (Article 9) and a partial licence (Article 8). 
(11) The Federal Minister of Defence is authorized, in agreement with the 
Federal Minister of the Interior, by means of an ordinance, with the 
approval of the Bundesrat, to determine licensing procedures other than 
those provided for in paragraphs 1 to 9 above for installations serving 
national defence. 
(12) Paragraph 11 shall not apply in land Berlin. 
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Article 11 
Objection by Third Parties to Partial Licences 
or Provisional Decisions 
Once a partial licence issued or a provisional decision made has become 
incontestable no objections may be raised in the further procedure for 
the granting of a licence for the establishment and operation of the 
installation, if such objections are based on facts which were put 
forward within the period specified for objection or which could have 
been put forward on the basis of the documents laid out for inspection. 
Article 12 
Supplementary Licensing Provisions 
(1) A licence may be granted subject to conditions and restrictions if 
this is necessary to ensure fulfilment of the conditions for a licence 
referred to in Article 6. 
(2) On application, a licence may be granted for a certain period of 
time. It may be issued with the reservation of withdrawal if the 
installation subject to licensing is intended for test purposes only. 
(3) A partial licence may be issued for a certain period, or subject to 
the reservation that it may be withdrawn or made subject to restrictions 
before a decision on licensing is made. 
Article 13 
Granting of Licences and other Official Decisions 
The licences shall include other official decisions regarding the 
installation, in particular licensing under public law, permits, 
concessions, authorizations and approvals, except for the approval of 
plans, approval of operating plans under mining law, other approvals, as 
well as official decisions on the basis of water and nuclear energy 
legislation. 
Article 4 of the Energy Law of 13 December 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 
1451) as most recently amended by the Foreign Trade Act of 28 April 1961 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 481) shall remain unaffected. 
Article 14 
Exclusion of Claims for Protective Measures 
under Private Law 
The cessation of the operation of an installation with a view to 
preventing adverse effects on property originating from neighbouring 
property cannot be demanded on the basis of claims under private law 
which are not supported by specific legal titles, once a licence has been 
granted and become incontestable; in that case only measures excluding 
such adverse effects may be requested. If such measures are ruled out by 
the state of technology or on economic grounds, only compensation can be 
claimed. 
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Article 15 
Significant Modification of Installations 
subject to Licensing 
(1) Any significant modification of the location, nature, or operation 
of an installation subject to licensing shall also be subject to 
licensing. A decision on the application for a licence shall be made 
within a period of six months. The competent authority may extend the 
time limit by three months at a time if such extension is necessitated by 
the complicated nature of the examination. 
(2) The competent authority may dispense with the requirement that the 
application and relevant documents be laid out for public inspection or 
that public notice be given of the project only if no additional or other 
emissions or other dangers, disadvantages or nuiscances to the general 
public and vicinity are to be feared as a result of such modification. 
Article 16 
Notification Requirement 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 1, the operator 
shall be obliged to notify the competent authority after a period of two 
years in each case whether and if so which divergencies have been made 
from the data relating to the application for a licence including the 
pertinent documents. This shall not apply to data which are the subject 
of an emission report pursuant to Article 27, paragraph 1. 
Article 17 
Subsequent Directions 
(1) In order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arsing out of 
this Law and out of ordinances issued pursuant to this Law directions may 
be given subsequent to the issue of the licence. If, after a licence has 
been granted, it is established that the general public or the vicinity 
are not adequately protected from harmful effects on the environment or 
other dangers, considerable disadvantages or considerable nuisances, the 
competent authority shall give subsequent directions. 
(2) The authority may not give a subsequent direction if the facts known 
to it show that the said direction 
1. is economically prohibitive for the operator and installations of 
the type operated by him, or 
2. cannot be carried out according to the latest state of technology. 
If it is to be expected that the reasons, mentioned in the first 
sentence, preventing the giving of a direction will cease to apply at 
some future date, the authority may give the direction with the provision 
that it must be complied with after that date. If a subsequent direction 
under the first sentence may not be given, the competent authority shall, 
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unless a direction under the second sentence is given, cancel the licence 
wholly or partly subject to Article 21, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs 3 to 
5; Article 21, paragraphs 3 to 6, shall be applied. 
(3) If the direction requires the location, nature or operation of the 
installation to be significantly modified, and if it does not finally lay 
down in what manner this is to be done, the modification shall be subject 
to licensing in accordance with Article 15. 
(4) Paragraphs 1 to 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis to installations 
subject to notification pursuant to Article 67, paragraph 2, or, before 
the entry into force of this Law, pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 4, of 
the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung). 
Article 18 
Expiry of the Licence 
(1) The licence shall expire if 
1. the establishment or operation of the installation is not commenced 
within the time limit fixed by the authority, or 
2. an installation has not been operated for a period of more than 
three years. 
(2) The licence shall also expire in so far as the licence requirement 
has been cancelled. 
(3) The licensing authority may extend the period in accordance with 
paragraph 1 for important reasons if the purpose of the Law is not 
thereby jeopardized. 
Article 19 
Facilitated Procedure 
(1) On the basis of an ordinance pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1, 
third sentence, licences for installations of a certain type or size may 
be issued by a facilitated procedure in so far as such procedure, 
considering the nature, extent and duration of the harmful effects on the 
environment and other dangers, considerable disadvantages and 
considerable nuisances caused by such installations, is compatible with 
protection for the general public and the vicinity. 
(2) Articles 8 and 9, Article 10, paragraphs 2,3,4,6,8 and 9, 
Article 11, Article 12, paragraph 3, and Article 14 shall not apply to 
the facilitated procedure. 
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Article 20 
Prohibition, Shut-down and Removal 
(1) If the operator of an installation subject to licensing does not 
comply with a restriction or subsequent executable direction, the 
competent authority may prohibit the operation of the installation wholly 
or partly until the restriction or direction has been complied with. 
(2) The competent authority may order an installation which has been 
established, operated or significantly modified without the necessary 
licence to be shut down or removed. It shall order the removal if the 
general public or the vicinity cannot be adequately protected by other 
means. 
(3) The competent authority may prohibit the further operation by the 
operator or a person in charge of the operation of an installation 
subject to licensing if it is in possession of facts which indicate that 
such persons cannot be relied upon to observe regulations affording 
protection against the harmful effects on the environment and such 
prohibition is necessary in the interest of the general public. The 
operator may on application be granted permission to have the 
installation operated by a person who can be trusted to ensure the proper 
operation of the installation. Such permission may be subject to 
restrictions. 
Article 21 
Cancellation of the Licence 
(1) A licence duly issued under this Law may, even after such time as it 
has become incontestable, be cancelled wholly or partly with subsequent 
effect only 
1. if such cancellation is permissible under Article 12, paragraph 2, 
second sentence, or paragraph 3; 
2. if the licence is subject to a restriction and the beneficiary has 
failed to comply with that restriction or to comply with it within a 
specified time limit; 
3. if the licensing authority is entitled on the basis of subsequent 
facts not to issue the licence and if non-cancellation would 
endanger the public interest; 
4. if the licensing authority is entitled on the basis of an amended 
regulation not to issue the licence in so far as the operator has 
not yet made any use of the licence and if non-cancellation would 
endanger the public interest; 
5. in order to prevent or remove serious disadvantages to the general 
public. 
(2) Should the licensing authority become cognizant of facts which 
justify the cancellation of a licence such cancellation may only be 
effected within twelve months after the said facts have become known. 
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(3) The cancelled licence shall cease to have effect on the day the 
cancellation becomes effective, provided the licensing authority has not 
fixed a subsequent date. 
(4) Should the licence be cancelled in the cases specified in paragraph 
1, sub-paragraphs 3 to 5, the licensing authority shall compensate the 
affected party upon application for any detriment to his property 
resulting from the fact that he has placed his trust in the continued 
validity of the licence, in so far as his trust deserves to be protected. 
Such detriment to property shall not be compensated over and above the 
amount which the interest of the person concerned in the continued 
validity of the licence is worth. The detriment thus to be compensated 
shall be determined by the licensing authority. Claims to such 
compensation may only be asserted within twelve months; the time limit 
shall begin as soon as the licensing authority has drawn the attention of 
the person concerned to it. 
(5) The Laender may depart from the provision of paragraph 4, first 
sentence, when determining liability to pay compensation. ' 
(6) For disputes regarding compensation recourse may be had to the 
courts according to regular procedure. 
(7) Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not apply if a licence that has been 
contested by a third party is cancelled during preliminary proceedings or 
during proceedings before the administrative court, in so far as this 
remedies the objection or action. 
Second Section 
Installations not Subject to Licensing 
Article 22 
Obligations of the Operators 
of Installations not subject to Licensing 
(1) Installations not subject to licensing shall be established and 
operated in such a manner that 
1. harmful effects on the environment which can be avoided by applying 
the latest state of technology are prevented, 
2. harmful effects on the environment which cannot be avoided by 
applying the latest state of technology are restricted to a minimum, 
3. wastes resulting from the operation of the installations can be 
properly disposed of. 
For installations not serving commercial purposes and not used within the 
framework of commercial undertakings, the obligation contained in the 
first sentence shall only apply in so far as it aims at avoiding or 
restricting harmful effects on the environment caused by air pollution or 
noise. 
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(2) More extensive provisions of public law shall remain unaffected. 
Article 23 
Requirements with regard to Establishment, Nature and 
Operation of Installations not subiect to Licensinq 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), to prescribe by ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, that the establishment, nature and operation of 
installations not subject to licensing in so far as they fall under the 
provision of Article 22, must satisfy certain requirements for the 
protection of the general public and the vicinity against harmful effects 
on the environment, in particular that 
1. the installations must meet specific technical requirements, 
2. emissions from installations may not exceed specific limits, 
3. the operators of installations must take measurements of emissions 
and immissions in accordance with procedures to be more specifically 
defined in the ordinance, or have them taken by an agency to be 
designated in the ordinance. 
Article 7, paragraph 2, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the requirements 
set forth in sub-paragraphs 1 to 3. 
(2) In so far as the Federal Government does not exercise that 
authority, the Land governments shall be authorized to issue regulations 
within the meaning of paragraph 1 by means of an ordinance. The Land 
governments may delegate such authority to one or several highest Land 
authorities. 
Article 24 
Directions in Individual Cases 
In individual cases, the competent authority may give the directions 
necessary for the implementation of Article 22 and of the ordinances 
based on this Law. If the aim of the direction can also be achieved by a 
measure for the protection of labour, such measure shall be ordered. 
Article 25 
Prohibition 
(1) If the operator of an installation does not comply with an 
executable direction given by an authority in accordance with Article 2, 
first sentence, the competent authority may prohibit the operation of the 
installation wholly or partly until the direction has been carried out. 
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(2) If harmful effects on the environment caused by an installation 
endanger human life and health or important material assets, the 
competent authority shall prohibit the establishment or operation of the 
installation wholly or partly in so far as the general public or the 
vicinity cannot be adequately protected by other means. 
Third Section 
Establishment of Emissions and Imnissions 
Article 26 
Measurements on Special Grounds 
The competent authority may order that the operator of an installation 
subject to licensing or, in so far as Article 22 applies, of an 
installation not subject to licensing, have the nature and extent of the 
emissions from the installation as well as of the immissions within the 
area of the installation established by one of the agencies designated by 
the competent highest Land authority, if it is to be feared that the 
installation will cause harmful effects on the environment. The 
competent authority is authorized to prescribe the details regarding the 
nature and scope of measurements and regarding the submission of results. 
Article 27 
Emission Report 
(1) The operator of an installation subject to licensing located in an 
area with a heavy pollution load (Article 44) or designated in an 
ordinance issued under paragraph 4, sub-paragraph 2, shall be obliged to 
inform the competent authority within a period to be specified by the 
competent authority or as of the date fixed in the ordinance pursuant to 
paragraph 4 of the nature, volume and distribution in terms of area and 
time of air pollution which has emanated from the installation over a 
specific period, as well as of the conditions of emission (emission 
report); he shall bring the emission report up to date annually. Article 
52, paragraph 5, shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(2) The provisions of Articles 93,97 and 105, paragraph 1, as well as 
of Article 111, paragraph 5, in conjunction with Article 105, paragraph 
1, and Article 116, paragraph 1, of the Code on Taxes and Duties shall 
not apply to the knowledge and documents obtained pursuant to paragraph 1 
above. This shall not apply to the extent the tax authorities need this information for proceedings on the ground of a tax offence and the 
corresponding taxation procedure, provided these proceedings are urgently 
required in the public interest, or wrong information has been given intentionally by the person obliged to provide the information concerned 
or by the persons acting on his/her behalf. 
(3) Details contained in the emission report may not be made public if 
conclusions can be drawn therefrom with regard to industrial or business 
secrets. Before publication the operator shall be consulted as to the 
nature and scope of the material to be published. 
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(4) The Federal government is authorized to prescribe by ordinance, with 
the approval of the Bundesrat, 
1. the contents, extent, form and date of the emission report, as well 
as the procedure to be observed in the establishment of emissions. 
2. that operators of installations subject to licensing not located in 
an area with a heavy pollution load, are obliged to submit an 
emission report, provided that this is necessary on account of the 
nature or size of the installation, especially in consideration of 
emissions from the installation. 
Article 28 
Initial and Recurrent Measurements in the Case of 
Ins 
The competent authority may, in the case of installations subject to 
licensing, 
1. after they have been put into operation or after a significant 
modification within the meaning of Article 15, and thereafter, 
2. after the expiry of five years in any one case, 
give directions pursuant to Article 26, even in the absence of the 
prerequisites referred to in that Article. 
Article 29 
Continuous Measurements 
(1) The competent authority may order in the case of installations 
subject to licensing that, in lieu of individual measurements pursuant to 
Article 26 or Article 28, or in addition to such measurements, specific 
emissions or immissions be continuously established by means of recording 
measuring equipment. 
(2) The competent authority may order in the case of installations not 
subject to licensing, in so far as Article 22 is to be applied, that, in 
lieu of individual measurements pursuant to Article 26, or in addition to 
such measurements, specific emissions or immissions be continuously 
established by means of recording measuring equipment, if this is 
necessary to determine whether the installation causes harmful effects on 
the environment. 
Article 30 
Cost of Measurements 
The cost of establishing emissions and immissions shall be borne by the 
operator of the installation. The cost of establishing such facts 
pursuant to Article 26 or Article 28, paragraph 2, shall only be borne by 
the operator of the installation if it is found that 
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1. restrictions or directions pursuant to this Law or the ordinances 
based on this Law have not been complied with, or 
2. directions or restrictions pursuant to this Law or pursuant to the 
ordinances based on this Law are imperative. 
Article 31 
Information regarding Emissions and Immissions established 
The operator of the installation shall, on request, disclose to the 
competent authority the results of the measurements made in compliance 
with a direction pursuant to Article 26, Article 28 or Article 29, and 
shall keep the records of the measuring equipment pursuant to Article 29 
for five years. The competent authority may prescribe the manner in 
which the results of the measurements are to be transmitted. 
THIRD PART 
NATURE OF INSTALLATIONS, SUBSTANCES, PRODUCTS 
AND FUELS (BBRENNSTOFFE, TREIBSTOFFE) 
Article 32 
Nature of Installations 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), to prescribe by ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, that mass-produced parts of industrial premises and other 
stationary facilities, as well as the installations described in Article 
3, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 2, may only be marketed or imported 
commercially or within the framework of commercial undertakings if they 
meet specific requirements to ensure protection from harmful effects on 
the environment caused by air pollution, noise or vibration. In the 
ordinances pursuant to the first sentence, it may, in particular, be 
prescribed that 
1. emissions from installations or from mass-produced parts thereof 
must not exceed specific limits, 
2. installations or mass-produced parts thereof must meet specific 
technical requirements for the limitation of emissions. 
Emission limits according to sub-paragraph 1, second sentence, may, 
allowing for technical developments, also be laid down for a date after 
the entry into force of the ordinance. Article 7, paragraph 2, shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to the first, second and third sentences. 
(2) Where emission limits are laid down in an ordinance pursuant to 
paragraph 1, second sentence, sub-paragraph 1, it may, furthermore, 
be prescribed that installations or mass-produced parts thereof may only 
be marketed or imported commercially or within the framework of 
commercial undertakings, if they are marked with details regarding 
emission levels. 
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Article 33 
Type Certification 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), by ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, 
1. to prescribe in order to ensure protection from harmful effects on 
the environment caused by air pollution, noise or vibration, that 
mass-produced parts of industrial premises and other stationary 
facilities, as well as the installations described in Article 3, 
paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 2, may only be marketed or imported 
commercially or within the framework of commercial undertakings if 
the type of installation or of the mass-produced parts is 
certificated and if the installation or mass-produced part 
corresponds to the certificated design; 
2. to determine type certification procedure; 
3. to determine the fees and expenses to be charged for type 
certification; the fees shall only cover the personnel and materials 
expenditure involved in inspections, including in particular 
expenditure for experts, test facilities and materials, as well as 
for the development of suitable test procedures and for the exchange 
of experience; it may be determined that fees may also be charged 
for inspections never started or completed on grounds for which the 
party who arranged for them is responsible; fee rates shall be based 
on the average number of hours which an expert requires for the 
various tests of the type of installation in question; the ordinance 
may provide for exemption from costs, for creditorship and 
debtorship, the extent of the expenses to be reimbursed and the 
charging of costs, notwithstanding the provisions of the Law on 
Administrative Costs (Verwaltungskostengesetz) of 23 June 1970 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 821). 
(2) Type certification may only be made dependent on the fulfilment of 
the requirements prescribed pursuant to Article 32, paragraph 1, second 
sentence. 
Article 34 
Nature of Fuels (Brennstoffe, Treibstoffe) 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), to prescribe by ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, that fuels may only be produced, marketed or imported 
commercially or within the framework of commercial undertakings if they 
meet specific requirements to ensure protection from harmful effects on 
the environment caused by air pollution. The ordinances pursuant to the 
first sentence may, in particular, lay down that 
1. the natural constituents or additives of fuels which, where they are 
used for their intended purpose, cause air pollution or hamper 
measures to prevent air pollution, may not exceed a specific maximum 
content, 
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2. fuels must contain specific additives by which the development of 
air pollution is limited, or 
3. fuels must be subjected to a specific treatment by which the 
development of air pollution is limited. 
Requirements pursuant to the second sentence may, allowing for technical 
developments, also be laid down for a date after the entry into force of 
the ordinance. Article 7, paragraph 2, shall apply mutatis mutandis with 
regard to the requirements under the first, second and third sentences of 
this paragraph. 
(2) The Federal Government is authorized to prescribe by ordinance, with 
the approval of the Bundesrat, 
1. that, on the importation of fuels for which requirements have been 
laid down pursuant to paragraph 1, second sentence, a written 
statement by the manufacturer regarding the nature of the fuels, 
must be presented to the customs authorities, accompany the shipment 
as far as the first place of destination, and be kept available 
there until the shipment leaves the first place of destination, 
2. that the importer must keep the statement with his business records, 
and 
3. which details regarding the nature of the fuels the written 
statement must contain, 
4. that fuels brought into the area of application of this Law, with 
the exception of customs-free zones, must upon being brought into 
that area be reported by the importer to the competent authorities 
at the place of destination, and 
5. that tank voucher books containing the names of suppliers must be 
kept for the storage of fuels. 
Article 35 
Nature of Substances and Products 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), to prescribe by ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, that certain substances or products from substances which, 
on being used in accordance with their intended purpose or on being burnt 
for the purpose of elimination or of recovery of individual constituents, 
are liable to cause harmful effects on the environment by air pollution 
may only be produced, imported or marketed commercially or within the 
framework of commercial undertakings or in any other way if they satisfy 
specific requirements with regard to their composition and the processes 
for their production so as to. ensure protection from harmful effects on 
the environment by air pollution. The authorization under the first 
sentence shall not extend to installations, fuels and vehicles. 
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(2) Requirements pursuant to paragraph 1, first sentence, may, allowing 
for technical developments, also be prescribed for a date after the entry 
into force of the ordinance. Article 7, paragraph 2, shall apply mutatis 
mutandis with regard to the requirements under paragraph 1 and paragraph 
2, first sentence, of this Article. 
(3) In so far as this is compatible with the aim of protecting the 
general public from harmful effects on the environment by air pollution, 
the ordinance provided for in paragraph 1 may prescribe, instead of the 
requirements with regard to the composition and production processes, 
that the substances and products carry a notice which is clearly visible 
and easily readable to the effect that upon being used in accordance with 
their intended purpose or upon being burnt they may give rise to harmful 
effects on the environment or that harmful effects on the environment can 
be avoided if the substances or products are used in a particular manner. 
Article 36 
Exportation 
The ordinances pursuant to Articles 32 to 35 may prescribe that the 
regulations concerning production, importation and marketing shall not 
apply to installations, substances, products and fuels which are intended 
for delivery to areas outside the area of application of this Law. 
Article 37 
Coliance with Intergovernmental Agreements and 
Decisions of the European Communities 
In order to ensure the fulfilment of obligations under intergovernmental 
agreements or compliance with binding decisions of the European 
Communities, the Federal Government may determine by ordinance, with the 
approval of the Bundesrat, for the purpose mentioned in Article 1, that 
installations, substances, products and fuels may only be marketed 
commercially or within the framework of commercial undertakings if they 
meet specific requirements pursuant to Article 32 to 35. 
FOURTH PART 
NATURE AND OPERATION OF VEHICLES, CONSTRUCTION AND 
MODIFICATION OF ROADS AND RAILTRACKS 
Article 38 
Nature and Operation of Vehicles 
The nature of motor vehicles and their trailers, rolling stock, aircraft 
and watercraft must be such that, if used in accordance with their 
intended purpose, their emissions do not exceed the limits set to ensure 
protection from harmful effects on the environment. They must be 
operated in such a manner that avoidable emissions are prevented and 
unavoidable emissions limited to a minimum. The Federal Minister of 
Transport and the Federal Minister of the Interior shall, after hearing 
the parties concerned (Article 51), determine by means of an ordinance 
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and also on the basis of the authorizations referred to in Article 70, 
paragraphs 1 to 5, the requirements with regard to the nature, equipment, 
operation and testing of the vehicles referred to in the first sentence 
of this Article which are necessary to ensure protection from the harmful 
effects on the environment, in so far as such requirements fall within 
the transport regulations of the Federal Government. They shall regulate 
the nature, equipment, operation and testing of vehicles, in so far as 
this is necessary to ensure protection from harmful effects on the 
environment, by means of an ordinance, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51); emission limits may, allowing for technical 
developments, also be fixed with effect from a date after the entry into 
force of the ordinance. 
Article 39 
Compliance with Intergovernmental Agreements and Decisions 
of the European Communities 
In order to ensure the fulfilment of obligations under international 
agreements or compliance with binding decisions of the European 
Communities, the Federal Minister of Transport and the Federal Minister 
of the Interior may, for the purpose mentioned in Article 1, by means of 
an ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, determine that the 
vehicles referred to in Article 38 must satisfy specific requirements 
with regard to their nature, equipment, testing and operation. 
Article 40 
Traffic Regulations where Air Circulation is Poor 
The Land governments are authorized to determine, by means of an 
ordinance, areas in which traffic has to be restricted or banned when air 
circulation is poor, in order to prevent or keep down to a minimum any 
increase in harmful effects on the environment by air pollution; the 
ordinance may also lay down the periods when such traffic restrictions 
shall be applicable. The road transport authorities must ban in these 
areas the vehicles specified in the ordinance, either wholly or partly, 
in accordance with transport regulations, as soon as the competent 
authority has notified poor air circulation conditions within the meaning 
of the first sentence of this Article. 
Article 41 
Roads and Railtracks 
(1) During the construction or significant modification of public roads 
as well as railways and tramways steps shall be taken to ensure that, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 50, no harmful effects on the 
environment can result from traffic noise which is avoidable in the light 
of the latest state of technology. 
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply in so far as the costs of such 
protective measures are out of proportion to the protective purpose. 
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Article 42 
Carpensation for Sound-proofing Measures 
(1) If in the case of Article 41 the emission limits laid down in the 
ordinance pursuant to Article 43, paragraph 1, first sentence, sub- 
paragraph 1 are exceeded, the owner of the building affected shall be 
entitled to claim adequate compensation in money from the person or 
persons responsible for the building measures unless the impairment can 
be considered reasonable in view of the particular purpose for which such 
building is used. This shall also apply in the case of buildings 
approved by the building supervisory authority when the plans are laid 
open for inspection during the plan approval procedure or when the 
building master plans, indicating routes, are laid open for inspection. 
(2) For sound-proofing measures carried out in the buildings 
compensation shall be paid to the amount of the necessary costs defrayed, 
in so far as such costs are within the scope of the ordinance pursuant to 
Article 43, paragraph 1, first sentence, sub-paragraph 3. Regulations 
providing for more extensive compensation shall remain unaffected. 
(3) If the person or persons responsible for the building measures and 
the person or persons affected fail to reach agreement on the amount of 
compensation, the competent Land authority shall upon application of one 
of the parties concerned determine the amount of compensation in a 
written notice. In all other respects, the procedure shall be governed 
by the expropriation laws of the Länder. 
Article 43 
Federal Government Ordinance 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized, after hearing the parties 
concerned (Article 51), by means of an ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, to issue the regulations necessary for the implementation 
of Article 41 and Article 42, paragraphs 1 and 2, in particular with 
regard to 
1. specific noise limits to protect the vicinity from harmful effects 
on the environment by noise, and on the procedures for establishing 
emissions and immissions, 
2. specific technical requirements regarding the construction of roads, 
railways and tramways in order to prevent harmful effects on the 
environment by noise, and 
3. the nature and extent of the sound-proofing measures in buildings 
necessary to ensure protection of the environment from harmful 
effects by noise. 
The ordinances issued pursuant to the first sentence shall make allowance 
for the special nature of rail traffic. 
(2) Article 7, paragraph 2, shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of 
the requirements under paragraph 1. 
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FTFTFI PART 
MONITORING OF AIR POLLWPION IN FEDERAL TERRITORY 
AND CLEAN AIR PLANS 
Article 44 
Findings in Areas with Heavy Pollution Load 
(1) In order to determine the extent and development of air pollution in 
Federal territory and to obtain a basis for remedial and precautionary 
measures, the authorities competent under Land laws shall, in areas with 
a heavy pollution load as defined in paragraph 2, continuously establish 
the nature and extent of certain types of air pollution in the atmosphere 
which may cause harmful effects on the environment, and shall examine the 
conditions that are conducive to the development and spread of such air 
pollution. 
(2) Areas with a heavy pollution load shall be areas in which air 
pollution occurs or is to be expected, which, owing to 
1. its frequency and duration, 
2. its high concentration, or 
3. the danger inherent in combinations of different types of air 
pollution, 
may cause particularly harmful effects on the environment. Areas with a 
heavy pollution load shall be determined by ordinances issued by the 
Land governments. 
Article 45 
Measurement and Evaluation Procedures 
In so far as is necessary for the purpose of ensuring uniform judgement 
of the extent and development of air pollution in Federal territory the 
Federal Minister of the Interior shall issue, for the implementation of 
establishment procedures pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 1, with the 
approval of the Bundesrat, general administrative regulations concerning 
1. the objects of measurement, 
2. measurement procedures and equipment, 
3. the principles to be observed in determining the number and location 
of measurement points, and 
4. the evaluation of measurement results. 
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Article 46 
Emission Registers 
(1) The authorities competent under Land laws shall keep emission 
registers for areas with a heavy pollution load (Article 44) containing 
details as to the nature, volume and distribution in terms of area and 
time and of the emission conditions of air pollutants from specific 
installations and vehicles, in particular in so far as such pollutants 
are 
1. specified as objects of measurement pursuant to Article 45, sub- 
paragraph 1, or 
2. are the subject of emission reports (Article 27). 
In obtaining data for the emission registers, the results of the 
measurements pursuant to Articles 26,28,29 and 52 shall be taken into 
consideration. The Land governments are authorized by means of an 
ordinance to determine suitable agencies for obtaining the data required 
for an emission register, especially with regard to the output of 
individual furnaces, the fuel used, and the height of chimneys, and to 
forward them to the competent authorites; the question of remuneration 
shall also be regulated. The competent authorities shall, at regular 
intervals, check the data submitted pursuant to the first sentence and 
amend the emission registers. The Federal Minister of the Interior 
shall, with the approval of the Bundesrat, issue general administrative 
regulations regarding the principles to be observed in drawing up 
emission registers. 
Article 47 
Clean Air Plans 
The findings pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 1, and the emission 
registers shall be evaluated, taking into consideration the 
meteorological conditions. If the evaluation shows that harmful effects 
on the environment occur, or can be expected to occur, by air pollution 
within the whole or parts of areas with a heavy pollution load, the 
authority competent under Land laws shall draw up a Clean Air Plan for 
that area. The Clean Air Plan shall contain the following details: 
1. nature and extent of established and expected air pollution and of 
the harmful effects on the environment, 
2. findings as to the causes of the air pollution, and 
3. measures to reduce or prevent the air pollution. 
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SIXTH PART 
JOINT PROVISIONS 
Article 48 
Administrative Provisions 
For the implementation of this Law and of the ordinances of the Federal 
Government issued on the basis of this Law, the Federal Government shall, 
after hearing the parties concerned (Article 51), issue, with the 
approval of the Bundesrat, general administrative regulations, regarding 
in particular 
1. immission limits which, to achieve the purpose stated in Article 1, 
may not be exceeded, 
2. emission limits which, in the light of the latest state of 
technology, need not be exceeded, 
3. the procedure for the establishment of emissions and imnissions. 
Article 49 
Protection of Specific Areas 
(1) The Land governments are authorized to prescribe by ordinance that, 
in areas to be more specifically defined which require special protection 
from harmful effects on the environment as a result of air pollution or 
noise, certain 
1. moveable installations may not be operated, 
2. stationary installations may not be established, 
3. moveable or stationary installations may only be operated at 
specific times or must satisfy more exacting technical requirements, 
or 
4. the use of fuels in installations may be restricted or totally 
prohibited, 
In so far as the installations or fuels are liable to cause harmful 
effects on the environment by air pollution or noise which are 
incompatible with the special protection requirements of those areas, and 
in so far as the air pollution and noise cannot be prevented by the 
imposition of restrictions. 
(2) The Land governments are authorized to determine by ordinance areas 
in which, when air circulation is poor, a considerable increase in the 
harmful effects on the environment by air pollution is to be feared. It 
may be prescribed in the ordinance that in those areas 
1. moveable or stationary installations may only be operated at 
specific times, or 
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2. the use of fuels particularly liable to cause air pollution is 
prohibited or restricted, 
as soon as poor air circulation conditions are notified by the competent 
authority. 
(3) Authorizations under Land laws for local authorities and 
associations of local authorities to issue by-laws to protect the 
population from harmful effects on the environment caused by air 
pollution or noise shall remain unaffected. 
Article 50 
Planning 
Within the framework of regional planning and pertinent measures, land 
intended for a particular purpose shall be zoned in such a way that any 
harmful effects on exclusively or predominantly residential areas or on 
other areas requiring protection will be avoided as far as possible. 
Article 51 
Hearing of Parties Concerned 
(1) In so far as authorizations to issue ordinances and general 
administrative regulations prescribe the hearing of the parties 
concerned, a group, to be chosen in each case, of representatives of 
scientific organizations, of the parties affected, of the industry 
concerned, of the transport system concerned, and of the highest Land 
authority responsible for immission control, shall be heard. 
Article 52 
Supervision 
(1) The competent authorities shall supervise the implementation of this 
Law and of the ordinances based on this Law. 
(2) The owners and operators of installations as well as the owners and 
holders of sites on which installations are operated shall be obliged to 
allow members of the staff of the competent authority and its authorized 
agents access to the sites and, in order to prevent any acute danger to 
public safety or order, also to living accommodation, to permit them to 
make tests including the establishment of emissions and immissions, as 
well as to provide them with the information and documents required for 
their work. The basic right of privacy of the home (Article 13 of the 
Basic Law) shall to that extent be restricted. Operators of 
installations for which an immission control officer has been appointed 
at the request of the competent authority, call on the services of such 
an officer for the purpose of supervisory measures in accordance with the 
first sentence. Within the framework of their obligations pursuant to 
the first sentence, the owners and operators of installations shall 
provide the labour was well as auxiliary materials, in particular motor 
fuels and prime movers. 
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(3) Paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to owners and holders of 
installations, substances, products and fuels, in so far as these are 
subject to the provisions of the ordinance issued pursuant to Articles 32 
to 35 or 37. Owners and holders shall permit sampling by members of the 
staff of the competent authority and its authorized agents to take 
samples for spot checks as required for their work. 
(4) The cost of tests in connection with the licensing procedure shall 
be borne by the applicant. Costs arising from the taking of samples 
pursuant to paragraph 3 and their analysis shall be borne by the party 
obliged to furnish information. The costs arising from tests pursuant to 
paragraphs 2 and 3 shall only be imposed upon the parties obliged to 
furnish information if the investigations show that 
1. restrictions or directions pursuant to the provisions of this Law or 
of the ordinances based on this Law have not been complied with, or 
2. directions or restrictions pursuant to the provisions of this Law or 
of the ordinances based on this Law are imperative. 
(5) The party obliged to furnish information may refuse to answer 
questions which would expose that party or any of its dependants 
described in Section 383, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Code 
of Civil Procedure to the danger of criminal prosecution or proceedings 
under the Law on Violations of Regulations. 
(6) In so far as immissions are to be established for the implementation 
of this Law or of the ordinances based on this Law, the owners and 
holders of sites on which installations are not operated shall also grant 
members of the staff of the competent authority and its authorized agents 
access to the sites and permit them to make tests there and, with a view 
to preventing acute dangers to public safety or order, to living 
accommodation. The basic right of privacy of the home (Article 13 of the 
Basic Law) shall to that extent be restricted. In exercising the powers 
granted under the first sentence of this paragraph, due regard shall be 
paid to the legitimate interests of the owners and holders; any damage 
caused shall be compensated by the Land, or, in cases covered by Article 
59, paragraph 1, by the Federal Government. If such damage was an 
inevitable consequence of supervisory measures, and if the supervisory 
measures have led to the giving of directions by the competent authority 
against the operator of an installation, the latter shall reimburse the 
Land or the Federal Government for the compensation paid. 
(7) The provisions of Articles 93,97 and 105, paragraph 1, as well as 
of Article 111, paragraph 5, in conjunction with Article 105, paragraph 
1, and Article 116, paragraph 1, of the Code on Taxes and Duties shall 
not apply to the knowledge and documents obtained pursuant to paragraphs 
2,3 and 6 above. 
This shall not apply to the extent the tax authorities need this 
information for proceedings on the ground of a tax offence and the 
corresponding taxation procedure, provided these proceedings are urgently 
required in the public interest, or wrong information has been given 
intentionally by the person obliged to provide the information concerned 
or by the persons acting on his/her behalf. 
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Article 53 
Appointment of an Immission Control Officer 
(1) The operators of installations subject to licensing shall appoint 
one or more immission control officers in so far as this is necessary, in 
view of the nature or size of the installations, on account of the 
1. emissions fran the installations, 
2. technical problems of emission control, or 
3. products which, upon being used in accordance with their intended 
purpose, are likely to cause harmful effects on the environment by 
air pollution, noise or vibration. 
The Federal Minister of the Interior, after hearing the parties concerned 
(Article 51), shall determine by means of an ordinance, with the approval 
of the Bundesrat, the installations subject to licensing whose operators 
must appoint immission control officers. 
(2) The competent authority may instruct the operators of installations 
subject to licensing for which the appointment of an immission control 
officer has not been prescribed by means of an ordinance, as well as the 
operators of installations not subject to licensing, to appoint one or 
more immission control officers in so far as this proves necessary on 
account of the criteria mentioned in the first sentence of paragraph 1. 
Article 54 
Responsibilities 
(1) The immission control officer shall be authorized and under 
obligation 
1. to influence the development and introduction 
(a) of processes compatible with the environment, including 
processes for the proper utilization of residual substances 
resulting from operations; 
(b) of products compatible with the environment, including re- 
extraction and recycling processes, 
2. to co-operate in the development and introduction of processes and 
products compatible with the environment, especially by submitting 
advisory reports on processes and products as to their environmental 
compatibility, 
3. to ensure the observation of the provisions of this Law and of the 
ordinances issued on the basis of this Law as well as compliance 
with conditions and restrictions, especially by inspecting the works 
at regular intervals, measuring emissions and immissions, reporting 
deficiencies and submitting proposals for measures to remove such deficiencies, 
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4. to inform employees about the harmful effects on the environment 
caused by the installation and about the facilities and measures for 
their prevention, making allowance for the obligations arising out 
of this Law or ordinances issued on the basis of this law. 
(2) The immission control officer shall submit an annual report to the 
operator on the measures taken or intended pursuant to paragraph 1, sub- 
paragraphs 1 to 4, of this Article. 
Article 55 
Obligations of the Operator 
(1) The operator shall appoint the immission control officer in writing; 
if more than one immission control officer is appointed, the duties and 
responsibilities of each one shall be specified in detail. The operator 
shall notify the competent authority of the appointment. 
(2) The operator may only appoint as immission control officer a person 
who possesses the necessary technical knowledge and is reliable. If 
facts become known to the competent authority which show that the 
immission control officer does not possess the necessary technical 
knowledge or is not reliable it may require the operator to appoint 
another immission control officer. The Federal Minister of the Interior 
is authorized, after hearing the parties concerned (Article . 51), by means 
of an ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, to prescribe the 
standards of technical knowledge and reliability for immission control 
officers. 
(3) If more than one immission control officer is appointed the operator 
shall ensure the necessary co-ordination of their duties, in particular 
by setting up an environment protection committee. The same shall apply 
where, in addition to one or more immission control officers, operational 
officers are appointed in accordance wth other statutory provisions. 
(4) The operator shall assist the immission control officer in the 
performance of his duties and in particular, as far as necessary for the 
fulfilment of his duties, provide auxiliary personnel as well as 
acccanx)dation, facilities, equipment and tools. 
Article 56 
Opinion with regard to Investment Decisions 
(1) The operator shall, before making investment decisions which may be 
of significance for immission control, obtain the views of the immission 
control officer. 
(2) Such views shall be obtained in time for them to be given adequate 
consideration in the preparation of an investment decision. They shall 
be submitted to the agency which makes the investment decision. 
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Article 57 
Right of Hearing 
The operator shall ensure that the immission control officer can make his 
proposals or objections directly known to the management if he has not 
been able to reach agreement with the competent operational head and if 
he considers that the matter calls for a decision by the management on 
account of its special importance. 
Article 58 
Non-discrimination 
The immission control officer may not be discriminated against on account 
of the duties which he has to perform. 
Article 59 
Competence with regard to Installations 
serving National Defence 
(1) The Federal Government is authorized to determine by means of an 
ordinance, with the approval of the Bundesrat, that the application of 
this Law and of the ordinances based on this Law shall, in the case of 
installations serving national defence, be the responsibility of Federal 
authorities. 
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply in Land Berlin. 
Article 60 
Exemptions for Installations serving National Defence 
(1) The Federal Minister of Defence may grant exemptions from the 
provisions of this Law and of the ordinances based on this Law in respect 
of installations within the meaning of Article 3, paragraph 5, sub- 
paragraphs 1 and 3, which serve purposes of national defence, in 
individual cases and also for certain types of installation, in so far as 
cogent reasons of defence or compliance with international obligations so 
require. The need to ensure protection from harmful effects on the 
environment shall be taken into consideration. 
(2) The Federal Armed Forces may, in respect of installations within the 
meaning of Article 3, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 2, which according to 
their type are exclusively intended for use in their sphere, deviate from 
the provisions of this Law and of the ordinances based on this Law, in so 
far as cogent reasons in fulfilment of their special responsibilities so 
require. The forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany 
pursuant to international agreements may in respect of installations 
within the meaning of Article 3, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 2, which are 
intended for use in their sphere, deviate from the provisions of this Law 
and of the ordinances based on this Law, in so far as cogent reasons in 
fulfilment of their special responsibilities so require. 
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(3) Paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, first sentence, shall not apply in Land 
Berlin. 
Article 61 
Report of the Federal Government 
The Federal Government shall submit reports to the German Bundestag, in 
each case one year after the opening of its first session, on the 
following points: 
1. The state and development of harmful effects on the environment 
caused by air pollution and noise within Federal territory during 
the period covered by the report, as well as on prospective future 
developments, 
2. measures taken and proposed in implementation of this Law, 
3. current and envisaged research projects with regard to the effects 
of air pollution and noise, 
4. the development of technical processes and facilities for reducing 
harmful effects on the environment caused by air pollution and 
noise, 
5. the funds spent on research and development pursuant to sub- 
paragraphs 3 and 4, in particular the funds made available for these 
purposes by the Federal Government and the Länder. 
Article 62 
Violations of Regulations (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) 
(1) Any person who, wilfully or negligently, 
1. establishes an installation without a licence pursuant to Article 4, 
paragraph 1, 
2. contravenes an ordinance issued pursuant to Article 7 on the 
operation of installations subject to licensing, in so far as the 
ordinance refers to this regulation concerning fines with regard to 
a specific violation, 
3. fails to comply duly, fully or in good time with an executable 
restriction pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1, 
4. significantly modifies the location, nature or operation of an 
installation subject to licensing without an authorization under 
Article 15, paragraph 1, 
5. fails to comply duly, fully or in good time with an executable 
direction pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 1, paragraph 2, second 
sentence, or paragraph 4, Article 24, first sentence, Article 26, 
Article 28 or Article 29, 
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6. operates an installation contrary to an executable prohibition 
pursuant to Article 25, or 
7. contravenes an ordinance issued under Articles 23,32,33, paragraph 
1, sub-paragraph 1, Articles 34,35,37, Article 38, fourth 
sentence, or Article 39, or an executable direction issued under 
such ordinance, in so far as the ordinance refers to this regulation 
concerning fines with regard to a specific violation or 
8. establishes a stationary installation contrary to an ordinance 
issued under Article 49, paragraph 1,2, or contrary to an 
executable direction issued under such ordinance in so far as the 
ordinance refers to this regulation concerning fines with regard to 
a specific violation, 
shall be deemed to have committed a violation of regulations. 
(2) Any person who, wilfully or negligently 
1. fails to make a correct, full or timely report pursuant to Article 
16, first sentence, 
2. contrary to Article 27, paragraph 1, fails to submit an emission 
report duly, fully or in good time, 
3. contrary to Article 31, fails to notify the finding or to keep the 
records produced by the measuring equipment, 
4. contrary to Article 52, paragraph 2, first sentence, also in 
conjunction with paragraph 3, first sentence, or paragraph 6, first 
sentence, fails to grant access to premises or to permit tests to be 
carried out, 
5. contrary to Article 52, paragraph 2, first, third or fourth 
sentence, also in conjunction with paragraph 3, first sentence, or 
paragraph 3, second sentence, 
(a) fails to provide full and correct information in good time or 
fails to submit records and documents duly, fully or in good 
time, 
(b) fails to bring in the immission control officer for supervisory 
measures upon demand, 
(c) fails to provide labour or auxiliary materials, 
(d) fails to allow samples to be taken, 
6. fails to make a report pursuant to Article 67, paragraph 2, first 
sentence, duly, fully or in good tine, 
7. contrary to Article 67, paragraph 2, second sentence, fails to 
submit records and documents, duly, fully or in good time, 
shall likewise be deemed to have committed a violation of regulations. 
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Article 63** 
Article 64** 
** Repealed by Article 12 of the eighteenth Amendment to the Penal Code 
- Law combat Environmental Crime - of 28 March 1980, Federal Law 
Gazette* I, p. 373. 
Article 64 
Criminal offences 
Article 65*** 
Violation of Obligation to Maintain Secrecy 
*** Repealed pursuant to, & 1, No 14 of the Law to amend the Introductury 
Law to the Penal Code of 15 August 1974 (Federal Law Gazette* I, p. 
1942) as of 1 January 1975. 
(2) If the offender has committed the act for consideration or with the 
intention of enriching either himself or a third person or of causing 
damage to a third person, the penalty shall be imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding two years. Similarly, anyone availing himself without 
authority of another person's secret, in particular, an industrial or 
business secret which has come to his knowledge under the circumstances 
described in paragraph 1, shall also be liable to punishment. 
(3) The offence shall not become the subject of criminal prosecution 
except at the request of the injured party. 
SEVENTH PART 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 66 
Continued Application of Regulations 
(1) Until the entry into force of the ordinance on installations subject 
to licensing pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1, third sentence, the 
licensing requirement shall be covered by the provisions of the ordinance 
on installations subject to licensing pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Industrial Code (Gwerbeordnung) as contained in the public notice of 7 
July 1971 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 888). 
(2) The following regulations shall apply until the entry into force of 
appropriate general administrative provisions issued pursuant to this 
Law: 
* BGBl 
246 
- Technical Instructions for Ensuring Clean Air, dated 8 September 
1964 (Gomeinsames Ministerialblatt, 14 September 1964, page 433), 
- Technical Instructions for Protection against Noise, dated 16 July 
1968 (Supplement to Bundesanzeiger No. 137,26 July 1968), 
- General Administrative Regulations for Protection against Building 
Noise - Noise Immission - dated 19 August 1970 (Supplement to 
Bundesanzeiger No. 160,1 September 1970), 
- do. - Emission Measuring Methods - dated 22 December 1970 
(Bundesanzeiger No. 242,30 December 1970), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Cement Mixing Facilities and 
Mobile Cement Mixers - dated 6 December 1971 (Bundesanzeiger No. 
231,11 December 1971) corrected on 14 December 1971 (Bundesanzeiger 
No. 235,17 December 1971), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Wheel Bearings, dated 16 August 
1972, (Bundesanzeiger No. 156,22 August 1972), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Compressors, dated 24 October 
1972 (Bundesanzeiger No. 205,28 October 1972), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Cement Pumps, dated 28 March 1973 
(Bundesanzeiger No. 64,31 March 1973), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Bulldozers, dated 4 May 1973, 
(Bundesanzeiger No. 87,10 May 1973), 
- do. - Standard Emmission Levels for Tracked Loaders, dated 14 May 
1973 (Bundesanzeiger No. 94,19 May 1973), 
- do. - Standard Emission Levels for Excavators, dated 17 December 
1973 (Bundesanzeiger No. 239,21 December 1973). 
(3) In so far as 
- the First Ordinance issued by the Government of Land Baden- 
Württemberg on the implementation of the Immission Control Law of 29 
March 1966 (Gesetzblatt p. 67), 
- the Second Ordinance issued by the Government of Land Baden- 
Württemberg for the implementation of the Immission Control Law of 
16 January 1973 (Gesetzblatt p. 18), 
- the Third Ordinance issued by the Government of Land Baden- 
Württemberg for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Oil-fired Installations) of 19 July 1973 (Gesetzblatt p. 279), 
- the First Ordinance issued by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior 
for the implementation of Article 18 b of the State Penal and 
Ordinance Law (Ordinance relating to Waste-burning Installations), 
dated 2 October 1967 (Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt, p. 458), 
- the Second Ordinance issued by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior 
for the implementation of Article 18 b of the Land Penal and 
Ordinance Law (Ordinance for the Prevention of Air Pollution by 
Furnaces), dated 16 July 1969 (GVB1. p. 229), 
- the Third Ordinance issued by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior 
for the implementation of Article 18 b of the Land Penal and 
Ordinance Law (Ordinance for the Prevention of Air Pollution by 
Chemical Cleansing Installations), dated 24 August 1970 (GVB1 p. 
440), 
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- the First Ordinance issued by the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City 
of Bremen for the implementation of the Law on Protection against 
Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration (Prevention of Air Pollution by 
Furnaces), dated 19 December 1972 (GB1. p. 259), 
- the Ordinance issued by the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg for the Prevention of Air Pollution by Furnaces using Liquid 
Fuels, dated 19 June 1973 (GVB1. p. 219), 
- the Police Ordinance issued by the Hessian Minister for Agriculture 
and the Environment and the Hessian Minister of Economics and 
Technology on the Control of Emissions from Furnaces using Oil 
Burners, dated 19 March 1973 (GVB1. p. 102), 
- the Ordinance issued by the Lower Saxon Land Ministry (sic) on the 
Control of Emissions from Furnaces using Oil Burners, dated 15 
February 1972 (GVBl. p. 121), 
- the Ordinance issued by the Lower Saxon Land Ministry (sic) on the 
Control of Emissions from Chemical Cleansing Installations, dated 6 
February 1973 (GVB1. p. 32), 
- the Ordinance issued by the Lower Saxon Land Ministry (sic) on the 
Establishment and Operation of Processing Installations for 
Bituminous Road Construction Substances and Machines for Tar-coated 
Chippings, dated 9 April 1973 (GVB1. p. 113), 
- the First Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(General Control of Smoke Emissions), dated 26 February 1963 (GVNW, 
p. 118), 
- the Second Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Establishment and Operation of Waste Disposal Installations), dated 
24 June 1963 (GVNW, p. 234), 
- the Third Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Control of Emissions from Furnaces using Oil Burners), dated 25 
October 1965 (GVNW, p. 370), 
- the Fourth Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Protection against Noise from Building Machines), dated 26 October 
1965 (GVNW, p. 322), 
- the Fifth Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Control of Emissions from Chemical Cleansing Installations) dated 
25 July 1967 (GVNW, p. 137), 
- the Sixth Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Establishment and Operation of Processing), 
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- Installations for Bituminous Road Construction Substances, 
(including Machines for Tar-coated Chippings), dated 17 October 1967 
(GVNW, p. 184), 
- the Seventh Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Control of Emissions from Drying Furnaces), dated 1 October 1968 
(GV? M, p. 320), 
- the Eighth Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Control of Emissions from Furnaces using Solid Fuels), dated 6 
February 1970 (GVNW, p. 172), 
- the Ninth Ordinance issued by the Government of Land North- 
Rhine/Westphalia for the implementation of the Immission Control Law 
(Control of Emissions from Domestic Oil Burners), dated 23 September 
1971 (GVNW, p. 250), 
- the Ordinance issued by the Government of Land Rhineland-Palatinate 
on the Control of Emissions from Furnaces using Liquid Fuels, dated 
11 December 1972 (GVB1. p. 378), 
relate to objects which can be covered by an ordinance pursuant to this 
Law, these regulations shall cease to have effect upon the entry into 
force of appropriate ordinances pursuant to this Law. The Federal 
Government is authorized, by means of an ordinance, with the approval of 
the Bundesrat, to abrogate ordinances referred to in the first sentence 
in so far as they relate to objects subject to the provisions of this 
Law. 
Article 67 
Transitional Provisions 
(1) Licences granted prior to the entry into force of this Law pursuant 
to Article 16 or Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Industrial Code, shall 
remain in force as licences under this Law. 
(2) An installation subject to licensing which, at the time of the entry 
into force of the ordinance pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1, third 
sentence, has been established or significantly modified, or the 
establishment of which or significant modification had been begun, must, 
within a period of three months after the entry into force of the 
ordinance, be reported to the competent authority, unless the 
installation was subject to licensing pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 
1, or Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Industrial Code, or has been 
reported in accordance with Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Industrial 
Code. Within a period of two months after the report has been made, 
documents in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1, concerning. the 
type, location, size and methods of operation of the installation at the 
time of the entry into force of the ordinance pursuant to Article 4, 
paragraph 1, third sentence, shall be submitted to the competent 
authority. 
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(3) The obligation to report pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not apply to 
moveable installations, a licence for which may be obtained in accordance 
with the facilitated procedure (Article 19). 
(4) Procedures already initiated shall be completed in accordance with 
this Law and with the legal and administrative regulations based on this 
Law. 
(5) Up to 4 September 1978 No 4 of the Technical Instructions on Air 
Pollution Control of 28 August 1974 (Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt p. 426, 
525) shall apply to 
1. the granting of a licence for the establishment and operation of an 
installation (Articles 6 and 8) and of any significant modification 
of the location, nature, or operation of an installation (Article 
15), 
2. the issue of a provisional decision (Article 9), 
3. subsequent directions (Article 17) and 
4. measurements ordered on special grounds to determine type and extent 
of the emissions from an installation as well as of the immissions 
within the area affected by the installation (Article 26). 
This shall not affect Article 6. First sentence, Nos 1 and 2 above shall 
also apply if the installation will only be put into operation after 4 
September 1978. 
Article 68 
Amendment of Trade Regulations 
(1) The Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) shall be amended as follows: 
1. Articles 16 to 28, with the exception of Article 24 to 24 d shall be 
abrogated; 
2. Article 33 a, paragraph 2 (3), shall be amended to read as follows: 
"3. if it is to be feared that the proposed industrial or business 
activity will have harmful effects on the environment within 
the meaning of the Federal Immission Control Law or cause any 
other considerable nuisance to the Community. "; 
3. Article 33 i, paragraph 2 (3) shall be amended to read as follows: 
"3. if it is to be feared that the industrial or business activity 
will constitute a danger to juveniles or excessively provoke 
the playing urge, that it will have harmful effects on the 
environment within the meaning of the Federal Immission Control 
Law or cause any other unreasonable nuisance to the general 
public, the vicinity, or any institution serving the public 
interest. "; 
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4. Article 49 shall be amended as follows: 
(a) In paragraph 1, first sentence, the words "of the types 
designated in Articles 16 and 24" shall be replaced by the 
words "of the type designated in Article 24"; 
(b) paragraph 4 shall be deleted; paragraph 5 shall become 
paragraph 4; 
5. In Article 51, paragraph 1, the following third sentence shall be 
added: 
"The first and second sentences shall not apply to installations 
subject to the provisions of the Federal Immission Control Law. " 
6. In Article 145 a, paragraph 1, the words ".... in the cases of 
Articles 16,24 and 25" shall be replaced by the words "the ....... in the case of Article 24". 
7. Article 147, paragraph 1 (2) and paragraph 3, shall be deleted. 
8. Article 155, paragraph 4, shall be deleted. 
(2) Article 10, paragraph 2 (1), of the ordinance on electrical 
installations in areas where there is a danger of explosion, dated 15 
August 1963 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 697), most recently amended by the 
second amending ordinance of 29 January 1968 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 
109), shall be amended to read as follows: 
"1. ... the provisions of the Federal Immission Control Law of 15 March 1974 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 721)". 
(3) Article 18 of the ordinance on pressure gas, dated 20 June 1968 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 730), as amended by the first ordinance amending 
the ordinance on pressure gas, dated 31 August 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 
p. 1658), shall be amended to read as follows: 
1. The title shall read as follows: 
"filling devices in connection with an installation subject to 
licensing pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Immission 
Control Law"; 
2. The first sentence shall read as follows: 
"The licence required under Article 4 of the Federal Immission 
Control Law shall be deemed permission within the meaning of Article 
17 of this ordinance in respect of filling devices which on 
operational grounds are constructed or operated in conjunction with 
an installation subject to licensing pursuant to the provisions of 
the Federal Immission Control Law of 15 March 1974 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 721)"; 
3. In No 2 of the second sentence, the words "Article 18 of the 
Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the words "Article 6 of the 
Federal Immission Control Law". 
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(4) The ordinance on acetylene of 5 September 1969 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 
p. 1593) shall be amended to read as follows: 
1. In Article 1, paragraph 2 (2) b, the words "Article 16 of the 
Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the words "the provisions of 
the Federal Immission Control Law of 15. March 1974 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 721) concerning installations subject to 
licensing"; 
2. Article 10 shall be amended to read as follows: 
(a) The title shall be worded as follows; 
"Acetylene equipment in conjunction with an installation 
subject to licensing pursuant to the provisions of the Federal 
Irrmission Control Law"; 
(b) The first sentence shall read as follows: 
"The licence required under Article 4 or Article 15 of the 
Federal Immission Control Law shall be deemed permission within 
the meaning of Articles 7 and 9 of this ordinance in respect of 
acetylene equipment which on operational grounds is constructed 
or operated in conjunction with an installation subject to 
licensing pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Immission 
Control Law of 15 March 1974 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 721)"; 
(c) in No 2 of the second sentence, the words "Article 18 of the 
Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the words "Article 6 of 
the Federal Immission Control Law". 
(5) The ordinance on combustible liquids as amended by the notification 
of 5 June 1970 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, pp. 689,1449) shall be amended to 
read as follows: 
1. In Article 1, paragraph 2, the words "Article 16 of the Industrial 
Code" shall be replaced by the words "the provisions of the Federal 
Immission Control Law of 15 March 1974 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 
721)"; 
2. Article 12 shall be amended as follows: 
(a) In the title the words 
"Article 16 of the Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the 
words "Article 4 of the Federal Irrmission Control Law"; 
(b) The first sentence shall read as follows; 
'The licence required under Article 4 of the Federal Immission 
Control Law shall be deemed permission within the meaning of 
this ordinance in respect of installations which on operational 
grounds are constructed or operated (Article 1, paragraph 2) in 
conjunction with an installation subject to licensing pursuant 
to the provisions of the Federal Imnission Control Law"; 
3. In Article 12, paragraph 2, the words "Article 18 of the Industrial 
Code" shall be replaced by the words "Article 6 of the Federal 
Immission Control Law". 
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Artir1 A9 
Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, the Catering Ac 
the Chimney Sweep Act, and the Waste Disposal Act 
(1) The Atonic Energy Act shall be amended as follows: 
1. Article 7 shall be amended as follows: 
(a) In paragraph 3, third sentence, the words "Articles 17 to 19 
and 49 of the Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the words 
"Articles 8,10, paragraphs 1 to 4 and paragraphs 6 to 8, and 
Article 18 of the Federal Immission Control Law of 15 March 
1974 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 721)". 
(b) In paragraph 5 the words "Article 26 of the Industrial Code" 
shall be replaced by the words "Article 14 of the Federal 
Inrnission Control Law". 
2. Article 8 shall be amended as follows: 
(a) The title shall read as follows: 
"Relationship with the Federal Immission Control Law and the 
Industrial Code"; 
(b) Paragraph 1 shall read as follows: 
"(1) The provisions of the Federal Immission Control Law which 
relate to installations subject to licensing as well as the 
prohibition of the further use of such installations shall not 
apply to installations requiring a licence within the meaning 
of Article 7 in so far as they relate to protection against the 
dangers of nuclear energy or the harmful effects of ionising 
rays. " 
(c) The following paragraph la shall be inserted: 
"(la) Should an installation subject to licensing in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Federal Immission Control Law 
be subject to a licence pursuant to Article 7 of this Act, such 
licence shall include the licence pursuant to Article 4 of the 
Federal Immission Control Law. The atomic energy licensing 
authority shall make such decision in agreement with the Land 
authority competent for immission control pursuant to the 
provisions of the Federal Immission Control Law and the 
ordinances issued on the basis of that Law. " 
3. In Article 13, paragraph 5, second sentence, the words "Article 7, 
paragraph 4, of this Act in conjunction with Article 26 of the 
Industrial Code" shall be replaced by the words "Article 7, 
paragraph 5, of this Act in conjunction with Article 14 of the 
Federal Immission Control Law". 
(2) The Catering Act of 5 May 1970 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, pp. 465,1298) 
shall be amended as follows: 
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1. Article 4, paragraph 1 (3), shall read as follows: 
"3. the industrial establishment, in view of its location or the 
manner in which its premises are used, is, contrary to the public 
interest, likely especially to have harmful effects on the 
environment within the meaning of the Federal Immission Control Law 
or to cause other considerable disadvantages, dangers or nuisances 
to the general public". 
2. Article 5, paragraph 1 (3), shall read as follows: 
"3. against harmful effects on the environment within the meaning 
of the Federal Immission Control Law and otherwise against 
considerable disadvantages, dangers or nuisances to the people 
living on the premises or neighbouring land as well as the general 
public. " 
(3) The Chimney Sweep Act of 15 September 1969 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, pp. 
1634,2432) shall be amended as follows: 
Article 13, paragraph 1 (10), shall read as follows: 
"10. Inspection of chimneys, fireplaces and connecting sections or 
similar devices as well as the establishing and forwarding of data 
required for the preparation of emission registers within the meaning of 
Article 46 of the Federal Immission Control Law, in accordance with 
public regulations in the field of protection against in-mission. " 
(4) The Waste Disposal Act of 7 June 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 873) 
shall be amended as follows: 
1. Article 7, paragraph 3, shall read as follows: 
"(3) The authority responsible for the approval of plans and for 
hearings in the case of waste disposal installations which are 
installations within the meaning of Article 4 of the Federal 
Immission Control Law shall be the authority whose licence pursuant 
to Article 4 of the Federal Immission Control Law is replaced by the 
approval of plans. 
2. In Article 8, paragraph 1, third sentence, the second half-sentence 
shall be deleted; the semicolon shall be replaced by a full stop. 
3. In Article 11, paragraph 2, the words "Article 16" shall be replaced 
by the words "Article 4 of the Federal Immission Control Law". 
Article 70 
Amendment of Transport Regulations 
(1) Article 6 of the Road Transport Act in the wording of the 
notification of 19 December 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 837) most 
recently amended by the Law Amending the Road Transport Act of 20 July 1973 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 870), shall be amended as follows: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
In paragraph 1, first sentence, the following sub-paragraphs 5a and 
5b shall be added after sub-paragraph 5: 
"5 a. the nature, equipment and testing of vehicles and on their 
performance in order to ensure protection against harmful 
effects on the environment within the meaning of the Federal 
Immission Control Law of substances emitted by vehicles; in 
this respect maximum emission levels may be laid down for a 
period after the entry into force of the ordinance, making 
allowance for technical developments; 
5 b. the ban on motor vehicles in the areas determined in 
accordance with Article 40 of the Federal Immission Control 
Law after the announcement of poor air circulation in those 
areas; ". 
In paragraph 1, first sentence, the following sub-paragraph 7 shall 
be added after sub-paragraph 6: 
"7. the measures provided for in sub-paragraphs 1 to 6, in so far 
as they are necessary in fulfilment of obligations arising from 
inter-governmental agreements or binding decisions of the 
European Communities. " 
Paragraph 1, second sentence, and paragraph 2 shall be replaced by 
the following paragraphs 2 and 3: 
"(2) Ordinances pursuant to paragraph 1, 'sub-paragraphs 5a and 5 
b, as well as sub-paragraph 7, in so far as they relate to measures 
pursuant to sub-paragraphs 5a and 5 b, and general administrative 
regulations thereto, shall be issued by the Federal Minister of 
Transport and the Federal Minister of the Interior. 
(3) In derogation of paragraphs 1 and 2, ordinances for the 
implementation of regulations on the nature, equipment and testing 
of motor vehicles and parts thereof as well as ordinances on general 
exemptions from regulations based on this Act shall not be subject 
to approval by the Bundesrat; before such ordinances and regulations 
are issued, the competent highest Land authorities shall be heard. " 
(2) The following second, third and fourth sentences shall be added to 
Article 57, paragraph 1, of the Passenger Transport Act of 21 March 1961 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 241), most recently amended by the Law amending 
the Law on Judicial Registrars, the Law on Authentication and Converting 
the Oath of Manifestation into an Affidavit, dated 27 June 1970 
(Bundesgesetzblatt It p. 911): 
"Ordinances issued pursuant to the first sentence, sub-paragraph 1, may 
also contain provisions affording protection against harmful effects on 
the environment within the meaning of the Federal Immission Control Law; 
in this respect maximum emission levels may be determined for a period 
after the entry into force of the ordinance, making allowance for 
technical developments. Provisions pursuant to the second sentence shall 
be issued by the Federal Minister of Transport and the Federal Minister 
of the Interior. The authorization pursuant to the second sentence shall 
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not apply in so far as Article 43 of the Federal Immission Control Law is 
applicable. " 
(3) Article 3 of the General Railways Act of 29 March 1951 
(Bundesgesetzblatt It pp. 225,438), most recently amended by the Law 
Introducing the Law on Violations of Regulations of 24 May 1968 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 503), shall be amended as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1 shall read as follows: 
"(1) The Federal Minister of Transport is authorized to issue for 
railways serving public rail transport, with the approval of the 
Bundesrat, ordinances on construction, operation and transport, as 
well as railway statistics, which 
(a) establish uniform requirements with regard to the construction, 
equipment and modes of operation of rail transport in terms of 
security, the latest technological developments, and 
international agreements, 
(b) establish uniform regulations for the transport of persons and 
goods in accordance with transport and commercial requirements 
and in conformity with the provisions of carmercial law, 
(c) contain the necessary provisions for the protection of railway 
installations and operations against disruptions and damage, 
(d) establish uniform regulations with regard to the nature and 
scope of railway statistics, 
(e) are designed to afford protection against harmful effects on 
the environment within the meaning of the Federal Immission 
Control Law; in this respect maximum emission levels may be 
determined for a period after the entry into force of the 
ordinance, making allowance for technical developments. 
Ordinances pursuant to sub-paragraph (e) shall be issued by the 
Federal Minister of Transport and the Federal Minister of the 
Interior. The authorization pursuant to the first sentence, sub- 
paragraph (e), shall not apply in so far as Article 43 of the 
Federal Immission Control Law is applicable. " 
2. Article 2 shall be deleted; the previous paragraph 3 shall become 
paragraph 2. 
(4) The Law on the Responsibilities of the Federation regarding Shipping 
on Inland Waterways of 15 February 1956 (Bundesgesetzblatt II, p. 317), 
most recently amended by the Second Amending Law of 14 April 1971 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 345), shall be amended as follows: 
1. Article 1, paragraph 1 (2), shall read as follows: 
"2. the avoidance of risks to the safety and facility of traffic as 
well as the prevention of dangers caused by shipping (river 
police) and harmful effects on the environment within the 
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meaning of the Federal Immission Control Law on Federal 
waterways; the action which river police may take in 
implementing regulations on the basis of an agreement to be 
concluded with the Laender, ". 
2. Article 3, paragraph 1, fourth sentence, shall be deleted. 
3. In Article 3 the following paragraph 1 (a) shall be inserted after 
paragraph 1: 
"1 (a) Regulations pursuant to paragraph 1, first sentence, sub- 
paragraphs 1 to 3, may also be issued 
1. to prevent the risks of water pollution, 
2. to prevent harmful effects on the environment within the 
meaning of the Federal Immission Control Law caused by 
shipping; in this respect maximum emission levels may be laid 
down for a period after the entry into force of the ordinance, 
making allowance for technical developments. 
Ordinances pursuant to the first sentence, sub-paragraph 2, shall be 
issued by the Federal Minister of Transport and the Federal Minister 
of the Interior. " 
4. In Article 4 the words "preventing dangers" shall be replaced by the 
words "preventing dangers and harmful effects on the environment". 
(5) The Law on the Responsibilities of the Federation with regard to 
ocean-going Vessels of 24 May 1965 (Bundesgesetzblatt II, p. 833), most 
recently amended by the Law on the Federal Border Guard of 18 August 1972 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1834), shall be amended as follows: 
1. Article 1 (2) shall read as follows: 
"2. the avoidance of risks to the safety and facility of traffic as 
well as the prevention of dangers (river police) and harmful 
effects on the environment within the meaning of the Federal 
Immission Control Law caused by ocean-going vessels on sea 
routes and inland waterways specified in Article 9, paragraph 1 
(1), as well as Federal ports along such routes and 
waterways; ". 
2. In Article 1 (4) the following phrase shall be inserted after the 
words "ocean-going vessels": 
"and to prevent harmful effects on the environment within the 
meaning of the Federal Irrmission Control Law". 
3. In Article 3 the words "maintaining the safety and facility of 
traffic" shall be replaced by the words "avoiding dangers and 
harmful effects on the environment". 
4. In Article 9 the following paragraph 1 (a) shall be inserted after 
paragraph 1: 
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"1 (a) Regulations pursuant to paragraph 1, first sentence, sub- 
paragraphs 2,4,5 and 6, may also be issued with a view to 
1. preventing the dangers of water pollution, 
2. preventing harmful effects on the environment caused by 
shipping within the meaning of the Federal Immission control 
Law; in this respect maximum emission levels may be laid down 
for a period after the entry into force of the ordinance, 
making allowance for technical developments. 
Ordinances pursuant to the first sentence, sub-paragraph 2, shall be 
issued by the Federal Minister of Transport and the Federal Minister 
of the Interior. " 
5. Article 12 shall be amended as follows: 
(a) In paragraph 1, first sentence, the words "Article 9, 
paragraphs 1 and 2", shall be replaced by the words "Article 9, 
paragraphs 1,1 (a), and 2, ". 
(b) In paragraph 2, sixth sentence, sub-paragraph 1, the words "for 
the safety and facility of traffic" shall be replaced by the 
words "and of harmful effects on the environment", and the 
words "and paragraph 1 (a)" shall be inserted after the words 
"Article 9, paragraph 1 (2) ". 
(6) Article 11, first sentence, of the Air Transport Act as contained in 
the notification of 4 November 1968 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1113), most 
recently amended by the Law to Prevent Aircraft Noise, of 30 March 1971 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 282), shall read as follows: 
'The provision of Article 14 of the Federal Immission Control Law shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to airports. " 
(7) Ordinances pursuant to the authorizations contained in paragraphs 4 
and 5 shall not be subject to approval by the Bundesrat. 
Article 71 
Transfer of References 
Where references to Articles 16 to 23 and 25 to 28 of the Industrial Code 
are contained in laws and Federal ordinances not amended by Articles 68 
to 70 of this Law, such references shall also apply to the corresponding 
provisions of this Law. 
258 
Article 72 
Abrogation of Provisions 
The following regulations shall be abrogated: 
1. the Law on Measures to Ensure Clean Air, dated 17 May 1965 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 413), as amended by the Law Introducing the 
Law on violations of Regulations, dated 24 May 1968 
(Bundesgesetzblatt It p. 503), 
2. the Law for the Prevention of Building Noise, dated 9 September 1965 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1214), as amended by the Law Introducing 
the Law on Violations of Regulations, dated 24 May 1968 
(Bundesetzblatt I, p. 503). 
Article 73 
Berlin Clause 
This Law shall also be applicable in Land Berlin in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Third Transitional Law of 4 
January 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1). Ordinances issued on the basis 
of the Industrial Code, the Air Transport Act or this Law shall apply in 
Land Berlin in accordance with Article 14 of the Third Transitional Law. 
Article 74 
Entry into Force 
The provisions of this Law authorizing the issue of ordinances and 
general administrative regulations, as well as Article 51, shall enter 
into force on the day after the promulgation of this Law. The remainder 
of the Law shall enter into force on the first day of the month following 
its promulgation. 
259 
APPENDIX 3 
THE AFCEN RULES PROGRAMME 
EdF and Framatome began joint collaboration as far back as 1978 for 
drafting the ROC (Design and Construction Rules for PWR Components). EdF 
and Novatome also undertook codification of rules governing the design 
and construction of fast breeder components in early 1980. 
The main objective of AFCEN is to produce practical and precise design 
and construction rules and to modify such rules according to the 
available experience acquired, the latest technological developments and 
the evolution in rules and regulations. Progress so far has been as 
follows: 
RCC -M (Design and Construction Rules for PWR Mechanical components) 
AFCEN published the RCC-M in an initial edition dated January 1981. The 
first modified version of this edition was ready for printing in July 
1981. The second modification of these texts was publisehd at the 
beginning of 1982. 
RCC -E (Design and Construction Rules for Electrical Equipment) 
In early 1981 AMEN finished printing of its initial edition of the RCC-E 
and is currently preparing the first addendum. 
(Design and Construction Rules for Full Assemblies) 
AFCEN has also edited the R -C and prepared the second edition. 
RCC - MR (Design and Construction Rules for Fast Reactor Mechanical 
Coaponents ) 
Drafting of the RCC-MR is complete. 
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APPENDIX 4 
FRAMAPZME'S RISK ANALYSIS 
The first risk analysis which Framatome made was to satisfy the South 
African Safety Authorities on the Licensability of the Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Plant. The first results of this study were presented in a paper 
to an ANS/ENS conference in 1981(1) and this appendix is based on that 
paper. The study was aimed at the identification of the main accident 
sequences and quantification of the consequences of these sequences in 
terms of probability and 1131 release. The pattern of the study was 
developed from that used in -he WASH 1400 report and took into account 
the differences between the Koeberg plant and the American Surry plant on 
which WASH 1400 was based. 
The paper did not present details of the probability of the initiating 
events or of particular consequences, but presented the following 
important conclusions: 
1) Among the dominant accident sequences are those induced by human 
error, such as miscalibration, leading to a total loss of two safety 
systems. 
2) It is important to follow how fault sequences develop with time, as 
in some cases it may be several months after the failure of a safety 
system occurs that the significant impact of the event occurs. 
3) The study identified components and areas where more precise 
reliability data are needed, and in this context it was suggested 
that probabilistic quantification of post accident conditions was 
important. 
REFERENCES 
1) NAMY, P. G., Koeberg Risk Analysis First Results, a paper 
presented at the ANS/ENS conference on Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment, September 21,1981, Port Chester, New York, USA. 
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APPENDIX 5 
WEST GERMAN FOURTH ORDINANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FEDERAL Th1ISSION CONTROL LAW ORDINANCE ON 
INSTALLATIONS SUBJECT TO LICENSING 
4. BImSchV 14 FEBRUARY 1975 
Pursuant to Article 4, Para. 1, Sentence 3 in conjunction with Article 
19, Para. 1 of the Federal Immissions Control Law of 15 March 1974 
(Federal Law Gazette 1, pp. 721,1193), as amended by the Law to Amend 
the Law to Introduce the Penal Code of 15 August 1974 (Federal Law 
Gazette 1, p. 1942), the Federal Government, after hearing the parties 
involved and with the consent of the Bundesrat, decrees the following: 
Article 1 
Installations Subject to Licensing 
(1) The construction and operation of installations listed in Articles 2 
and 4 is subject to licensing in accordance with Article 4, Para. 1 of 
the Federal Inmissions Control Law. 
(2) The construction and operation of installations listed in Article 2, 
Nos. 42 and 43 and Article 4, Nos. 2,12 and 31 is only subject to 
licensing insofar as the installations serve commercial purposes or are 
used within the framework of cony ercial undertakings. 
Article 2 
Formal Licensing Procedure 
Licences for the following installations shall be issued in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Articles 8 to 15 of the Federal 
Immissions Control Law: 
1. Furnaces for solid and liquid fuels with a thermal capacity 
exceeding 40 gigajoules per hour and furnaces for gaseous fuels with 
a thermal capacity of 2 terajoules and more per hour; in cases where 
there are several individual furnaces in one single installation or 
where several individual furnaces use one common stack with one or 
more flues, the sum total of the individual furnace capacities shall 
be applicable; 
Cooling towers with a cooling water throughput of 10,000 cubic 
metres or more per hour; 
2. Installations which use combustion or thermal decomposition 
(gasification) to either partially or completely dispose of solid or 
liquid substances; 
Installations which use combustion to recover individual 
constituents from solid materials; 
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Carposting plants; 
Installations for processing substances which are to be burnt or 
thermally decomposed in installations of the types listed in sub- 
paragraphs 1 or 2, composted in sub-paragraph 3 installations or 
stored; 
Installations which use rotary mills to shred scrap metal; 
3. Installations for crushing and grading rock obtained in quarries; 
Installations for grinding or bloating slate and clay; 
Installations for burning or grinding bauxite, dolomite, feldspar, 
gypsum, diatomaceous earth, magnesite, mineral pigments, shells, 
pegmatite sand, quartzite, fireclay, slag, steatite, talc, tuff 
(trass) and limestone, with the exception of installations for 
burning limestone if the exhaust gas is used in a subsequent 
production process; 
Installations for the production of cements; 
Installations for firing coarse ceramic products, particularly 
firebricks, stoneware pipes and other coarse stoneware products, 
wall and floor bricks, roof tiles, clinkers and other products from 
brickworks; 
4. Installations for the production of pig iron and unrefined 
nonferrous metals; 
5. Installations for roasting (heating in air to convert to oxides), 
smelting or sintering (heat fusion of fine-granular substances) 
mineral materials; 
6. Installations for smelting pig iron or raw steel as well as steel 
production plants, with the exception of vacuum-smelting plants for 
charges of up to 5 tonnes; 
Installations for the mechanical flame-scarfing of steel (ingots, 
plates etc. ); 
Smelting plants for nonferrous metals and including the refining 
plants, not including vacuum-smelting plants and smelting plants for 
charges of up to 50 kilograms of light metal or 200 kilograms of 
heavy metal and smelting plants for precious metals or alloys made 
entirely from precious metals; 
Installations for rolling metals; 
7. Iron, malleable iron and steel foundries; 
Foundries for nonferrous metals, with the exception of foundries for 
bell or art castings and which use metallic moulds or in which the 
metal is smelted in portable crucibles; 
263 
8. Leading, tinning and galvanizing plants where molten pools with an 
overall raw material throughput of one tonne or more per hour are 
used; 
9. Installations consisting of one or more machine-driven hammers when 
the impact energy of any one hammer exceeds 1 kilojoule; vertical 
drop machines are also classified as hampers; 
10. Installations for obtaining asbestos, as well as for working and 
processing asbestos and asbestos products; 
11. Installations for the production of metal powder and metal paste; 
12. Production factories in which steam boilers, pipes or containers are 
rivetted or worked with hampers; 
Installations for the production of hot-worked seamless or welded 
steel pipes; 
13. Installations for the production or maintenance of metal hulls for 
ships; 
Installations for the production of steel frame structures which 
must be rivetted or worked with machine-driven harmers; 
14. Test beds which are either used for testing or are equipped with 
combustion engines or gas turbines with a performance exceeding 300 
kilowatts; 
Test beds which are either used for testing or equipped with 
airscrews, reaction drive units or jet engines; 
15. Installations consisting of one or more gas turbines for driving 
engines or machines, not including gas turbines in a closed loop 
system; 
16. Installations for the production of formed parts where cement or 
other binding agents are used and in which machines with a ramming, 
shock, shaking or vibrating action and a production output of 1 
tonne or more per hour are used; 
17. Factories or production installations in which substances are 
manufactured by chemical conversion, particularly installations 
a) for the production of inorganic base chemicals such as acids, 
bases and salts, 
b) for the production of metals or non-metals using wet processes 
or with the aid of electrical energy, 
c) for the production of corundum or calcium carbide, 
d) for the production of halogens or halogen products as well as 
sulphur or sulphur products, 
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e) for the production of fertilizers containing phosphorus or 
nitrogen, 
f) for the production of pressure-dissolved acetylene (dissolved 
acetylene factories), 
g) for the production of organic base chemicals or solvents such 
as alcohols, aldehydes, ketones, acids, esters, acetates, 
ethers, 
h) for the production of synthetic materials or man-made fibres, 
i) for the production of celluloid, 
k) for the production of synthetic resins, 
1) for the production of hydrocarbons, 
m) for the production of synthetic rubber, 
n) for the regeneration of rubber and rubber-based products using 
chemicals, 
o) for the production of coaltar dyes and coaltar dye 
intermediates, 
p) for the production of soaps or detergents; 
installations for the production or fissioning of nuclear fuels or 
for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels are not included 
here; 
18. Installations for the production of soot; 
19. Installations for the production of friction linings where phenolic 
resins or other synthetic resin cements are used; 
20. Installations for melting resins; 
21. Installations for purifying or processing sulphate turpentine oil or 
tall oil; 
22. Installations for the production of wool from textile waste using 
the carbonization process; 
23. Installations for bleaching yarns and textile fabrics where alkaline 
substances and chlorine and chlorine compounds are used; 
24. Installations for the production of cellulose from wood straw and 
similar fibrous materials; 
25. Installations for the production of wood-fibre board or wood-chip 
board; 
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26. Installations for the production of condiments from animal or 
vegetable substances using acids; 
27. Installations for the distillation, refining or general further 
processing of petroleum or petroleum products; 
28. Surface installations for the extraction of oil from shale and other 
types of rock, as well as installations for distilling or further 
processing such oils; 
29. Dry distillation plants, particularly for hard coal, wood, peat or 
pitch (for example coking plants, gas works and carbonization 
plants), not including charcoal kilns; 
Installations for the production of generator gas or water gas from 
solid fuels; 
Installations for the production of town or grid gas by splitting 
hydrocarbons; 
30. Installations for the distillation or further processing of coaltar 
or coaltar products and of tar or gas water; 
31. Pitch boiling plants; 
32. Installations for melting or distillating natural asphalt; 
33. Installations for the production or melting of mixtures of bitumen 
or tar and mineral substances, including processing plants for 
bituminous roadbuilding materials and tar-coated chipping plants, 
when circumstances indicate that they will be operated on the same 
site for over 6 months; 
34. Installations for briquetting lignite or hard coal; 
35. Installations for the production of hard-burned carbon or graphite 
by firing, for example for electrodes, current collectors or 
instrument components; 
36. Installations for the production of coal igniters where naphtalene, 
anthracene or similar substances are used; 
37. Installations for soaking or coating materials or objects with hot 
bitumen, tar or tar oil, not including installations for soaking or 
coating cables with hot bitumen; 
38. Installations for the production of carbonized cork; 
39. Installations for coating, impregnating, lacquering and soaking 
glass fibres, mineral fibres. or supporting webs made of fibre 
materials, fabrics or paper with oxidized linseed oil or with 
synthetic resins or synthetic substances which contain organic 
solvents or softeners, not including installations within the 
meaning of Article 4, No. 17; 
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Installations for insulating wires where phenolic or cresylic resins 
are used; 
40. Installations for the production of glass, including glass fibres; 
41. Installations for the production of imitation leather or similar 
synthetic materials where celluloid or nitrocellulose solutions are 
used; 
42. Installations for the production, processing, recovery or disposal 
of any of the explosive substances listed in Annex 1 of the 
Explosive Substances Act of 25 August 1969 (Federal Law Gazette 1, 
p. 1358,1970 1, p. 224), detonating agents or pyrotechnical items 
within the meaning of Article 2, Para. 2 of the Explosive Substances 
Act and explosive substances used for blasting; installations for 
loading, unloading or dis-assembling ammunition or other explosive 
devices are also included; installations for the production of 
safety matches are not included; 
43. Installations for storing inflammable gasses in containers with 
an overall capacity of more than 15,000 cubic metres based on 20 
degrees Centigrade and 1,013 millibars; 
44. Installations for storing petroleum or liquid petroleum products in 
containers with an overall capacity of more than 50,000 cubic 
metres; 
45. Installations for keeping or rearing hens or fattening poultry and 
which are designed to accommodate more than 7,000 hens or 14,000 
fattening birds, with the exception of installations in which 
poultry is kept exclusively for breeding purposes; 
Installations for keeping or rearing pigs and which are designed to 
accommodate more than 700 fattening pigs or 280 sows, with the 
exception of installations in which the pens are littered down 
(solid dung method) and which are designed to accommodate less than 
900 fattening pigs or 360 sows; 
46. Installations for the slaughtering of animals, with the exception of 
installations for the slaughtering of animals which are run by 
small-scale businesses; 
Installations in which meat or fish products are smoked, with the 
exception of installations which are run by restaurant businesses or 
by small-scale businesses in general or which are not likely to be 
operated on the same site for longer than six months; 
47. Carcass disposal plants and establishments where animal carcasses, 
parts of animals and products of animal origin are delivered and 
stored (depots) for subsequent disposal in carcass disposal plants; 
Installations for storing, treating and utilizing bones, animal 
hair, feathers, horns, hooves, blood or other animal wastes; 
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48. Installations for the production of fish meal or fish oil; 
Installations for the preparation and for the containerless storage 
of fish meal; 
Drying and boiling plants for shrimps and prawns which are to be 
used as animal fodder; 
49. Installations for cleaning or desliming animal guts or stomachs; 
Installations for preparing or processing calf stomachs in order to 
obtain rennet; 
50. Installations for drying, salting, storing or unhairing rawhide and 
pelts; 
51. Installations for tanning hides and pelts; 
52. Installations for the production of gelatine, hide glue, leather 
glue and bone glue; 
53. Installations for melting animal fats, with the exception of 
installations run by small-scale butcheries for processing self- 
gained animal fats into edible fats; 
54. Flax and hemp retting installations, with the exception of dew 
retting and meadow retting; 
55. Hop kilns in which sulphur is used; 
56. Installations for drying green-crop, with the exception of farm- 
owned, small-scale installations for drying green-crop; 
57. Sugar factories; 
58. Installations for explosive forming or for plating with explosives 
when 10 or more kilograms of explosives per detonation are used. 
Article 3 
Test Installations 
(1) If the installations listed in Article 2 are test installations, the 
licence shall be issued using a facilitated procedure as provided for in 
Article 19 of the Federal Immissions Control Law but limited to a maximum 
operating period of one year. 
(2) Test installations are installations which are exclusively or mainly 
used for the development and. testing of new processes and products and 
which are not operated for longer than one year. 
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(3) Upon request, the competent authority may extend the licence 
provided for under Para. 1 for up to one further year if there are 
legitimate grounds for doing so. A further extension using the procedure 
laid down in Article 19 of the Federal Immissions Control Law can not be 
granted, even if the location, structure or mode of operation of the 
installation has been altered. 
Article 4 
Facilitated Licensing Procedure 
Licences for the following installations shall be issued using the 
facilitated procedure laid down in Article 19 of the Federal Immissions 
Control Law: 
1. Furnaces using solid or liquid fuels and with a thermal capacity of 
4 to 40 gigajoules per hour; in cases where there are several 
individual furnaces in one single installation or where several 
individual furnaces use one common stack with one or more flues, the 
sum total of the individual furnace capacities shall be applicable; 
2. Installations where acids are used for treating metal surfaces; 
3. Stationary installations in which steel structures or sheet metal 
parts are surface treated with sand, steel-sand or similar granular 
material; 
4. Leading, tinning or galvanizing plants where molten pools with a 
total raw material throughput of less than one tonne per hour are 
used; 
5. Installations for the production of bolts, nails, rivets, nuts, 
screws, bearing balls, pins or similar standardized metal parts, 
using automatic pressure forming machines; 
Installations for the production of crown caps; 
6. Installations for the production of cold-worked seamless or welded 
steel pipes; 
7. Installations for crushing and grading gravel; 
8. Stationary installations for the production of concrete or mortar; 
9. Stationary installations for the production of formed parts where 
cement or other binding agents are used and in which machines with a 
ramming, shock, shaking or vibrating action and a production output 
of under one tonne per hour are used, 
10. Installations for the production of sand-lime bricks or gas aerated 
concrete blocks under steam pressure; 
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11. Installations for grinding fine ceramic raw materials and for firing 
fine ceramic products, particularly porcelain, sanitary ware, 
kitchenware, wall and floor tiles, sintered ceramics, ornamental 
ceramics and abrasives; 
12. Installations for acid polishing glass and glassware where 
hydrofluoric acid is used; 
13. Installations for the production of synthetic abrasive discs, 
wheels, papers or fabrics where organic bonding agents or organic 
solvents are used; 
14. Installations for vulcanizing natural or synthetic rubber where 
sulphur or sulphur compounds are used; 
15. Installations for the production of lacquers without the use of heat 
or the production of printing inks; 
Installations for the production of building preservatives, 
adhesives or cleansing agents when the production does not involve 
chemical conversion processes; 
16. Installations for lacquering objects with lacquers containing 
organic solvents, including all drying plants on the premises, if 
the total hourly lacquer consumption is 50 kilograms or more; 
17. Installations for the production of moulding materials (for example 
resinous mats or moulding compounds), mouldings or finished products 
where unsaturated polyester resins with styrene as an additive or 
epoxy resins with amines as hardening agents are used; 
18. Installations for the production of objects where phenolic, cresylic 
or furfural resins and heat treatment are used; 
19. Installations in which potatoes or vegetables are fried, boiled or 
steamed, with the exception of installations run by restaurant 
businesses or other small-scale businesses and installations which 
are not likely to be operated on the same site for longer than six 
months; 
20. Installations in which meat or fish is fried, boiled or steamed with 
the exception of installations run by restaurant businesses or other 
small-scale businesses and installations which are not likely to be 
operated on the same site for longer than six months; 
21. Installations for roasting coffee, coffee substitutes, cocoa, 
cereals; 
Installations for frying onions, with the exception of installations 
which are run by restaurant businesses and installations which are 
not likely to be operated on the same site for longer than six 
months; 
270 
22. Installations for the production of confectionery where chocolate, 
liquorice or marzipan is used, with the exception of installations 
which are run by restaurant businesses or other small-scale 
businesses and installations which are not likely to be operated on 
the same site for longer than six months; 
23. Installations for the production of yeast or starch flours; 
24. Molasses distilleries, breweries, drying plants for brewers' grain; 
25. Installations for drying cereals or tobacco where blowers are used, 
with the exception of farm-owned, small-scale installations for 
drying cereals or tobacco; 
26. Installations for dyeing polyester fabrics or polyester mixture 
fabrics where dye accelerators are used, including the stenter- 
drying plants; 
27. Installations which consist of one or more machine-driven weaving 
looms; 
28. Installations for automatically cleansing, filling or packing 
beverage bottles; 
29. Automatic car-washing plants; 
30. Voltage transforming stations with a primary voltage of 220 
kilovolts or more; 
31. Installations for storing combustible gasses in containers with an 
overall capacity of 1,500 to 15,000 cubic metres based on 20 degrees 
Centigrade and 1,013 millibars; 
32. Stationary installations where goods which give off dust (for 
example ores, bauxite, coal) are loaded and unloaded by being tipped 
into or out of wagons or containers or by using excavators, shovel 
loaders, grabs and other similar equipment found on open loading and 
unloading sites; 
33. Installations for the production or melting of mixtures of bitumen 
or tar and mineral substances, including processing plants for 
bituminous roadbuilding materials and tar-coated chipping plants, 
when circumstances indicate that they will not be operated on the 
same site for longer than six months; 
34. Installations for storing petroleum or liquid petroleum products in 
containers with an overall capacity of 10,000 to 50,000 cubic 
metres; 
35. Factories for the production of pharmaceutical products where 
a) plants, plant parts or plant substances are extracted, 
distilled or similarly treated; 
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b) animal carcasses, including live animals, as well as animal 
parts, animal body substances and metabolic products of animals 
are used; 
c) micro-organisms, as well as their substances or metabolic 
products are used; 
36. Large-scale installations for the production of sauerkraut 
(sauerkraut factories); 
37. Stationary installations in which solid weed or pest control agents 
or substances with which they are manufactured are ground, mixed 
packed or transferred from one container to another, with the 
exception of installations run by small-scale businesses; 
38. Quarries in which explosives are used; 
39. Motor sport or motor sport training installations; 
40. Shooting galleries and ranges which do not serve national defence 
interests. 
Article 5 
Parts of Installations Subject to Formal Licensing 
If any of the installations listed in Article 4 are part of an 
installation listed in Article 2, the licence for such installations 
shall be issued in accordance with Articles 8 to 15 of the Federal 
Imnissions Control Law. 
Article 6 
Berlin Clause 
This ordinance shall also be applicable in Land Berlin in accordance with 
Article 14 of the Third Transitional Law of 4 January 1952 (Federal Law 
Gazette 1, p. 1) in conjunction with Article 73, Sentence 2 of the 
Federal Ininissions Control Law. 
Article 7 
Anu1n nt 
The Ordinance on Installations Subject to Licensing as provided for in 
Article 16 of the Industrial Code as amended up to 7 July 1971 is 
anulled. 
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Article 8 
Entry into Force 
This ordinance shall enter into force on the first day of the calendar 
month following its promulgation. 
Bonn, 14 February 1975 
The Federal Chancellor 
Schmidt 
The Federal Minister of the Interior 
Werner Maihofer 
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APPENDIX 6 
WEST GERMAN TWELFTH ORDINANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
GERMAN FEDERAL IMMISSION CONTROL LAW 
(HAZARDOUS INCIDENT ORDINANCE) 
12 BImSchV 27 JUNE 1980 
Pursuant to Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Immission Control Law of 
15th March 1974 (Federal Law Gazette* I, pp. 721,1193), the Federal 
Government, after hearing the parties concerned and pursuant to Article 
120 e para. 1 of the Industrial Code of the Federal Minister for Labour 
and Social Affairs, with regard to Article 15 pursuant to Article 10 
para. 10 of the Federal Immission Control Law of the Federal Government 
and with regard to Article 14 pursuant to Article 4 para. 1 sentence 3 
and Article 19 para. 1 of the Federal Immission Control Law of the 
Federal Government, after hearing the parties concerned, with the consent 
of the Bundesrat, decrees the following: 
Part One 
General Provisions 
Article 1 
Scope of Applications 
This ordinance shall apply to those installations subject to licensing in 
accordance with the Federal Immission Control Law which are listed in 
Annex I of this Ordinance and in which substances listed in Annex II of 
this Ordinance may be present during normal operation or may be formed in 
the event of a disturbance of normal operation. It shall not apply to 
installations in which the amounts of these substances which may be 
present or formed are so small that a public hazard resulting from a 
disturbance of normal operation can obviously be excluded. 
Article 2 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this Ordinance the term 
(1) "hazardous incident" means a disturbance of normal operation during 
which a substance listed in Annex II of this Ordinance is released, 
formed, ignites or explodes, giving rise to a public hazard, 
* Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. ) 
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(2) "public hazard" means a risk to 
1. the life of, or the risk of a serious health damage to, any 
person other than a member of the operating personnel in the 
affected part of the installation, 
2. to the health of a large number of people or 
3. to material goods of a high value which are located outside of 
the installation if a change in their state, condition or 
usefulness would be detrimental to the public interest. 
(3) "State-of-the-art of safety technology" means the state-of-the-art 
of development of advanced processes, equipment and modes of 
operation which indicates the practical suitability of a measure to 
prevent hazardous incidents or to limit their effects. The 
assessment of the state-of-the-art of safety technology shall in 
particular be based on comparable processes, equipment or modes of 
operation that have been successfully proved in practice. 
Part TWO 
Prevention and Control of Hazardous Incidents 
Article 3 
Safety Obligations 
(1) The operator of an installation shall take the measures required in 
view of the type and extent of possible hazards in order to prevent 
hazardous incidents. This shall not affect any obligations ensuing 
from provisions other than those pursuant to the Immission Control 
Law. 
(2) In fulfilling the obligations ensuing from para. 1 above the 
following sources of hazard or danger shall be taken into 
consideration, unless they may be reasonably expected not to cause 
any hazardous incident: 
1. internal danger sources 
2. external danger sources, such as earthquakes and 
floods and 
3. actions of unauthorized persons. 
(3) In addition to para. 1 above, precautions shall be taken to limit 
the effects of hazardous incidents as much as possible. 
(4) Technical precautions to fulfil the obligations of paras. 1 and 3 
shall comply with the state-of-the-art of safety technology. 
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Article 4 
Requirements for the Prevention of Hazardous Incidents 
To fulfil the obligations ensuing from Article 3 para. 1, the operator of 
an installation shall in particular 
1. ensure that the installation will also withstand the stresses and 
strains to be expected in the event of a disturbance of normal 
operation; 
2. ensure that fires and explosions 
a) are prevented inside the installation and 
b) cannot adversely affect its safety from the outside; 
3. equip the installation with sufficient warning, alarm and 
safety/security systems; 
4. equip the installation with as many sufficiently reliable different 
types of independently operating measuring and control or regulating 
devices as are necessary from a technical safety standpoint; 
5. protect the parts of the installation that are important from a 
technical safety standpoint from actions of unauthorized persons. 
Article 5 
Requirements Aimed at Limiting the Effects of Hazardous Incidents 
(1) To fulfil the obligations ensuing from Article 3 para. 3, the 
operator of an installation shall, in particular 
1. ensure that the design of the foundations and loadbearing parts 
of the buildings cannot cause additional hazards in the event 
of an incident; 
2. equip the installation with the necessary safety equipment and 
take the necessary technical and organizational precautions; 
3. establish emergency and hazard control plans in line with local 
disaster control and hazard control planning. 
(2) The operator shall commission a person or staff unit with the task 
of limiting the effects of hazardous incidents and shall forward the 
relevant names to the responsible authority. 
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Article 6 
Supplementary Requirements 
(1) To fulfil the obligations ensuing from Article 3, para. 1 or 3, the 
operator of an installation shall, apart from complying with the 
requirements of Articles 4 and 5, 
1. continuously monitor and regularly maintain the installation 
from a technical safety standpoint; 
2. carry out the maintenance and repair work according to the 
generally accepted rules of technology; 
3. take the precautions necessary from a technical safety 
standpoint to avoid operator errors; 
4. provide suitable operating and safety instructions as well as 
training for personnel in order to obviate htm an error; 
5. acquaint the employees concerned with the procedures applicable 
in the event of a hazardous incident as laid down in the 
installation's emergency and hazard control plans. 
(2) The operator shall keep or commission the keeping of written records 
on whether the maintenance and repair work of importance from a 
technical standpoint and the functional testing of the warning, 
alarm and safety devices have been carried out in accordance with 
the requirements laid down in para. 1, nos. 1 and 2. These records 
shall be stored for at least five years for inspection by the 
responsible authority. 
Article 7 
Safety Analysis 
(1) The operator shall prepare a safety analysis which contains the 
following information: 
1. a description of the installation and a description of the 
process used together with flow diagrams showing its main 
characteristics during normal operation; 
2. a description of the parts of the installation which are of 
significance from a technical safety standpoint, the potential 
danger spots and the conditions that could lead to a hazardous 
incident, 
3. the chemical name, the state and the quantity 
a) of any substance listed in Annex II of this Ordinance 
which may be present in the installation during normal 
operation, 
b) of any substance listed in Annex II of this Ordinance 
which may be formed during normal operation, and 
c) of any substance which may be formed during a disturbance 
of normal operation and lead to the formation of a 
substance listed in Annex II of this Ordinance; 
4. a statement on how the requirements laid down in Articles 3 to 
6 are being fulfilled and 
5. information on the potential effects of a hazardous incident. 
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Article 4, para. 2, nos. 1 and 2 of the Ninth Ordinance for the 
implementation of the Federal Immission Control Law (Principles of the 
Licensing Procedure) of 18 February 1977 (Federal Law Gazette 1, p. 274) 
applies accordingly with respect to the information required in para. 1, 
no. 1. 
(2) Reference may be made in the safety analysis to the documents 
required under Article 10, para. 1 of the Federal Immission Control 
Law, or to a notification in accordance with Article 12, para. 1, to 
the extent they contain the information required under para. 1 
above. 
Article 8 
updating of the Safety Analysis 
The operator shall keep the safety analysis in line with the state-of- 
the-art of safety technology and significant new findings of importance 
for the assessment of the risks involved. 
Article 9 
Availability of the Safety Analysis 
The operator of an installation shall always keep the safety analysis 
available and upon request submit it to the responsible authority; should 
the information given in the safety analysis not be sufficient for 
assessing compliance with the safety obligations acc. to Article 3, the 
operator shall upon request of the responsible authority supplement the 
safety analysis within a reasonable period of time. 
Article 10 
Exemptions 
The responsible authority may exempt the operator of an installation from 
the obligations ensuing from Articles 3 to 9 in individual cases, 
especially if, owing to favourable siting or owing to the small amounts 
of substances listed in Annex II of this Ordinance or through measures 
taken on neighbouring premises, a public hazard is not to be feared. 
Article 11 
Compulsory Reporting of Incidents 
(1) The operator shall inform the responsible authority without delay if 
1. a hazardous incident occurs or 
2. a disturbance of normal operation occurs and the possibility of 
a hazardous incident resulting cannot be ruled out with 
certainty. 
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(2) The operator shall provide the responsible authority with a written 
confirmation of the information required under para. 1 without delay 
or within one week at the latest. 
(3) In the written confirmation, the operator shall 
1. in cases falling under para. 1 no. 1 
a) describe the incident, its causes and its effects in such 
a way that they can be adequately assessed from ä 
technical safety standpoint 
b) state the measures taken to prevent the hazardous 
incident, to limit its effects as well as to avoid 
repetitions 
2. in cases falling under para. 1 no. 2 
a) describe all circumstances of relevance for ensuring an 
adequate technical safety assessment and 
b) state the measures taken to prevent a hazardous incident. 
(4) A notification under para. 1 shall be reported to the Works Council 
without delay. A copy of the written confirmation provided for in 
para. 2 shall be given to the Works Council on request. 
Part Three 
General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 12 
Transitional Provisions 
(1) The operator of an installation which was licensed before this 
Ordinance came into force shall notify the responsible authority 
within eight months of the ordinance entering into force of 
1. the type and location of the installation and 
2. the chemical name, state and quantity of any substance listed 
in Annex II of this Ordinance which may be present in the 
installation during normal operation or formed during a disturbance of normal operation. 
Reference may be made in the notification to documents required 
under Article 10, para. 1 of the Federal Immission Control Law, a 
notification in accordance with Article 16 of the Federal Immission 
Control Law or an emission declaration in accordance with Article 4 
of the Ordinance on Emission Declarations of 20 December 1978 (Fed. 
Law Gazette I, p. 2027), to the extent they contain the information 
required under para. 1 nos. 1 and 2 above. 
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(2) The operator of an installation which was licensed before this 
Ordinance came into force shall keep the safety analysis required 
under Article 7 available without delay, or within two years after 
the entry into force of this Ordinance at the latest. The 
responsible authority may extend this deadline in justified cases by 
up to one further year. 
Article 13 
Administrative offences 
(1) An administrative offence within the meaning of Article 62, para. 1, 
no. 2 of the Federal Immission Control Law shall be deemed to have 
been conTnitted by anyone who wilfully or negligently 
1. contravenes Article 6, para. 2 by failing to prepare or have 
prepared the documents described therein or to keep them 
available for at least five years, 
2. contravenes Article 7,8 or 9 by failing to prepare, update on 
request, keep available, submit or supplement the safety 
analysis, 
3. contravenes Article 11, para. 1 by not reporting a hazardous 
incident or a disturbance defined therein immediately or 
contravenes Article 11, para. 2 or 3 by not providing the 
written confirmation of the information required in Article 11, 
para. 1 correctly, in full or on time, or 
4. does not provide the notification required in Article 12, para. 
1, sentence 1 correctly, in full or on time. 
Article 14 
Amendment to the Fourth Ordinance for the Implementation of the Federal 
Irrmission Control Law. 
The Ordinance on Installations Subject to Licensing of 14 February 1975 
(Fed. Law Gazette, pp. 499,727) shall be amended as follows: 
In Article 4, no. 37 the word "feste" (solid) after the words "in denen" 
(in which) shall be deleted. 
Article 15 
Amendment to the Ninth Ordinance for the Implementation of the Federal 
Immission Control Law (Principles of the Licensing Procedure). 
The Ninth Ordinance for the Implementation of the Federal Immission 
Control Law (Principles of the Licensing Procedure) of 18 February 1977 
(Fed. Law Gazette I, p. 274) shall be amended as follows: 
1. In Article 4 the following paragraph 2a shall be added after para. 
2: 
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"2a In plants to which the Hazardous Incident Ordinance of 27 June 
1980 (Fed. Law Gazette I, p. 772) is applicable, a safety analysis 
meeting the requirements of Article 7 of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance shall also be included in the application. " 
2. Article 25 shall be amended as follows: 
a) the present text shall become paragraph 1 
b) the following paragraph (2) shall be added: 
"(2) Procedures started prior to the entry into force of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance of 27 June 1980 (Fed. Law 
Gazette I, p. 772) shall be completed in accordance with 
the requirements of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance. 
Compliance with Article 4 para. 2a may be waived; in this 
case, the safety analysis shall be submitted subsequently 
within a period of six months. " 
Article 16 
Berlin Clause 
This ordinance shall also be applicable in Land Berlin in accordance with 
Article 14 of the Third Transitional Law in conjunction with Art. 73 of 
the Federal Irrmission Control Law and Article 156 of the Industrial Code. 
Article 17 
Entry into Force 
This Ordinance shall enter into force on the first day of the second 
calendar month following its promulgation. 
Bonn, 27 June 1980 
The Federal Chancellor 
Schmidt 
The Federal Minister of the Interior 
Baum 
The Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
Ehrenberg 
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»IIEX 1* 
- Plants subject to approval - 
1. Installations for either completely or partially disposing of solid 
or liquid substances by way of combustion or thermal decomposition; 
installations for the chemical treatment of concentrates containing 
cyanides and for the chemical treatment of nitrites, nitrates or 
acids in so far as the aim is to facilitate dumping as wastes; 
2. Installations for manufacturing asbestos fibres; 
3. The following installations in which materials are manufactured by 
chemical conversion: 
a) Installations for manufacturing metals or non-metals by wet 
processes or with the aid of electrical energy, 
b) Installations for manufacturing halogens or halogen products 
and installations for manufacturing sulphur or sulphur 
products, 
c) Installations for manufacturing fertilizers containing 
phosphorus or nitrogen, 
d) Installations for manufacturing acetylene, 
e) Installations for manufacturing plastics or synthetic fibres, 
f) Installations for manufacturing synthetic resins, 
g) Installations for manufacturing synthetic rubber, 
h) Installations for manufacturing coaltar dyes or coaltar dye 
intermediates, 
i) Other installations for manufacturing inorganic or organic 
chemicals. 
4. Installations for the distillation or refining or other further 
processing of crude oil or crude oil products; 
5. Installations for the dry distillation of hard coal or lignite; 
installations for the production of combustible gases from hard coal 
or lignite; 
* This Annex shall also apply to the installations listed if they are 
a part of or adjoined to installations subject to licensing which 
are not listed. 
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6. Installations for manufacturing, working, processing, recovering or 
destroying explosive substances listed in Annex I of the Explosives 
Act of 13 September 1976 (Fed. Law Gazette I, p. 2737), last amended 
by the Ordinance of 27 June 1979 (Fed. Law Gazette I, p. 938); 
7. Installations for the storage of inflammable gases in tanks with a 
total capacity of more than 500 tons; 
8. Installations for the storage of mineral oil or liquid mineral oil 
products in tanks with a total capacity of more than 50,000 tons; 
9. Stationary installations in which herbicides, pesticides or 
substances used for their manufacture are ground, mixed, packed or 
refilled with the exception of installations which are operated as 
small-scale businesses. 
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ANNEX 2 
List of chemicals that would require the plant in which 
they are kept, used or generated to be licensed and a safety 
analysis prepared and presented to the licensing authorities 
Lfd Nr Chemische Stoffbezeichnung 
Triviainamen, handelsübliche Bezeichnung 
1 Acrylaldehyd 
= Acrolein 
2 Acrylnitril 
3 3-Aminopropylen 
= Allylamin 
4 A1uminitunphosphid 
5 4-Amino-diphenyl 
6 (5-Amino-3-phenyl-1H-1,2,4-triazolyl)- 
bis (dimethylamino)-phosphinoxid 
= Septin 
= Triamiphos 
7 Antimonwasserstoff (Stibin) 
8 Arsen (III)-oxid, Arsen (III)-säure 
oder ihre Salze 
9 Arsen (V)-oxid, Arsen (V)-säure 
oder ihre Salze 
10 Arsenwasserstoff (Arsin) 
11 Asbest 
12 Aziridin 
= Ethylenimin 
13 Benzidin oder seine Salze 
14 Beryllium oder seine Verbingungen, 
Partikelgrösser kleiner als 5 Mikroneter 
15 Beryllium oder seine Verbindungen, 
Partikelgrösse grösser als 5 Mikrometer 
16 Biphenyle, polybroanierte 
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17 Biphenyle, polychlorierte, mit Ausnahme von 
mono 
= oder dichlorierten Biphenylen 
18 Bis (2-chlorethyl)-sulfid 
19 Bis (chlormethyl)-ether 
20 0,0-Bis (p-chlorphenyl)-N-acetimidoyl- 
thiophosphorsäureamid 
= Phosazetim 
21 Bleialkylverbindungen 
22 Brom 
23 Bromcyan 
24 Cadmiumstearat (in Form atembarer Stäube) 
25 Calciuwhramat (in Form atembarer Stäube) 
26 Calciumphosphid (ausser als Verunreinigung) 
27 Chlor 
28 4-Chlorbenzolazo-thioharnstoff 
oder 3,4-Dichlorbenzolazo-thiohamstoff 
= Promurit 
29 Chlorcyan 
30 0-(2-Chlor-l-(2,4-dichlorphenyl)-vinyl)- 
0,0-diethyl-phosphat 
= Chlorfenvinphos 
31 2-Chlor-4-dimethylamino-6 methyl-pyrimidin 
= Crimidin 
32 N-Chlorformyl morpholin 
33 Chlormethyl-methylether 
34 2-Chiorvinyldichlorarsin 
35 Cyano-methylquecksilber-guanidin 
36 Cyanphosphorsäuredimethylamid 
37 Cyanwasserstoff 
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38 Alkalicyanide 
39 Erdalkalicyanide 
40 1,2-Dibromthan 
41 Dichlorethylarsin 
42 Dichlorphenylarsin 
43 0,0 Diethyl-S-(4-chlorphenylthio)-methyl- 
dithiophosphat 
= Carbophenothion 
44 0,0-Diethyl-S-(2-chlor-1-(phthalimido)- 
ethyl-dithiophosphat 
= Dialiphor (Dialifor) 
45 0,0-Diethyl-S-(N-(1-cyan-l-methyl)- 
ethylcarbamoyl-methyl)-thiophosphat 
= Cyanthoate 
= Tartan 
46 0,0-Diethyl-S-(2-diethylaminoethyl)-thio- 
phosphat 
= Amiton 
47 0,0-Diethyl-S-(2-ethylsulfinylethyl) dithio- 
phosphat 
= Disyston-S 
= Oxydisulfoton 
48 0,0-Diethyl-S-(ethylsulfiny1-methyl)-thio- 
phosphat 
49 0,0-Diethyl-S-(ethylsulf inyl-methyl)-thio- 
phosphat 
50 0, O-Diethyl-S-(2-ethylthioethyl)-dithio- 
phosphat 
= Disulfoton 
= Disyston 
= Thiodemeton 
51 O, O-Diethyl-O-(2-ethylthioethyl)-thio- 
phosphat (I) 
und 
0,0-Diethyl-S-(2-ethylthioethyl)-thio- 
phosphat (II) 
= Demeton 
= Systox 
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52 0,0-Diethyl-S-(ethylthiornethyl)-dithio- 
phosphat 
= Phorate 
= Thimet 
53 O, O-Diethyl-S-( ethylthiomethyl)-thio- 
phosphat 
54 0,0-Diethyl-S-(isopropylthiomethyl)-dithio- 
phosphat 
55 0,0-Diethyl-0-(3-methyl-5-pyrazolyl)- 
phosphat 
= Pyrazoxon 
56 0,0-Diethyl-0-(4-methylsulfinylphenyl)- 
thiophosphat 
= Fensulfothion 
= Terracur P 
57 0,0-Diethyl-0-(p-nitrophenyl)-phosphat 
= Paraoxon 
58 0,0-Diethyl-0-(p-nitrophenyl)-thiophosphat 
= Parathion (E 605) 
59 0,0-Diethyl-S-((4 oxo-3H-1,2,3-benzo- 
triazin-3-yl)-methyl)-dithiophosphat 
= Azinphos-ethyl 
60 0,0-Diethyl-S-(propylthiomethyl)-dithio- 
phosphat 
61 O, O-Diethyl-O-(pyrazin-2-yl)-thiophosphat 
= Nemafos 
= Thionazin 
= Zinophos 
62 2,3-Dihydro-2,2-dimethyl-7-benzofuranyl- 
N-methyl-carbamat 
= Carbofuran 
63 Dimethylaminocyanphosphorsäure-ethylester 
64 N, N-Dimethylcarbamoylchlorid 
65 0,0-Dimethyl-0-(2-(N, N-diethylcarbamoyl)- 
2-chlor-l-methylvinyl)-phosphat 
= Dimecron 
= Phosphamidon 
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66 0-(((2,4-Dimethyl-1,3-dithiolan-2-yl)- 
methylen)-amino)-N-methyl-carbamat 
= Tirpate 
67 0,0-Dimethyl-0-(2-methoxycarbonyl- 
1-methyl-vinyl)-phosphat 
= Mevinphos 
= Phosdrin 
68 0,0-Dimethyl-0-(p-nitrophenyl)-thio- 
phosphat 
= Methylparation 
69 N, N Dimethylnitrosamin 
70 0,0-Dimethyl-S-((4-oxo-3H-1,2,3-benzo- 
triazin-3-yl)-inethyl)-dithiophosphat 
= Azinphos-methyl 
71 3-(2-(3,5 Dimethyl-2-oxocyclohexyl)- 
2-hydroxy-ethyl)-glutarimid 
= Actidion 
= Cycloheximid 
72 2-Diphenylacetyl-1,3-indandion 
= Diphacinone (Diphacin) 
73 2,6 Dithia-1,3,5,7-tetraza- 
adamantan-2,2,6,6-tetroxid 
= Tetramethylendisulfotetramin 
74 O-Ethyl-0-(p-nitrophenyl)- 
benzol-thiophosphonsäureester 
= EPN (EPN 300) 
75 4-Fluorbuttersäure 
76 4-Fluorbuttersäuresalze 
77 4-Fluorbuttersäureester 
78 4-Fluorbuttersäureamide 
79 4-Fluorcrotonsäure 
80 4-Fluorcrotonsäuresalze 
81 4-Fluorcrotonsäureester 
82 4-Fluorcrotonsäureamide 
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83 Fluoressigsäure 
84 Fluoressigsäuresalze 
85 Fluoressigsaureester 
86 Fluoressigsäureamide 
87 2-Fluorethyl-4-(1,1-biphenyl)-acetat 
= Fluenethyl (Fluenetil) 
88 4-Fluorhydroxybuttersäure 
89 4-Fluorhydroxybuttersäuresalze 
90 4-Fluorhydroxybuttersäureester 
91 4-Fluorhydroxybuttersäureamide 
92 Fluorwasserstoff (Konzentration grösser 95 
Gew -$) 
93 G1ykolsäurenitril 
94 1,2,3,7,8,9-Hexachlordibenzo-p-dioxin 
(HCDD) 
95 1,2,3,4,10,10-Hexachlor-6,7-epoxy- 
1,4,4a, 5,6,7,8,8a-octahydro-1,4-endo- 
5,8-endo-din thano-naphthalin 
= Isodrin 
96 Hexamethylphosphorsäuretriamid (HMPT) 
97 2-Hydroxy-2-nethyl-propiondAurenitril 
= Acetoncyanhydrin 
98 5-Hydroxy-1,4-naphthochinon 
= Juglon 
99 4-Hydroxy-3-(3-oxo-l-phenyl-butyl)-cumarin 
= Warfarin 
100 Kobalt (in Form atembarer Stäube von Kobalt- 
metall und schwerlöslichen Kobaltsalzen) 
101 Magnesiumphosphid 
102 Methanfluorphosphonsaure-isopropylester 
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103 Methanfluorphosphonsäure- 
(1,2,2-trimethyl-propyl)-ester 
104 4,4' Methylen-bis (2-chloranilin) 
105 S, S-Methylen-bis (0,0-diethyl-dithio- 
phosphat) 
= Diethion 
= Ethion 
106 Methylisocyanat 
107 2-Methyl-2-(nnethylthio)-propionaldehyd- 
0- (methylcarbamoyl)-oxim 
= Aldicarb 
108 Methylquecksilberchlorid 
109 Methylquecksilberthioacetamid 
110 Methylvinylsulfon 
111 2-Naphthylamin 
112 Natriumselenit 
113 Nickel (in Form atembarer Stäube von Nickel- 
metall, Nickelsulfid und sulfidischen Erzen, 
Nickeloxid und Nickelcarbonat, wie sie bei der 
Herstellung und Weitereverarbeitung auftreten 
können) 
114 Nickelcarbonyle 
115 1,3,4,5,6,7,10,10-Octachlor- 
4,7-endomethylen-4,7,8,9-tetrahydrophthalan 
= Telodrin 
116 Nitrose Gase (Im Zusamenhang mit Anlagen 
nach Anhang I Nr. 1 und 3, soweit in ihnen im 
bestimmungsgerrtssen Betrieb Salpertersaure 
in einer Menge von mehr als 10,000 kg vorhan- 
den sein kann) 
117 Osmiumtetroxid 
118 Pentaboran 
119 Phosgen 
120 Phosphorwasserstoff 
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121 1,3-Propansulton 
122 1-Propen-2-chlor-l, 3-diol-diacetat 
123 Propylenimin 
124 2-(3-Pyridyl)-piperidin 
= Anabasin 
125 Sauerstoffdifluorid 
126 Schwefeldichlorid 
127 Schwefelpentafluorid 
128 Schwefelwasserstoff 
129 Selenhexafluorid 
130 Selenwasserstoff 
131 Strontiumchromat (in Form atembarer Stäube) 
132 Tellurhexafluorid 
133 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlordibenzo-p-dioxin (TODD) 
in Konzentrationen grösser 0,1 ppm 
134 Tetraethyldiphosphat 
= Tetraethylpyrophosphat (TEPP) 
135 0,0,0,0-Tetraethyldithiodiphosphat 
= Sulfotepp 
136 N, N, N, N'-Tetramethyldiamido-fluorphosphin- 
oxid 
= Dimefox 
137 Trichlormethylsulfenylchlorid 
138 Tricyclohexylstannyl-1 H-1,2,4-triazol 
139 2,4,6-Tris (1-aziridinyl)-s-triazin 
= Triethylenmelamin (TE2) 
291 
Lfd Nr Chemische Stoffbezeichnung 
Triviainamen, handelsübliche Bezeichnung 
140 brennbare Gase, das sind leicht entztindliche 
Stoffe, die im gasförmigen Zustand bei Nor- 
maldruck in Mischung mit Luft einen Z1lndbe- 
reich haben und deren Siedepunkt bei Normal- 
druck bei 200 Celsius oder bei einer geringeren 
Temperatur liegt, soweit sie im bestimmungs- 
gemässen Betrieb in einer Menge von mehr als 
1.500 Tonnen in Anlagen nach Anhang I Nr. 7 
zu dieser Verordnung gespeichert werden 
oder 
2.50 Tonnen in sonstigen Anlagen nach 
Anhang I zu dieser Verordnung vorhanden 
sein können 
141 Leicht entzundliche Flussigkeiten, das sind 
Stoffe, die einen Flammpunkt unter 
21° Celsius haben und deren Siedepunkt bei 
Normaldruck uber 200 Celsius liegt, soweit sie 
Im bestimmungsgemassen Betrieb in einer 
Menge von mehr als 
1.50,000 Tonnen in Anlagen nach Anhang I 
Nr. 8 zu dieser Verordnung gespeichert und 
gelagert werden, 
2.2,000 Tonnen in sonstigen Anlagen nach 
Anhang I zu dieser Verordnung vorhanden 
sein können, sofern die Temperatur im be- 
stimsnungsgemässen Betrieb unterhalb des 
siedepunktes liegt oder 
3.50 Tonnen in sonstigen Anlagen nach An- 
hang I zu dieser Verordnung vorhanden 
sein konnen, sofern die Temperatur im be- 
sticmnungsgemassen Betrieb oberhalb des 
Siedepunktes liegt 
142 explosionsgefährliche Stoffe, soweit diese in 
der Anlage I des Sprengstoffgesetzes aufge- 
führt und der Lagergruppe 1.1 der Zweiten Ver- 
ordnung zum Sprengstoffgesetz vam 23. No- 
vember 1977 (BGBI. I S. 2189) zugeordnet 
sind und soweit sie im bestimmungsgemässen 
Betrieb in einer Menge von mehr als 10 Tonnen 
in einer Anlage nach Anhang I zu dieser Ver- 
ordnung vorhanden sein können. 
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APPENDIX 7 
WEST GERMAN FIRST GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 
ON THE HAZARDOUS INCIDENT ORDINANCE 
(1 STORFALL VWV) 23 APRIL 1981 
pursuant to Article 48 of the Federal Immission Control Law of 15 March 
1974 (Federal Law Gazette* I. p. 721,1193) the Federal Government, after 
hearing the parties concerned, and with the consent of the Bundesrat, 
issues the following Administrative Regulation: 
1. Scope of this Administrative Regulation 
1.1 This Administrative Regulation governs the enforcement of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance of 27 June 1980 (Federal Law Gazette I, 
p. 772) 
1.2 The provisions of this Administrative Regulation shall be complied 
with by the responsible authority 
- when checking whether Article 1 applies to the installation in 
question 
- when granting an exemption pursuant to Article 10 and 
- when checking any notification pursuant to Article 12, para. 1. 
2. Ad Article 1 (Scope of Application) 
2.1 Ad Article 1, first sentence 
If an authority has to decide whether the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance applies, it must check 
- whether the installation is covered by Appendix I of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance (2.1.1) and 
- whether in this installation substances listed in Annex II of 
the Hazardous Incident Ordinance may be present during normal 
operation or may be formed in the event of a disturbance of 
normal operation (2.1.2). 
2.1.1 Appendix I 
* Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. ) 
293 
2.1.1.1 The Hazardous Incident ordinance shall apply to the 
installations which are listed in Annex I of the Ordinance 
provided they are subject to the Ordinance on Installations 
Subject to Licensing of 14 February 1975 (Federal Law Gazette 
I, p. 499,727), as amended by Article 14 of the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance, taking into account that the designations 
for the relevant installations in Appendix I of the Hazardous 
Incident ordinance do not always correspond to the designations 
given in the Ordinance on Installations Subject to Licensing. 
2.1.1.2 Special reference is made to the foot-note in Appendix I of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance. 
2.1.2 Appendix II 
2.1.2.1 If it has been established that the installation is an 
installation subject to licensing listed in Appendix I of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance (2.1.2) it shall be checked 
whether in this installation a substance listed in Appendix II 
of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 
- may be present during normal operation (possibility 1) or 
- may be formed in the event of a disturbance of normal operation 
(possibility 2). 
The Hazardous Incident Ordinance shall also be applicable if 
only one of these two possibilities applies. 
2.1.2.2. If the first possibility applies, it shall be checked whether 
the operator is entitled through the licence granted to him to 
manufacture, store or use in the installation any substance 
listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance, 
regardless of whether the substance listed in Appendix II of 
the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 
- is actually present in the installation, 
- may be present in the installation in the form of a 
starting material, an intermediate product, a by-product, 
a final product or an auxiliary material or 
- may be present in pure form, in a mechanical mixture, a 
blend or a solution. 
However, if specific threshold concentrations are given for 
these substances in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance, these concentrations also apply if the relevant 
substance is or may be present in a mechanical mixture, a blend 
or a solution. 
2.1.2.3 No. 2.1.2.2 applies correspondingly to the quantity thresholds 
given in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance for 
No. 116 and nos. 140 to 142. The criterion to be applied is 
the quantity designed for normal operation. 
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2.1.2.4 If the second possibility applies, it shall be checked whether 
in the event of a disturbance of normal operation substances 
listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance may 
be formed from substances that may be present in the plant but 
are not listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance. 
2.1.2.5 The second possibility shall also be deemed to apply if any 
substance that may be present in the plant may be converted 
into any substance listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance after a disturbance of normal operation. 
2.2 Ad Article 1, second sentence 
2.2.1 If 2.1 applies, it shall be checked whether the quantity of any 
substance listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance that may be present or formed in the installation is 
so small that a public hazard resulting from a disturbance of 
normal operation can obviously be excluded. 
2.2.2 Article 2.2.1, last part of the sentence, shall, as a rule, be 
deemed to apply if the quantity of a substance listed in 
Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance that may be 
present in the installation during normal operation or formed 
during a disturbance of normal operation is lower than the 
quantity (quantity threshold A) given in the Appendix of this 
Administrative Regulation under column A. 
If more than one of the substances listed in Appendix II of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance may be present or formed in an 
installation in quantities below the quantity threshold A, yet 
at the same time and close to each other, or in case of 
unfavourable siting conditions (of No. 3.2.1.2, second indent) 
it shall be decided on a case-by-case basis, whether a public 
hazard is excluded. 
2.2.3 The application of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance depends on 
the following criteria: 
- in the case of substance No. 2a quantity of 5000 kg in 
polymerization reactions at normal pressure and 
temperatures of less than 7700 
- in the case of substance No. 11 the quantity in the form 
of respirable fine dusts 
- in the case of substances No. 14 and 15 the quantity in 
the form of respirable dusts 
- in the case of substance No. 40 the quantity in 
concentrations of more than 40 per cent by weight 
- in the case of substance No. 116 the quantity of nitric 
acid (HN03) in a concentration of more than 60 per cent by 
weight 
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- in the case of substance No. 128 the quantity in liquefied 
form 
- in the case of substance No. 133 solely the concentration 
given for this substance in Appendix II of the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance. 
3. Ad Article 10 (Exemptions) 
3.1 Application 
3.1.1 Any exemption from the obligations ensuing from Articles 3 to 9 
requires an application filled by the operator which shall 
contain the following information: 
a) the name and residence or principal place of business of 
the applicant, 
b) the type and location of the installation, 
c) the individual obligations for which exemption is 
requested, 
d) the chemical name, state and quantity of any substance 
listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 
that may be present in the installation during normal 
operation or formed during a disturbance of normal 
operation, 
e) Statement giving the reasons for the application, with 
particular emphasis on all circumstances that may be of 
relevance for assessing whether or not a public hazard is 
to be feared. 
3.1.2 Reference may be made in the application to the contents of the 
notification pursuant to Article 12, para. 1 of the Hazardous 
Incident ordinance or to any other documents that have been 
filed with the authority in question, especially the licensing 
documents, to the extent they contain the information required 
under 3.1.1 d or e. However, the application must be 
intelligible as such. 
3.2 Exemption from obligations 
3.2.1 Prerequisites 
3.2.1.1 The authority shall only grant exemption pursuant to Article 10 
if the information under 3.1.1 shows convincingly that any 
public hazard is not to be feared, i. e. is excluded with 
sufficient probability, even if exemption from individual 
obligations ensuing from Articles 3 to 9 'of the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance is granted. 
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3.2.1.2 A public hazard can be deemed to be excluded with sufficient 
probability especially in the following cases: 
- if the quantity of any substance listed in Appendix II of 
the Hazardous Incident ordinance that may be present 
during normal operation or during a disturbance of normal 
operation is small 
- in the case of favourable siting, e. g. in the case of 
sufficient safety distances between the installation and 
housing areas or neighbouring installations, low 
population density in the endangered area around the 
installation or favourable topographical features 
- if precautions have been taken on neighbouring premises, 
e. g. the construction of protective walls or embankments. 
3.2.1.3 When deciding upon the exemption application, all circumstances 
in addition to those listed under 3.2.1.2 that may be of 
importance for preventing hazardous incidents or limiting their 
effects shall be taken into account to the best of the 
authority's judgement. Before taking a decision, the 
responsible authority shall hear the Works Council (cf. Article 
89, para. 2 of the Employees' Representation Act). 
3.2.2 Exemptions fron Articles 3 to 6 
When granting an exemption from Articles 3 to 6, the individual 
obligations for which exemption is granted shall be stated 
accurately. An exemption shall not be granted if the 
obligations ensuing from Articles 3 to 6 are already contained 
in other legal provisions. 
3.2.3 Exemptions from Articles 7 to 9 
3.2.3.1 As a rule, the responsible authority should exempt the operator 
from compliance with the obligations ensuing from Articles 7 to 
9, if the quantity of any substance which may be present in the 
installation during normal operation or formed during a 
disturbance of normal operation is lower than the quantity 
given under column B of the Appendix of this Administrative 
Regulation (quantitative threshold B). The Appendix of this 
Administrative Regulation does not indicate a quantitative 
threshold B for substances Nos. 116,128 and 140 to 142; 
therefore, the quantities of these substances must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. In the case of substances Nos. 140 to 
142, it shall be considered whether the technical facilities, 
'including auxiliary facilities, are operated close to each 
other; the question whether the technical facilities have been 
licensed through one or several notifications is insignificant 
in this context. 
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Installations subject to licensing and falling under Appendix 
I, No. 6 of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance in which any 
substance listed in Appendix II, No. 142 of the Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance may be present shall be assessed on the 
basis of the quantities that may explode in these installations 
at the same time. Quantities of these substances which are 
present in separate premises are deemed not to explode at the 
same time if the safety distances comply with the figures given 
in the relevant tables of the Second Ordinance under the 
Explosives Act. 
3.2.3.2 If there are any particular circumstances that may increase or 
reduce the risk, especially if several substances listed in 
Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance may be present 
or formed close to each other at the same time, the exemption 
application shall be decided upon independent of the 
quantitative threshold B. Especially the following factors in 
addition to those mentioned under 3.2.1.2 may be deemed as 
characteristics liable to increase or reduce the risk: 
- Properties of the substance (e. g. toxicity, 
carcinogenicity, persistence, accumulation), 
- state of the substance 
- process conditions (e. g. polymerization of acrylonitrile 
in aqueous emulsion) 
- method of processing 
- handling of the substance 
3.3 Withdrawal of exenption granted 
In the case of applications for licensing any subsequent 
modifications and in the case of notifications pursuant to Articles 
15 and 16 of the Federal Immission Control Law it shall be checked 
to what extent the prerequisites for granting an exemption are still 
being complied with, otherwise the exemption granted may be 
withdrawn (cf. Article 49 of the Law on Administrative 
Proceedings*). 
4. Ad Article 12, para 1 (Notification) 
4.1 Obligation to notify the responsible authority 
The operator of an installation licensed prior to the entry into 
force of the Hazardous Incident ordinance (1st September 1980) but 
subject to the Hazardous Incident ordinance pursuant to Article 1 of 
the Hazardous Incident Ordinance shall be obliged to notify the 
responsible authority. 
* Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 
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4.2 Form of notification and deadline 
The notification shall be deemed to be submitted in due form if it 
is submitted to the responsible authority in writing and not later 
than on 30 April 1981. 
4.3 Contents of notification 
4.3.1 The notification shall contain the following information: 
a) the name and residence or principal place of business of 
the operator of the installation 
b) the type and location of the installation 
c) the chemical name, state and quantity of any substance 
listed in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident Ordinance 
which according to the Licence may be present in the 
installation during normal operation or formed during a 
disturbance of normal operation; the quantity shall be 
given in kg. 
4.3.2 The designation(s) of any substance shall correspond to that 
(those) used in Appendix II of the Hazardous Incident 
Ordinance. 
4.3.3 The state of any substance shall be expressed by the parameters 
of state, i. e. pressure and temperature; the pressure and 
temperature ranges that are permissible during normal operation 
shall be given. 
Bonn, 23 April 1981 
The Deputy Federal Chancellor 
Genscher 
For the Federal Minister of the Interior, 
The Federal Minister of Justice 
Schmude 
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APPENDIX 8 
WEST GERMAN SECOND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HAZARDOUS INCIDENT 
ORDINANCE (2. STORFALL VWV) 
Contents 
1. 
a. 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
3. 
3.1 
3.1.1 
3.1.2 
3.1.3 
3.2 
3.2.1 
3.2.1.1 
3.2.1.1.1 
3.2.1.1.2 
3.2.1.1.3 
3.2.1.1.4 
3.2.1.2 
Scope 
Ad Article 2 (Definition of terms) 
Hazardous incident 
Normal operation 
Disturbance of normal operation 
Release 
Formation 
Ignition, explosion 
Public Hazard 
State-of-the-art of safety technology 
Ad Article 7 (Safety Analysis) 
General principles 
Coleteness of the safety analysis 
Correctness of the safety analysis 
Form of the safety analysis 
Information given i n the safety analysis 
Description of the installation and of the process used 
Description of the installation 
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3.2.1.2.1 Technical purpose of the installation 
3.2.1.2.2 Basic features of the process used 
3.2.1.2.3 Process conditions 
3.2.1.2.4 Description of the process 
3.2.1.2.5 Energy supply 
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3.2.7 Data on the effects of hazardous incidents 
3.2.8 Description of precautions taken to limit hazardous 
incidents 
4. Ad Article 8 (Updating of the Safety Analysis) 
5. Ad Article 9 (Availability of the Safety Analysis) 
5.1 Availability and submission of the safety analysis 
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5.2 Checking of the safety analysis by the responsible 
authority 
5.3 Supplementing the safety analysis 
Annex 
Pursuant to Article 48 of the Federal Immission Control Law of 15 March 
1974 (Federal Law Gazette* I, p. 721,1193) the Federal Government, after 
hearing the parties concerned, and with the consent of the Bundesrat, 
issues the following Administrative Regulation: 
1. Scope 
1.1 This Administrative Regulation governs the enforcement of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance of 27 June 1980 (Federal Law Gazette I. 
p. 772). 
1.2 The provisions of this Administrative Regulation shall be complied 
with by the responsible authority 
- when interpreting the terms defined in Article 2 
- when checking the safety analysis pursuant to Article 7 and 
- when implementing Articles 8 and 9 of the Ordinance. 
2. Ad Article 2 (Definition of terms) 
2.1 Hazardous incident 
Pursuant to Article 2, para. 1 of the Ordinance, the term "hazardous 
incident" shall be deemed applicable if each of the following 
conditions is given 
- disturbance of normal operation 
- release, formation, ignition or explosion of a substance under 
Annex II of the Ordinance and 
- causation of a public hazard 
and if there is a causal connection between these conditions. 
* Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1. ) 
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2.2 Normal operation 
The term "normal operation" shall be deemed applicable to the 
operation for which the installation is designed and suitable from a 
technical safety standpoint; the term "normal operation" shall not 
apply to operational conditions which do not comply with the 
requirements of the licence granted or any subsequent provisions. 
The term "normal operations" shall include in particular 
- normal operation 
- start-up and shut-down operations 
- test runs as well as 
- inspection, maintenance and repair operations. 
2.3 Disturbance of normal operation 
The term "disturbance of normal operation" shall apply to any 
deviation from "normal operation" as defined under 2.2 above. 
2.4 Release 
A substance shall be deemed to be "released" if it escapes from the 
container, tank, vessel, piping etc. designed to contain it. It 
shall be deemed irrelevant in this context whether the substance is 
still held back inside the installation or whether it will leave the 
premises of the installation or finally reach air, water or soil. 
2.5 Formation 
A substance shall be deemed to be "formed" if it results from any 
chemical conversion. The question whether the substance is formed 
inside a container, tank, vessel, piping etc. or outside, e. g. by 
- continuation of a reaction that had started in the container, 
tank, vessel, piping, etc. 
- thermal decomposition or reaction with atmospheric oxygen 
or 
- reaction on contact with atmospheric moisture or water 
shall be deemed irrelevant in this context. 
2.6 Ignition, explosion 
If a substance explodes it shall be deemed irrelevant whether it 
ignites with a flame or is only smouldering. 
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If a substance explodes it shall be deemed irrelevant whether the 
substance explodes in bulk (Annex II, No. 142 of the Ordinance) or 
whether it explodes in a mixture with other substances, especially 
with air; it shall also be deemed irrelevant whether the explosion 
takes place inside or outside a container, vessel, tank, piping etc. 
2.7 Public hazard 
a) The term "public hazard" within the meaning of Article 2, para. 2, 
No. 1 of the Ordinance shall be applicable if death or a prolonged 
or permanent impairment of the health of any person other than a 
member of the operating personnel in the affected part of the 
installation may occur. The term "member of the operating personnel 
in the affected part of the installation" shall only be applicable 
to persons present in the affected part of the installation or in 
its immediate surroundings to safeguard the normal operation of the 
installation. The term "part of the installation" within the 
meaning of Article 2, para. 2, No. 1 of the Ordinance shall be 
applicable to operating units which 
- may at least temporarily be run independently as part of a 
processing plant 
- serve to carry out a processing step 
- must be assessed as a separate item of in-plant hazard control. 
b) The term "public hazard" within the meaning of Article 2, para. 
2, No. 2 of the Ordinance shall be applicable if the health of 
a large number of persons is at risk. It shall be deemed 
irrelevant whether these persons are members of the operating 
personnel in the affected part of the installation or other 
persons. The question whether a "large number of persons" is 
affected depends in particular on the seriousness of the health 
injuries to be expected. 
Minor health injuries deemed to 'affect' a large number of 
people must therefore be linked with higher figures than health 
effects reaching the threshold of serious health injury. 
c) The term "public hazard" within the meaning of Article 2, para. 
2, No. 3 of the Ordinance shall be applicable if material goods 
of high value which are located outside of the installation are 
endangered, provided that a change in their state, conditions 
or usefulness would be detrimental to the public interest, for 
example, if 
- surface waters, ground water, soil, animal or plant 
populations are. contaminated 
- an area must be evacuated or closed. 
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2.8 State-of-the-art of safety technology 
The term "state-of-the-art of safety technology" is defined in 
Article 2, para. 3 of the Ordinance in conformity with Article 3, 
para. 6 of the Federal Immission Control Act (BInSchG). 
3. Ad Article 7 (Safety Analysis) 
3.1 General principles 
3.1.1 C leteness of the safety analysis 
The safety analysis to be prepared by the operator according to 
Article 7 of the Ordinance is a documentation which must be 
intelligible as such and summarize and evaluate a systematic 
assessment of all conditions which are of significance for the 
safety and security of the installation and its operation. 
This documentation shall only be deemed complete if it contains 
the information required according to Article 7, para. 1, No. 
3.2 of the Ordinance. The information shall be sufficiently 
comprehensive and detailed to allow the responsible authority 
to adequately assess the operator's compliance with the safety 
obligations pursuant to Articles 3 and 6 of the Ordinance. If 
calculations are required for this purpose, it shall become 
manifest from this documentation that they have been carried 
out. 
The safety analysis shall also provide a clear picture of the 
various steps of the assessment methods used for the systematic 
analysis of the installation with regard to the parts of the 
installation which are of significance from a technical safety 
standpoint, critical situations, the effects of hazardous 
incidents and safety precautions. Deterministic methods of 
proceýslsýand regulating technology or other methods may be 
used, e. g. Hazop (Hazard and operability stdy), tabular 
checklists, f lure modes and ffects analysis, preliminary 
risk analysis, j fault trees, (3' event analysis(4) ). 
REFF ENCES 
1) Der Störfall im chemischen Betrieb; Verhütung durch Prognose, 
Auffinden der Ursachen, Abschätzen der Auswirkungen, 
Gegenmassnahmen; (Hazardous Incidents in Chemical Industry; 
Prevention by means of Forecasts, Tracing of Causes, Impact 
Assessment, Countermeasures). Issued by: Internationale Sektion der 
I. V. S. S. Sekretariat: Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen 
Industrie., P. O. box 101480,6900 Heidelberg. 
2) DIN 25448 of June 1980 
3) DIN 25424 of June 1977 
4) DIN 25419, Part I of June 1977 
DIN 25419, Part II, of February 1979 
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3.1.2 Correctness of the safety analysis 
The safety analysis shall only be deemed to comply with the 
requirements of Article 7 of the ordinance if 
- the descriptive parts of the safety analysis correspond to 
the process, equipment, facilities and modes of operation 
used in the installation and 
- if the right conclusions are drawn from the described 
facts. This shall be deemed to apply if all 
interrelations between the various operations and 
conditions in the installation which are of significance 
from a technical safety standpoint, were correctly 
assessed - taking scientific and technological laws and 
casua]ities into account - if the calculations were carried 
out correctly and the effectiveness of the measures taken 
to prevent hazardous incidents or to limit their effects 
were evaluated along the lines of plausibility from an 
engineering standpoint. 
3.1.3 Form of the safety analysis 
The safety analysis shall be submitted in writing. 
In the case of any reference made acc. to Article 7, para. 2 of 
the Ordinance, the document referred to shall be specified 
precisely; the safety analysis shall be intelligible as such. 
3.2 Information given in the safety analysis 
3.2.1 Description of the installation and of the process used 
Pursuant to Article 7, para 1, first sentence, No. 1 of the 
Ordinance, the safety analysis shall contain a description of 
the installation and a description of the process used together 
with flow diagrams showing its main characteristics during 
normal operation. 
3,2,1.1 Description of the installation 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, second sentence of the 
Ordinance, the description of the installation shall contain 
data on the plant and equipment required for operation 
including ancillary units and equipment which must be 
constructed, installed and operated on near-by premises for 
reasons of process technology; it shall be deemed irrelevant 
whether the technical plant and equipment was licensed by one 
or several notifications. The above data, as well as the data 
pursuant to 3.2.1.1.1 to 3.2.1.1.4 need not be more detailed 
than in the documents to be submitted according to Article 4, 
para. 2, No. 1 of the 9th Ordinance for the Implementation of 
the Federal Immission Control Law (Principles of the Licensing 
Procedure) - 9. BImSchV - of 18 February 1977 (Federal Law 
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Gazette* I, p. 274), as amended on 27 June 1980 (Federal Law 
Gazette I, p. 772). 
3.2.1.1.1 Location 
The description of the installation shall contain data on the 
location of the installation and of the individual parts of the 
installation, especially 
- site survey 
- spacing of the individual parts of the installation 
- delimitation towards other installations 
- spacing with regard to other installations and buildings 
- distances from traffic routes 
- use of the areas within the danger zone around the 
installation which is permissible according to the 
development plan and actual use of the areas within the 
danger zone around the installation 
- other special site characteristics as far as the required information is accessible to the operator without 
unreasonable expenditure. 
This documentation shall, to the extent possible, consist of 
drawings. 
3.2.1.1.2 Structural characteristics and design data of the individual 
parts of the installation 
The description of the installation shall contain data on the 
structural characteristics and on the lay-out of the individual 
parts of the installation, especially 
- materials used, as far as they are of significance from a 
technical safety standpoint (for example with regard to 
corrosion resistance and strength) 
- design data (e. g. working pressure, operating 
temperatures, volumes) 
- scaffolding and design of load-bearing parts 
- foundation 
- heights of buildings 
* BGBl. = Bundesgesetzblatt 
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- size of storage and collection facilities 
- static stability (static calculations and data on 
soil mechanics) 
3.2.1.1.3 Protective zones 
Protective zones or any other special zonings, e. g. for areas 
with an explosion hazard, protective or safety spacing, etc. 
shall be indicated as far as they are already existing or 
envisaged in the installation or in its surroundings or 
required because of technical safety standards. 
3.2.1.1.4 Accessibility of the installation 
The description of the installation shall contain data on the 
accessibility of the installation, especially on 
- the escape routes within the installation 
- its connection to traffic routes and 
- the traffic routes in the vicinity which may be of 
significance for rescue and salvage operations. 
3.2.1.2 Description of the process 
The safety analysis shall contain a description of the process 
in compliance with the requirements of Article 4, para. 2, No. 
2 of the 9th BImSchV*. 
In the case of installations under Annex I. Nos. 7 and 8 of the 
Ordinance, this "process" consists in storing. 
3.2.1.2.1 Technical purpose of the installation 
The description of the process used shall indicate the 
technical purpose of the installation. 
3.2.1.2.2 Basic features of the process used 
The description of the process used shall include a description 
of the operational steps required to serve the purpose of the 
operation, especially 
- basic operations 
- chemical and physical conversions and transformations 
- on-site interim storage 
* 9th ordinance for the Implementation of the Federal Immission 
Control law 
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- discharge, retention, re-use and recycling or disposal of 
residual substances and wastes 
- discharge and/or treatment of waste gases 
- other basic features of the process, especially treatment 
and processing operations. 
3.2.1.2.3 Process conditions 
The process description shall include the data which are of 
significance from a process technology and technical safety 
standpoint, e. g. the pressure and temperature ranges of the 
successive steps of the process. 
In addition, any specific precautions shall be stated which 
must be complied with during storage, transport or handling 
because of the specific substance characteristics (e. g. 
protection from vibrations or precautions relating to the state 
of the ambient air, e. g. concerning air humidity). 
3.2.1.2.4 Description of the process 
Flow sheets containing the information mentioned in DIN 28004 
Part 1, June 1977, shall be added to the description of the 
process. 
For units of the installation or steps of the process which 
involve parts of the installation that are important from a 
technical safety standpoint, the safety analysis shall also 
include a process flow sheet containing all data mentioned in 
DIN 28004, Part It No. 5. 
For the description of individual parts of the installation 
that are of importance from a technical safety standpoint, a 
piping and instrumentation diagram with information selected on 
a case-by-case basis in accordance with DIN 28004 Part I. No. 
6, may be required. 
The flow sheets or added tables shall in particular contain 
data on: 
- the machinery and equipment needed in the process as well 
as the main flow patterns 
- energy or energy resource 
- characteristic process conditions, such as pressure and 
temperature ranges 
- dimensions of the containers and pipes that may contain 
substances under Annex II of the Ordinance 
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- characteristic parameters of state for the substances 
under Annex II of the Ordinance 
- basic measuring, control and regulating requirement. 
The starting materials and auxiliary agents used as well as 
intermediate, secondary and final products shall be given. The 
quantities used and reacting or the throughput shall be given 
for the individual steps of the process. The residual 
substances shall be indicated as far as they fall under 
Appendix II of the Ordinance or as far as substances falling 
under Appendix II of the Ordinance may be formed from them. 
3.2.1.2.5 Energy supply 
The energy supply system of the installation, including the 
emergency supply system, shall be described; the parts that may 
be of importance for preventing hazardous incidents or limiting 
their effects, shall be marked. 
3.2.2 Description of the substances 
3.2.2.1 Designation of the substances 
The safety analysis shall contain a description of the 
substances pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 
3 of the Ordinance. Substances under Nos. 1 to 139 in Annex II 
of the ordinance shall be given under the designations used 
there, other substances shall be designated by their chemical 
name and, if such a name exists, by their commercial name. 
The description of the substances shall list the substances 
under Appendix II of the Ordinance that may be present in the 
installation during normal operation. This includes the 
substances actually present in the installation, but also the 
substances which are permissible in the installation according 
to the licence, taking into account any subsequent provisions. 
The description of the substances must also include substances 
under Annex II of the Ordinance which may be formed inside or 
outside the installation in the event of a disturbance of 
normal operation. In addition it shall be indicated from which 
other substances these substances may be formed. 
3.2.2.2 Substance and reaction characteristics 
The description of the substances shall also give the substance 
and reaction characteristics which may be of importance for 
judging the measures taken to prevent hazardous incidents or to 
limit their effects. 
They include, in particular, 
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a) general substance characteristics, e. g. 
- melting tenrerature 
- boiling temperature 
- specific heat 
- vapour pressure 
- vapour density 
- density 
- particle size 
- solubility 
- state at normal temperature and normal pressure 
- heat of evaporation 
b) substance and reaction characteristics of importance from 
a technical safety standpoint, e. g. 
- explosion limit 
- flash point 
- ignition tererature 
- combustibility of solids 
- spontaneous-ignition teperature 
- thermal stability data 
c) activity data, to the extent they are known to the 
operator, or to experts, e. g. 
- toxicity (acute, subacute, chronic) 
- persistence 
- irritant effects 
- long-term effects 
- synergistic effects 
- warning symptoms (odour threshold) 
d) maximum permissible working place concentration (MAK- 
Werte) 
or technical guiding concentrations (TRK-Werte). 
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3.2.2.3 
3.2.2.4 
3.2.3 
State of the substances 
For each of the substances designated pursuant to 3.2.2.1, the 
following parameters of state shall be given for normal 
operation and for the onset of abnormal conditions: 
- pressure 
- temperature 
- concentration 
- State 
Quantities of the substances 
In the case of the substances under Annex II of the Ordinance 
which may be present in the installation during normal 
operation, the largest quantity possible from a technical 
standpoint during normal operation shall be given. In addition 
to this quantity, individual quantities must also be indicated 
if present if any part of the installation that has to be 
assessed separately from a technical safety standpoint. The 
first sentence above shall apply correspondingly to substances 
under Annex II of the Ordinance which may be formed inside or 
outside the installation during a disturbance of normal 
operation. 
Description of the parts of the installation that are of 
importance fron a technical safety standpoint 
Pursuant to Article 7, para 1, first sentence, No. 2 of the 
Ordinance, the safety analysis must contain a description of 
the parts of the installation which are of significance from a 
technical safety standpoint. 
Parts of the installation that are of importance from a 
technical safety standpoint are: 
- Parts of the installation containing specific substances 
(3.2.3.1) 
- safety equipment, installations and structures (3.2.3.2) 
and 
- other parts of the installation that are required for safe 
operation (3.2.3.3). 
The description of the parts of the installation that are of 
significance from a technical safety standpoint shall, in 
particular, indicate the 
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- function 
- type and extent of strains and stresses to be expected 
- significance from a technical safety standpoint and 
- specific design characteristics, to the extent they 
correspond to specific risks. 
3.2.3.1 Parts of the installation containing specific substances 
Parts of the installation containing specific substances are 
parts of the installation where a substance to be designated 
pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 3 of the 
Ordinance may be present or formed in significant quantities 
from a technical safety standpoint, especially 
- handling, processing and storage vessels (tanks, bunkers, 
silos) 
- reactors 
- furnaces, kilns and ovens 
- filters, separators, scrubbers 
- columns, distillation units 
- pumps, compressors, ventilators 
- heat exchangers, including condensers 
- piping. 
3.2.3.2 Safety equipment, installations and structures 
Safety equipment, installations and structures include in 
particular 
a) systems designed to limit the release of any substance 
under Annex II of the Ordinance or of substances which may 
form any substance under Annex II of the Ordinance such as 
- rapid closing interlocking devices and mechanisms, 
- collecting vessels, 
- water or vapour screens, sprinkler systems, spraying 
and scrubbing systems, 
- compressed-air barriers (to produce traps on water 
surfaces) 
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b) fire protection units and systems, such as 
- fire protection walls, 
- traps for flammable liquids, 
- stationary or mobile fire-fighting units, 
- sprinkler systems for cooling purposes; 
c) units and systems for the protection against the impact of 
explosions, e. g. 
- pressure relief systems, such as blow-down towers, 
expansion and relief systems 
- protective walls, protective embankments 
- bunkers 
3.2.3.3 Other parts of the installation that are required for safe 
operation 
- machinery and equipment for safeguarding an appropriate 
energy cycle, e. g. pumps, compressors, control valves, 
switches, emergency generators 
- machinery and equipment for safeguarding appropriate mass 
flow, e. g. pumps, valves, piping 
- parts of the installation used for the discharge, disposal 
or retention of substances under Annex II of the Ordinance 
which may be present in the installation during normal 
operation or of substances from which substances 
under Annex II of the Ordinance may be formed, e. g. 
filtering and scrubbing equipment, flare systems and 
after-burning installations, collecting vessels, chimneys, 
blow-down towers, emergency expansion and relief systems. 
3.2.4 Description of the danger sources 
Danger sources are conditions or events that may give rise to 
hazardous incidents. 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, no. 2 of the 
Ordinance the safety analysis shall describe the following 
danger sources: 
- the internal danger sources (3.2.4.1) 
- the external danger sources (3.2.4.2) 
- the actions of unauthorized persons (3.2.4.3) 
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Pursuant to Article 3, para. 2 of the Ordinance, last part of 
the sentence, it is not required to include all thinkable 
danger sources but only danger sources that cannot reasonably 
be excluded. Practical experience is of particular 
significance in this context, the following criteria being of 
particular importance: 
- the general state of technological and scientific 
knowledge 
- experience gained with similar-type installations 
- calculations, assessments or transfer of knowledge to the 
case in question. 
When considering the obligations ensuing from Article 3, para. 
1 of the Ordinance, it may, as a rule, be excluded 
- that various independent external sources, such as 
earthquake and flooding, will act on the installation at 
the same time 
- that substances which can only form a substance under 
Annex II of the Ordinance in case they react with each 
other will be released simultaneously and independently. 
The description of the danger sources shall not consider any 
measures taken to prevent hazardous incidents (3.2.6). 
The responsible authority shall assist in making the required 
detailed description possible if the operator of the 
installation is unable to acquire the knowledge needed for the 
description. 
3.2.4.1 Internal danger sources 
a) Internal danger sources include any potential failures 
and breakdowns resulting from the characteristics of 
relevant parts of the installation or from error 
functions, such as 
- mechanical failure of walls, e. g. as a consequence of 
corrosion 
- breakdown of machines, e. g. pumps, compressors, 
ventilators, agitators, 
failing energy supply, e. g. electricity, instruments, 
- failure of measuring, control or regulating devices 
for pressure, temperature, filling level, quantity, 
concentration, retention time etc., 
- disturbed supply or discharge of thermal energy, 
315 
- unintended energy supply, e. g. frictional hr--at, 
heating of revolving parts, 
- leakages 
- plugging, e. g. of blow-out or expansion lines, 
- accidents during internal transport operations. 
b) Internal danger sources also include actions endangering 
the safety of the installation, such as 
- lacking compliance with the safety provisions snider 
public law, with accident prevention requirementz or 
with operating instructions 
- operator errors 
- errors made during monitoring and maintenance 
operations, e. g. when checking the operation of parts 
of the installation that are important from a 
technical safety standpoint, or erzors made during 
the supply of the installation with types of fuel or 
energy which are of significance from a technical 
safety standpoint. 
3.2.4.2 External danger sources 
External danger sources are: 
- neighbouring installations 
- neighbouring transport facilities (road traf f ic, railway, 
water) 
- conditions or events that are due do natural site 
characteristics 
provided they imply an increased risk to the safe operaticr2 of 
the installation, pursuant to a) to c) 
a) Not only immediately adjoining installations shall be 
regarded as danger sources, but also installations at a 
greater distance if the installation under review is 
within the danger zone of any of these installations. 
Only such installations shall be deemed to fall under this 
category which may cause danger through explosion, 
vibrations or the release of acutely toxic substances. 
b) Neighbouring transport facilities (road, railway, water) 
shall be considered as sources of danger if the increased 
risk is due to the traffic conditions in the vicinity of 
the installation (e. g. traffic density, traffic routes, 
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type of transports, weather conditions). These conditions 
are, as a rule, fulfilled in the following cases: 
- fuel or gas wharfs at Federal waterways 
- shunting stations for tank wagons 
- traffic areas of large-scale fuel depots or 
corresponding filling stations 
- internal roads, including access roads where 
flammable gases or liquids are transported and loaded 
or deloaded. 
Air traffic as a source of danger can, as a rule, be 
neglected if the installation is located 
- near airports outside the approach zone (Article 12, 
para 1, No. 5 LuftVG*) or outside the approach 
sector, but less than 4 km from the beginning of the 
runway or 
- in the case of landing grounds outside a sector of 
75m on both sides of the axis of the landing strip at 
the beginning of the landing strip, and within a 
sector of 225m on both sides of the axis of the 
landing strip at a distance of 1.5km from the 
beginning of a landing strip, 
unless particular conditions are giving rise to an 
increased hazard rate (e. g. obstacles to air traffic in 
the vicinity of the airport). 
c) Conditions or events that are due to natural site 
characteristic shall include 
- flooding, flood waves or tidal waves if the 
installation is located in an area which, as 
several years of experience have shown, may be 
deemed to be endangered 
- landslides or subsidence if the installation is 
located in a mining area 
- earthquakes if the installation is located in a 
seismic area as defined in DIN**) 4149, Part 1 
of April 1981. 
* 
** 
LuftVG = Air Traffic Act 
DIN = German Industrial Norms 
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3.2.4.3 Actions of unauthorized persons 
3.2.5 
3.2.6 
3.2.7 
"Unauthorized persons" shall be deemed to be especially those 
persons who acquire illegal access to the area of the 
installation. 
Dangers caused by persons who act on the installation from 
outside with the intention to destroy shall only be considered 
if the parts of the installation that are of significance from 
a technical safety standpoint are particularly accessible to 
such actions. 
Description of critical conditions 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 2 of the 
Ordinance, the conditions that may lead to a hazardous incident 
(critical conditions) shall be described in the safety 
analysis. Critical conditions are events prompted when a 
danger source is becoming active. The critical conditions may 
also be described together with the danger source concerned. 
Description of measures taken to prevent hazardous incidents 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 4 of the 
Ordinance, the measures taken to prevent hazardous incidents in 
accordance with Article 3, para. 1 of the Ordinance shall be 
described in the safety analysis under the aspects outlined 
under Nos. 1 and 3 in the Annex of this Administrative 
Regulation. The requirements of Article 3 of the Ordinance 
shall not be deemed to be complete; it may therefore be 
necessary to describe further precautions taken. 
The safety analysis shall clearly indicate which danger source 
is being referred to in each case and which critical events or 
series of events are excluded by which precautions. 
In addition, the safety analysis shall include an assessment 
stating whether the precautions required pursuant to Article 3, 
para. 1 of the Ordinance in view of the type and extent of 
potential hazards have been taken. The hazards which are 
characteristic of the installation shall also be described. 
In the case of potential hazards with various effects, each of 
these effects shall be given separately (e. g. acute or chronic 
health injuries, damage to commodities). 
Data of the effects of hazardous incidents 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 5 of the 
Ordinance, the safety analysis shall contain data on the 
effects that may result from hazardous incidents. The 
description of the effects of hazardous incidents serves the 
purpose of assessing whether the operator has taken adequate 
precautions to limit the effects of hazardous incidents as much 
as possible - (Article 3, para. 3 of the Ordinance). 
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The effects of any hazardous incident that are of relevance to 
disaster control planning shall also be described. In case of 
any hazardous incidents may take different forms (release, 
formation, ignition or explosion of a substance under Annex 2 
of the Ordinance), each of these forms shall be described. 
When describing the effects of hazardous incidents, the 
precautions taken in the installation to limit the effects of 
hazardous incidents may be allowed for (3.2.8). 
To the extent the information required is not of a descriptive 
nature, numerical data may be given; they shall be made 
plausible, e. g. by means of calculations, assessments or the 
transfer of experience to the case concerned. Assumptions made 
in this context must be plausible; if assessments made on a 
modelling basis are used, the assumptions and conditions under 
which the results were obtained shall be stated. Depending on 
the substance concerned, this information shall include 
a) information on the release of a substance or of energy, 
e. g. 
- type, quantity and state of the pollutant 
- effects of the released pollutant, to the extent 
these effects are known (short-term, medium-term, 
long-term effects; acute toxicity, chronic toxicity) 
- location of the release (e. g. part of the 
installation, height above ground) 
- duration of the release 
b) dispersion data, such as 
- type and path of dispersion and, in particular, 
transport of the pollutant (plume, cloud, flow of 
liquid) 
transport of the energy (pressure or shock wave, 
thermal radiation) 
- peripheral conditions characteristic of the 
installation or of the hazardous incident in question 
(thermal lift, turbulences) 
- buildings and structures in the surroundings (type, 
height, position) 
- topographical features of the surroundings (hills, 
vegetation, waters) 
- other obstacles (type, height, position) 
- chemical and physical conversions and transformations 
(chemical reaction, condensation, sorption) 
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c) information on the impact, e. g. 
- type and chronological variations of the pollutant 
concentration (atmosphere, soil or waters, 
precipitation), in the case of airborne emissions for 
the least favourable and for mean weather conditions 
as well as for the least favourable and mean pressure 
and temperature conditions 
- dimensions of the danger zone 
- buildings in the danger zone (uses, number of 
persons) 
- utilization of non-built-up areas, 
- special uses (hospital, school, throughroad) 
d) information on possible damage, such as 
- assessment of health risks 
- damage to structures and facilities outside the 
installation 
3.2.8 Description of measures taken to limit hazardous incidents 
Pursuant to Article 7, para. 1, first sentence, No. 4 of the 
Ordinance, a statement on how the requirements to limit the 
effects of hazardous incidents as laid down in Article 3, para. 
3 of the Ordinance are being fulfilled shall be contained in 
the safety analysis, taking into account the aspects outlined 
under Nos. 2 and 3 in the Annex of this Administrative 
Regulation. 
The requirements of Article 5 of the Ordinance shall not be 
deemed to be complete; it may therefore be necessary to 
describe further precautions taken. The safety analysis shall 
clearly indicate why the described precautions are considered 
to be sufficient to meet the safety requirements of Article 3, 
para. 3 of the Ordinance. 
4, Ad Article 8 (Up-dating of the Safety Analysis) 
Pursuant to Article 8 of the Ordinance, the safety analysis shall be 
up-dated when 
- the state-of-the-art of safety technology with regard to the 
installation concerned has advanced 
- significant new findings of importance for the assessment of 
the risks involved, e. g. with regard to substance 
characteristics, reaction characteristics, susceptibility of 
materials used to corrosion, data on the effects of specific 
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substances, have emerged which are of importance for the 
assessment of the risks involved. 
5. Ad Article 9 (Availability of the Safety Analysis) 
5.1 Availability and submission of the safety analysis 
Pursuant to Article 9, first sentence of the Ordinance, the safety 
analysis shall always be kept available. This obligation shall only 
be deemed to be fulfilled by the operator if he keeps one copy of 
the safety analysis always available within the premises of the 
installation which is subject to approval. 
Pursuant to Article 12, para. 2, first sentence of the Ordinance, 
this obligation shall be complied with immediately after the entry 
into force of the Ordinance, i. e. as of 1st September 1980; the 
safety analysis shall be kept available as of 31 August 1982 at the 
latest. 
The deadline pursuant to Article 12, para. 2, second sentence of the 
Ordinance can only be extended up to 31 August 1983. 
Pursuant to Article 9, para. 1 of the Ordinance, the operator is 
also obliged to submit the safety analysis to the responsible 
authority upon request. This authority shall be entitled to request 
that a copy of the safety analysis is left to it for inspection and, 
as far as possible, for keeps. The responsible authority may also 
request the submission of documents to which reference is made in 
the safety analysis. 
5.2. Checking of the safety analysis by the responsible authority 
The responsible authority (licensing or monitoring authority) shall 
check the information contained in the safety analysis to find out 
whether it is 
- complete as defined in 3.1.1 of this Administrative Regulation 
and whether it is 
- correct as defined in 3.1.2 of this Administrative Regulation. 
This examination shall be such as to enable the responsible 
authority to arrive at a well-founded opinion with regard to the 
question whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure the 
safety and security of the installation as well as the effective 
internal control of hazardous incidents and whether the required 
measures to limit the effects of hazardous incidents have been 
taken. 
The examination whether the precautions described pursuant to 
Article 7, para. 1, sentence 1, No. 4, are complete, shall be based 
on the Annex of this Administrative Regulation. 
When checking the safety analysis, it may be appropriate to use the 
systematic methods employed in its preparation (3.1.1). 
321 
5.3 S plementing the safety analysis 
Pursuant to Article 9 of the ordinance, second part of the sentence, 
the operator shall upon request of the responsible authority 
supplement the safety analysis within a reasonable period of time if 
the information given in the safety analysis is not sufficient for 
assessing compliance with the safety obligations acc. to Article 3 
of the Ordinance. The responsible authority shall state the concrete 
reasons of their request. When setting the deadline, the operator's 
expenditure of time and energy which is needed to supplement the 
safety analysis shall be taken into account. 
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1. Requirements to be met to prevent hazardous incidents 
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Ordinance, the operator is obliged to 
take the precautions required to prevent hazardous incidents. The 
following aspects may be of relevance: 
1.1 Design and layout, stresses and strains 
1.1.1 Stresses and strains to be expected during normal operation, 
e. g. 
- static loading 
- dynamic loading (e. g. as a consequence of shock pressure 
or acceleration) 
- density of the substances or mixtures 
- internal or external pressure, high rate of pressure rise 
- very high, very low or strongly varying temperatures 
- stresses and strains resulting from specific modes of 
operation (continuous or discontinuous operation) 
- corrosion 
- external stresses and strains (e. g. wind, snow, 
earthquakes, subsidence due to mining, settlement). 
1.1.2 Stresses and strains to be expected during a disturbance of 
normal operation, e. g. because of 
- fire 
- explosion 
- formation of ignitable mixtures 
- malfunction or breakdown of parts of the installation 
- release of substances 
- operator errors 
- faulty design, layout or manufacture of parts of the 
installation 
- fitting and assembling errors 
- repair and maintenance errors 
- unexpected chemical or physical reactions 
- leakage of flanges, pumps and other moving parts 
- rupturing of pipes due to external mechanical impacts 
- rupture of welding seams 
- corrosion 
- inflow of water or brine 
- confused substances 
- dosing errors 
- inflow of air 
- breaking or standstill of an agitator 
- failure of the cooling system 
- failure of instruments, control mechanisms etc. 
- failure of interlocking elements 
- disturbed energy supply and discharge (e. g. electricity, 
gas, steam, cooling water, cooling agent, air) 
- impact of unfavourable weather conditions on open-air installations, especially frost damage 
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- delayed or accelerated reactions, especially in the case 
of catalytical reactions 
- temperature rise 
- pressure rise 
- accumulation of by-products or residues 
- acceleration or delay of reactions by means of catalysts 
or inhibitors 
1.1.3 Design and layout criteria as well as stresses and strains to 
be expected according to relevant technical rules and 
regulations, e. g. 
- DIN-Normen (German industrial norms) 
- VDE-Bestimmungen (VDE rules) 
- VDI-Richtlinien (VDI guidelines) 
- DVGW-Arbeitsblätter (DVGW work sheets) 
- technical rules for installations requiring surveillance 
(TRB/AD-Merkblätter, TRD, TRbF, TRGL, TRAB) 
- accident prevention rules 
- guidelines issued by the vocational associations 
- ABB-Vorschriften (ABB instructions) 
- VDS-Vorschriften (VDS instructions) 
- VdTUV-Richtlinien (VdTÜV instructions) 
- works' specifications 
1.1.4 Safety margins considering specific stresses and strains, e. g. 
- design safety margins 
- safety margins on wall thickness 
1.2 Precautions against fire and explosion 
1.2.1 Protection against events inside the installation 
1.2.1.1 Fire protection: 
- substitution of flammable substances by non-inflammable 
substances or by substances that are difficult to ignite 
- limitation of the quantities of flammable substances 
- proof occlusion of all flammable substances 
- safe discharge of flammable substances that are released 
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- prevention of the exposure of flammable substances at 
atmospheric oxygen, to oxidising agents or other 
substances leading to an increased fire-risk 
- precautions to prevent ignition sources from becoming 
active 
- limitation of ignitable, oxidizing or other substances 
that lead to an increased fire-risk, to the smallest 
quantities possible from an operational standpoint 
- appropriate storage of flammable substances 
- construction of traps for flammable liquids or liquefied 
gases 
- compliance with structural fire protection requirements 
- adequate spacing 
- stationing and installation of mobile and stationary fire- 
fighting units 
- preparation of escape, rescue and approach routes 
- miscellaneous 
1.2.1.2 Protection against explosion 
Precautions against explosions: 
- preventing or abating the development of a dangerous 
explosible atmosphere 
- preventing the ignition of a dangerous explosible 
atmosphere. 
Measures to limit explosions and their effects: 
- pressure-proof or shock-proof design 
- suppression of explosions 
- halting of explosive reactions 
- relief of explosion pressure 
- safety spacing 
- blow-out design, massive construction (bunkering) 
- miscellaneous 
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1.2.2 Protection against events which may affect the installation 
from the outside 
Protective measures, e. g. 
- adequate spacing 
- structural separation by means of embankments, protective 
walls, etc. 
- fire-coating, fire-protection insulation 
- sprinkler systems for cooling 
- fighting of external fires 
1.3 Warning, alarm and safety/security systems 
1.3.1 Devices to warn or alarm the personnel 
- in case of deviations from the permissible operational 
parameters which are of significance from ä technical 
safety standpoint, e. g. deviations from permissible 
pressure, temperature, concentration, quantities, filling 
level 
- in the case of the breakdown of devices and systems that 
are of significance from a technical safety standpoint, 
e. g. compressors, pumps, agitators, ventilators 
- in case of loss of services that are of significance from 
a technical safety standpoint, e. g electricity, steam, 
instrument air, cooling water, deactivating agents 
- in case a fire develops or substances are released. 
1.3.2 Devices and systems preventing that 
- deviations from the permissible operational parameters 
which are of significance from a technical safety 
standpoint will occur. They include eg. safety valves, 
shear-disks, temperature control units, filling control 
systems, interlocking systems, safety systems and agents 
used to stop ongoing reactions, emergency cooling systems 
- devices and systems of significance from a technical 
safety standpoint (see No. 1.2) will break down. They 
include substitute devices and systems as well as devices 
and systems triggering the operation of emergency systems. 
- there is a loss of services that are of significance from 
a technical safety standpoint. They include emergency 
supply units and systems. 
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1.3.3 Devices and systems which in the event of disturbances that are 
of significance from a technical safety standpoint will allow 
to switch to safe conditions, either automatically or by hand. 
They include e. g. cut-off systems and emergency cutout systems. 
1.4 Measuring and control or regulating systems 
1.4.1 Type and design of the measuring and control or regulating 
system: 
- possibility of breakdown or faulty functions of components 
of the measuring and control or regulating system that are 
of significance from a technical safety standpoint and 
their effects; 
- possibility of operator errors that are of significance 
from a technical safety standpoint and their effects. 
1.4.2 Ensuring reliability of measuring and control or regulating 
system, e. g. through 
- the use of suitable devices which proved to be reliable 
under comparable conditions (definition acc. to DIN 40 
042) 
- the use of precision devices or automatically controlled 
devices 
- redundant layout of measuring and control or regulating 
systems, i. e. installation of several measuring and 
control or regulating devices as far as they are of 
significance from a technical safety standpoint; 
- decentralized design and layout of measuring and control 
or regulating systems, i. e. independent operation of the 
above multiple system components of significance from a 
technical safety standpoint; 
- diversified layout of measuring and control or regulating 
systems, i. e. the installation of differently operating 
safety system components; 
- regular operational tests at appropriate intervals. 
1.5 Precautions against the actions of unauthorized persons 
- Enclosure of the installation or of the parts of the 
installation that are of significance from a technical safety 
standpoint (using fences, walls, etc. ) and their illumination 
during the dark hours of the day 
- location of parts of the installation that are of significance 
from a technical safety standpoint in especially safeguarded 
premises of the installation 
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- surveillance of access to parts of the 
installation that are of 
significance from a technical safety standpoint. 
2. Requirements aimed at limiting the effects of hazardous incidents 
pursuant to Article 5 of the ordinance, the operator shall take the 
necessary precautions to limit the effects of hazardous incidents. 
The following aspects may be of importance in this context. 
2.1 Structural measures 
- sufficient stability 
- protection of loadbearing parts of the buildings against the 
effects of fires, e. g. by means of fire-protection insulation, 
jacketing with concrete, fire-coating 
- use of refractory or fire-retarding building material. 
2.2 Technical and organizational precautions 
2.2.1 Technical safety devices and systems as well as technical 
precautions: 
- gas warning systems inside and outside the installation 
- traps 
- protective walls and embankments 
- sprinkler systems, water or vapour screens, compressed-air 
barriers (to produce traps on water surfaces) 
- rapid closing interlocking devices and mechanisms 
- suitable layout of the process control stations in 
accordance with VDI/VDE guide-lines* 3546, sheet 2. 
2.2.2 Organizational precautions 
- internal fire-fighting and rescue services 
- organization of first-aid services, medical assistance 
- marked escape, rescue and approach routes 
- marking of danger spots 
- availability of protective clothing, gas masks etc 
* VDI/VDE Richtlinien 
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2.3 Internal emergency and hazard control plans 
- Alarming of the persons at risk 
inside and outside the 
installations 
- alarming of the hazard control teams 
- information of the employees on the procedures applicable 
in 
the event of an emergency 
- instructions on the organization of 
internal hazard control 
teams and their work 
- internal distribution of responsibilities 
- notification of external 
institutions. 
2.4 Person or staff unit 
- Forwarding of the relevant names to the responsible authority 
- duty hours, telephone numbers. 
3. S plementary requirements 
pursuant to Article 6 of the Ordinance, the operator shall take the 
supplementary measures required. The following aspects may be of 
importance in this context: 
3.1 Monitoring and surveillance, maintenance 
- Monitoring of the operating parameters that are 
important from 
a technical safety standpoint, using measuring devices in the 
process control station or in the unit concerned; 
- surveillance of the parts of the installation that are 
important from a technical safety standpoint, e. g. by making 
rounds or providing for remote control; 
- monitoring of the services that are important from a technical 
safety standpoint (e. g electricity, steam, instrument air, 
cooling water, deactivating agents); 
- maintenance at regular intervals. 
3.2 Maintenance and repair work 
- Type of maintenance and repair work 
- generally accepted rules of technology applied. 
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3.3 Precautions to prevent operator errors 
- Ergonomic adjustment of operating and indicating or display 
elements etc. that are important from a technical safety 
standpoint 
- marking of operating, indicating or display elements etc. that 
are important from a technical safety standpoint 
- measures to prevent the risk of confusing substances which are 
present in the installation during normal operation, eg. by 
means of appropriate labelling, marking, sampling, incoming- 
material control, packing 
- interlocking in the case of switching sequences, re-setting, 
adjustments or switchings that are important from a technical 
safety standpoint 
- safeguards to prevent unintended or unintentional switching, 
adjusting or setting operations 
- suitable communication systems for the operating personnel of 
the installation. 
3.4 Precautions against hinan error 
- Process conditions and process flow during normal operation 
including start-up and shut-down operations 
- procedures applicable in the case of deviations from normal 
operation. 
Training of the personnel relating to 
- process conditions and process flow during normal operation, 
including start-up and shut-down operations 
- procedures applicable in the case of deviations from normal 
operations or in the event of a hazardous incident 
- the properties of the substances used, especially the 
properties of the substances under Annex II 
- experience gained in comparable installations 
3.5 Instruction of the employees on the procedures applicable 
in the event of a hazardous incident 
3.6 Written records 
3.6.1 Maintenance and repair work done 
3.6.2 Functional testing of the warning, alarm and safety devices 
3.6.3 Storage and availability of the written records 
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APPENDIX 9 
THE DUTCH RDGULATORY AUTHORITIES' METHOD OF CALCULATING 
THE THRESHOLD VALUES FOR CHEMICALS WHICH IF F EIDID RDQUIRE 
'I' A SAFETY REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED 
The threshold quantity of a dangerous substance is defined as the lowest 
quantity of that substance which, occurring under certain specified 
reference conditions, may give rise to a major accident. 
The reference conditions used are: 
- the substance is being processed (not passively stored or 
warehoused), 
- the installation 
is situated in the open air, 
- the substance is present 
in the liquid phase boiling under 
atmospheric pressure, 
- the process temperature equals or exceeds ambient temperature 
(25°C). 
Dangerous substances are subdivided into 4 categories: 
Flammable substances. Since flammable substances - such as 
petroleum products - provide roughly equivalent hazards, the 
threshold quantity for all flammable substances has been set at 
10,000 kg. 
- Explosive substances. There being no simple and practicable way to 
distinguish between explosives, a threshold quantity of 1000 kg has 
been set for all explosives. This figure is based on calculations 
and experiments with TNT. 
- Toxic substances. Since the effects of toxicity are specific for 
each substance, and there are very large variations between 
substances in this respect, each toxic substance must have its own 
specific threshold quantity. Chlorine has been chosen as a 
reference substance and a threshold quantity. Chlorine has been set 
for it. The threshold quantity of a toxic substance is the quantity 
which gives hazards for life and health equivalent to those caused 
by 300 kg chlorine. 
_ Extremely toxic substances. These 
include substances which even in 
the smallest quantities may cause permanent effects on health - such 
as carcinogenic and mutagenic substances. A threshold quantity of 1 
kg has been fixed for all substances of this category. 
In Table 1 the threshold quantities of the 4 categories of dangerous 
substances are summarized. 
REFS 
(1) The Safety Report Legislation and its Application in the 
Netherlands. T. VAN DE PULTE, The Journal of Hazardous Materials 7 
(1983), pp 136-138 
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TABLE 1 
Threshold quantities of dangerous substances 
Category Quantity (kg) 
Flammable substances 10,000 
Explosive substances 1,000 
Toxic substances Variable 
(chlorine 300) 
Extremely toxic substances 1 
Correction Factors 
When a dangerous substance occurs in an installation under conditions 
differing from the reference conditions, the quantity present is 
multiplied by one or more correction factors - smaller than unity when 
the conditions render the substance less dangerous than it would be under 
reference conditions, and larger than unity when the conditions present 
an extra hazard. 
If the quantity of the substance thus corrected exceeds the relevant 
threshold quantity, the installation is designated. Table 2 gives the 
correction factors to be applied. In this table X and Y are variable 
factors with values depending on the relationship between process 
temperature and atmospheric boiling point, and on the values of these 
temperatures themselves. 
From unity at the atmospheric boiling point of the substance, X increases 
by 1 for every 10°C which the process temperature exceeds that boiling 
point, up to a maximum value of 10. For processes below the atmospheric 
boiling point, X decreases by 0.1 for each 10°C by which that boiling 
point exceeds the process temperature, with a minimum of 0.1. 
For processes below ambient temperature, a factor Y is applied with a 
value rising from 1, for processes at ambient temperature, increasing by 
1 for each 50°C by which the atmospheric boiling point is below 25°C 
(ambient), with a maximum value of 4. 
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TABLE 2 
Correction factors 
Condition Factor 
The substance is in storage 0.01 
The installation is situated within a building 10 
, 
The substance is in the liquid phase 
- process temperature above atmospheric boiling point 1-10 
- process temperature below atmospheric boiling point 0.1-1 
The substance is present as a refrigerated liquid at Y* (max. 4) 
atmospheric pressure only 
The substance is present as a refrigerated liquid x+ Y-1 (max 10) 
under overpressure 
The substance is in the gas phase 10 
The substance is in the solid phase (powder only) 0.1 
*X and Y are variable factors explained in the text 
phasing factors 
Since it is impractical to simultaneously handle a large number of safety 
reports of existing installations, the Safety Report Regulation will be 
implemented in phases, starting with the installations with the highest 
hazard potential. This is done by designating in every phase only those 
installations where corrected quantities of dangerous substances occur 
which exceed the relevant threshold quantities multiplied by a phasing 
factor. Subsequent phases are then introduced by decreasing the phasing 
factor in steps. 
If a Safety Report must be drawn up for an installation, it is preferable 
for all parties concerned to do that when the installation is constructed 
rather than after some time of operation. Therefore a lower phasing 
factor is applied to new installations than to existing ones. In the 
first phase for existing installations a phasing factor of 400 is applied 
as against 25 for existing ones. 
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Results of the designation 
. 
Summarizing: a safety report must be compiled for an installation when 
the amount of dangerous substances present in the installation multiplied 
by one or more correction factors exceeds the relevant threshold quantity 
multiplied by the prevalent phasing factor, or: 
QC >TF 
where Q= quantity of substance present in the installation, C= 
correction factor(s), T= threshold quantity, F= phasing factor. 
To give an impression of the existing installations to be designated in 
the first phase of the implementation (phasing factor F= 400), some 
examples of installations where the presence of one single dangerous 
substance is decisive for the designation are given in Table 3. The 
figures are for existing installations located in the open air. For 
existing installations within a building the quantities in Table 3 must 
be divided by 10 (C = 10). For new installations subject to the Safety 
Report Regulation, in the first phase of the implementation (phasing 
factor F= 25) the quantities in Table 3 are to be divided by 16. 
TABLE 3 
Quantities Q of some dangerous substances in existing installations for 
which a Safety Report has to be compiled in the first phase 
(phasing factor 400) 
Substance Storage Processing 
Ref5igerated Ambient (25 C) 25 100 
(10 kg) (10 kg) (10 kg) 3 (103 kg) 
Acetone - 570,000 5700 800 
Acrylonitrile - 160,000 1600 265 
Atnnonia 100,000 28,500 285 200 
1,3-Butadiene 200,000 100,000 1000 400 
Chlorine 6,000 1,700 17 12 
Ethylene 100,000 40,000 400 400 
Phosgene 1,600 500 5 1.6 
Carbon disulphide - 150,000 1500 200 
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1. INIRODLETION 
This paper attempts to solve the problem of determining the 
acceptability of a risk in a way that weighs in a logical and consistent 
manner the technological, economic and social factors. 
To limit the paper to a reasonable length, the discussion 
concentrates on the assessment of risks related to the nuclear industry 
and those industries identified as potential major hazards but the 
assessment techniques described are flexible and can be applied to the 
assessment of any risk. 
In the distant past, many decisions about the acceptability of risk 
were made in a quite arbitrary manner which can be put more tactfully as 
being on the basis of professional intuition, with no indication being 
given of the significance attached to individual factors. Since that 
time a number of steps have been taken towards a more rational approach. 
Among these steps are specification of requirements such as maximum 
levels of contamination, quantitative limits on discharges to the 
environment, standards for construction, test and operational procedures 
that have to be satisfied, and presentation of detailed justification of 
the acceptability of the proposal. One type of approach to providing a 
single unified criterion that has been given considerable exposure is the 
'limit line' method which defines an acceptable risk as one for which the 
probability and magnitude of the unpalatable event is below a defined 
'limit line'. Experience with the method has been reviewed by Farmer. WlW 
The unpalatable events have often been expressed in terms of the number 
of casualties that would result. 
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While these methods have much to commend them in that they quantify 
every step in the technical development of the risk, they have proved to 
be somewhat emotive in that opposition groups have used the figures 
selectively to give an uneven impression of the risk. More recently 
attention has been focussed on the broader issues involved in the 
acceptance of risk. In 1980 the discussion on risk arranged by the Royal 
Society of London did much to draw attention to questions related to the 
public's perception of risk and to the economic cost/benefit arguments 
that are associated with risk reduction. (2) The need for a more 
objective criterion for assessing the acceptability of risk was discussed 
by Hayns and Winter in their ANS paper in 19803) Any attempt to make 
an overall evaluation of this complex range of factors has to overcome 
the problem that social and economic factors have quite different 
dimensions to purely technical factors. It is the solution of this 
problem that forms the main theme of this paper. The solution that is 
suggested is basically a non-dimensional method of ranking the various 
factors that have to be considered in evaluating the acceptability of a 
risk and, from this ranking of the significance of the individual 
factors, the overall acceptability of the risk is derived. Viewed in 
another way, this ranking technique represents a multi-factor criterion 
for judging the acceptability of a risk. 
In the body of this paper the concept of a multi-factor criterion is 
built up in four steps. The steps are: identification and assessment of 
the factors that have to be considered, a review of the criteria that 
have been proposed as a basis for determining acceptability, a 
description of a non-dimensional method of evaluating acceptability on 
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the basis of an assessment of the significance of the whole spectrum of 
related factors and, finally, a critique is presented of the proposed 
multi-factor ranking process as a criterion for determining 
acceptability. 
2. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN ASSESSA3 RISK ACCEPTABILITY 
In a comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of risk, the 
factors that have to be considered can be divided into three groups. 
These groups are the sources of risk, variations with time and the nature 
of risk. Each of these groups of factors has its own characteristics and 
the three groups can be described as the three dimensions of risk. In 
Figure 1 the main factors that make up each of the three groups are shown 
diagrammatically in a way that suggests they make up a three dimensional 
matrix. 
The sources of the risk represent the primary activities that give 
rise to the risk potential. If the assessment is comprehensive, in the 
sense that it considers the whole operation from collection and 
processing of raw materials through to the ultimate disposal of the plant 
involved, it must include every source involved. It is appreciated that 
for some assessment purposes only part of the spectrum of sources need be 
considered. For example, an assessment may only be required of the 
reactor and not of the associated fuel transport. 
The nature of the risk, shown as the vertical dimension in Figure 1, 
is intended to cover all the aspects of risk that have to be considered 
in making a comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of risk. These 
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aspects cover the whole spectrum of sub-factors, from initiating event to 
consequences in terms of harm to individuals and to the public in general 
and must also cover the economic and socio-political implications. The 
economic and socio-political sub-factors involve consideration of 
concepts such as optimizing costs and benefits, and public acceptability. 
The nature of public acceptability is notoriously fickle and variable 
with time. 
Variations with time are important as with the passage of time very 
little in life remains unchanged. The importance of the variations with 
time is recognized by their being given a separate dimension. Typical of 
these variations with time is the way risks are different at different 
stages of a project. When a project is in the commissioning and wear out 
phase, the risks will normally be higher than in the steady operational 
phase. Regulatory requirements also change with time and change the 
incidence of risk. Developments in knowledge is another time dependent 
influence on identification and assessment of the significance of risks. 
The fact that identification and assessment of risks can change 
throughout the life of a project stresses the need for the risks to be 
kept under review throughout the life of a project. 
The factors that are considered in the arguments that follow are 
mainly those that fit under the grouping of factors that define the 
nature of the risk. The other factors are more related to the definition 
of the source of the risk and timing of a risk assessment. The factors 
that define the nature of risk are of two main types: those that can be 
defined in quantitative terms and those that can be defined in 
qualitative terms. These two types of factor can be described 
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respectively as hard and soft factors and their division between hard and 
soft is summarized in Table I. Simply identifying factors as hard or 
soft is not intended to imply any ranking of the importance of the 
factors - that question is dealt with a little later. 
Assessment of hard factors generally results in a statement about 
the significance of the factor in quantitative terms, but unfortunately 
the dimensions of quantitative evaluation are different for different 
factors. 
These differences in the dimensions of quantification make it 
difficult to compare the significance of the various factors. The three 
main dimensions used in describing risk are money, the number of 
casualties and the probability of the event in a given period. A 
statement about probability may be associated with factors described in 
either money or casualty terms. Even these three dimensions are used in 
different ways. 
Money terms may be used to describe the value of life for 
compensation purposes or the cost of saving a life. From a study of 
these values by Chicken, (4) the current value for compensation purposes 
seems to be about E200,000 and for saving a life typically ranges from 
E10,000 to E100,000. 
Economic evaluations related to costs and benefits are generally 
made in direct money terms. Statements about societal and individual 
risks are normally couched in terms such as the probability of death in a 
year for individual risks or the probable number of deaths per year for 
societal risks. One problem with comparing such figures from various 
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Table I. Identification of Hard and Soft Factors 
FACTOR TYPE TYPICAL FACIU S 
Socio-Political factors such as 
SOFT public acceptability, findings 
of public inquiries and the 
FACTORS political climate for decision 
making 
Carparative, individual and 
HARD societal risk. 
Possible fault initiating 
FACTORS events and the consequences of 
such events 
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studies is that the area and extent of the population considered is often 
different in each study. 
Descriptions of events that can lead to casualties are generally 
described in terms of the probability of the event occurring per unit of 
time coupled with some statement of the nature of the event such as 
failure of a component or failure} of a system to operate. 
3. CRITERIA PROPOSED FOR DETERMINING ACCEPTABILITY 
Risks can be evaluated in many ways and the way they are evaluated 
is frequently different at the conceptual stage to the operational stage. 
At the conceptual stage there is generally some form of preliminary 
assessment to determine the likely acceptability of a project. The 
practices adopted vary between industries and also between countries. At 
one extreme you have protracted public inquiries like the Sizewell PWR 
inquiry, which are extremely expensive and put a delay of uncertain 
length into the approval procedure for a project. Delays and costs of 
the magnitude involved in the Sizewell inquiry would be beyond the 
resources of a modestly sized privately owned company operating in a 
competitive market. However, it should be recognized that the Sizewell 
inquiry is a special case and that such a long inquiry is not a feature 
of the licensing arrangements in the United Kingdom. 
An interesting alternative approach is that used by the Dutch 
Directorate General of Labour to assess the extent of the justification 
of the acceptability which they require to be presented for a new process 
installation. (5) They specify that a safety report need only be 
presented if a factor, known as the threshold quantity and which 
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identifies the main hazard parameters of the plant, exceeds a certain 
value. This threshold quantity is calculated from the quantity of 
hazardous material present in the plant and the circumstances under which 
it is kept. If a safety report is required, the depth of analysis that 
must be presented is determined by the combined value of a Fire and 
Explosion Index and a Toxicity Index. The Fire and Explosion Index is 
derived f rom the index developed in the Dow Chemical Company. Taken 
together these indices give a good comparative indication of the 
significance of the hazard. If a safety report is required, it should 
describe the possibility and consequences of emissions of dangerous 
substances and also, if the installation is one in which novel technology 
is applied, the hazard analysis should give an insight into the 
probability and consequences of an undesirable event. 
For chemical plant there is generally no strict quantitative 
criterion that has to be satisfied in terms of probability of an 
unacceptable event occurring, although quantitative assessments are 
sometimes called for as an aid to decision making and not the basis for 
decision making about acceptability. Regulatory bodies generally retain 
a flexible approach to defining what is acceptable and frequently use 
such terms as 'the best practicable means' to describe the precautions 
they expect to be taken to reduce risks. This is a very direct way of 
allowing the regulatory bodies freedom to take into account whatever 
factors they judge to have a bearing on risk acceptability but it leaves 
the proposer with a very uncertain target to satisfy. 
In the nuclear industry, quantified targets have been established by 
the regulatory authorities in some countries and in others they are under 
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discussion. Representative lower limit values currently attributed to 
these targets are shown in Figure 2 which shows a line drawn below the 
target values reported by France, Germany and Great Britain to the Task 
Force on Safety Goals/Objectives appointed by the Commission of the 
European Communities. (6) As in the chemical industry, the regulatory 
authorities keep some flexibility in the way they use these targets and 
the quantified assessments of risk that proposers have to prepare to show 
how close a design is to the target. The fact that quantified targets 
have been identified does mean that considerable effort is devoted to 
quantifying the level of risk associated with particular plants and the 
various systems they incorporate. - 
Although not an official criterion, the scale of acceptability of 
risk that Lord Ashby, former Chairman of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, postulated as a guide to decision makers, still 
represents a sound basis for judging acceptability. The four points on 
the scale are: risks of one in a million are of no concern to the average 
person, risks of one in 100,000 elicit warnings, when risks rise to one 
in 10? 000 people are willing to pay to have the risk reduced, and risks 
of one in 1,000 are unacceptable to the public and there would be strong 
pressure to have them reduced. The probability in the terms of this 
argument is taken to be the annual probability of an individual becoming 
a casualty. The Ashby criteria are discussed further in reference 7. 
If risks are to be assessed in quantified terms, it is important to 
understand the confidence that can be put on the results. The techniques 
that are used to quantify risk are well established and include fault 
tree, event treer failure mode and effect,, cause consequence analysis, 
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Fig. 2. Representative lower limit of targets used in the nuclear 
industry 
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and random number simulation. The accuracy of the estimates from using 
such techniques depends to a large extent on the accuracy of the data 
used. The data required for such estimates ranges from the reliability 
of electronic components to the failure rate of pressure vessels, and 
from the probability of loss of electricity supply to estimates of the 
possibility of human errors. Precisely relevant data may not exist and 
uncertainty factors of 4 are to be expected in estimating failure 
rates. (8) 
In addition to the evaluation of the technical aspects of risk, the 
significance of risk and expenditure to reduce it can be evaluated in 
economic terms. The economic arguments have been summarized by Professor 
Pearce in the following incisive way: (9) 
"If, as economists have repeatedly pointed out for the. last 
two centuries, our wants exceed our capacities to meet 
them, we must, when choosing one thing, give something else 
up. This, very simply, is the notion of opportunity cost 
and an inescapable fact of life. Since no society devotes 
its entire resources to the elimination of the risk of 
death (if it did, we would spend our entire gross national 
product, bar something to enable us to survive# on the 
national and private health services), it follows that 
society itself places a finite value on human life. What 
the cost benefit analyst seeks is a methodology for 
'revealing' that underlying valuation. " 
It is recognized that assessing the optimum level of expenditure on 
risk reduction has to take into account a very wide range of factors and 
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discussion of these factors is well beyond the limits imposed in the 
length of this paper. 
Beyond the technical and economic factors there are many socio- 
political requirements that are similar to criteria as they have to be 
considered in assessing the acceptability of a risk. These requirements 
are not allowed for directly in the criteria that have been disýussed so 
far, although doubtless the people that devised the criteria would argue 
that they allowed for what they perceived to be the relevant public 
opinion. To illustrate how divergent views can be, employers' 
associations generally tend to support the quantification of risk and 
some trade unions call for a zero-risk working environment. (10) 
The great diversity of factors and criteria associated with 
assessment of risk acceptability seems to cry out for rationalization to 
make the process of their assessment more manageable and understandable. 
The ideal solution would be a single comprehensive technique to assess 
and give an integrated view of the acceptability of the risk as indicated 
by the various factors. one possible technique can now be described. 
4. A NON-DIMENSIONAL METHOD OF EVALUATING RISK 
Quantitative methods are a very useful way of assessing the level of 
safety of large systems like nuclear reactors, but the margins of error 
are considerable and results from such analysis require careful 
interpretation. (11) Also, the units in which the hard technical factors 
associated with risk are evaluated will be quite different to terms used 
to describe the soft socio-political types of factors. These facts make 
a comprehensive assessment of the acceptability of risk a daunting 
348 
problem. Th overcome this problem and to give a logical and consistent 
structure to the assessment of the acceptability of risk, a non- 
dimensional nethod of ranking acceptability is proposed. 
The procedure proposed had, as the starting point for its 
development, the method Professor Wilson suggested for evaluating 
environmental policy options. (12) The essential feature of the technique 
is to score the acceptability of each factor as objectively as possible. 
This is done by allocating each factor a score on the scale of 0 to 4 
under the headings of acceptability and uncertainty. The lower the mark 
given to a factor under the heading of acceptability, the more acceptable 
it would be and, similarly, the lower the mark given to the uncertainty, 
the lower the uncertainty. If the score of an individual factor is three 
or more, it would be considered of doubtful acceptability and before a 
factor with such a ranking could be considered acceptablep extensive 
analysis would be required to demonstrate that the factor was acceptable. 
The integrated score of the individual factors gives the ranking of the 
whole project. 
In Table II a simple example is given of how the technique could be 
applied to the assessment of the acceptability of a nuclear power 
station. The factors selected are purely arbitrary and the scoring quite 
intuitive. Both the factors and the scoring categories can be varied to 
suit the assessment environment in which they are being used but it is, 
however, important that the scores are built up in a consistent way to 
enable scores to be compared. 
Each of the factors identified in Table II can be divided into 
smaller factors and the scores of these smaller factors integrated to 
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Table II. btanple of Application of Ranking Technique 
FACTOR SCORE 
NUMBER 
ACCEPTABILITY UNCERTADM WTAL 
I Socio- 2 2 4 
Political 
2 Economic 1 2 3 
3 Czeparison 
with other 2 2 4 
risks 
4 Societal 2 3 5 
Risk 
5 Individual 2 3 5 
Risk 
TOML 21 
90QtE EVALt . TIcI 10 - 25 ACCEPTABLE 
26 - 34 AOCEPTABILITY REQUIRES 
CAREFUL ASSESSNEW 
35 - 40 VERY tbLIK MBE 
ACCEPTABLE 
350 
give the score of the main factor. For example, the socio-political 
factor could be divided into factors such as public perception of 
acceptability, political acceptability and employment improvements. 
Similarly, the economic factors could be divided into cost and benefits, 
influence on electricity prices and comparison with alternatives. The 
purely technical factors can be divided into the hundred thousand or so 
sub-factors, similar to the way sub-factors were studied with 70 man- 
years of effort for the WASH 1400 report. (13) 
The technique can be extended to deal with other aspects of 
assessment such as ranking the priorities for action required to control 
risks and ranking the action to be taken to deal with an emergency. 
Ranking also has the advantage that it can be refined in an iterative way 
as better data becomes available about each factor. 
In Table III the ranking related to acceptability score and control 
action is shown. This suggests that projects with a score in the 10-17 
range would be acceptable without further action and this is the most 
acceptable category of risk. If the score is in the range 18-25, the 
risk would be in the third rank of risk and as such considered to be 
capable of being made acceptably safe by additional engineering work. 
Projects in the second category of risk, that is with a score in the 26- 
34 range, would only be considered acceptable if it could be shown that 
strict administrative controls would reduce the risk to an acceptable 
level. For projects with the highest ranking of risk, that is with a 
score in the range 35-40, it is unlikely that action would be possible to 
make them acceptable. This ranking of risks amounts to a multi-factor 
criterion for assessing the acceptability of risks. 
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Table III. Ranking Related to Acceptability and Control Action 
RISK SCORE ACCEPTABILITY CONTROL 
RANK IRAME ACTION 
1 35 - 40 Very unlikely to be Unlikely to 
acceptable be controllable 
Acceptable only if 
2 26 - 34 confidence can be Administrative 
established 
3 18 - 25 Yes Engineering 
4 10 - 17 Yes None required 
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Table IV. Catparison of Ranking Tachnigwe with other Fbrms of 
Risk Characterization 
OTHER RISK CHARACTERIZATIONS 
RISK ACCEPTABILITY 
RANK 
ILRD ASHBY SIDVIC 
Unlikely to be Unacceptable Dreaded 
1 acceptable (probability of death Unknown 
greater than 1 in 
1,000 per year) 
Acceptable with Willing to spend imney Dreaded 
2 qualifications (probability of death Known 
greater than I in 
10,000 per year) 
warnings given Not 
3 Acceptable (probability of death Dreaded 
greater than 1 in Unknown 
100,000 per year) 
Acceptable Acceptable Not 
4 (probability of death aded 
greater than 1 in Known 
1,000,000 per year) 
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Table IV presents a comparison of the risk as categorized by the 
ranking method suggested in this paper and those methods proposed by Lord 
Ashby and by Slovic. (14) A detailed examination of the extent to which 
risk ranked in probability terms agrees with risk ranked in perception 
terms is given in reference 4. From the relatively small sample of risks 
assessed in that study, the risk associated with X-rays was the only risk 
ranked the same by both methods. It is considered that ranking, as 
described in this paper, provides a constructive compromise between the 
probability and perception approaches. 
5. A CRITIQUE OF THE MULTI-FACTOR RANKIM CRITERIA 
The concept of ranking risks in a non-dimensional way to overcome 
the problem of assessing and comparing factors expressed in different 
units is commendable as it allows such assessments to be made in a 
logical and consistent way. However, there are arguments both for and 
against the technique and in order to establish an unbiased judgement of 
the usefulness of the technique, both sides of the argument must be 
evaluated. 
The points in favour of the technique are as follows: 
1) The method introduces some logical structure into the assessment of 
all the various quantitative and qualitative factors related to 
decisions about the acceptability of risk. Without such structure 
and discipline, the assessment of the acceptability of risks 
described in qualitative terms is somwhat arbitrary. 
2) A particularly attractive feature of the method is that it allows 
the significance of factors such as perception of risk and 
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probability of risk to be weighed and theii significance integrated 
into a single factor that characterizes the comprehensive 
acceptability of risk. 
3) The method provides a way of deciding which activities should be 
given priority for reducing the level of risk associated with them. 
4) The technique also identifies those activities which, without 
further expenditure, have an acceptable level of risk associated 
with them. 
5) By putting the risk in non-dimensional terms, the ranking technique 
will help the public presentation of risks by removing the emotive 
element without reducing the fairness of the description. 
6) The more quantified data there is about a risk being ranked, the 
more precise the ranking becomes. When new data becomes available, 
the ranking can be refined in an iterative way. 
The points against the technique are as follows: 
The ranking technique merely complicates the assessment of the 
acceptability of risk argument by introducing another step in the 
process. 
2) It may be considered by the public as a way of hiding unpalatable 
facts and for this reason may give rise to opposition to the 
activity. 
3) There is a chance that a risk may be wrongly ranked. 
4) It would remove an element of freedom f rom regulatory bodies by 
codifying the way they assess risk. 
5) The method is untried. 
Even though the points for and against the adoption of the ranking 
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technique are not all of equal weight, the balance does seem to be in 
favour of the technique. This suggests that there is a useful role for 
ranking procedure as a criterion for judging acceptability. The main 
advantages of the technique are that it provides a uniform and logical 
way of ranking risks which takes account of all the factors, including 
perception of risk and probability of risk, that have to be considered in 
making decisions about the acceptability of risk and the ranking can be 
refined as better data becomes available. The main argument against the 
technique is that the public may consider it a way of hiding unpalatable 
facts. If such criticism is raised, it can be countered by making 
available to the public the information on which the ranking was based. 
There is always some scepticism about new methods and this will disappear 
if the method is found to be reliable and honest in practice. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Fran this paper the following conclusions appear to be justified: 
1) For an assessment of the acceptability of a project with a high 
risk potential to be considered comprehensively, it must take into 
account a range of quantitative and qualitative factors. These 
factors must include technical, economic and socio-political 
issues. Among the socio-political factors that it is important to 
consider is the public perception of the particular risk. 
2) Currently, no criteria have been established for judging the 
acceptability of a proposal in a comprehensive way that makes 
allowance for all the related factors. 
356 
3) Although criteria have been postulated which state target values 
for the technical features of risk in probability terms, these 
criteria are generally cast in the role of guidelines rather than 
mandatory requirenents that must be satisfied. 
4) The proposal to use the non-dimensional method of ranking seems a 
reasonable way of overcoming the problem of making comprehensive 
assessment of the acceptability of risk which takes into account 
all the quantitative and qualitative factors. 
5) The ranking technique provides a consistent, logical and repeatable 
way of ranking the acceptability of risks. It also has the 
advantage that it can be ref ined. in an iterative way as better data 
becomes available. 
6) The multi-factor method of ranking risks does, by its very nature, 
represent a criterion for making a comprehensive judgement about 
the acceptability of risk. Adoption of such a criterion would give 
proposers a clearer guidance on the conditions that have to be 
satisfied to make a proposal acceptable. 
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